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Introduction 
Statement of the Problem 
To India goes the distinction of being a home for all the 
major religions of the world. It is for this reason that it is often 
described as 'Land of Religious Toleration'. Its historic past 
dating back over 4000 years gives ample testimony to this claim. 
Many of the ancient Indian sacred texts and works on polity are 
outstanding documents on religious toleration. Indeed, most of 
the ancient Indian rulers followed a unique policy of Medieval 
Period was for more enlightened that Muslim rule elsewhere. A 
noteworthy effect of their rule was the emergence of a new 
synthesis of Hindu and Muslim doctrines. With the establishment 
of British rule, India came in contact with secular ideas and 
thoughts of the west. Attempts were made to harmonise western 
doctrines and concepts with those of India. The Hberal and 
democratic movement of the west strenthened Indian secular 
trends. Religious freedom clauses of many western countries also 
considerably influenced Indian thinking. The Indian Constitution 
passed in 1950 guaranteed to every person subject to necessary 
limitations the right to profess, practise and propagate religion. It 
must, however, be stressed here that although the theme that 
underlines the constitutional provisions, takes into account the 
Introduction 
western ideas, it is essentially Indian, being the product of her 
history and tradition.^ 
The Constitution of India guarantees freedom of conscience, 
Freedom to profess, practise and propagate religion, however is 
subjected to certain limitations imposed by the constitution. The 
judiciary has made further effort to curtail by laying down 
principle that the constitution protects only the essential aspects 
of religious freedom. India, being a secular country, allows the 
existence of various religion and does not promote any particular 
religion. The question of inviability of personal laws was 
discussed by the Constituent Assembly twice, first when the 
fundamental rights in Part III relating to personal laws, was 
incorporated in the Constitution and secondly, at the time when 
Article 44 contained in Part IV of the Constitution to secure 
Uniform Civil Code was debated. The Muslim members of the 
Constituent Assembly vehemently opposed the move but the 
Constituent Assembly with equal vehemence refused to accept the 
contention that Muslim Personal Law is immutable and inseperable 
law in Islamic religion. 
Dr. Ambedkar refused to accept the immutability of the 
personal laws and held that state could change personal laws as a 
measure of social welfare and reform. To ensure the religious, 
linguistic, cultural and educational identity the Constitution of 
[ 2 ] 
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India contains special provisions for the protection of Indian 
minorities. These freedoms assure that Muslims who are the 
largest minority in India do enjoy these accordingly and there shall 
be no intervention or discriminates on in the name of prohibition, 
reformation, abrogation or change in their personal laws which is 
religious and cultural symbols of the Muslim Indians. The scope 
of religious freedom is not left unlimited as it does not immunise 
these religious laws from legislation which run counter to public 
order, morality, social welfare and social interest. 
It is stated that for social welfare reason, the state has the 
authority to enact a law under Article 25(11) and to formulate 
'Uniform Civil Code' under Article 44 throughout the territory of 
India. It is to be remembered that when Article 44 was being put 
forth for debate in the Constituent Assembly the Chairman of the 
Drafting Committee Dr. B.R. Ambedkar : 
"The Muslims unnecessarily read too much in Article 44." 
He further declared that: 
"No government can exercise the legislative power in 
such a manner as to provoke Muslim community to 
rise in rebellion, to think, it would be a mad 
government if it did so."^ 
The Supreme Court judgement of April, 1985 in Shah Bano^ 
case was widely, almost universally regarded in the country as a 
[ 3 ] 
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landmark judgement and an earth shaking event. Unfortunately the 
controversy that followed the judgement resulted in more heat 
than light, and displayed ignorance, prejudice and fanaticism 
rather than a rational arguement. The Supreme Court judgement in 
Shah Bano case and the subsequent debate over it have divided 
Hindus and Muslims of the country so sharply as no other issue 
ever did since independence. An overwhelming majority of the 
Muslims of India protested against the decision of Supreme Court 
of India and convinced the government that the judgement was 
wrong hence it should be correctd by the legislation. Apart from 
this, the Supreme Court had in 1979^ and 1980^ ruled that the 
amount paid by the way of 'Mehr', which customed required the 
husband to settle on the wife at the time of marriage, was no 
substitute for maintenance. But it is worth noting that the Supreme 
Court judgement in these two cases did not settle much 
controversy amongst the Muslims in India. The reason seems to 
be that in Bat Tahira and Fazlun Bi cases the Supreme Court had 
only passed the judgement relating to the maintenance of Muslim 
divorcee but in Shah Bano case in addition to the maintenance of 
the Muslim divorcee the Court also directed the government of 
India to look into the desirability of enacting a Uniform Civil 
Code throughout the territory of India. When in 1949 Article 44 
of the constitution was enacted directing that "The state shall 
[ 4 ] 
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endeavour to secure for citizens a Uniform Civil Code throughout 
the territory of India", we had already Uniform Codes of laws 
covering almost every aspect of legal relationship excepting only 
those matters in which we were governed by the various personal 
laws. The laws of Contract, the Transfer of Property, the sale of 
Goods, the Partnership, the Companies and Negotiable 
Instruments, Civil Procedure, Arbitration and Limitation, and a 
host of other statutory laws were Uniform Code applying to all 
throughout the country. As Ambedkar observed during the 
debates in the Constitutent Assembly* on the draft of Article 35 
(subsequently enacted as Article 44), the only province which was 
not covered by any Uniform Civil Code was marriage and 
succession and it was the intention of those who enacted Article 
44 as part of the constitution to bring about that change. Infact, 
Article 44 could have only the different personal laws in view, the 
rest of the field having mostly, if not wholly been covered by 
Uniform Civil Codes, the article, therefore, appears to be a 
demonstration of the conviction on the part of its framers that the 
existence of the different religion oriented personal laws of ours 
were not in tune with the egalitarian philosophy of our new 
National Charter and required to be replaced by a set of general 
and territorial laws contained in a Uniform Civil Code. 
Mr. Justice Gajendra Gadkar, former Chief Justice of India 
has observed^ that in any event the non-implementation of the 
[ 5 ] 
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provision contained in Article 44 amounts to a great failure of 
democracy and the sooner we take suitable actions in that behalf, 
the better and that "In the process of evolving a new Secular 
Social order a Common Civil Code is a must". 
Justice Hedge, a former judge of the Supreme Court has also 
observed^ that "Religion oriented personal laws were a concept of 
medieval times alien to modern societies which are secular as well 
as cosmopolitan" and that "so long as our laws are religion 
oriented we can hardly build up a homogenous nation. 
A unanimous five judge Bench of the Supreme Court has also 
regretted in Shah Bano Begum^ that "Article 44 of our 
constitution has remained a dead letter" and that" a begining has 
to be made if the constitution has to be any meaning". In yet a 
latter decision in Jordan Diengdeh,^^ a two Judge Bench of the 
Supreme Court has reitrated that "the time has come for the 
intervention of the legislature in there matters to provide for a 
uniform code of marriage and divorce and to provide by law for a 
way but of the unhappy situations in which the couples like the 
present have found themselves." The Court directed that a copy 
of this order may be forwarded to the Ministry of Law and Justice 
for early action as they deem fit to take. 
In a latter decision in Sarla MudgaP^ Justice Kuldeep Singh 
observed : 
[ 6 ] 
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" One words have long will it take for the government 
of the day to implement the mandate of the framers of 
the Constitution under Article 44 of the Constitution 
of India. The traditional Hindu Law-Personal Law of 
Hindu-governing inheritence, succesion and marriage 
was given a go- by as back as 1955-56 by codifying 
the same. There is no justification whatever in 
delaying in definitely the introduction of a Uniform 
personal law in the Country." 
He further clarified that: 
"Article 44 is based that there is no neccesary 
connection between religion and personal Law in a 
civilised society. Article 25 guarantees religion 
freedom where as Article 44 seeks to divest religion 
from social relation and personal law, marriage, 
succession and like matter of a secular character can 
not be brought within the guarantee enshrined under 
Articles 25,26 and 27. The personal law of the 
Hindus, such as relating to marriage, succession and 
the like have all the sacremental origin, in the same 
manner as in the case of the Muslims or the 
Christians." 
After criticising the successive governments for not 
implementing the contitutional mandate under Article 44 of the 
[ 7 ] 
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constitution of India he directed the Government of India through 
Secretary Ministry of Law and Justice to file an affidavit of a 
responsible officer in this court by August 1996 indicating therein 
the steps taken and efforts made by the Government of India 
towards securing a "Uniform Civil Code" for the citizens of 
India. 
It is however, true that five members^^ of the Constituent 
Assembly, all of whom were Muslims strongly expressed^^ 
themselves against this article and moved without success 
amendments to this Article to secure exclusion of all Personal 
Laws from its operation and one member unhesitatingly branded 
this article as "tyrannous provision""* and "tyrannous 
measure" ^ ^ A modern legal scholar has also very strongly 
doubted^^ any correlationship between Uniform Civil Code and 
national solidarity and has gone to the length of holding that "a 
logical probability appears to be that code in question will cause 
dissatisfaction and disintegration than serve as a common 
umbrella to promote homogenity and national solidarity.'^ The 
learned scholar has relied, among other on Fyzee'^ and has also 
quoted with approval a progressive Muslim lady law-person who 
has been quiet categorical in declaring that it is 
"naive to imagine that such a code would cut down 
the number of communal riots or lead to integration; 
it would serve no purpose except to divide us.''^^ 
[ 8 ] 
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Family relations in India are governed by religious personal 
Laws. Personal laws are often referred to as Civil laws but in India 
they are more correctly termed religious personal laws and 
distinguished from other civil laws. The four major religious 
communities : Hindu, Muslim, Christian and Parsi, each have their 
Personal Laws. They are governed by their respective religious 
laws in matters of marriage, divorce, succession, adoption, 
guardianship and maintenance. In the laws of all these 
communities, women have less right than men in corresponding 
situations that in itself is not surprising since religion in every part 
of the world discriminate against women. Religious personal laws 
are reputedly on religious rules and doctrines.'^" 
It is sometimes alleged that the personal laws are 
discriminatory in nature and the Muslim Personal Law is more 
discriminatory against women which will be cleared by way of 
following illsutrations. 
1. The Muslims are polygamous, but the Hindus, Christians and 
Parsis are monogamous. 
2. The Muslims are allowed extra-judicial divorce, but the 
Hindu, Christians and Parsis can effect divorce only through 
court. 
3. A wife married under the Muslim Law can be divorced by the 
husband at whim or pleasure, but a wife married under the 
[ 9 ] 
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Hindu, Christian or the Parsi law can be divorced only on 
certain grounds specified on those laws and only through 
court. 
4. Under the Muslim Law, a husband's apostasy from Islam 
results in automatic dissolution of a muslim marriage though 
a wife's apostasy does not. 
Under the Hindu law, apostasy from Hinduism by either 
of the spouses does not effect a Hindu marriage, though it 
confers on the non-apostate spouse a right to sue for 
divorce. 
Under the Parsi law also, any spouse ceasing to be a 
Parsi Zoroastrian would only entitled his or her spouse to sue 
for dissolution, but would not otherwise effect a Parsi 
marriage. 
Under the Christian law, a change of religion has no 
effect on a Christian marriage except where the apostate 
husband has married again, in which case the wife would be 
entitled to sue for divorce. 
5. Under the Muslim law, a divorced wife is not entitled to any 
maintenance, from the husband, except during the period of 
Iddat. But the other personal law allows a divorced wife post 
divorce permanent alimony. 
[ 10 1 
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6. Under the Muslim Law, a daughter inherits half the share of 
the son; but under the Hindu law a daughter shares equally 
with the son. (It may, however, be noted that under the Indian 
Succession Act governing the Parsis and also others who are 
not Hindus, Muslims, Buddhists, Sikhs or Jains, the position 
is the same as under Muslim Law). 
7. Under the Muslim law a person cannot dispose off more than 
one-third of its properties by will; but the other Personal laws 
do not impose any such limitations. 
8. Muslim law confers on a person the right to pre-empt any 
property in respect of which he is a co-sharer, or a 
participator in appendages or immunities or an adjoining 
donour. But the other personal laws do not confer any such 
right. 
Now, if all these discriminations follow from the different 
personal laws and the personal laws apply to a person only on the 
ground of his belonging to or professing a particular religion, then 
these discriminations are also operating on the ground of religion 
only and Article 15 forbidding discrimination on the ground of 
religion alone would strike down all these provisions and 
unconstitutional and ultra vires.^° 
However, the Constitution of India adopted by the state 
subsequent to independence from Britain guarantees equality 
[ 11] 
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(including sex-equality) to everyone (Article 14 & 15). The state 
is expressly prohibited from discriminating on the grounds of sex. 
The Constitution delcares void all laws which are inconsistent 
with its provisions regarding Fundamental Rights (Article 13). Yet 
religious personal laws that discriminate against women are still 
being applied almost four decades after the adoption of the 
Constitution. The Constitution and religious personal laws, while 
seemingly in conflict with each other, have coexisted for nearly 
fifty years. 
The state has not adopted a consistent policy with regard to 
the reform of religious personal laws. Hindu Personal law has 
been extensively reformed in order to give equal legal rights to 
Hindu women. The Personal laws of other (minority) communities 
have been left virtually untouched, ostensibly because the leaders 
of these communities claim that their religious laws are inviolable 
and also because there is said to be no demand for change from 
within their communities. The present situation is that the women 
of minority communities continue to have unequal legal rights and 
even though women of the majority community has yet to gain 
complete formal equality in all aspects of family law. 
The debate about religious personal laws has until now 
concentrated on their religious nature and on the capacity of the 
secular state to change them. This is partly because the state has 
[ 12] 
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neither rejected nor totally expected the claims about the 
inviolable nature of religious personal laws. That the Constitution 
is ambigous about the nature of religious personal laws is 
indicated by the fact that the arguements in favour their reform as 
well as those against any reform are both based on the provisions 
of the Constitution. The state claims the right to reform these laws 
in order to bring them into conformity with the Constitution by 
giving women equality. The opposition to reform is based on the 
Constitutional right to freedom of conscience guaranteed as a 
Fundamental Right by Articles 25-28, which is claimed to 
encompass the right to be governed by religious personal laws. 
The Constitution does not resolve the difficult questions as to 
whether the religious nature of these laws prevents a secular state 
from interfering with them or whether the personal nature of these 
laws as distinct from territorial laws makes them immune to state 
control. Such ambiguity in the Constutiton permits contradictory 
claims and permits the claims to act discrepantly with respect to 
essentially similar claims of different communities.^' 
It is intended to approach the question from a purely legal 
point of view, shorn of religious sentimentalism and political 
abracadabra. The question that is intended to be raised in this 
academic venture is the problem of the Uniform Civil Code and 
whether we should have a Uniform Civil Code relating to or 
[ 13 ] 
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replacing the different personal laws operating throughout India. 
Whether it will be beneficial for national solidarity or it will be 
injurious for that. Does Muslim personal law allows reform in it 
and if such a reform is allowed what should be the mechanism for 
such a reform? Moreover to what extent the reform can be done 
and what would be the model of the proposed Uniform Code for 
marriage and succession and matters. 
Scope of the Study 
The basic aim of this academic venture is to highlight the 
seriousness of the problem of gender discrimination based on 
religion based personal laws. It is also intended to search out the 
real intentions of the framers of the Constitution. Whether they 
wanted an immediate enactment of an All India Civil Code or 
whether it was a slow step by step approach. The objective of the 
present study is to find out the correct relationship between the 
Part III and Part IV of the Constitution of India i.e. Fundamental 
Rights and Directive Principles. The aim of the work is also to 
see the state action regarding the reform of Hindu Personal Law. 
The present is intended demonstrate study the state policy 
towards the reform of personal laws since 1947. The role of 
judiciary regarding the controversy of Uniform Civil Code and 
personal laws is also discussed keeping in view the prevailing 
situation in the country. An indepth study of the subject is need 
of the day; so that suitable measures have been suggested for 
[ 14] 
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incorporation in the Constitution of India for solving the problem 
of Uniform Civil Code. 
Objectives of Present Study 
The present study was undertaken keeping in view the 
following broad objects : 
1. To find out the historical perspectives of personal laws in 
India. 
2. To enquire into the causes of heated debate in the Constituent 
Assembly between Muslim and Non-Muslim member over the 
issue of Uniform Civil Code. 
3. To enquire into the causes of opposition from the minorities 
especially the Muslims. 
4. To analyse the emerging pattern of the Indian judiciary 
regarding Uniform Civil Code and Muslim Personal Law. 
5. To evaluate the existing legal position of personal laws in 
India. 
6. To analyse the system of reform in Muslim Personal Law. 
7. To critically evaluate the desirability of having a Uniform 
Civil Code for all the communities in India. 
8. To draw conclusions and put forward suggestions in order 
to solve this problem. 
Chapter I of this study is devoted to the statement of 
problem and its importance in India. In recent years not a month 
passes without a newspaper carrying statements of political 
[ 15] 
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leaders, social workers, women organizations and religious leaders 
regarding implementation of Uniform Civil Code or it's 
opposition. The problem has become very serious due to the 
mixing of politics in this socio-legal issue. 
The proper understanding of the subject cannot be done 
without looking ino the history of presonal laws. Three different 
legal systems having their origin in Hinduism and Islam and British 
Christian system have influenced Indian society. Basic principles 
of Hindu law were drawn from Vedas and Puranas. Epics like 
Ramayana, Mahahharata and Bhagwat Gita were moral 
fountain head. Manu is accepted as first law giver and Manu 
Smiriti is regarded as first law book. In ancient India, the king 
usually did not interfere in personal laws of people. Local 
customs and traditions were part of legal systems. During Muslim 
rule, Muslims were governed by their religion based personal laws. 
Whereas Hindus were left to produce their customs, traditions and 
religion based laws in family matters. During British rule, the 
colonial masters did not interfere in the personal laws of Hindus 
and Muslims. During the last years of their rule Britishers 
attempted to codify various personal laws. 
Chapter II provides an insight into the above mentioned 
issues. The chapter is sub-divided into three parts namely, 
personal laws in ancient India, personal laws in Muslim India 
(medieval period) and personal laws in British India. 
[ 16] 
Introduction 
Chapter III peeps into the legislative history of personal laws 
and Uniform Civil Code. Existence of numerous personal laws in 
India are known phenomenon, hence, its relevance and utility was 
bound to be discussed in the Constituent Assembly. On the basis 
of debates on personal laws in Constituent Assembly, the weak 
points of the framers of the constitution have been highlighted. 
For two years, the Constituent Assembly witnessed debates in 
favour of and against Uniform Civil Code. In fact the issue of 
Uniform Civil Code divided the House on communal lines. This 
chapter critically examines the view point of the protogonists and 
opponents of Uniform Civil Code. 
Chapter IV discusses different dimensions of Uniform Civil 
Code. The misconceptions about Uniform Civil Code have been 
highlighted. Uniform Civil Code is victim of certain 
misconceptions and it is an irony that the interpretation as well as 
implementation of Article 44 of our Constitution is not being taken 
into account in its right perspective. There are pre-judicial 
attempts on the part of Legislature and court both to examine the 
whole issue from the 'majoritarian' approach. Such attempts 
defeat the very purpose of Article 44. There is erroneous quest 
for Common Civil Code simply because Article 44 does not direct 
the Legislature to enact a Civil Code. 
It contains a principle basically for uniformity in Civil laws. 
All these issues have been dealt in this chapter. 
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Chapter V is intended to examine and evaluate various cases 
decided by High Court and the Supreme Court of India. Important 
court cases have been discussed in this chapter which attracted 
the attention of affected groups. In these cases either the 
constitutionality of personal laws has been challenged or the 
courts have expressed suo-motto opinion in favour of enactment 
of a Uniform Civil Code. Attempts have been made to make 
impartial analysis of the judgement delivered and their affects on 
the masses. For this purpose five important, well known and 
celebrated cases have been selected. These cases are : 
* State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa Mali (AIR 1952 Bom. 84); 
* Mohd Alimad Khan v. Shah Bano (AIR 1985 SC 945); 
* Ms. Morden Diengdeh v. S.S. Chopra (AIR 1985 sC 935); 
* Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India [(1995) 3 SCC 635] and 
* Ahemdabad Women Action Group v. Union of India [(1997) 
3 SCC 573]. 
Chapter VI focusses on the relationship between 
Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles of State policy. This 
chapter is intended to be an analytical note on Fundamental Rights 
and Directive Principles. It takes into account the legislative 
history well categorised into three periods on the basis of 
Supreme Court's decision on Directive Principles. In the first 
period Madras v. Champakam Dorai Raj an (1951), Han if 
[ 18] 
Introduction 
Qureshi (1959), in Re Kerala Education Bill, 1957; in the second 
period Chandra Bhavan 's case and in the third period Minerva 
Mills and post Minerva Mills cases have been thoroughly and 
critically analysed. The myth that the Directive Principles of State 
Policy can override the Fundamental Rights has been demolished. 
Discrimination against women in India is prevalent in every 
sphere of life and most women experience some form of 
disadvantage. As such wide spread existence of discrimination 
does not land itself to analysis as a simple or unified 
phenomenon, it is not possible to study all aspects of 
discrimination against women. Chaper VII is intended to discuss 
the history of Hindu law reforms in its totality. In this chapter an 
attempt has been made to traces the legislative history of the 
Hindu law reform proposals with the main aim of identifying the 
gains made in women's legal rights at the initiative of the state, as 
well as pointing out the areas in which legal equality has not yet 
been granted. A detailed analysis of the process of Hindu law 
reform reveals the reasons that were put forward to justify the 
denial of equal rights to women. Statements made by state 
functionaries about the basis of their authority to reform religious 
personal laws will give some idea of the perceptions of political 
leaders about the relationship between the state and religion. They 
also provide an insight into their conception of law as a 
technology for social transformation. 
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Chapter VIII is an attempt to trace the legislative history of 
the religious personal laws of minorities namely Muslims, 
Christian and Parsis. Under the religious personal laws of 
minorities women had fewer rights than men, except in the case of 
Parsi law. There was also a considerable amount of diversity in 
the laws governing Christians to Muslims. The chapter is sub-
divided into 5 parts. Legislative activity with regard to Islamic law, 
the enactment of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 1939, 
the Special Marriage Act, 1954, Hindu Law Reforms Act, The 
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, Reforms in Christian Personal 
Laws and Reforms of Parsi Personal Laws. In this chapter it has 
been shown that the state is trying to achieve equality of men and 
women but its attitude differs for Hindu and minorities due to 
several reasons. 
Chapter IX deals with the reform of Muslim Personal Law. 
Whether personal laws should remain status quo or change be 
initiated from reformative angles? Reformation in Muslim personal 
law is a controversial issue, diving the community for and against 
such a process. To address the issue meaningfully, several aspects 
as the permission to make any change and the manner for that 
shift including the identified areas must be considered. This 
chapter discusses the possibility of any change in Islamic law, 
mechanism for change and the areas where the reform is most 
required. 
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Chapter X is devoted to the role of the Government towards 
achieving the mandate of Article 44 of the Indian Constitution. Its 
attitude towards the Hindu Personal Law and Muslim Personal 
Law has been analysed. Role of politicians has also been 
analysed. The attitude of the press, the intellectuals - both Hindus 
and Muslims, Ulema and the role of minority organisations has 
also been incorporated in this chapter. 
On the basis the discussions and findings in the preceding 
chapters, inferences and conclusions have been drawn which find 
place in chapter XI of the present study. Several suggestions have 
been made in this chapter to solve the ticklish problem of Uniform 
Civil code and personal laws in India. 
Research Methodology 
In the processing of this work the doctrinal method of research 
was adopted. The work does not involve any field study as lot of 
relevant material is available in the printed form. For the purpose 
of this study extensive survey of textual materials, articles, 
newspapers and writeups formed the basis of preliminary study 
which was then expanded to cover a deeper survey of the literature. 
Ancient texts. Constituent Assembly Debates, Parliamentary 
Debates, Legislative Assembly Debates, relevant statutes and 
landmark decisions have been scanned and analysed in a systematic 
manner. The present work is thus based on the above referred 
material and is an original contribution to the problem studied. 
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Indian society is governed by Hindu, Muslim and British legal 
systems. The researcher has tried to analyse the evolution of these 
systems and has discussed the influence of the Britishers. More 
importantly codification of laws and enactment of some other 
laws as Kazi Act, 1881 throws light on the initiatives of colonial 
masters with regard to development of laws. It has been proved 
that as far as personal laws are concerned, Britishers left them 
untouched but decisions of the courts influenced them. 
Present Indian society is the inheriter of three different and 
distinct legal systems - Hindu, Muslim and British.^ The personal 
laws of Hindus and Muslims find their source and authority in 
their religious ancient texts. Since ancient time religion regulated 
almost every aspect of human life both public and personal. 
Rehgion was the guiding force behind all laws including personal 
matters as well as crime, evidence, procedure, contract, trade and 
commerce. The area of applicability of laws has been reduced, 
and is only confined to such aspects of life as marriage, 
dissolution of marriage, maintenance, minority, guardianship, 
adoption, succession and inheritence. These personal laws were 
considered immutable and beyond the legislative jurisdiction. 
From a historical perspective, many areas of Hindu law and 
Muslim laws have remained unaffected by centuries of political 
Historical Background of Personal Laws 
vicissitudes and socio-economic upheavals. Doubts have been 
expressed as to whether or not personal laws are protected under 
the religious freedom guaranteed by the Indian constitution.^ In 
this chapter an attempt has been made to examine the historical 
background of the application of the personal laws in India and 
their immunity from the perview of state legislations. This chapter 
deals with the constitutional, legislative and judicial attitudes of the 
problem. The chapter is sub divided to cover three distinct 
periods of Indian history namely. Ancient, Medieval and British 
India. 
A. Personal Laws in Ancient India 
The basic principles of Hindu law are found in the 'Vedas' or 
revealed texts, which are reputed to have been divinely inspired. 
Tradition has it that God Brahma, the creator, and the first 
member of Hindu Trinity himself uttered the Vedic texts. They 
were regarded as infallible and as supreme to the early Hindus as 
were decay locks to the later Christians. 
One can also discover in ancient India sacred works like the 
Puranas, the two great epics. The Ramayana and the 
Mahabharata and the Bhagvata Gita, the moral foundation upon 
which was built the Hindu law which has been in continuous 
application to this day.^ The Vedas, which are also called Shruti, 
what is heard is also revealed text. Like any other revealed texts, 
the Vedas contains many titles of positive law. They believed that 
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the Rishis or sages of immemorial antiquity heard it and 
transmitted it for next generation. There is another class of 
scripture known as the Smriti which means tradition or 'what is 
remembered'. Smritis are different from Shrutis as they are not a 
direct perception of the divine precepts but are an indirect 
perception founded on memory. These two sources are 
considered as fundamental source of Hindu Law. 
In ancient society the Hindu sages were the leaders of the 
community and they were revered both for their holiness and their 
profound learning. The rules laid down by them formed the basis 
on which the society was organised. In addition to their religious 
duties they also served as a code of ethics and morality but also 
governed social matters, and matters relating to politics and 
government. But in the early writings of these sages no distinction 
was made between civil laws and religious and social laws. It is 
only the later treatises that dealt them separately. That is why it 
seems that in early societies law and religion were inter-twined and 
were often indistinguishable from each other. Sir H.S. Maine 
stated that : 
"There is no system of recorded law from China to 
Peru, which when it first emerges into notice, is not 
seen to be entangled with religious ritual and 
observances."* Freud claims that religion, morality 
and a social sense - the chief elements of what is 
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highest in man - were original one and the same.^ In 
Yajnavalkya Smriti the subject is dealt with under 
three headings Acharya, Vyavahara and 
Prayaschita. The second one is devoted to civil law 
and the first and the last of these relate to rules of 
religious observances and expiation. 
'Manu Smriti' may also be put in the same category. Manu 
is regarded as the first law giver or exponent of the law. The code 
of Manu is divided into twelve chapters, eight of which state rules 
on various subjects of law both civil and criminal. Other chapters 
deal with religious sacraments and prescribe moral rules. In the 
third category fall other treatises like, Narad Smirti and 
Brihaspati Smriti etc. which in their entirety are devoted to the 
discussion of civil law and which are posterior to the Manu 
Smriti.^ 
Within this scheme of ancient Indian law, the king did not 
have significant authority to interfere with the personal laws of the 
people. Infact, the law did not derive its sanction from any 
temporal power; the sanction was self contained. Both the king 
and his subjects were equally subject to the rule of law formulated 
and enunciated by the sages. He executed, but seldom, if ever, 
formulated law.'' 'Law was the king, of the king.' The king could 
not set the law aside.* Indeed, the king was required to take a vow 
at his coronation that he would scrupulously respect the 
established laws and customs.^ 
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It is, however, submitted that it would be an over 
simplification to contend that the Hindus regarded the law as an 
integral part of their religion. Indeed, religion has its vital role to 
play in controlling and guiding the behavior of the people, yet 
local customs and approved usages had also acquired the force 
of law. ^ "^  
B. Personal Laws in Medieval India 
It is sometimes said that during the Muslim rule in India while 
"Muslim Scriptural" law was applied to the Muslim by the Qazis, 
there was "No similar assurance so far litigation concerning 
Hindus was concerned." It is also claimed that application of 
Hindu religious law to Hindus began in 1772 when Warren 
Hastings "made regulations for the administration of justice for the 
native population without discrimination between Hindus and 
Mahomedans."'' But this is not the correct and authentic 
historical fact and this has been proved by most of the legal 
historians of India. 
Muslim jurisprudence furnishes us with an example of 
complete union of law and religion. In 'Islam', says James Bryce, 
'Law is rehgion and religion is law' being both content in the 
divine revelation. Similarly, J. Schacht streeses that 'Islamic 
thought is the most typical manifestation of the Islamic way of 
life, the core and kernel of Islam itself'^^ 
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The word Islam is derived from the Arabic root "SLM" 
which means, among other things, peace, purity, submission and 
obedience. In the religious sense the word Islam means 
submission to the will of God and obedience to his law. The 
connection between the original and religious meanings of word is 
strong and obvious. Only through submission to the WILL OF 
GOD and by obedience to HIS LAW, one can achieve true peace 
and enjoy lasting purity.^ "* Qur'an consists of very words of God 
revealed to the Prophet Mohammad. The Qur'an is in the form of 
addresses which were revealed by God on different occasions 
starting from the time when the Prophet (SAW) made his first call 
to the people to submit to the religion of God, and continuing till 
the Prophet (SAW) completed his task in the form of a society 
fully organised, well integrated and patterned with all the basic 
institutions.'^ 
Tradition has it that the Koran, was a transcript of a tablet 
preserved in the Heaven, upon which is written all that has 
happened and all that will happen. Islamic law from the very 
beginning had a well defined line of demarcation between 
(i) Public law (Huqullah) and 
(ii) Private law {Huququl Ebad). 
Under this classification criminal law and public 
administration were placed in first category while marriage, family 
relations, successions, etc., were regarded as private law. 
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Whenever in history the Muslims found themselves in the ruling 
position in places having the mixed population, they applied the 
Islamic public law to all their subjects, but the Islamic private law 
was always applied, if at all, to all Muslims only. In matters faUing 
in the domain of private law all Non-Muslims were left free, 
always and everywhere, to follow their own religious laws and 
customs and there was no compulsion on non-Muslims. From the 
very beginning this rule was adhered to as a matter of state policy 
(Siyasa Shariyah). 
In actual practice, Muslim rulers did not exactly enforce in 
many places, the Islamic private law even for the Muslims - leave 
alone non-muslims. This explains the continued prevalance of 
numerous local customs in the Muslim dominated lands like 
Morocco and Indonesia. Probably that is the reason that in India 
the British found many Muslim communities (convert from 
Hinduism) continuing with their indigenous customs and usages 
and decided not to make any change in this respect.'^ 
In India the Muslim rulers applied only some aspects of 
Islamic public law - e.g. Criminal law which they indeed found 
not drastically different from this country's own classical law. But, 
they surely never interfered with the religious laws and customs of 
the Non-Muslims relating to marriage, family and succession, etc. 
- despite the fact that they were extremely different from Islamic 
laws. They did not prohibit even practices relating to Sati and Dev 
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Dasi customs, despite their conflict with Islamic public law. How 
could they be expected to interfere with the other harmless 
institutions of Hindu religious law and customs? Eminent Arab 
travellers to Medieval period, have affirmed the undisturbed 
prevalence of Buddhist and Hindu religious laws under the Muslim 
rule.'^ Hence, during Muslim rule all Non-Muslims were governed 
in matters of their personal laws by their own traditional and 
customary laws. 'Hindus', writes Grady, 
"...enjoyed under the Mussalman government, a 
complete indulgence with regard to the rites and 
ceremonies of their religion as well with respect to 
various privileges and immunities in matters of 
properties - and in all other temporal concerns the 
Mussalman law gave the rule of decision excepting 
where both parties were Hindus, in which case the 
point was referred to the judgement of the Pundits or 
Hindu lawyers. ^ ^ 
Similarly U.C. Sarkar states that the Islamic civil court did 
not govern the Hindus in matters of inheritance, marriage and 
other analogous matters.^'' Islamic law applied to Non-Muslims 
only where they were directly or indirectly involved with Muslims. 
Thus, disputes between Hindus and Muslims sometimes taken 
before a Muslim Kadi (or Kazi, religious judge under the 
Shariah). Another appropriate illustration is to be found in 
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criminal law where Islamic principles applied to Muslims and Non-
Muslims alike.^' In the words of Tahir Mahmood : 
"The Muslim rulers of India enforced the public law 
of Islam as the law of the land. But in the areas of 
private law they applied Islamic law only to the 
Muslims. The law of Islam as a personal law thus 
emerged in India as one of the various personal laws, 
along with those of the Hindus, Buddhist, Jains, 
Sikhs... which were fully protected by the Muslim 
rulers."2^ Hindu religious law and customs were 
indeed placed by the Muslim rulers of India at par 
with the Muslim Personal Law. 
It is an indisputable historical fact that Hindu law infact 
reached the heights of scholarly development during the Muslim 
rule in the country. "Before what is commonly called Muslim rule 
in the country, all law was derived from what is now known as 
Hindu religion and its injunctions and precepts as found in the 
Srutis and Smritis including the Holy Vedas, Dharmashastras, 
and Dharmasutras. Legal treatise like the Manusmirti, 
Yagyavalkya Smriti and Kautilya's Arthashastra, were legal codes 
of their respective times based on Vedic and Dharmic foundations. 
The law given by these ancient Indian codes is now called Hindu 
law. Development of this law did not stop after the advent of 
Islam in India. Muslim rulers of the country did not interfere with 
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it and left the process wholly free from state intervention. 
Vijyaneswhara's Mitakshara (11th century) and Jimutavahan's 
Dayabhaga (12th century) both were produced after the advent 
of Islam and were accepted and acted upon as veritable codes of 
Hindu law - (the latter in eastern India and the former in the rest 
of the country) - during the reign of the succeeding Muslim rulers. 
Devanna's Smriti Chandrika, the Dravida code of Hindu law , 
was also produced in South India towards the end of 12th century 
A.D. In North India Vachaspati Mishra's Vivada Chintamani and 
Mitramishra's Viramitrodaya appeared in the 15th and 17th 
centuries respectively the latter during the Mughal rule. At the 
peak of Mughal authority in the country Western India witnessed 
emergence of Nikhanata's Vyavharmayukha (17th century). All 
these work were legal codes of their ages based on Hindu religious 
sources however taking into account the exigencies of the time. 
These work eventually gave birth to the four sub schools of 
Mitakshara - (Madras, Mithila, Banaras, Bombay) schools. This 
massive development of Hindu law during the so called 'Muslim 
rule' in India confirm the historical fact of an absolute non-
interference by the state at that time in the juristic evolution of 
indegenous law."^^ To confirm this attitude of exemption of 
personal law from the perview of state is reflected in the writings 
of Prof. M.P. Jain a well known legal historian of our time when 
he says about Mughal judicial systems in following words : 
"Not much litigations came before the Kazis because 
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of the existence of village panchayats, and also 
because civil causes among the Hindus were decided 
by their own elders or Brahmins. The practice of the 
Mughal government seems to have been to leave the 
Hindus free to decide their cases as best as they 
could.24 
Thus it is crystal clear that the Muslim ruler never interfered 
in the personal laws of Non-Muslims. 
C. Personal Laws in British India 
The criminal law was the only law during the Muslim rule, 
which was largely common to Hindus and Muslims with the 
exception of the application of oaths and ordeals. The Muslim 
rule came to an end with the disintegration of Mughal Empire. 
Towards its end the Empire has already weakened to such an 
extent that the Governors of different provinces had virtually 
usurped the whole power and became independent functionaries. 
It is at this juncture that the Britishers came to India as innocent 
traders, as they were, ultimately turned out to be the mercenaries 
and became the forerunners of British rule in India.^^ 
The emergence of the British empire in India stands out as 
unique event in the history of the world. Unlike many other 
empires, the huge edifice of this empire was created by merely a 
company which was organized in England for fiirthering the British 
commercial interests in overseas countries. 
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During the British Raj in India as a matter of colonial policy, 
it was politically expedient for the British not to interfere with 
existing personal law in so far as they related to family and 
inheritence rights alone. Because the main object of the East India 
Company, namely trade, commerce and exploitation on the natural 
resources of the country, their primary motive was with law 
relating to trade and commerce. 
When the British established their hegemony over India 
(1757), they more or less continued the Muslim pattern of judicial 
administration. But in the course of time, as they consolidated 
their position, they completely changed the criminal law and 
introduced their own system to deal with various matters of civil 
law.2^ Legislative immunity was granted to certain specified areas 
of Hindu and Muslim laws which, they considered, were deeply 
interwoven with rehgion. During this period the Britishers in India 
followed the policy of non-interference with the religious 
susceptibilities of their subjects. They thought that anything could 
not be wiser than to assure by legislative Act, the Hindus and 
Muslims of India that the private laws, which they reversely hold 
sacred and a violation of which they would have thought the most 
grievous oppression, would not be superseded by a new system 
of which they must have considered as imposed on them a spirit 
of vigour and intolerance.^^ Their attitudes towards Hindu and 
Muslim laws also appear to reflect the original Christian doctrine 
of two distinct spheres of life, the temporal and the spiritual; the 
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first being under the control of the state and the second under the 
control of the Church. 
The earliest trace of the acceptance of this policy is found in 
the Charter of George II, granted in 1753. The Charter of 1753 
was principally of the Europeans, and the Hindus and Muslims 
having their own special customs were left free to dispose off 
their cases themselves lest difficulty may arise by their custom 
being broken. The Charter Act of 1753 expressly exempted the 
Indians from the jurisdictions of Mayor's court and directed that 
such suits and disputes should be determined by the Indians 
themselves, unless both parties submitted themselves to the 
jurisdiction of the court. Warren Hastings throughout his tenure of 
his office adhered very tenaciously for the policy of applying the 
personal laws to the Hindus and Muslims. Hastings Rule reserving 
'the laws of Koran' to the Muslims and the laws of \Shastra' to 
the Hindus was rephrased in the Cornwalis Code of 1793. Thus 
the rule 'to each religious community to its own personal law' 
was, thus, firmly established in the country when the British came 
here in the 17th century. Most certainly it was not a gift from 
Warren Hastings, who arrived here over 150 years later as 
Governor of the Calcutta Presidency under the Rule of the 
Overseas usurpers from the Britain. When in his Judicial Plan of 
1772, Warrent Hastings provided for the application of 'law of the 
Koran' with respect to the Mohammadans and those of the 
'Shastra' with regard to the Gentoos (Sec. 23). He was simply 
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guaranteeing continuation in force of the legal position regarding 
Hindu, Muslim laws well established in the country since the 
begining of the Muslim rule. By no dint of imagination he can be 
said to have introduced any new rule. What he did was to 
guarantee that the legacy of the Mushm rule under which Hindu 
law was to apply the Hindus and Muslim law to the Muslims 
would not be changed. And this guarantee, notably, the British 
governor gave only to serve the political interest of his masters -
not by way of gift to the natives.^* 
The British policy towards Hindu and Muslim laws during the 
period of their dominion over India may be discussed under the 
following heads, viz. : 
(i) Legislation indicating their neutrality towards Hindu law and 
Muslim law; 
(ii) Legislation aimed at maintaining law, and order, good 
government, and introducing social reform and applying them 
to all communities alike; 
(iii) Legislation on matters falling within the purview of Hindu law 
and Muslim law, and 
(iv) Interference with Hindu law and Muslim law through judicial 
interpretation.^^ 
As discussed above the British rule from its inception 
followed a policy of non-interference in the religious matters of 
137] 
Historical Bacltground of Personal Laws 
the Hindus and Muslims. The Charter Act of 1753 exempted the 
Indians from the jurisdiction of the Mayor's courts and directed 
that all disputes should be determined by the Indian themselves, 
unless both parties submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the 
court. In 1772 Warren Hastings exempted the Muslims and Hindus 
and it was directed that the matters relating to Muslims and 
Hindus will be determined according to Koran and Shastra. The 
rule, requiring the application of Hindu laws to Hindus and the 
Muslim laws to Muslims was later extended to His Majesty's 
Court of Judicature, i.e. The Supreme Court of Judicature at 
Calcutta, Madras and Bombay, when these were established in 
1773.^" To the list laid down by Warren Hastings, succession was 
added in 1781 by the Act of Settlement. In 1793 Lord Carnwallis 
rephrased the Warren Hasting's rule of 1774. In this way Hasting's 
policy of preserving Hindu and Muslim law was generally 
supported by the British. Similar provision was also enacted by 
an Act of 1797 and by the Government of India Act, 1915. The 
1797 provision was passed for the guidance of courts in Madras 
and Bombay and 1915 provisions for the guidance of the High 
Courts at Calcutta, Madras and Bombay. 
Although the British did not directly interfere in the personal 
laws of Hindus and Mushms, their judicial mechanism, however, 
considerably influence the growth of these laws. The plan of 1772 
place the administration of justice in the hands of English judges. 
Although this change was inoffensive, but it tended to mould 
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traditional concepts. The English judges used to consult Pandits 
and Maulvis in matters relating to personal laws of Hindus and 
Muslims, but nonetheless he was a foreigner with a foreign 
background. He could only make his judgement conform to what 
he thought was the law; his principal task was to search out a legal 
solution. Needless to say, the role of judges in the pre-British 
system was primarily to put an end to dispute brought before 
them, but when the administration of justice fell into the hands of 
British, the doctrine of precedent or stare decisis was introduced. 
Thus, the law which hitherto had potentially existed in 
scriptural work and treatises now came to be fixed in the case law 
of these new courts. Before the advent of the British judicial 
system, the Hindu law was developed by commentaries and 
digests written by Hindu jurist. It is they who interpreted the 
scriptural law. But with the growth of case law this source began 
to dry up.^ * 
In Muslim law certain misleading decisions were given by the 
English judges. The classic example of this is the judgement of 
the Privy Council in Abul Fatah Vs Rassomoydhar Chaudhry^^ 
which was contrary to the principles of Islamic law relating to 
family waqfs. Thus decision led to enactment of the Mussalman 
Waqfs Validing Act in 1913 with a view to restoring the status 
quo. 
Another way to introduce English notions in Hindu and 
Muslim, personal laws by using the so called fonnula of "justice, 
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equity and good conscience". This maxim has enjoyed a 
continued existence and has been repeatedly laid down in a 
number of laws passed by the British. Infact, in the course of time 
justice, equity and good conscience came to mean English law as 
far as applicable to the Indian situation. 
D. CodiHcation of Laws in British India 
During the British rule in India, except towards its close, no 
attempt was made to codify the personal laws." As had been 
noted above, the British felt hesitant to interfere with the customs 
and religious-cum-legal principles applicable to the Hindus and 
Muslims. The first Law Commission had, however expressed a 
desire to prepare their code for the personal laws but, thereafter, 
it became an accepted tenet of British policy not to interfere with 
these systems, to leave them severely alone and to modify them 
only to the extent there was demand for the same backed by a 
strong public opinion. '^* The Second Law Commission gave vent 
to this policy and the same was repeated by the fourth Law 
Commission.^^ 
In persuance of section 353 of the Charter Act of 1833,^ '^  the 
first Law Commission was appointed in 1834 and Lord Macaulay 
was appointed as its Chairman. The first task set before the 
commission, under the instructions from the Government of India, 
was to prepare a draft penal code for India. The commission 
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prepared the required draft and submitted it to the Government on 
October 14, 1837, before Macaulay's departure from India. 
Meanwhile the Britishers had penetrated into Muffassils and 
the absence of lex loci posed many problems there. There was no 
lex loci or territorial law for persons other than Hindus and 
Muslims in the Muffassils. While within the presidency towns, a 
lex loci prevailed in the absence of personal or other special law. 
In different reports submitted by the commission from 1866 to 
1869, many legislative enactments were made, such as the native 
Converts Marriage Dissolution Act, 1866, Indian Divorce Act, 
1869. Other legislations that came into existance in the era of third 
Law Commission were the Hindu Wills Act, 1870; Special 
Marriage Act, 1872; The Indian Evidence Act 1872; The Christian 
Marriage Act 1872, which has now been amended by the Child 
Marriage Restraint (Amendment) Act, of 1978. A study of the 
legislative activities of the period of 1862 to 1872 points out that 
on the one hand the Third Law Commission was busy in making 
its contribution to the codification of the Indian law, on the other 
hand. Sir H.S Maine^^ and Sir James F. Stephen, both respectively 
as the law members of the Government played a vital role in the 
shaping of the codification of the laws in various spheres. Some 
of the more legislations this time were the Married Women's 
Property Act 1874; The Indian Majority Act 1875, The Bengal 
Mahammedan Marriages and Divorces Registration Act 1876. The 
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First legislative measure relating to any subtantive provision of 
Muslim Personal Law was enacted in British India was Avadh 
Laws Act of 1876.^ * This was an Act of regional covering ten 
districts of Uttar Pradesh which constituted the erstwhile Oudh 
state." 
On the suggestion of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, the government 
thought it expediant to make a law empowering itself to appoint 
Kazis in any area if demanded by a sizeable number of local 
Muslims.'*" Hence the Kazis Act 1881 was enacted. Other 
important legislation which need to be mentioned in this context 
are the Transfer of Property Act 1882; The Guardians and Wards 
Act 1890; The Bengal Protection of Mohammadan's Pilgrim Act 
1896. 
Although, the new statutes applied alike to all people 
irrespective of their religious affiliations, the effect of some of the 
provisions was to limit the Hindu and Muslim laws in their own 
spheres of application and to introduce in English common law.'" 
The Caste Removal Disabilities Act ... abrogated the Hindu 
and Muslim laws of property in regard to apostates. Many laws 
were passed introducing reforms in the old Hindu law. In most 
cases, the innovating Acts had the support of Hindu community, 
but conservative and orthodox Hindus weaved these innovations 
as encroaching upon their religious practices. The Hindu Widow 
Remarriage Act 1856, permitted a Hindu widow to remarry. 
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Legislation enabling a widow's remarrige was contrary to Shastric 
prohibition. Although in ancient India widow remarriages were 
permitted in special cases and were commonly resorted to 
amongst certain classes in certain areas, they came to be opposed 
by the majority of Hindus on religious grounds."^ The Hindu Wills 
Act of 1870 for the first time conferred a power of testamantory 
disposition on Hindus; which were previously unknown to Hindu 
law.'*^  The Indian Majority Act 1875 fixed 18 as the age of 
majority the Act applied to Hindus in all matters except marriage, 
divorce and adoption. Many other Acts such as the Hindu 
Inheritance (Removal of Disabilities) Act 1928; The Hindu Law of 
Inheritance (Amendment) Act 1929; Child Marriage Act of 1929; 
Hindu Women's Right to Property 1937 etc. were enacted. 
In the field of Muslim law very little legislative activity is 
found. Most statutes were enacted to restore the orthodox Muslim 
doctrines. The four central statutes were passed during the British 
India. The Mussalman PFo^ /" Validating Act, 1913; The Muslim 
Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act of 1937; The Insurance 
Act of 1938 and The Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act 1939. 
The Mussalman W^^ /" Validating Act of 1913 was passed to 
undo the effect of the judgement given by Privy Council in Abul 
Fata Case.'*'' The Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 
1937 was passed to fulfill the desire of Muslim community to 
replace customary laws which was causing hardship to Muslim 
women, till that time, governed by Hindu Customary law. The 
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Insurance Act of 1938 was passed in order to solve certain 
difficulties regarding the assignment of insurance policies in 
regard to Muslims. The Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 1939 
gave Muslim women certain rights to get their marriages dissolved 
by the court. 
In the light of the above discussion, it is submitted that there 
were several factors which were responsible for the shift of British 
policy of neutrality towards Hindu and Muslim law, i.e. their 
desire to remove anarchronistic practices from religion, improve 
the lot of women, achieve uniformity and certainty in the law, 
overwhelming support by religious leaders for their legislative 
innovations and later participation of Indian in law making 
process. 
Further it is clear that the origin of personal laws lies with 
different religions. In ancient India there was not much distinction 
between personal law and pubhc law. Religion played a very 
important role in regulating the affairs of the people. During 
Muslim rule in India which lasted about 700 years the state did 
not interfere in the personal laws of the other communities i.e. 
Hindu, Christians. The Muslim personal law enjoyed complete 
immunity during this period. During the 150 years of British 
domination the position was almost similar to that of Medieval 
period and the personal laws of Muslims and Hindus were to a 
large extent immune from state legislation. Whatever changes were 
introduced in Hindu law they were introduced to rectify some 
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apparent injustice to certain sections of Hindu society. Whether 
they be untouchables, widows or minor children. Similarly, the 
Acts which were passed exclusively for Muslims were enacted 
mostly on the demands of the Muslim community either to rectify 
misinterpreted judgement or to restore the correct Islamic position 
in place of customary law applicable in many Muslim communities 
who had converted from Hinduism. More or less the Britishers 
were hesitant to introduce their ideas in the personal laws of 
Hindus and Muslims. They thought that interference with the 
existing system of law might be resented by the Indians as an 
interference in their religion based laws. The Britishers were very 
careful not to injure the religious susceptibilities of the Indians. 
However, when they consolidated their position in India they 
gradually introduced their system nevertheless left the personal 
laws of Hindus and Muslims to perpetuate. 
Summary 
Three different legal systems having their origin in Hindu's 
and Muslim's religion and British system have influenced today's 
Indian society. Basic principles of Hindu law were drawn from 
vedas and Puranas. Epics like Ramayana, Mahahharata and 
Bhagwat Gita were moral fountainhead. Manu is accepted as first 
law giver and Manu Smiriti as first law book. In ancient India the 
king usually did not interfere in personal laws of people. Local 
customs and traditions were part of legal system. 
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During Muslim rule, Muslims were governed by their own 
laws whereas Hindus were left to practice their customs, 
traditions and laws. Although Muslims were usually bound by 
Qur'an and Islamic law, in practice Muslim rulers did not strictly 
enforce Islamic law. 
During the British rule, the colonial masters did not interfere 
into the personal laws of citizen i.e. Hindus and Muslims. In the 
beginning, their basic aim was to trade from India and exploit its 
natural resources. They continued judicial system enforced by 
Muslim rulers. After consolidating their rule, they gradually 
changed criminal law and injected their own system in civil laws. 
An attempt was made codify the personal laws by Britishers 
during their last years. Although, First Law Commission was 
appointed in 1834 but some legislative enactments could be made 
around 1860s such as Marriage Dissolution Act, 1866 and Indian 
Divorce Act 1869. For Muslims, on the suggestion of Sir Syed 
Ahmad Khan, Britishers enacted Kazis Act 1881 for appointing 
Kazis. Several others laws were also enforced. 
The whole history of personal laws proves that they were 
influenced by change of time to some extents and Britishers 
introduced their system gradually but left personal laws 
untouched. 
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Uniform Civil Code and the 
Constitution of India 
Personal laws attracted the attention of the Constituent 
Assembly and heated debates in favour of Uniform Civil Code 
and against it took place. The Uniform Civil Code was debated 
under Article 35. Muslim members strongly opposed it whereas 
most of the Hindu members supported it. B.R. Ambedkar opined 
in favour of interference in personal laws. This researcher has 
taken into account whole controversy in the light of the 
Constitution of India and drawn conclusions impartially. 
A. Constituent Assembly Debates and Uniform Civil Code 
Soon after independence the question of the position of 
personal laws got entangled into the whirlpool of national politics. 
On the floor of the Constituent Assembly, for about two years, 
the issue suffered convulsions caused by the utterances of 
progressive legislators, dissenting voices of their so called 
conservative brethren, apprehensions echoed by the spokesmen of 
the minorities, and bricks and buckets thrown from outside by 
laymen and law-men.' 
The Constituent Assembly Debates in the constitution making 
process revealed that the constitution makers debated the 
Uniform Civil Code and The Constitution of India 
concept, relevance and utility of the Uniform Civil Code. The 
Muslim members of the Constituent Assembly opposed the move 
with all possible intensity at their command. In this background, 
the arguments for and a quest for the objective evaluation of the 
Uniform Civil Code, will not be out of place in India which is 
known for its religious, cultural and lingual diversities. The 
Constituent Assembly had its first meeting in December 1946. 
However just after the freedom of India from the grip of British 
imperialist, the place and shape of personal laws in the future legal 
order in the country got much entangled into the whirlpool of 
national politics. Framers of the constitution envisage to estabhsh 
a Sovereign, Democratic, Republic - ideas based on the ideas of 
justice, liberty, equality and fraternity. Later on, in 1976, words 
'secularism' and 'socialism' were added to the Preamble. 
Fundamental rights especially regarding the right of freedom to 
religion was designed in our Constitution before its 
commencement in 1950. Since then, in the Constituent Assembly 
as well as on every platform, a great deal of discussion on 
personal laws has taken place repeatedly. Even prior to the 
commencement of the Constitution much was debated in the 
Constituent Assembly for and against the personal laws.^ 
i) The attitude of the antagonists 
The Constituent Assembly debated the Uniform Civil Code 
under Article 35. Mohammad Ismail from Madras moved the 
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following proviso for addition to Article 33 which provided that 
'any group, section or community of people shall not be obliged 
to give up its own personal law in case it has such a law'. He 
advocated that the right to adhere to ones own personal laws was 
one of the fundamental rights. He asserted that personal laws were 
a part of the way of life of the people. In his evaluation, personal 
laws were the part and parcel of religion and culture. Any 
interference with the personal laws, in his view would tantamount 
to interference with the very way of life of those who had been 
observing such laws from generation to generation. He elucidated 
that India was emerging as a secular state and it must not do 
anything which hinder the religious and cultural ethoes of the 
people. To strenghten his argument, he cited precedents of 
Yugoslavia, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes which 
were obliged under treaty obligations to guarantee to Muslims 
being in minority in the matter of family laws and personal status : 
"The Serbs, Croats and Slovene States agree to grant 
to Mussalmans in the matter of family law and 
personal status, provisions suitable for regulating 
these matters in accordance with Mussalman usage."^ 
To enrich his arguments, he named similar protective clauses 
of other European constitutions which dealt with the minorities. 
However, he pointed out that such clauses were narrow in scope 
as they dealt with any group, section or community of the people 
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and not confined to minorities only. His proposed amendments 
read : 
"That any group, section or community of the people 
shall not be obliged to give up its personal law in 
case it has such a law." 
His proposed amendments sought to secure the rights of people 
in respect of their existing personal laws. He contended that in 
favour of the Uniform Civil Code was counter productive and the 
discontentment and faithfulness would be the natural result. By 
following their own persnal laws, people of different caste and 
communities would not be in conflict with each other."* The 
argument of Mohd. Ismail was objected by H.C. Majumdar, 
another member of the Constituent Assembly, who contended that 
the proposed amendment was in direct negation of Article 35. His 
objection was sustained by the Vice-President and Mohd. Ismail 
could not succeed. Another member of the Constituent Assembly 
Nazir Alimad moved a proviso to article 35 which read : 
"Provided that the personal law of any community 
which has been guaranteed by the statutes shall not be 
changed except with the previous approval of the 
community ascertained in such a manner as Union 
legislature may determine by law." 
He further remarked that the Uniform Civil Code would create 
inconvenience not only to Muslims but to all religious 
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communities who had religion oriented laws. He further pointed 
out that the very concept of Uniform Civil Code clashed with the 
religious and cultural freedom guaranted to every citizen. He was 
also apprehensive that under Article 35 the state may violate the 
religious freedom of the citizens. 
Surveying the legal developments in the Indian subcontinent, 
he pinpointed certain provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, 
1908 which had already interfered with the Muslim Personal Law. 
However, the British administration, as he pointed out, during its 
175 years rule, did not interfere with the institution of marriage, 
dower, divorce, maintenance, guardianship, paternity and 
acknowlegement, administration of estate, wills, gifts, waqf and 
inheritence. Whatever laws were enacted in the area of Muslim 
Personal Law during the British administration of justice were 
mostly on the initiative of Muslim community.^ He put a note of 
caution in these words : 
"What the British in 175 years failed to do or was 
afraid to do. What the Muslims in the course of 500 
years refrained from doing, we should not give power 
to the state to do at all once... I submit Sir, that we 
should proceed not in haste but with caution, with 
experience, with statesmanship and with sympathy." 
Another member, Mahboob Ali Beg sahib Bahadur moved 
the following proviso to Article 35 : 
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Providecrtn^^notning in this article shall affect the 
personal law of the citizen."^ 
Mahboob Ali Beg emphasized that the civil code spoken of 
in Article 35 did not include family law and inheritence but since 
some people have doubts about it should be made clear by a 
proviso to assure that the civil code would cover transfer of 
property, contract, etc., but not matters regulated by personal 
laws. He also claimed that secularism did not negative diversity in 
Personal laws.^ M.A. Ayyanger, member of the Constituent 
Assembly intervened and remarked on it as a matter of contract. 
Ayyanger tried to put his argument forcefully and asserted that the 
matrimonial contract was enjoined by the Holy Our'an and the 
Traditions of the Prophet (SAW). He stated that the Indian 
concept of secularism tolerated the existence of all religions with 
equal honour and dignity. He emphasised that in secular state like 
India, different communities must have the freedom to practice 
their own religion and culture, and they should be allowed to 
observe their own personal law. B. Pocker Sahib another Muslim 
member of the constituent Assembly while supporting the motion 
proposed the following provisio to Article 35. 
"Provided that any group, section or community of 
people shall not be obliged to give up its own 
personal law in case it has such a law." 
He laid emphasis on the following points : 
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(a) One of the 'secrets of the success' of the British rulers and 
the basis of their judicial administration was retention of 
personal laws; 
(b) If the civil code was intended to supersede the provisions of 
the various civil code laws guaranting application of personal 
laws to cases of family law and inheritence, etc.. Article 35 
should be termed as 'tyrroneous provision'; and 
(c) No community favoured uniformity of civil laws. 
Organisations - both of Hindus and Muslims, questioned the 
competence of the Constituent Assembly to interfere with 
religious laws. Article 35 was thus, antagonistic to religious 
freedom.^ Hussain Imam, too expressed similar views and pointed 
out: 
"India is too big a country with a large population so 
diversified that it is almost impossible to stamp them 
with one kind of anything. In the north, we have got 
extreme heat. In Assam we have got more rain than 
anywhere in else in the world...." 
In Rajputana desert we have no rain. In a country 
so diverse. Is it possible to have uniformity of civil 
laws? ... We have ourselves provided for -
Concurrent jurisdiction to the provinces as well as 
to the centre in matters of succession, marriage, 
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divorce and other things. How is it possible to have 
uniformit when there are 11 or 12 legislative bodies ... 
to legislate on subject according to requirements of 
their own people?'^ 
He further argued and appealed : 
"The apprehension felt by the members of minority 
community is very real. Secular state does not mean 
that it is anti-religious but non-religious and as such 
there is a word of difference between irreligious and 
non religious. I, therefore, suggest that it would be a 
good policy for the member of the Drafting 
Committee to come forward to such safeguards in 
this proviso as will meet the apprehension genuienly 
felt and which people are feeling and I have every 
hope that ingenuity of Dr. Ambedkar will be able to 
find a solution to this."^° 
The above account of the opinions expressed by Muslim 
members shows two different opinions. While Naziruddin Ahmad 
and Hussain Imam visualized the possibility of having uniform 
family law sometime in future the other speakers ruled out the 
possibility of having a Uniform Civil Code for all time to come. 
Thus, members of the minority strongly argued for exclusion of 
personal laws from the ambit of the Uniform Civil Code. 
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Nevertheless, despite their convincing arguments and deep 
resentment, they could not succeed. They only got some 
assurance from Dr. B.R. Ambedkar. 
(ii) The attitude of protagonists 
Many members of the Hindu community expressed their 
opinions contrary to the views of Muslim members. K.M. Munshi 
expressed the following views. 
(A) Even in the absence of Article 35 it would be lawful for 
Parliament to enact a uniform civil code, since the article 
guaranteeing religious freedom gave to the state power to 
regulate secular activities associated with religion. 
(B) In some Muslims countries, for example, Turkey and Egypt 
personal laws of religious minorities were not protected; 
(C) Certain communities amongst Muslims, for example, Khojas 
and Memons did not want to follow the Shariat, but they 
were made to so under the Shariat Act, 1937; 
(D) European countries had uniform laws applied even to 
minorities; 
(E) Religion should be divorced from personal law; The Hindu 
Code Bill did not conform in its provisions to the precepts 
of Manu and Yajnavalkya; 
(F) Personal laws discriminated between person and person on 
the basis of sex which was not permitted by the Constitution; 
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(G) People should outgrow the notion given by the British that 
personal law was part of religion." 
Conclusively, he beseeched to divorce religion from personal 
laws. 
"We want to divorce rehgion from personal laws from 
what may be called social relations or from the rights 
of the parties as regards inheritence or succession. 
What have these things got to do with religion, we 
really fail to understand." 
He advised Muslim brethren in these words. 
"I want my Muslim friends to realise this that the 
sooner we forget this isolationist outlook on life, it 
will be better for the country. Religion must be 
restricted to spheres which legitimately appertain to 
rehgion, and the rest of life must be regulated, unified 
and modified in such a manner that we may evolve, as 
early as possible into a strong and consolidated 
nation." 
A.K. Iyer, a member of the Constituent Assembly, supported 
K.M. Munshi and urged the assembly to pass the article dealing 
with the Uniform Civil Code. He explained the scope of Uniform 
Civil Code : 
'A Civil Code ... runs into every department of civil 
relations to the law of contract, to the law of 
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property, to the law of succession, to the law of 
marriage and similar matter.'^^ 
The Assembly passed the article accordingly, brushing aside 
the proposal of the Muslim members for the exclusion of personal 
laws from the ambit of Uniform Civil Code. In the words of Prof. 
Tahir Mahmood : 
"I want to point out that Mohd. Ismail, Hussain 
Imam, Mahboob Ali Beg and Naziruddin Alimad had 
the same status in the Constituent Assembly as Hans 
Mehta, H.C. Majumdar, K.M. Munsi and A.K. Iyer 
whose opinion prevailed is a different matter."'^ 
Dr. B.R. Ambedkar although did not accept the amendments 
and defended the right of the state to interfere in the personal laws 
of different communities. He defended laws of different 
communities. He defended the arguments of Hindu members of 
the Constituent Assembly. But the same time he also gave some 
assurances to the Muslim members and he explained that the 
proposal was creating only a 'power' not an 'obligation', and 
closed the debate with these memorable words : 
'Sovereignty is always limited, no matter even if you 
assert that it is unlimited, because sovereignity in the 
exercise of power must reconcile itself to the 
sentiments of different communities. No government 
can exercise its power in such a manner as to provoke 
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the Muslim communit to rise in rebellion. I think it 
would be a mad government if it did so. But that is a 
matter which relates to exercise of power and not the 
power itself'* 
Besides, the above observation Dr. Ambedkar persuaded the 
Muslim members "Not to read too much into Article 44". He 
affirmed even if the Uniform Civil Code was implemented it would 
be applicable to those who would consent to be governed by it.'-^  
B. Personal Laws and the Constitution of India 
The Constitution of India empowers the Legislature to 
legislate with respect to family relations governed by the personal 
laws by a Common Civil Code. With the enactment of the Hindu 
Code to replace significants segments of the customary Law of 
the Hindu Law, the demand for a Common Civil Code on the one 
hand and for the reform of the Muslim Personal Law on the other, 
has gained momentum. Enactment of a Common Code is 
recommended for a wide variety of reasons, which include 
averting communal riot and acceleration of the process of 
National Integration. While replacement of Muslim Law by a 
Common Civil Code has provoked intense opposition from a 
section of Muslims. Not all the advocates of the reforms are for 
replacement of Muslim family law, nor all their opponents, in India 
are scholars of Muslim Law. They do not conduct the debate on 
sound and sober lines. Consequently, the real issues are lost in a 
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whirlpool of non issues. We have already seen in the preceeding 
section how the debate took in relation to Uniform Civil Code. 
How after heated discussion the Article 35 of the draft 
constitution (Now Article 44) was incorporated in the Indian 
Constitution. Dr. Ambedkar the Chairman of the drafting 
Committee while supporting the inclusion of the provisio of 
Uniform Civil Code assured the members that they should not 
read too much into Article 44". he also assured the Muslim 
members that even if the Uniform Civil Code was implemented it 
would be applicable only to those who would consent to be 
governed by it. 
The Constitution of India guarantees the religious and cultural 
freedom to every citizen of India Article 25 (1) states : 
"All persons are equally entitled to freedom of 
conscience and the right freely to profess, practice 
and propagate religion." 
Article 26 states : 
"every religious denomination or any section thereof 
shall have the right : (a) To establish and maintain 
institutions for religious and charitable purposes; (b) 
To manage its own affairs in matters of religion"; 
Article 29 (1) states : 
"Any sections of the citizens ... having a distinct 
lagnuage, script or culture of it sown shall have the 
right to conserve the same". 
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Religion is the matter of faith and conscience. The culture 
and civilization incorporate the religious ethoes. Muslim Personal 
Law being the very core of Islamic religious faith amalgamates in 
itself'belief, 'practice'. Propagation'. The ambit of religious and 
cultural freedom enshrined in Part III of the Constitution as the 
fundamental rights covers the Muslims Personal Law. 
Under Article 372, the Constitution of India ensures the 
application of "all the law in force in the territory of India 
immediately before" its commencement. The Muslim Personal 
Law {Shariat) Application Act, 1937 is 'the law in force before 
the comencement of the Constitution of India.'^ 
(1) Notwithstanding the repeal by this Constitution of the 
enactments referred to in article 395 but subject to the other 
provisions of the Constitution, all the law in force in the 
territory of India immediately before the commencement of 
this Constitution shall continue inforce therein until altered or 
repealed or amended by a competent Legislature or other 
competent authority. 
(2) For the purpose of bringing the provisions of any law in 
force in the territory of India into accord with the provisions 
of this Constitution, The President may by such order make 
such adaptation and modifications of such law, whether by 
way of repeal or amendment, as may be necessary or 
expedient, and provide that the law shall, as from such date 
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as may be specified in the order, have effect subject to the 
adaptations and modifications so made, and any such 
adaptation or modification shall not be questioned in any 
court of Law. 
(3) Nothing in clause (2) shall be deemed : 
(a) to empower the President to make any adaptation or 
modification of any law after the expiration of three 
years from the commencement of this Constitution; or 
(b) to prevent any competent legislature or other competent 
authority from repealing or amending any law adapted or 
modified by the President under the said clause. 
Explanation I. 
The expression "law in force" in this Article shall include a 
law passed or made by a legislature or other competent authority 
in the territory of India before the commencement of this 
Constitution and not previously repealed, notwithstanding. That it 
or parts of it may not be then in operation either at all or in 
particular areas. 
The very letter and spirit of Article 372 of the Constitution 
reveal that the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 
1937 which ensures and governs the application of Muslim 
Personal law is the 'law in force' as it is enacted by the competent 
legislture. Since its application, the Act has have been 'altered or 
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repealed or amended by the competent legislture or other 
competent authority' till date, so that it is the 'law in force' or 
'living law' according to Article 372 of the Constitution.'* 
The phrase "all the law inforce" in this article includes 
statutory, customary and, it seems, also personal laws.''^ The 
language of Article 372(1) is analogous to section 292 of the 
Government of India Act, 1935, which also recognised the 
continued application of "all law inforce" then. The Federal 
Court in United Provinces v. Atiqa,^^ had held that the phrase 
included also non-statutory laws including personal laws. Even 
after the commencement of the Constitution the High Courts of 
Rajasthan,^^ Hyderabad,^^ Calcutta,^^ Madhya Pradesh^"^ and 
Bomhay^^ have confirmed the applicability of Article 372 to 
personal laws. This article, in any case, is the only provision of 
the Constitution under which personal laws can be claimed to 
have been recognized. If we do not apply it to personal laws, 
those laws are left without any Constitutional recognition.^'' 
As regard the Constitutional postulate of continuity and 
change in the matter of pre-1950 laws, at the time of the 
commencement of the Constitution a variety of Personal laws 
both codified and uncodified was applied to various religions and 
ethnic communities. By virtue of Article 372 of the Constitution 
all these laws, of every variety, got a statutory lease. It was not, 
however, a perpetual lease. The period of lease for all such laws 
extended till "further action", if any, by a "competent 
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authority". As specified in Article 372(1), this "further action' 
could be taken in the form of alteration, repeal, amendment, or 
adaptation. The principal "competent authority" that could take 
any such 'action' would, of course, be Parliament or a state 
Legislature. An executive authority, however, could also exercise 
the power of delegated legislation." 
The question of the power of adaptation and modification of 
the existing laws, conferred by Article 373 (2) on the President of 
the Republic, could be exercised by him also in respect of an 
uncodified law or custom has not been free from difficulty. 
However, since that power was not exercised by the President 
within the stipulated period of three years from the 
commencement of the Constitution, this question is now more or 
less redundant.^* 
It should be remembered that all the three lists in schedule 
VII of the Constitution of India also include subjects relating to 
personal laws. They are as follows : 
(i) Marriage and divorce; infants and minors; adoption; wills, 
integracy and succession; joint family and partition; all 
matters in respect of which parties in judicial proceedings 
were immediately before the commencement of this 
Constitution subject to their personal law.^ '^  
(ii) Transfer of property other than agricultural land; registration 
of deeds and documents.^" 
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(iii) Charities and charitable institutions, charitable and religious 
endowments and religious institutions.^^ 
List II (specifying the subjects on which state legisltures can 
make law) includes burial and burial grounds," rights in or over 
land" (covering succession to agricultural lands) and 
administration of justice and organization of courts at the district 
level.^" 
In List I (mentioning subjects for parliamentary legislation) 
the only entry relevant to Muslim law is "Pilgrimage to places 
outside India.^^ Under this provision Parliament can make laws 
regulating Haj and Ziyarat. 
Thus, nearly the entire gamut of subjects which traditionally 
falls within the ambit of personal law, has been placed at the 
disposal of either the state Legislature or the Parliament.^'^ 
Summary 
In post-independent India the status of personal laws got 
politicised. For two years, the Constituent Assembly witnessed 
heated debates in favour of and agaisnt Uniform Civil Code. In 
fact the Uniform Civil Code divided the house on communal lines. 
Muslim members opposed it while Hindu members strongly 
supported the move. 
The debates were carried on under Article 35 Mohammad 
Ismail of Madras moved an amendment exempting any group or 
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community from being covered by such legislation. He cited 
precedents of Serbs, Croat etc. where Muslims were assured to 
have their own personal laws. Some members like H.C. Majumdar 
contested the amendments on the ground that it negates Article 
35. Objections were sustained and Mohd. Ismail's amendments 
were over-ruled. Some other members also moved for 
amendments but they failed despite strong pleas aand arguments. 
Some of the Hindu members opined just opposite to Muslim 
members. K.M. Munshi, A.K. Iyer and even Dr. B.R. Ambedkar 
were most vocal in this regard. Dr. Ambedkar coldly suggested to 
Muslim members, "not to read too much into Article 44" and 
declared that Uniform Civil Code will be applicable only with their 
consent. 
No doubt Constitution of India empowers Parliament to enact 
Uniform Civil Code. After enactment of Hindu Code the demand 
for reforms in Muslim Personal Laws and Uniform Civil Code 
gained momentum. Constitutionally all laws including personal 
laws can be changed or amended. In reality personal laws are 
placed within the purview of Parliament and legislature. 
So far as the question of recognition of personal laws is 
concerned, the Constitution does acknowledge the existence and 
continuation of such laws under Entry 5 List III of Seventh 
Schedule, together with Article 372. 
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Uniform Civil Code : Misconceptions and Reality 
Uniform Civil Code is often debated for political purposes. 
Whereas the reality is that masses find such debates difficult to 
understand. One point stands out clearly on which everyone can 
agree; the problem is serious one and it needs careful examination. 
There are direct claims and indirect comments without 
understanding whole issue. To dispel the ignorance manifested 
wittingly or unwittingly, researcher is taking up the issue from a 
point of view of an academician and hopes to pinpoint myths and 
realities revolving around Uniform Civil Code. 
Article 44 of the Indian Constitution states that :-
"The state shall endeavour to secure for citizens a 
Uniform Civil Code throughout the territory of 
India." 
One of the most common misconceptions about the Uniform 
Civil Code is that the Hindus have surrendered their personal laws 
for the sake of uniformity throughout the country. Another 
important misconception is that the four Hindu enactments made 
in 1955-56 have rectified all the evils of Hindu's laws associated 
with, inter alia, the gender justice. The third popular fallacy about 
the Uniform Civil Code is that Muslims are the only stumbling 
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block in the implementation of the directive contained in Article 
44 of the Indian Constitution. The fourth popular misconception 
is that the Muslim law is against the gender justice. Hence Muslim 
women are the most inferior women in India with respect to their 
legal rights as opposed to others. The fifth popular misconception 
is that the Uniform Civil Code, if implemented, would 
strenghtened the national unity. The sixth fallacy is that the 
personal laws are a gift by the Britishers and extended by the 
Constitution of India to the minorities especially MusHms in India. 
The seventh misconception about the Uniform Civil Code and 
personal laws is that, in all the states, all the religious communities 
have surrendered their laws for the sake of uniformity and national 
unity. 
But the reality is otherwise. It is not so that only the Muslims 
are opposed to the change in their religion based personal laws. If 
we go through the history of the Hindu Code Bill, we would find 
that there was a very stiff resistence by the Hindu religious 
scholars, constitutional academicians, political leaders and the 
upper caste Hindus. Even the first Hindu Code Bill was allowed 
to lapse. It was due to the inhuman and degrading state of Hindu 
women in their ancient laws that the then government headed by 
Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru, brushing aside all opposition, got the Bill 
passed in Parliament despite a threatened veto by President of 
India Dr. Rajendra Prasad. Due to the threat posed by Dr. 
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Rajendra Prasad and the stiff opposition by the upper caste Hindu 
especially Brahmin certain anti women and anti secular laws, were 
incorporated in four Hindu Acts.* 
It will be desirable to discuss some of the important fallacies 
in detail. 
A. Dimensions of personal laws. 
B. Erroneous approach for Uniformity 
C. Misconception about Muslim Personal Laws 
D. What does Article 44 demand? 
A. Dimensions of Personal Laws 
(i) Diversities based on region and territory 
It is a great myth that different sections of Indian citizens are 
governed by different personal laws due to the fact that they 
follow different religion which have laws of their own. In fact 
neither all followers of any religion are governed by uniform law 
throughout India, nor is any personal laws uniformly applicable to 
all followers of a rehgion from which it is derived. The law differs 
from region to region and territory to territory and often 
differently applies in different circumstances. 
The scope for countrywide uniformity as envisaged in Article 
44 is restricted by the Constitution itself as enactment of personal 
laws, including its family laws has been placed in list III 
(concurrent Isit) of the Constitution.^ Accordingly, parliament and 
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State legislature both can make, and have made, laws in these 
areas.^ Parliamentary legislation on family law matters is moreover 
often supplemented with additional provision by the state 
legislatures/ 
The other dimension of diversity in Family Laws may be 
noted as below : 
I. Jammu and Kashmir state has, under the special provisions 
of the Constitutions applicable to that state, its own set of 
family laws - both statutory and non statutory. 
Their application is regulated by the Sri Pratap Consolidation 
ofLaws Acts of 1977 (B). 
II. When Pondichery was annexed to India in 1954, Local 
inhabitants (Hindu, Muslims, Christian and others) were given 
a choice to be governed by the old French Civil Code 
(Applicable in region under the French Colonial Rule^). 
III. In 1962 when Goa, Daman and Diu became part of India, the 
Portuguese Civil Code 1867 and its supplementary laws -
including the archaic Hindu usages decrees of 1880 were 
written in force in the entire region. The position remains 
unchanged after the creation of the state of Goa.^ 
IV. In Nagaland and Mizoram the local customary law was 
protected by a special provision incorporated in the 
Constitution in 1962,* through an amendment. The purpose 
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of this amendment was to protect the identity of the local 
tribes. In these and many other regions the Hindus, Muslims 
and Christians are governed by personal laws which are 
significantly different from those which govern their co-
religionists citizens in the other parts of India. 
(ii) Diversities based on specified group of persons 
There are various categories of persons whom personal law 
enactments regard as the exception to the general Indian citizen 
by which they are exempt from the purview of the executive 
action through statutory law. This phenomenon is found almost all 
over the country where certain categories of persons, in matters 
of their personal law, are exempt from the purview of statutory 
law. This leads the complicated diversities in the field of personal 
laws. 
Under the Indian Succession Act, 1925, the government of 
every state is authorised to issue a gazette notification in order to 
exempt from the application of that Act, any particular race or 
tribe, in the state on the ground of 'impossibility' or 
'inexpediency' of the applying the same.'" This authorisaiton has 
in the past, been exercised in the favour of the Christians of 
Coorg, certain Christian Races in Assam'^ and the several 
Christian Tribe in Bihar and Orissa.'^ 
After independence the age old tradition of protecting tribal 
and secterian laws was allowed to continue by the Indian 
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Constitution the two privileged classes under the Constitution 
were created viz., the "Scheduled Caste" and "Scheduled 
Tribe". Out of these two privileged classes special exemptions 
have been given to the Scheduled Tribes, though no such special 
exemption has been given to any of the scheduled caste under any 
of the personal law statute. Thus, all the four Hindu-law 
enactments of 1955-56 are wholly inapplicable to each of the 
Scheduled tribes.''* Inapplicability of some of these Acts to 
certain tribes in Assam, Bihar and Orissa has been judicially 
confirmed.'^ 
As such these Acts cover almost the entire gamut of family 
law and succession, the tribal customs in these areas stand fully 
protected. And due to the concentration of particular tribes in 
particular regions of India, this statutory perpetuation of their 
customs, that are at great variance with the general law and 
pratice, adds a new chapter to territorial diversities in the personal 
laws of India.'^ 
(iii) Diversities based on customs usages 
Going through the four Hindu-Law enactment of 1955-56 one 
finds an interesting and relevant aspect of diversity which is based 
on the customary law of Hindus, Buddhists, Jains and Sikhs. 
Specific provisions relating to the customs of Hindus, Buddhists, 
Jains and Sikhs, running counter to general statutory provisions, 
enjoy full legal protection under the provisions of the concerned 
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enactments iReffiSfl^es. Among the customs and customary 
institutions that remained so protected are : 
(i) those violating statutory rules relating to \sapinda' 
relationship and prohibited degrees in marriage;'^ 
(ii) Customary marriage - rites replacing 'SaptapadC\^^ 
(iii) Customary divorce;'^ 
(iv) Custom of adopting major and married children.^° 
The customs under each of the abovementioned heads maybe 
in vogue among the Hindus in any "local area, tribe, community, 
group or family".^' No court has perhaps ever frowned on this 
wide-based protection of diversified custom despite the fact that 
the term "law" in Article 13 of the Constitution is specifically 
extended to custom and usage having the "force of law". 
Not only the Hindu law retains custom as an exception of the 
general rule but the customs in derogation of the general law are 
protected under other laws as well. For example, the law relating 
to civil marriage did not contain any statutory provision relating 
to the 'prohibited degrees' was not subjected to the face of 
contrary customs. But after 9 years the law was amended to 
protect customs and usages contrary to the rules of 'prohibited 
degrees' in marriage.^^ Under the amended law customs find a 
greater role to prevail and be recognized, as in this case it would 
be sufficient if it governs with in"atleast one of the parties" to 
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marriage^^ (unlike under the Hindu Marriage Act which would 
conceive supremacy of the custom in this regard only if it governs 
both parties to marriage.^'* 
The Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937 
also contains provisions relating to custom and usage applied to 
wills and legacies and adoption. These provisions are contrary to 
the Islamic law yet this discriminatory provision was incorporated 
into the Act due to purely political reasons. Interestingly such a 
provision has been repealed in Pakistan by the Pakistan Muslim 
Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962. The net result of 
the exception to the general law is that in predominantly Muslim 
Union territory of Lakshadweep and in Malabar region of Kerala, 
there remains a dyarch in respect of law applicable to the 
Muslims. 
The diversity in the realm in personal laws in our country is 
very wide. This diversity is based not on religious but other 
grounds. Having their roots in the distant past the interterritorial 
and custom based diversity in the sphere of personal law could 
not be hurried in the debries of freedom movement. 
B. Uniformity : An Erroneous Approach 
Article 44 appears in Part IV of the Constitution which 
provide "Directive Principles of State Policy". The most 
important Article which governs this part is Article 37 which 
contains the following three points : 
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(1) The principles contained in part IV shall not be enforceable 
by any court. 
(2) This principle will be nevertheless, fundamental in the 
governance of the country; and 
(3) It shall be the duty of the state to apply to these principles in 
making laws. 
Article 44 clearly, does not ask the legislature to enact a civil 
code; It contains a principle which the state should apply in 
making civil laws. The principle of Article 44, basically, is 
'uniformity in civil laws'. The state is expected to apply these 
principles - whenever wherever and as far as, possible - making 
laws relating to civil transactions. 
In the constitutional expression "Uniform Civil Code" the 
prefix, "Uniform" - not found in any of existing codes (IPC, 
CPC, CrPC), and the absence of a capital ' C in the words 
"Civil" and "code" very were establish that this expression 
does not pointout to a single comprehensive law; it only prescribe 
a principle of policy : that in reforming old and enacting New Civil 
Laws the principle of Uniformity should be observed as far as 
possible". 
What appears strange is that the interpretation or 
implementation of Article 44 on line that application of the same 
law for all the members of a particular community throughout the 
length and breadth of India is not talked about at all. Nobody 
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demand that all Hindus should be governed by one and the same 
law in all circumstances in all the parts of country. Nobody is 
interested in the abolition of the Hindu customary law which is still 
in the force. Until today the target of law men and laymen who 
have taken interest in Article 44 has been the personal law of the 
religious-cum-cultural monirities, especially the Muslim Personal 
law which the protogonists of uniformity want to be abolished by 
one stroke of legislation.^^ 
Ordinarily, the principle of Uniformity to be applied in 
making civil laws, is fundamental in the governance of the 
country; but if - for any valid and cogent reason - the state can 
not apply the principle of uniformity by while making civil laws, 
no court in the country can in any way have the principle 
enforced. The constitution leaves it, entirely and exclusively to the 
wisdom of the state when, how, in what way, and to what extent it 
can and should apply the principle of uniformity in making civil 
laws.^^ 
Attempts have been made both by the legislature and court to 
apply Hindu law to non-Hindus in the place of their own laws; and 
this is often done under the pretext of effecting uniformity in 
family law. For example - the blanket restriction on marrying a 
cousin (drawn from the Hindu Laws) under Special Marriage Act 
of 1954.28 
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Another instance of this legislative trend was found in a local 
law enacted in 1950 by the West Bengal government, protecting 
continued enforcement of the classical (Dayahhaga) Hindu law 
to the Muslims in the former state of Cooch-Bihar now merged in 
West Bengal.^^ This was done to counter effect a law enacted by 
Parliament during the same year, under which the Muslim Personal 
Law (Sharlat) Application Act of 1937 would have become 
applicable in Cooch-Bihar - in 1950 itself.^ *^ . For 30 years 
extension of the Shariat Act, 1937 to that territory was kept 
stalled and the move had the blessing of the Calcutta High Court. 
It is submitted that it is highly improper to impose the law or 
usage of a particular community over another under the pretext of 
seeking 'Uniformity' in civil laws. By no dint of imagination can 
the constitutional doctrine of the uniformity in civil law means 
imposition or forced domination of one particular legal culture or 
a total suppression of another. 
C. The Great Fallacy about Muslim Personal Law 
It is a popular belief that the Muslims alone have a personal 
law and that this personal law is the stumble of block in 
implementing the directive of Article 44 of Indian Constitution. 
Muslims are blamed that due to their personal law the directive of 
Article 44 is not being reahsed as the do not want to forgo their 
personal law in favour of a Uniform Civil Code. This is a 
fallicious notion : There are a varieties of personal laws which are 
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applicable to different communities both Muslims and non-
Muslims in India. They are as follows :-
I. Hindu Personal Laws largely codified but partly the codified 
(Also applicable mutatis mutandis, to Budhists, Jains and 
Sikhs); 
II. Customary Law of Hindus, Budhists, Jains and Sikhs 
wherever protected by legislation or case law; 
III. Tribal law of Hindus and others; 
IV. Christian Personal Law - reformed and codified. 
V. Parsi Personal Law - reformed and codified; 
VI. Jewish Personal Law - wholly unreformed and uncodified 
and; 
VII. Muslim Personal Law partly reformed but uncodified.^^ 
Another issue which has been forcefully advocated by justice 
Kuldeep Singh in Sarla Mudgal Case^^ was " Have the Hindus, 
Budhists, Jains and Sikhs (constituting more than the 80% of the 
citizen in India) been brought under "one unified code". 
The answer to this question is in negtative. The fact is that 
the Hindus, Buddhists, Jains and Sikhs are still not governed by a 
uniform law. 
(I) The four Hindu law enactments of 1955-56 do not cover the 
entire gamut of Hindus Personal Law. Certain important 
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aspects of Hindu Law are still qualified i.e., the law relating 
to co-parcenary, joint family and partition of property. In 
these matters the classical Hindu law is still applied. Hindu 
law, broadly speaking, has two schools (1) Mitakshara, (2) 
Dayahhaga. Even today thousands of cases relating to 
propertis are being decided by the court in accordance with 
principle of the above mentioned schools. 
(II) The four Hindu law enactment of 1955-56 have uniform 
application through out the territory of the India. But, in Goa, 
Daman Diu, there still is in force old Hindus usages decrees 
of 19th century. In Pondichery most of Hindus have opted to 
be governed by the French Civil Code. Similarly Jammu and 
Kashmir has its own Hindu law enactment, State of Uttar 
Pradesh and Tamil Nadu have amendments to Hindu Code. 
Andhra Pradesh and Kerala have enacted special Hindu Law 
statutes supplementing the central laws. 
III. In south Indian states - Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala 
and Tamil Nadu, the Hindu matriarchal families are governed 
not by the Hindu code, but by a variety of customary laws. 
IV. Local custom and usage prevailing in North-eastern states -
Nagaland, Mizoram, Meghalaya, Arunachal Pradesh and 
Sikkim are fully protected under Article 371A of the Indian 
Constitution or by virtue of legislative provision and judicial 
decisions. 
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V. Various tribes are free to follow their own customs which 
differ from tribe to tribe and place to place under Section 2-
3 of the four Hindu enactments. The entire tribal population 
following the Hindu, Buddhist, Jain and Sikh religion is fully 
exempt from the four Hindu law enactments. 
VI. The Hindu Law Enactment allows all the Hindus, Buddhists, 
Jains and Sikhs to follow their respective customs and 
usages in the following matters :-
(i). Prohibited degrees in marriage and sapinda relations^^ 
(Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, sec. 5); 
(ii). Marraige-rites and ceremonies^^ (sec. 7); 
(iii). Right to obtain divorce without proper Judicial 
proceedings" (sec. 291); 
(iv). Adoption of adult and married persons (Hindu 
Adoption and Maintenance Act,"** 1956, sec. 10); 
(v). Mitakshara Coparcenary Property (Hindu Succession 
Act,39 1956, sec. 6); 
(vi). Joint family properties governed by 
Marumakkattayam^ nambudh and Ahyasandantana 
customs'"' (sec. 7); 
(vii). Properties held by Sthanamandans'^^; and 
(viii). Specified impartible estates'*^ (sec. 5(ii)) '^*. 
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All the four Hindu law enactment of 1955-56 clarify that 
"custom and usages" for this purpose include those prevalent, 
"In any local area tribe community, group or family."'-' The 
scope for customary practices is, thus, extremely wide. 
These may and often do, differ - among the Hindus, 
Buddhists, Jains, Sikhs from area to area, tribe to tribe, 
community to community, group to group and family to family. 
Whither uniformity? The Four Hindu Enactment of 1955-56, 
surely do not bring "more than 80% of citizens" following the 
Hindus, Budhists, Jains or Sikhs religious under the banner of one 
uniform law. 
It does'nt mean that no uniformity has been effected by these 
Acts. Many provisions of the Four Acts do uniformity apply to 
those who are governed by them but quite a few do not; and a 
very large number among those "more than 80% citizens" are not 
governed by those statutes at all. It is a fact that there remains 
considerable diversity in respect of conflicting traditional joint 
family rules, prevalence of local, law, exemptions to schedule 
tribes and statutory protection to all types of customs and usages. 
So far as, the Muslim Personal Law is concerned, it could 
not have and did not, remain outside the ambit of the states' 
legislative power. Central legislature have occasionally exercised 
its power to make statutory provision regarding the scope of 
Muslim personal law"* administration of waqf,'*^ women to judicial 
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divorce'*'', and post divorce rights;'** registration of marital 
transactions and dowers.^" 
The protagonists of uniform civil code project the issue in 
such a manner that the minorities, especially the Muslims, feel that 
it is they who will have to sacrifice their personal law for the sake 
of Uniform Civil Code. This apprehension is due to the manner of 
compaign in which it is alleged that the only defect lies in the 
personal laws of Muslims. We have seen and we will see later that 
the other religious groups including the Hindus also have 
discriminating laws and laws which are unequal. So the campaign 
for a uniform civil code should be carried on in such a way that 
the minorities should not become apprehesive. Supposing that if 
the Muslims, Christians and the Parsis were to give up their 
personal laws abruptly, what could be the susbtitute for them? 
Obviously, the Special Marriage Act, 1954, the Guardians and 
Wards Act, 1886. How could, then, these minorities be expected 
to adopt the said laws when the majority community has not done 
...? If the idea is to impose on Muslims, Christians and Parsis, the 
Hindu Law Enactments of 1955-56 in the name of Uniform Civil 
Code, for obvious and legally tenable reasons they can not be 
expected to digested.^' This is the main reason why the Muslims, 
Christians and Parsis link their rspective personal law with their 
religious identity. They are apprehensive that if a Uniform Civil 
Code is ever enacted that would mean the total abrogation of their 
religion based personl laws and the imposition of the terol laws. 
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They do not want to give up their personal laws for the sake of 
implementing the mandate of Article 44. 
The state can not discard the personal laws of the minorities, 
which has by its own direct action gifted to the majority 
community a separate religon based personal law. Doing so will 
be wholly unconstitutional of course, the state can codify and 
reform the personal laws of minorities as it has done in the case 
of majorty but neither the personal laws of minorities can be 
altogether repealed while that of majority community remains 
intact - protected and fortified by statute nor can the personal 
laws of the majority despite its codified and reformed shape be a 
substituted for a uniform civil code so as to be imposed on the 
minorities'^. 
So for as the question, what is the stumbling block to a 
uniform civil code is concerned the answer lies with the diverse 
variety of personal laws - Both codified and uncodified, 
reformed and unrefomed - applicable not only to minorities but 
to the majority communities also. Each of such personal laws is 
a stumbling law who what the constitution call " a uniform civil 
code through out the territory of India." The state is not at all 
interested in carrying out the directive principle of Article 44. 
Custodian of state authorities are continuously practising the 
policy of appeasement of the majority community through an 
effective step by step, protection of its religion, communal 
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customary, tribal and personal laws, and a blow for thwarting 
a uniform civil code is squarely put on the Muslims only. It is 
nothing short of fraud. 
D. What Does Article 44 Demand? 
It is necessary to know the meaning message, import and 
scope of each and every word of Article 44 to know the exact 
nature of this article. If we carefully and honestly analyse the 
provision of Article 44 then we would be able to draw a just and 
reasonable conclusion. The cautiousty selected wordings of 
Article 44 is very important. Article 44 in our constitution does 
not direct any law-making body to enact a uniform civil code 
straight away. It only says that the state shall endeavour to secure 
a uniform civil code for the citizen throughout the territory. If we 
pay deep attention to the wordings of the said article following 
questions arise. 
(i) Is endeavouring to secure something the same as directly 
enacting a law? 
(ii) What is the meaning and scope of a 'civil code'? What does 
the expression 'uniform' stand for? 
(iii) 'Do uniform' and 'common' convey the same meaning and 
are they interchangeable words? 
(iv) Is the Uniform Civil Code to be compulsorily applicable to 
all citizens of India? 
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Now we will discuss the meaning of the words endeavour to 
secure uniformity in civil law and extend of their applicability. 
Article 44, clearly, does not ask the legislature to enact a civil 
code, it contains a principle which state should apply in making 
civil laws. The demands of Article 44 - whatever they are - and 
the modalities for the implimentation both are to be determined in 
tune with the provisions of part III of Constitution guaranteeing 
Fundamental Rights - including right to equality before law and 
equal protection of laws, '^* citizen civil liberties, freedom of 
individual to profess and practice their respective religions,^'' 
freedom of religious communities to manage their own affairs*^ ^ 
and right of sections of citizens to preserve their distinct culture." 
Legislative enactment of an all India Uniform Civil Code 
straight away is not envisaged by the Constitution even at the 
central or union level. Article 44 wants the government and the 
legislature to make possible endeavours which may in the long run 
secure uniformity in the making and application of civil laws. To 
demand that parliament should straight away enact a uniform civil 
code goes against the letter and the spirit of Article 44.'"' What 
should be the rule of interpretation and how the balance between 
part III and part IV of the constitution should be maintained has 
been very beautifully explained by the Supreme Court of India in 
Minerva Mills case^^. It was observed by the Supreme Court :-
"India represent a mosaic of humanity consisting of 
diverse religious, linguistic and caste groups. The 
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rationale behind the insistence on fundamental rights 
has not yet lost its relevance, alas or not. The 
Congress session of Karachi adopted in 1931 the 
Resolution on Fundamental Rights as well as on 
economic and social change. 
The Sapru Report of 1945 said that the Fundamental Rights 
should serve as a "standing warning" to all concerned that : 
'What the Constitution demands and expects is 
perfect equality between one section of the 
community and another in the matter of political and 
civil rights, equality of liberty and security in the 
enjoyment of the freedom of religion, worship, and 
the pursuit of the ordinary application of life. (p. 
260).'^ o 
The Indian nation marched to freedom in this background. 
The Constituent Assembly resolved to enshrine the Fundamental 
Rights in the written text of the Constitution. The interlinked goals 
of personal liberty and economic freedom then came to be 
incorporated in two separate parts, nevertheless parts of an 
integral indivisible scheme which was carefully and thoughtfully 
nursed over half a century. The seeds sown in the 19th century 
saw their fruition in 1950 under the leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru 
and Dr. Ambedkar. To destroy the guarantees given by part III in 
order purportedly to achieve the goals of part IV is plainly to 
[ 9 0 ] 
Uniform Civil Code: Misconceptions and Reality 
subvert the Constitution by destroying its basic structure. Indian 
Constitution is founded on the bed-rock of the balance between 
part III and IV. To give absolute primacy to one over the other is 
to disturb the harmony of the Constitution."^'' 
These are the settled position of the relationship between the 
part III and part IV of the Indian Constitution and the directive 
contained in Aticle 44 is not an exception. 
As to the meaning and scope of civil code an imminent 
Expert of Hindu law. JDM Derrett observed : 
"Civil code throughout the world, suggests a great 
deal of private law, including contract and Tort." 
Professor Tahir Mehmood righly formulated this situation and 
observed that : 
"This is indeed true. There are numerous countries in 
the world which have no civil codes at all. In many 
other countries there is in force a civil code which 
contains all sorts of civil laws (as opposed to penal 
laws) except family and succession laws. In very few 
countries there is a civil code which covers also laws 
of families relations and succession. In most countries 
family and succession laws are contained in special 
statutes standing separate from the local civil codes if 
there any inforce. In view of these various models 
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available outside India, how do we determine the 
meaning and the scope of the expression "Civil 
Code" as used in article 44 of the Constitution? shall 
be presume that in this provision the terms is just 
synonym for family code? Is it right to presume so? 
The word 'code' is used in many different senses. It may 
mean a single comprehensive statute (e.g. The Indian Penal Code), 
but it may also refer to the body of several statute dealing with 
the same subject. It is in this later sense that the term Hindu Code 
- by which means the four Hindu law statute is enacted during 
1955-56. What does, then, article 44 mean? Does it necessarily 
talk of a family code, which is single (like the Indian Penal Code), 
or does it leave room for a body of several statutes of family law 
and succession on the pattern the Hindu code 1955-56." 
As far as the word 'uniform' is concerned the standard 
dictionaries of the English language do not translate 'uniform' as 
'common' and vice-versa. 
In recent years we have been hearing a lot about the 
sophistry that the constitution speaks of a Uniform Civil Code but 
anti-Muslim block wants to introduce a common civil code. 
P.C. Chatterjee comments : 
"I have to confess that the distinction to 'uniform' 
and 'common' in this context is one that beats me. 
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No examples are provided of a code which may be 
'common' but not 'uniform' or vice versa. For 
instance, if a Code prescribes that some men may 
have four wives (Muslims) but others may have only 
one, would such a Code, be described as uniform? In 
ordinary language, one would be inclined to say that 
such a code is not uniform because it does not apply 
equally to all males. Could such a code be described 
as common? I would say again that it is not common 
and for the same reason. But supposing it is 
contended that a code is uniform it if prescribes a rule 
which applies to a particular limited class only and is 
not intended to assert anything more" .^ '^  
Is it, then, not worth examining what are in fact the 
requirements of uniformity in respect of a civil code (to the more 
specific and accurate of a family code)? Does the Constitution 
talks of a strict and rigid uniformity of family law? Is such 
uniformity in fact possible. All these questions are indeed worth 
pondering in the interest of a smooth, peaceful and harmonious 
implementation of article 44 in a forseeable future. Uniformity, 
obviously can not be a purposeless goal. The modalities for 
translating the mandate of Article 44 into action should be 
decided with the reference to its objects and purposes. What does 
the law of interpretation provides in such a situation is very 
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beautifully summed up by a writer : 
"Generally a mandatory provision is to be construed 
strictly, while a directory provision is to be construed 
liberally. There is no reason to adopt a different line 
of reasoning in the construction and interpretation of 
the Constitution. In all such cases one must consider 
the real purpose of the provision, whether statutory or 
Constitutional."^^ 
To conclude the discussion about the scope of the word 
uniform used in Article 44. The researcher is fully agreed with the 
observation of learned author Dr. Tahir Mahmood : 
"The word 'uniform' here (in article 44) has so far 
been thoughtlessly regarded as a synonym for the 
word 'common', and perhaps nobody has ever 
considered why the father of Constitution prefered the 
former to the latter expression. I think there is 
difference between 'common' and 'uniform' - the 
former meaning one and the same in all circumstances 
whatsoever and the latter meaning 'same in the similar 
circumstances'."^^ 
To give the answer of the fourth question that whether the 
Uniform Civil Code should be applied compulsarily to the all the 
citizens of India. It is necessary that every uniform civil law, if 
and when enacted, must compulsarily apply to all Indians? In this 
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regard the observatios made by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar is worth 
mentioning which he made while concluding the debate on uniform 
civil code in the Consititute Assembly : 
"Nothing would prevent a future parliament from 
enacting a civil code and making it applicable only to 
these who voluntarily submit to its provisions."^'" 
It can safely observed that in our country the personal laws 
applicable to different communities are 'veriform'. This diversity 
in personal in laws is not only based on religion or religious or 
group but it also due to the customs of the people. The myth that 
the Muslim Personal Law is the only of obstacle in the 
procurement of the Uniform Civil Code is totally baseless. In fact 
the personal laws of the majority community are more veriform 
than the personal laws of minorities' community. The meaning and 
scope of Article 44 is generally misunderstanding not only by the 
laymen but the by law men also. 
Summary 
Uniform Civil Code is the victim of certain misconceptions 
and realities and it is an irony that the interpretation as well as 
implementation of Article 44 of our Constitution is not being taken 
into account in its right perspective. 
There are prejudicial attemtps on the part of legislature and 
court both to examine the whole issue from a 'majoritarian' 
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approach. Such attemtps defeat the very purpose of Article 44 for 
uniformity in personal laws. 
India is a large country with diverse personal laws and 
customs. These diversities are by product of different customs, 
regions and territorial separation. Again there are specified groups 
who enjoy special treatment like tribal laws which were allowed to 
continue even by Constitution of India. Beside that Constitution 
itself created two privileged class viz., the "Scheduled Caste" 
and "Scheduled Tribe". We have a spectrum of personal laws 
and customs as diverse as nation's languages, cultures and 
geographical realities. 
There is erroneous quest for Uniform Civil Code simply 
because Article 44 does not direct the legislature to enact a civil 
code. It contains a principle basically for "Uniformity" in civil 
laws. 
Whenever Muslim Personal Law is debated it lacks 
intellectual impartiality. Media reportage, academic analysis and 
often politician's view points reflect the vested interests of those 
concerned. Often Muslim Personal Law is shown as defective and 
discriminatory. 
The question is - what does Article 44 demand? It desires to 
provide nation's citizen uniformity in civil laws but applicable on 
those who voluntarily accept and submit to its provision. Thus, it 
wants only a shift from veriform to uniform. 
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Part IV, of the Constitution of India contains eighteen 
Articles (including Articles added by amendments) which are 
bracketed under the title "Directive Principles of State Policy" 
for the good governance of the coutnry. None of such directives 
has evoked so much reactions as the constitutional requirement of 
a Uniform Civil Code for all citizens throughout the country. 
These are active obligations of the state. The state shall secure a 
social order in which social economic and political justice shall 
inform all the institutions of national life. The Directive Principles 
of State Policy detailed in Articles 37 to 51 of the Constitution 
possesses to characteristics. Firstly, they are not enforceable in 
any court and therefore if a directive is infringed, no remedy is 
available to the aggrieved party by judicial proceedings. Secondly, 
they are fundamental in the governance of the country and it shall 
be the duty of the state to apply these principles in making laws. 
In this chatper, an endeavour has been made to discuss the 
constitutional obligation of the state to secure for citizens a 
Uniform Civil Code - throughout the territory of India and Judicial 
craftmanship of the High Courts and Supreme Court. The cases 
discussed in this chapter are those in which either the 
constitutionality of some personal-law was challenged or the 
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court, suo-moto, discussed the desirability of the enactment of a 
Uniform Civil Court. Since the time of its incorporation in the 
Constitution this has been a controversial topic and it continues 
to be so. Article 44, of the Indian Constitution runs as follows : 
"The state shall endeavour to secure for citizens a 
Uniform Civil Code throughout the territory of 
India". 
A. Narasuappa Mali case 
The first case was State of Bombay vs. Narasuappa Mali'', 
where the legislative provisions modifying the old Hindu law were 
challenged on the ground of being violative of Articles 14, 15 and 
25 of the Constitution, the Bomaby High Court held that the 
Bombay Prevention of Hindu Bigamous Marriages Act, 1946^ was 
intra vires to the Constitution. The Act had imposed severe 
penalties on a Hindu for contracting a bigamous marriage. The 
validity of this Act was attacked on the ground that it violated the 
freedom of religion guaranteed by Article 25 and permitted 
classification on religious grounds only, forbidden by Articles 14^  
and 15. 
It was argued that "among the Hindus the institution of 
marriage is a sacrament and that marriage is a part of Hindu 
religion which is regulated by what is laid down by Shastras. It 
was also argued that a Hindu marries not only for his association 
with his mate but in order to perpetuate his family by the birth of 
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sons. It is only when a son is born to a Hindu male that he secures 
spiritual benefit by having a son when he is dead and to the spirits 
of his ancestors and that there is no heavenly region for a sonless 
man. The institution of polygamy was justified as a necessity of a 
Hindu obtaining a son for the sake of religious efficacy. Because 
son has a unique position in Hindu society no other religious 
system has given a such position to a son. 
The above arguments were rejected by the court. Gajendra 
Gadkar J. was not prepared to concede that legislative 
interference with the provisions as to marriage constituted an 
infringement of Hindu religion or religious practice he was of the 
opinion that a sonless man can obtain a son not only by a second 
marriage but by adoption. 
Chagla C.J., while upholding the validity of the Bombay Act, 
cited three reasons, firstly, what the state protected was religious 
faith and belief, but not all religious practices. Secondly, he 
claimed that polygamy was not integral part of Hindu religion. 
Finally, if the state of Bombay compels Hindus to became 
monogamist, and if it is a measure of social reform then the state 
is empowered to legislate with regard to social reform under 
Article 25(2) (b), notwithstanding the fact that it may interfere with 
the right of a citizen freely to profess, practice and propogate his 
relgion. Chief Justice Chagla relied heavily on Davis vs. Beason\ 
In this case constitutionality of an Idhao statute of 1882, which 
[ 103] 
Uniform Civil Code : Judicial Approach 
out-lawed bigamy was challenged. It was contended that the 
impugned Act infrigned Church and violated the First 
Amendment^ of the U.S. Constitution. In those days the members 
of that Church used to practice polygamy as a part of their 
religion. The Supreme Court rejected the contention and 
observed: 
"However free the exercise of religion may be it may 
be subordinate to the criminal laws of the country 
passed with reference to actions regarded by general 
consent as properly the subjects of punitive 
legislation". 
Regarding the discrimination made by the Act on religious 
grounds it was contended that only the Hindu community was 
choosen for the purpose of legislation while Muslims were 
allowed to practice polygamy. Gajendra Gadkar J. thought that the 
classification made between Hindus and Muslims for the purpose 
of legislation was reasonable and did not violate the equality 
provision of constitution contained in Article 14. 
Chagla C.J. also considered that : 
"Article 14 does not lay down any legislation that the 
state may embark upon must necessarily be of and all 
embracing character. The state may rightly decide to 
bring about social reform by stages, and the stages 
may be territorial or they may be community wise, and 
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that the discrimination made by the Act between the 
Hindus and the Muslims does not offend the equahty 
provision of the Constitution.^ 
Chagla C.J., further observed that : 
"there can be no doubt that the Muslims have been 
excluded from the operation of the Act in question. 
Even Section 494, Penal Code exempt them." 
The court, thus submitting to the wisdom and supermacy of 
Legislature in a democracy kept its hand off from interfering with 
the prerogative of the Legislature. 
The other point which emerges from this judgement is that 
the religious freedom guaranteed by Article 25 is the protection of 
rehgious faith and belief and not all religious practices. The third 
inference which can be drawn from the judgement is that the 
polygamy is not an integral part of Hindu religion. 
These arguments of learned judge however, raise two 
questions, first, are the judges qualified to determine what is an 
integral part of a religion?, and second, does the Constitution 
protects only the essentials of a religion? The answer to both 
these question is, apparently, not in affirmative.^ 
The Madras High Court^ was also grappled with the question 
of the validity of a Madras Law which has abolished polygamy 
among Hindus. The Act in question was the Madras Hindu -
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(Bigamy and Divorce) Act, of 1949.^ Challenge to the Act was 
made on substantially the same grounds on which the Bomaby 
Law was attacked, viz. The Act unconstitutionally interferred with 
the free practice of religion and permitted discrimination against 
Hindus. The arguments were not accepted by the court like the 
Bombay High Court the Madras High Court pointed out that the 
abolition of polygamy did not interfere with religion because if a 
man did not have a natural borned son, he could adopt one.^° 
Further, relying on the passage in Rynold v. f/.5.," the court said 
that whilst - religious belief was protected by the Constitution 
religious practices were subject to state regulation.'^ The High 
Court observed : 
"the religious practice, therefore, may be controlled 
by legislation if the state think that the in interest of 
the social welfare and reform it is necessary to do."'^ 
Thus, the court took the position that in a democracy it is the 
Legislature which is to lay down the policy of the state and to 
determine what legislation to put up on the statute book for the 
advancement of the welfare of the state. Moreover, the next 
inference which can be drawn is that the state way rightly decide 
to bring about social change by stages and these stages may be 
territorial or community wise. 
Again in Ram Prasad vs. State of U.P. almost identical issue 
was raised before the Allahabad High Court, upholding the validity 
of the statutory provisions prohibiting bigamy among Hindus.'" 
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B. Shah Bano Case 
The next important case relating to Muslim Personal Law and 
Uniform Civil Code is Mohd. Ahmad Khan vs. Shah Bano 
Begum.^^ 
The appellant, Mohd. Ahmad Khan, being an advocate by 
profession at Indore, M.P. married to respondent in 1932. In 1975 
the appellant broke the matrimonial home by driving Shah Bano 
Begum out of matrimonial home. During this period the 
respondent gave birth to three sons and two daughters. In 1978 
the respondent filed a suit under section 125 Cr.P.C. in the court 
of judicial magistrate 1st class, Indore, asking for the maintenance 
provision at the rate of Rs. 500/- per month. On November 6, 
1978, the appellant divorced the respondent excercising the so 
called unilateral power of talaaq irrevocabily. In his defence the 
appellant advanced the argument that by virtue of talaaq, she 
seized to be his wife, he was no more under obligation to maintain 
her and he had already paid maintenance to her at the rate of Rs. 
200/- per month for about two years. He deposited Rs. 3000/- in 
the court in lieu of dower during the period of iddat. In August 
1979, the lower court directed the appellant to pay a sum of Rs. 
25 per month by way of maintenance. The respondent went in 
appeal to the Madhya Pradesh High Court in 1980 for the 
enhancement of maintenance amount. The High Court enhanced 
the maintenance amount to Rs. 179.20 per month. Against this 
order the husband approached the highest judicial institution 
through special leave. 
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A Bench consisting of Mr. Justice Miirtaza Fazle AH and Mr. 
Justice A. Vardharajan were of the opinion that these two cases 
were not correctly decided, hence they referred this appeal to a 
larger Bench on Feb. 3, 1981 stating that : 
"As this case involves substantial questions of law of 
far reaching consequences, we feel that the decisions 
of this court in Bai Tahira vs. AH Hussain fissoly 
Chotia^^ and Fazlun Bi vs. K. Khader Vali^'' require 
reconsideration because, in our opinion they are not 
only in direct contravention of the plain and the 
ambiguous language of section 127 (2) (b) of the 
Code of Criminal Procedure 1973... The decisions 
also appear to us to be against the fundamental 
concept of divorce by the husband and its 
consequences under the Muslim law which has been 
expressly protected by section 2 of Muslim Personal 
Law (Shariat) Apphcation Act, 1937 - An Act which 
was not noticed by the aforesaid decision. We, 
therefore, direct that the matter may be placed before 
the honourable Chief Justice for being heard by a 
larger Bench consisting of more than three judges." 
A Constitution Bench consisting of five judges 
{Chandrachud, C.J., D.A. Desai, J.O., Chenappa Reddy, J.L.S., 
Venkat Ramiah, J. and Rangnath Mishra J.) heard the case. 
Chief Justice Chandrachud wrote and delivered the judgement. 
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Technically, the case related to the maintenance of Muslim 
divorcee but the observations of the court regarding Muslim 
Personal Law and Uniform Civil Code created a controversy in 
the socio-legal and political arena. The question of maintenance 
of Muslim divorcee and the applicability of section 125 of Cr.P.C. 
was settled by the Supreme Court in Bai Tahira and Fuzlin Bi 
case. 
In Shah Bano case apart from observations relating to the 
maintenance of Muslim divorcee the Supreme Court held that : 
(i) There is no conflict between provisions of Section 125 of 
Criminal Procedure Code and Muslim Personal Law in the 
matter of maintenance of divorcee, however, in case of any 
conflict section 125 shall prevail over the Personal Law. 
(ii) That a Muslim divorcee has a right to obtain maintenance till 
her remarriage or death under section 125 of the code and if 
she is unable to maintain herself, her ex-husband has a duty 
to provide for her maintenance till her remarriage or death. 
(iii) That if a husband, even he be a Muslim, marries another 
women the wife has a right to refuse to live with him and yet 
obtain maintenance from him. 
(iv) Moreover, the Supreme Court has strongly criticized the 
Government of India for its reluctance to enact Uniform Civil 
Code in view of the sensitivity of the Muslim community. 
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Regarding the implementation of Article 44 of the 
Constitution, the Court pointed out the apathy of the 
Legislature that it has not been sincere enough to bring the 
Uniform Civil Code into practice.'^ The court further 
remarked that the government's in action has rendered the 
directive contained in Article 44 of the Constitution of India 
meaningless and asked the government to take steps for 
enacting a Uniform Civil Code without any regard to the 
Muslim reaction. The Court felt that : 
"Inevitably, the role of the reformer has to be 
assumed by the court because, it is beyond the 
endurance of sensitive mind and to allow injustice to 
be suffered when it is so palpable. But piecemeal 
attempts of the Court to bridge the gap between 
personal laws cannot take the place of a common 
Civil Code. Justice to all is a far more satisfactory 
way of dispensing Justice than Justice from case to 
case." 
In this case, the appellant and the interveners stressed that 
under Islamic Law a husband is duty bound to maintain the wife 
in case of divorce till the expiry of Iddat period only. In support 
of this assertion they relied on some very important text books 
(e.g. MuUa, Tyebji, Paras Diwan) on law, but the court did not 
find any merit in the referred textual materials. The court rejecting 
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the above argument held that in case the divorcee was unable to 
maintain herself, the period of Iddat must not come in the way 
and she in such case, was entitled to be maintained by ex-husband 
even after the expiry of Iddat period and would continue till she 
had remarried. The court cited the two Qur'anic verses in support 
of this view point: 
"For divorced women 
Maintenance (should be provided) 
... on a removable scale 
This is a duty 
On the righteous."^^ 
"Thus doth God 
Makes clear his signs 
To you : in order that 
Ye may understand."^" 
Although the correctness of the translation was challenged by 
the appellant and the intervener. All India Muslim Personal Law 
Board, regarding the meaning of the word "M47M" used in verse 
241 of Holy Our'an but this point of dispute was not conceded 
and accepted by the court. The meaning of the word "A/^Z^" 
meant 'provision' and not 'maintenance' was asserted by the 
appellant as well as not rehed on the translation of appellant but 
relied on the translation of the verses 241 and 242 by Zafarullah 
Khan^^ The translation of Zafarullah Khan is thus : 
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"For divorced women also there shall be provision 
according to what is fair. This is an obligation binding 
on the righteous. Thus, does Allah make his 
commandments clear to you that you may 
understand." 
The translation of verses 240 to 242 in the 'meaning of the 
Qur'an'^^ was relied upon by the court. 
"Those of you, who shall die and leave wife behind 
them, should make a will to the effect that they should 
be provided with a year's maintenance and should not 
be turned out of their homes. But if they leave their 
homes of their accord, you shall not be answerable 
for whatever they chose for themselves in a fair way; 
Allah is all powerful, all wise. Likewise, the divorced 
women should also be given something in accordance 
with the known fair standard. This is an obligation 
upon the God fearing people." 
Besides the above the court cited certain other translations of 
the Holy Qur'an by renowned scholars. 
After anlaysing the above mentioned translations of the 
verses 241-242 the court held that the Qur'an imposes obligation 
on the husband to provide maintenance for the divorced wife 
beyond the Iddat period. 
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When the appellant and the intervener All India Muslim 
Personal Law Board cited the following statement made by Shri 
Ram Niwas Mirdha, the then Minsiter of State, Home Affairs on 
Dec. 18, 1973^^ in the Parliament which is as follows : 
"Dr. Vyas very learnedly made certain observations 
that a divorced wife under a Muslim Law deserves to 
be treated justly and she would get what is her 
equitable or legal due. Well, I will not go into this, but 
say that we would not like to interfere with the 
customary law of Muslims through the Criminal 
Procedure Code. If there is a demand for change in 
Muslim Personal Law, it would actually come from 
the Muslim community itself and we should wait for 
the Muslim public opinion on these matters to 
crystallise before we try to change this all, this is 
hardly, the place where we could do so. But as I tried 
to explain, the provision in the Bill is an advance over 
the previous situation. Divorced women have been 
included and brought within the ambit of clasue 125, 
but a limitation is being imposed by this amendment 
to clause 127, namely, that the maintenance order 
would sieze to operate after the amounts due to her 
under the personal law or paid to her ... so this I 
think, should satisfy honourable members that 
whatever advanced we have made is in the right 
direction and it should be welcomed." 
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The court ignored the legislative history of Section 125 and 
127 of Criminal Procedure Code and held that : 
"The provision contained in Section 127 (3) (b) may 
have been introduced because of the misconception 
that dower is an amount payable on divorce. But that 
cannot convert an amount payable as a mark of 
respect for the wife into an amount payable on 
divorce." 
The judgement has been criticized on the following grounds : 
(i) The Our'an and Shariat have been wrongly interpreted and 
by relying on these the Supreme Court held that there is no 
conflict between the Personal law and Section 125 Cr.P.C. 
and ignored the authoritative texts and unanimity of Ulema. 
The Supreme Court has flouted the established principles of 
interpretations of Islamic Law by Muslim jurists and Ulema 
and an uninterrupted practise of the Muslims of the world for 
the last 1400 years. 
(ii) That the Muslim Personal Law {Shariat) Application Act 
1937, covers maintenance if the parties are Muslims. The 
Supreme Court by enunciating the prevalance of the secular 
laws of social significance over the provisions of the Shariat 
Act has opened a way for courts to interfere in the Muslim 
Personal Law. 
(iii) The decision is a clear cut interference in Muslim Personal Law. 
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(iv) That the Supreme Court in this case not only ignored 
legislative history and clear intent of Legislature and violated 
the well established rules of harmonious construction for 
interpretation of statutes and for harmonising conflicts 
between different parts of the same law but set itself up as a 
"Super Legislature" or as a "Third Chamber of 
Legislature". 
(v) That the Constitution authorises to interprete the 
Constitution, not the Our'an and to test the laws, enacted by 
competent Legislature as regard their constitutionality. The 
Constitution bestows no authority on Supreme Court to 
reinterpret a religion or to perform it. 
At the outset, in his judgement, Y.V. Chandrachud, C.J. 
speaking for the court, observed that : 
"It is alleged that the fatal point in Islam is 
degradation of women. To the Prophet (SAW) is 
ascribed the statement, hopefully wrongly that women 
was made from a crooked rib and if you bend it 
straight it will break; therefore treat your wife 
kindly. "2-* 
It showed the misconception of the learned judge about the 
status of women in Islam. However, the most objectionable part 
of the judgement is that in which the court unncessarily assumed 
the function to interpret the holy Our'an. The Supreme Court in 
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this case forgetting its role of interpreter tried to give that potent 
impression to the reformer of law as Legislature ignoring the 
scheme of "seperation of power theory" on which ever 
constitution is designed. According to Prof. Tahir Mahmood : 
"The Shah Bano judgement has caused great 
resentments in many circles of Muslim community in 
India. Though we may not agree with the other 
opponents of the judgement on many points that they 
have raised, we do strongly feel that the assumption 
by the Supreme Court of function to interpret the 
Holy Qur'an was absolutely uncalled for. If Justice 
Chandrachud was convinced (which he obviously 
was) that in the wake of a conflict between the Cr.P.C. 
and the Islamic law the former should prevail. He 
should have simply so asserted. There was no need 
no justification, for him to assume the role of an 
interpreter of the Qur'an, for which extremely delicate 
and difficult task most certainly he was 
unqualified."^^ 
The attempt of judiciary to interpret certain verses of Qur'an 
and admonition to state with regard the Uniform Civil Code 
definitely frustrates the well estabhshed principle of 'Judicial self 
restraint' and the concept of 'Judicial Activism' surely does not 
permit Indian independent judiciary to do like this.^^ 
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The concept of Uniform Civil Code has become very 
complex issue in Indian context. Unnecessarily and without any 
due relevance Supreme Court advocated for its preparation and 
application. Really, this aspect of Supreme Court's observation 
can be respectfully submitted as "Unwarranted" vmcalled for. 
How can a Uniform Civil Code be enforced in India based on 
diversified languages, religion, laws (in rare areas only) and 
culture?^^ It may be pointed out that such sporadic observations 
are bound to create controversy and for which our government 
has to face and some times becomes bound to pay a heavy cost.^* 
The judgement as a whole caved thus be read like this : 
"Islam degrades women; Qur'an negates certain 
popular behef; therefore all Muslims must be 
subjected to a Uniform Civil Code by altogether 
scrapping their personal law." 
One may legitimately ask was it in fact necessary to say all 
this to decide that the Cr.P.C. provision on divorced wife 
maintenance did not exclude Muslims from its scope?^^ Dr. Tahir 
Mahmood, an eminent scholar observed about this judgement : 
"The ideas expressed by the Supreme Court at the 
end of the judgement in respect of the legendary 
Uniform Civil Code were as uncalled for as the 
attempt to put a new glass on a Our'anic verse. The 
enthusiastic support given by the court to an 
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extremely controversial issue in respect of which the 
Muslims are - awfully sensitive, and that too in a 
judgement directly concerning the Islamic personal 
law, is in-explicable. This 'obiter' in the judgement 
could have been easily avoided without affecting in the 
least its 'ratio decidendi\'"^° 
The Shah Bano judgement did unintentionally provide 
inflammatory materials to Muslim bashers of whom, also there is 
no dirth in the country and thereby negated its own wisdom and 
rationale. In a recent book Prof. Tahir Mahmood wrote : 
"By mixing up the actual issue in the case with the 
controversial question of a Uniform Civil Code and by 
trying to justify its ruling on the strength of certain 
Our'anic verses as understood by the court, the 
judgement (opening with an uncalled for reference to 
the ill founded western criticism of Islams alleged anti 
women stance) raised an unhealthy controversy which 
unfortunately assumed communal and political 
overtones. This unpleasant chapter of recent legal 
history of India could have been easily avoided by 
showing judicial self-restraint. "^' 
C. Jorden Diengdeh Case 
The third important case relating to the present discussion is 
Jorden Diengdeh vs. S.S. Chopra^^ which was delivered only a 
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fortnight later than the controversial Shah Bano case. The special 
leave petition in Jorden Diengdeh case, relating to Christian 
personal law, was decided by a division bench of the Supreme 
Court on 10th May, 1985. The judgement was delivered by Justice 
O. Chinappa Reddy who sat also on Shah Bano Bench. The 
judgement is on the same lines as Shah Bano case and it is 
suppliment to Chief Justice Chandrachud's view on Uniform Civil 
Code expressed in Shah Bano Case. The facts of the case are 
somewhat novel and peculiar. The wife, the petitioner claims to 
belong to the 'Khasi tribe' of Meghalaya who was born and 
brought up as a Presbytarian Christian at Shillong. She is now a 
member of the Indian Foreign Service. The husband is a Sikh. 
They were married under the Christian Marriage Act, 1872. The 
marriage was performed on October 14, 1975. A petition for 
declaration of nullity of marriage or judicial separation was filed in 
1980 under Sections 19, 20 and 22 of the Indian Divorce Act, 
1869. The prayer for declaration of nullity of marriage was 
rejected by a learned single judge. The wife filed petition for 
special leave to appeal against the judgement of High Court. She 
sought a declaration of nullity of marriage under the Indian 
Divorce Act, 1969, as the marriage was solemnised by Christian 
rites under the Christian Marriage Act, 1872. The ground on 
which the declaration was sought in the courts below and before 
the Supreme Court the ground was the impotence of the husband 
in that though the husband was capable of achieving erection and, 
penetration, he ejaculate pre-maturely before the wife has an 
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orgasm, leaving the wife totally unsatisfied and frustrated. The real 
problem before the court was that the marriage appeared to have 
broken down irretrievably. Finding that it was not possible for the 
court to give the desired relief under the Christian law, the learned 
judge talked of the urgent need to enact a 'Uniform Civil Code'. 
He reproduced the ground of divorce and nullity under various 
statutes (Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Parsi Marriage and Divorce 
Act, 1936; Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939; Special 
Marriage Act, 1954; Hindu Marriage Act, 1955) and concluded : 
"It is thus seen that the law relating to judicial 
separation, divorce and nullity of marriage is, far from 
being uniform. Surely the time has now come for a 
complete reform of the law of marriage and make a 
uniform law applicable to all people irrespective of 
rehgion and caste... We suggest that the time has come 
for the intervention of the Legislature in these matters 
to provide for a Uniform Code of marriage and 
Divorce and to provide by law for a way out of the 
unhappy situations in which couples like the present 
have found themselves. We direct that a copy of this 
order may be forwarded to the Ministry of Law and 
Justice for such actions as they may deem fit to 
take.^^ 
The court did not give any relief to the victim and no one 
knows what finally happened to the poor tribal lady. The Delhi 
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High Court had, while refusing a decree of nullity allowed her a 
judicial seperation keeping her irretrievably broken marriage legally 
intact. 
The Jorden Diengdeh case involved application and 
interpretation of the Christian Personal Law. Yet, the Supreme 
Court judgement in the case examined neither the present state of 
Christian Personal Law in the country nor the response of the 
Christian community to the issues of Personal law reforms and 
Uniform Civil Code. Nor did it talk of the Parsi community's 
feelings in this matter. Paraphrasing divorce and nullity provisions 
in the Christian and Parsi laws and the comparable sections of the 
statutes applicable to Hindus and Muslims, Justice O. Chinappa 
Reddy choose only to join the chorus of groans of the day to 
rebuke Muslims for their opposition to the Shah Bano ruling that 
in which the state had been asked to 'act' towards enacting a 
Uniform Civil Code even if the majority community was not 
prepared to give a 'lead' by offering repeal of its own personal 
law in favour of Uniform laws.^'' 
The learned judge further held that under strict Hanafi law, 
there was no provision enabling a Muslim women to obtain a 
decree dissolving her marriage on the failure of her husband to 
maintain her or on his deserting her or maltreating her and it was 
the absence of such a provision entailing 'unspeakable misery in 
innumerable Muslim women' that was responsible for the passing 
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of Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939. He further 
observed : 
"If the Legislature could so alter the Hanifi law, we 
fail to understand the hallaballo about the recent 
judgement of this court in the case of Mohammad 
Ahmad Khan Vs. Shah Bano Begum interpreting the 
provisions of Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure 
Code of the Muslim law."'^ 
The learned judge while quoting from the statement of 
Objects and Reasons of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages 
Act, 1939 did not say that these provisions were drawn from 
another school of Islamic Law itself, i.e. the Maliki School (which 
fact the statement of object and reasons does explain at length) 
which is permissible under Hanafi law. This appeal involved some 
very serious issues faced by the society other than the Uniform 
Civil Code but Chenappa Reddy J. did not make any reference to 
those issues, it shows the intention of the learned judge. He has 
unnecessarily created a serious doubts about the legitimacy of 
codified law workable in India since 1950. In the opinion of Prof. 
Tahir Mahmood : 
"Neither the issue of 'Uniform Civil Code' nor that 
of the response to Shah Bano judgement was in 
question in the case before the court. What does it 
mean? Can the court speak suo moto only about a 
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'Uniform Civil Code' and the Muslim law and never 
about any other factors even if they are much more 
relevant than 'Uniform Civil Code' and Muslim law in 
any case.-^ ^ 
If we scrutinize Christian Marriage Act, 1872 we find that 
the Christian Marriage Act demands that every marriage between a 
Christian and non-Christian (besides all Christian - Christian 
marriages) must also take place under the provisions only. This is 
provided in section 4 of the said Act. When enacted, this 
provision reflected the high handedness of the then foreign rulers 
who regarded their own religion as superior to all others. But no 
body bothered because the Act clashed only with Muslim Law 
which allowed a Muslim Chrisitan marriage - Hindu law did not 
any interreligious marriage at all. 
Since 1954 the legal position has been very different. The 
Special Marriage Act, 1954 now allows all sorts of inter religious 
marriages to take place freely. Can a non-Christian marry a 
Christian under this Act? Of course, yes. But, then, how about 
the demand of Section 4 of the Christian Marriage Act, still 
enforce demanding that a non-Christian's marriage to a Christian 
must also be solemnised by Christian rites only. The two Acts are 
apparently in conflict. People are not sure of the correct legal 
position and therefore want to play safe unmindful of the possible 
consequence in future - by complying with section 4 of the old 
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Act of 1872." The Indian Divorce Act 1869 applies if either party 
to a marriage is a Christian (besides all cases where all parties are 
Christians). Can a non-Christian married to a Christian, whose 
marriage is governed by the Christian Marriage Act, 1872, seek or 
divorce under the Special Marriage Act 1954? Two High Courts 
have given conflicting rulings - Rajasthan^^ saying yes, 
AllahabcP^ No. The Act itself is not clear on the point, though 
the preamble - an Act to provide an special form of marriage in 
certain cases for the registration of, such and certain other 
marriages and for divorce - tilts in favour of the Rajasthan ruling. 
Was it not imperative case to examine all these aspects of the law? 
Could it not have upheld the already available Rajasthan ruling 
and give the desired relief to the poor tribal girl, paving the way 
for salvaging in future other women finding themselves in a similar 
mess. 
In this case nothing of this sort was done, the only thing 
which was done to suggest the government to enact a Uniform 
Civil Code and to admonish the Muslims for their unfavourable 
reactions to the Shah Bano ruling. 
What the Jordan Dingdeh case, and many other judicial case 
have brought to the limelight for a recodification of the Christian 
law in India. Last codified in 1865-1872 on the basis of the 
progress made till then in Britain, statutory Christian law is now 
rather outdated. It is the women who are the worst sufferers under 
the 19th century Christian-law statutes of 1866 to 1872. Not only 
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Christian women but also those non-Christian women who are 
married to Christian and are therefore, again governed by those 
laws. The plight of women governed by the 19th century statitutes 
of Christian law has been described by the Kerela High Court in 
following words : 
"Life of a Christian wife who is compelled to live 
against her will, though in name only, as the wife of 
the man who hates her, has cruelly treated her and 
deserted her, putting an end to marital relationship 
irreversible, will be a sub-human life without dignity 
and personal liberty ... which she is bound to lead till 
her death.''^" 
Although Ammine E.J. got relief from a miserable life by the 
Kerala High Court but Jorden Dingdeh was not given any relief 
and she was left to suffer endlessly till a Uniform Civil Code is 
enacted. 
D. Saria Mudgal Case 
The fourth important case relating to personal laws of Hindus 
and Muslims and Uniform Civil Code is Sarla Mudgal v. Union 
oflndia^^ Once again a very controversial judgement was handed 
down by the Supreme Court of India which once again raised the 
qustion of the enactment of a Uniform Civil Code. The judgement 
became very controversial due to its uncalled for 'obiter dicta\ 
The issue raised before the court were as follows : 
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(i) Article 44 is based on the concept that there is no necessary 
connection between religion and personal laws in a 'civilized 
society'. 
(ii) Article 25 guarantees religious, freedom whereas article 44 
seems to divest religion from social relations and personal 
law. Marriage, succession and like matters of secular 
character cannot be brought within the guarantees enshrined 
under Articles 25, 26 and 27. 
(iii) Article 44 is decisive step towards national integration. 
Justice Kuldeep Singh observed that : 
"The personal laws of the Hindus, such as relating to 
marriage, succession and the like have all a 
sacramental origin, in the same manner as in the case 
of the Muslims or the Christians. The Hindus along 
with Siklis, Buddhists and Jains have foresaken their 
sentiments in the cause of national unity and 
integration, some other communities would not 
though, the Constitution enjoins the establishment of 
a 'Common Civil Code' for the whole of India." 
Justice Kuldeep Singh further observed that : 
"Those who preferred to remain in India after the 
partition, fully knew that the Indian leaders did not 
believe in the two nation or three nation theory and 
that in the Indian republic there was to be only one 
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orgasm, leaving the wife totally unsatisfied and frustrated. The real 
problem before the court was that the marriage appeared to have 
broken down irretrievably. Finding that it was not possible for the 
court to give the desired relief under the Christian law, the learned 
judge talked of the urgent need to enact a 'Uniform Civil Code'. 
He reproduced the ground of divorce and nullity under various 
statutes (Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Parsi Marriage and Divorce 
Act, 1936; Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939; Special 
Marriage Act, 1954; Hindu Marriage Act, 1955) and concluded : 
"It is thus seen that the law relating to judicial 
separation, divorce and nullity of marriage is, far from 
being uniform. Surely the time has now come for a 
complete reform of the law of marriage and make a 
uniform law applicable to all people irrespective of 
religion and caste... We suggest that the time has come 
for the intervention of the Legislature in these matters 
to provide for a Uniform Code of marriage and 
Divorce and to provide by law for a way out of the 
unhappy situations in which couples like the present 
have found themselves. We direct that a copy of this 
order may be forwarded to the Ministry of Law and 
Justice for such actions as they may deem fit to 
take." 
The court did not give any relief to the victim and no one 
knows what finally happened to the poor tribal lady. The Delhi 
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High Court had, while refusing a decree of nullity allowed her a 
judicial seperation keeping her irretrievably broken marriage legally 
intact. 
The Jorden Diengdeh case involved application and 
interpretation of the Christian Personal Law. Yet, the Supreme 
Court judgement in the case examined neither the present state of 
Christian Personal Law in the country nor the response of the 
Christian community to the issues of Personal law reforms and 
Uniform Civil Code. Nor did it talk of the Parsi community's 
feelings in this matter. Paraphrasing divorce and nullity provisions 
in the Christian and Parsi laws and the comparable sections of the 
statutes applicable to Hindus and Muslims, Justice O. Chinappa 
Reddy choose only to join the chorus of groans of the day to 
rebuke Muslims for their opposition to the Shah Bano ruling that 
in which the state had been asked to 'act' towards enacting a 
Uniform Civil Code even if the majority community was not 
prepared to give a 'lead' by offering repeal of its own personal 
law in favour of Uniform laws.^'' 
The learned judge further held that under strict Hanafi law, 
there was no provision enabling a Muslim women to obtain a 
decree dissolving her marriage on the failure of her husband to 
maintain her or on his deserting her or mahreating her and it was 
the absence of such a provision entailing 'unspeakable misery in 
innumerable Muslim women' that was responsible for the passing 
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of Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939. He further 
observed : 
"If the Legislature could so alter the Hanifi law, we 
fail to understand the hallaballo about the recent 
judgement of this court in the case of Mohammad 
Ahmad Khan Vs. Shah Bano Begum interpreting the 
provisions of Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure 
Code of the Muslim law."^^ 
The learned judge while quoting from the statement of 
Objects and Reasons of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages 
Act, 1939 did not say that these provisions were drawn from 
another school of Islamic Law itself, i.e. the Maliki School (which 
fact the statement of object and reasons does explain at length) 
which is permissible under Hanafi law. This appeal involved some 
very serious issues faced by the society other than the Uniform 
Civil Code but Chenappa Reddy J. did not make any reference to 
those issues, it shows the intention of the learned judge. He has 
unnecessarily created a serious doubts about the legitimacy of 
codified law workable in India since 1950. In the opinion of Prof. 
Tahir Mahmood : 
"Neither the issue of 'Uniform Civil Code' nor that 
of the response to Shah Bano judgement was in 
question in the case before the court. What does it 
mean? Can the court speak suo moto only about a 
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'Uniform Civil Code' and the Muslim law and never 
about any other factors even if they are much more 
relevant than 'Uniform Civil Code' and Muslim law in 
any case.-'^ 
If we scrutinize Christian Marriage Act, 1872 we find that 
the Christian Marriage Act demands that every marriage between a 
Christian and non-Christian (besides all Christian - Christian 
marriages) must also take place under the provisions only. This is 
provided in section 4 of the said Act. When enacted, this 
provision reflected the high handedness of the then foreign rulers 
who regarded their own religion as superior to all others. But no 
body bothered because the Act clashed only with Muslim Law 
which allowed a Muslim Chrisitan marriage - Hindu law did not 
any interreligious marriage at all. 
Since 1954 the legal position has been very different. The 
Special Marriage Act, 1954 now allows all sorts of inter religious 
marriages to take place freely. Can a non-Christian marry a 
Christian under this Act? Of course, yes. But, then, how about 
the demand of Section 4 of the Christian Marriage Act, still 
enforce demanding that a non-Christian's marriage to a Christian 
must also be solemnised by Christian rites only. The two Acts are 
apparently in conflict. People are not sure of the correct legal 
position and therefore want to play safe unmindful of the possible 
consequence in future - by complying with section 4 of the old 
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Act of 1872." The Indian Divorce Act 1869 applies if either party 
to a marriage is a Christian (besides all cases where all parties are 
Christians). Can a non-Christian married to a Christian, whose 
marriage is governed by the Christian Marriage Act, 1872, seek or 
divorce under the Special Marriage Act 1954? Two High Courts 
have given conflicting rulings - Rajasthan^^ saying yes, 
AllahabcP^ No. The Act itself is not clear on the point, though 
the preamble - an Act to provide an special form of marriage in 
certain cases for the registration of, such and certain other 
marriages and for divorce - tilts in favour of the Rajasthan ruling. 
Was it not imperative case to examine all these aspects of the law? 
Could it not have upheld the already available Rajasthan ruling 
and give the desired relief to the poor tribal girl, paving the way 
for salvaging in future other women finding themselves in a similar 
mess. 
In this case nothing of this sort was done, the only thing 
which was done to suggest the government to enact a Uniform 
Civil Code and to admonish the Muslims for their unfavourable 
reactions to the Shah Bano ruling. 
What the Jordan Dingdeh case, and many other judicial case 
have brought to the limelight for a recodification of the Christian 
law in India. Last codified in 1865-1872 on the basis of the 
progress made till then in Britain, statutory Christian law is now 
rather outdated. It is the women who are the worst sufferers under 
the 19th century Christian-law statutes of 1866 to 1872. Not only 
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nation - Indian nation - and no community could 
claim to remain a separate entity on the basis of 
religion." 
These observations of the learned judge requires a close 
scrutiny. If we go through the above observation than we come to 
the following conclusion. 
(i) India was partitioned in 1947 by the protagonist of "two-
nation theory". 
(ii) Indian leaders did not believe in that theory. 
(iii) In the RepubHc of India there was to be only "one nation -
the Indian nation." 
(iv) In the Indian republic "No community could claim to remain 
a separate entity on the basis of religion." 
(v) Those who prefer to remain in India after partition "fully 
knew this". 
Therefore, the government of India is directed to immediately 
enact a Uniform Civil Code by introducing a bill in the Parliament. 
The above observations or the 'obiter dicta' of the judgement 
have ruined the sensible "ratio decidendi' of this case that is to 
hold the second marriage of a Hindu husband after his conversion 
to Islam (without getting his first marriage dissolved) as void 
marriage. 
The observations of Justice Kuldeep Singh need close 
scrutiny. Firstly, we will take the observation that the Hindus 
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along with Sikhs, Buddhists and Jains have foresaken their 
sentimetns in the cause of national unity and integrity. The 
concrete issue before the court was that while the statutory Hindu 
law did not and the Muslim Personal law as enforced in India did 
allow bigamy, could a Hindu husband circumvent the restriction 
by anouncing a sham conversion to Islam? 
Assertively ruling that the law could not allow him to do so, 
the court ascribed the problem to the plurality of the personal laws 
in the country and stressed the need for a uniform of the Islamic 
law on bigamy - more often by non-Muslims than by Muslims 
themselves - is, of course, is a growing menace. While it does 
call for urgent remedial measures, seeking those measures in the 
terribly complex issue of a Uniform Civil Code ignores the maxim 
'Justice delayed is Justice denied'. In the opinion of the court the 
delay on the part of the government in enacting a Uniform Civil 
Code is attributable to "reasons too obvious to be stated." On 
the one hand the court said that the reasons are too obvious to be 
stated and on the other hand the court discussed those obvious 
reasons in full detail. It seems that the court also believes in 
certain popular misconceptions in respect of personal laws and 
the constitutional provisions relating to a Uniform Civil Code. 
The courts ruling that majority has foresaken their personal 
laws for the sake of national unity is also not correct. If we go 
through the legislative history of four Hindu-Law-Statutes we find 
that these statutes were enacted not for the sake of national unity 
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but for ameliorating the conditions of Hindu women. The 
legislative history of the four Hindu statutes makes it clear that a 
Hindu Code Bill was inherited by independent India from the pre-
consitution regime. After the introduction of Article 44 it was 
discussed in the Parliament for about four years. In 1954 it 
enacted a new general non-religious law of marriage and divorce -
The Special Marriage Act 1954 - attaching to it also the secular 
law of succession contained in Chapter 2 of Part III of the Indian 
Succession Act, 1935. Instead of applying these secular laws 
compulsory to the majority community, within the next two years 
Parliament enacted two special laws - The Hindu Marriage Act, 
1955 and the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Both retaining many 
rehgious based provisions. The already available secular laws of 
minority and guardianship -The Indian Majority Act 1875 and The 
Guarandians and Wards Act 1880 - were also not found fit 
enough for the majority community. Instead, a New. Hindu 
Minority and Guardianship Act was enacted in 1956. Special 
provisions relating to maintenance if wife and other relations were 
included in the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act 1956. The 
most important feature of the above mentioned Hindu law statutes 
was that it reserved certain family rights relating to adoption, 
guardianship and maintenance etc. for the Hindus only and if a 
person ceases to be a Hindu it would result in the loss of above 
mentioned certain special rights. 
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Secondly, all the four Hindu-law statutes were not enacted for 
the directive of Article 44. As the vast population of Hindu tribe 
was kept out of all the Hindu law enactments of 1955-56 and were 
left free to follow their age old customs and those who were 
brought within the fold of newly enacted laws again certain local 
and caste customs relating to the extra-judicial divorce and 
women's property rights were specifically protected. We can say 
that the new Hindu Personal Law of 1955-56 was, thus, neither 
uniform nor free from religion based and sex based discrimination 
as it made many 'exceptions' in the form of customs and castes. 
It may be noted that these four Hindu law statutes were clearly 
against the directive of Article 44. 
Persisting in the anti-uniformity policy in respect of the 
Personal Law of the majority, in 1962 when Goa, Daman and Dieu 
were liberated the local Hindu usages decrees of 1880's of the 
Portugese regimes were legally protected. Though wholy outdated 
and different from the Hindu law statutes of the main land, those 
decrees are still inforce in the State of Goa and the territories of 
Daman and Dieu, as exceptions of the Portugese Civil Code of 
1867.« 
In 1976 the Indian Succession Act till then compulsorily 
applicable to all those who voluntarily opted for the non-religious 
marriage law of the Special Marriage Act, was made wholy in 
applicable to the Hindus, Buddhists, Jains and Sikhs. Hence 
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fourth they would be governed by the religion based Hindu 
Succession Act even if they married - within those four 
communities - under the Special Marriage Act (while in the same 
situation members of the other communities would be still 
governed by the Indian Succession Act). Adopted on the 
recommendation of the law commission (which as per the court 
judgement should now be asked to draft a Uniform Civil Code) 
this measure had clearly put Article 44 in the reverse gear.'*'* 
Thus, the observation of Justice Kuldeep Singh that the 
Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists and Jains, have foresaken their 
sentiments for the sake of 'national unity and integration' is not 
true rather the codified Hindu Law of 1955-56 was extended to 
these communities because these three communities never had any 
scripture - based personal laws of their own. Even before 1955-
56 they were governed by Hindu law subject to some contrary 
usages of their own; and there is still ample room for the retention 
of those special usages under all the Hindu law enactments of 
1955-56. As far as Muslims, Christians and Parsis are concerned 
they always had their own religion based Personal laws. 
It may be observed that the Hindu law statutes do not at all 
satisfy the constitutional ideals of secularism, gender justice, legal 
equality and uniformity. They cannot be imposed on the other 
communities in the name of a Uniform Civil Code. A very 
important comment appeared in the Sunday Observer*^ by an 
imminent lawyer Indira Jaising : 
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"One of the largest beneficiaries of the absence of a 
Common Civil Code have been the Hindus. The shoe 
is really on their foot. The judgement (in Sarla 
Mudgal) exposes the hypocracy of the Hindu 
community rather than the so called backwardness of 
Muslim Personal Law ... Those who have misused it 
(The Law), The Hindus, are demanding a change as if 
it were a stick in their hands with which to beat the 
Muslims. No where in the BJP rheotric there an 
acknowledgement of the fact that it is the Hindus who 
have used the existing system to their advantage. 
Perhaps if there was such an acknowledgement, the 
other community would be more willing for a 
change." 
The observation of the court that Article 44 is based on the 
concept that there is no necessary connection between religion 
and Personal laws in a civilized society also needs a close 
scrutiny. It is submitted that under Islam the concept of religion 
covers the whole life cycle and even the hereafter. Law and 
religion under Islam cannot be seperated. Islam enjoins its believer 
to follow Shariah. These are numerous provisions in Our'an to 
this effect : 
"These are the limits ordained by God : so do not 
transgress them. If they do transgress the limits 
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ordained by god such persons wrong (themselves as 
well as others)".''^ 
As far as marriage is concerned in the words of Justice 
Abdur Rahim : 
"The Mohammadans Jurists regard the institution of 
marriage as partaking both of the nature of Ihadai or 
devotional acts and Muamlat or dealings among 
men." 
Seen from the religious angle, Muslim marriage is an 'Ihadaf 
(devotional act). The Prophet (SAW) is reported to have said the 
marriage is essential for every physically fit Muslim who could 
afford it. Moreover the following traditions may also be 
considered : 
"He who marries completes half his religion; It now 
rests with him to complete the other half by leading a 
virtuous life in constant fear of God." 
"There is no mockery in Islam". 
"There are three persons whom the Almighty himself 
has undertaken to help - First, he who seeks to buy 
his freedom; second, he who marries with a view to 
secure his chastity; and Third, he who fights in the 
cause of God." 
"... whoever marries a woman in order that he may 
retain his eyes - God putteth a blessedness in her for 
him, and in him for her." 
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The Prophet (SAW) is reported by some of the writers to say 
that marriage is equal to 'Jehad' (Holy War); it is sinful not to 
contract a marriage; it is a sunnah; and it is obligatory on those 
who are physically fit.''^  In view of the above it is not correct that 
Article 25 does not cover marriage. 
The irrationality of Justice Kuldeep Singh's approach can be 
seen by this observation noted below :"** 
"Article 44 is based on the concept that there is no 
necessary connection between religion and personal 
laws in a civilized society. Article 25 guarantees 
religious freedom where as Article 44 seeks to divest 
religion from social relations and personal laws. 
Marriages, succession and like matters of a secular 
character can not be brought within the guarantee 
enshrined under Articles 25, 26 and 29." 
He further observed : 
"The legislation - not religion - being the authority 
under which Personal law was permitted to operate 
and is continuing to operate, the same can be 
superseded supplemented by introducing a Uniform 
Civil Code. In this view of the matter no community 
can oppose the introduction of human Civil Code for 
all the citizens in the territory of India."^'^ 
He held the government responsible for its failure in the 
following words : 
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"The successive governments till date have been 
wholly remiss in their duty of implementing the 
constitutional mandate under article 44 of the 
Constitution of India. "^^ 
Besides other key concepts, secularism, religious and cultural 
freedom under Article 25 is not confined to freedom of 
conscience but its ambit covers the right to process, practice and 
propagate the religion by the citizens. Indeed, religion is a wide 
and pursuasive concept. It is not confined to 'faith' only because 
'practise' and propagation are the part and parcel of the religion. 
'Faith' represents the inner aspect of religions, while 'practise' 
and 'propagation' manifest the 'external aspect'.^' 
With great respect to the learned judges, it is submitted that 
under Islam the concept of religion covers the whole life-cycle 
and even the hereafter. Law and religion under Islam cannot be 
separated. Islam does not allow its believers to follow man made 
law or customs in matters of social life in contravention of 
Shariat. On each of these matter these are specific provision in 
the Holy Our'an and Muslims have been enjoined to warned of 
severe retribution in cases of contravention. 
After laying down the law an divorce the Our'an goes on to 
say : 
"These are the units ordained by God : so do not 
transgress them. If they do transgress the limits 
ordained by God, such persons wrong (themselves as 
well as others)."" 
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Once Lord Bryce speaking on the nature of Muslim law 
observed : 
"In Islam law is religion and religion is law, because 
both have same sources and an equal authority being 
both contained in the Divine Revelation' ... A 
revelation which covers whole sphere of man's 
thoughts and actions."" 
Justice Kuldeep Singh perhaps is totally ignorant about the 
history of Muslim Personal Law in India when he says : 
"Political history of India shows that during the 
Muslim regime. Justice was administered by the Qazis 
who would obviously apply the Muslim scriptural law 
to Muslims, but there was no similar assurance so far 
litigations concerning Hindus was concerned. The 
system, more or less, continued during the time of 
East India company, until 1772 when Warren Hastings 
made Regulations for the administration of civil justice 
for the native population, without discrimination 
between Hindus and Mohammadans. The 1772 
Regulations followed by the Regulations of 1781 
where under it was prescribed that either community 
was to be governed by its 'personal law' in matters 
relating to inheritance, marriage, religious usage and 
mstitutions. 5 5 
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A cursory perusal of the history of Muslim Personal Law in 
India reveals that the policy of non-interference in the Personal 
laws of other communities was established by Mohammad Bin 
Qasim, who conquered Sindh. The local population was, however, 
treated with utmost consideration as reflected in a letter written by 
powerful viceroy of Eastern Provinces of the Umayyad Empire 
Hajjaj to him : 
"They have been taken under our protection and we 
cannot in any way stretch out our hands upon their 
lives or property. Permission is given to them to 
worship their God. Nobody must be forbidden. They 
may live in their houses in whatever manner they 
like."-''» 
The historians attach little importance to Arab rule in Sindh; 
yet its indirect effects are many and far reaching. For example, 
the political arrangements made by Mohammad-lbn-Qasim with 
non-Muslims provided the basis for later Muslim policy in the 
sub-continent.^^ 
This policy of non-interference in religious and family matters 
was later on followed by Muslim rulers of Delhi during Mughal 
regime the Islamic law was the law of the land. The judiciary 
enforced the civil and criminal laws, but the non-musiims enjoyed 
the full freedom in respect of their personal laws. The British 
government also allowed the Muslims and Hindus to follow their 
own personal laws. 
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Section 27 of the Regulation of 1772 Provides : 
"That in all suits regarding inheritance, succession, 
marriage and caste and other usages or instructions 
the laws of the Koran with respect to Mohammadans 
and those of Shastras with respect to Gcntoos 
(Hindus) shall be invariably adhered to." 
Justice Kuldeep Singh further observed that : 
"It has been judicially acclaimed in the United States 
of America that the practice of polygamy is injurious 
to "public morals", even though some religion may 
make it obligatory or desirable by its followers. It can 
be superseded by the state just as it can prohibit 
human sacrifice or the practise of ''suttee'" in the 
interest of public order."^^ 
In Islam too polygamy is an "exception" to the genral rule 
of monogamy. To quote Billy Graham .• 
"Islam has permitted polygamy as a solution to social 
ills and has allowed a certain degree of latitude to 
human nature but only within strictly defined 
framework of law. Christian communities make a great 
show of monogamy, but actually they practise 
polygamy. No one is unaware of the part 
"mistresses" played in western society." In this 
respect, Islam is fundamentally honest religion, and 
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permits a Muslim to marry a second wife if he must, 
but strictly forbids all clandestine amatory association 
in order to safeguard the moral probity of the 
community. ^ ^ 
If polygamy is not permitted, the resuh will be sexual anarchy 
and moral deterioration. In fact, the western world has 
deteriorated morally. Some scholars advocate monogamy. But the 
unfortunate thing is that they do not think about the other side of 
the problem. The views of Aimie Besant is quite germane in the 
circumstances : 
"There is pretended monogamy in the west, but there 
is really polygamy without responsibility. The 
'mistress' is cut off when the man is weary of her and 
sinks gradually to the woman of the street for the first 
lover has no responsibility for the future and she is 
hundred times worse off than the sheltered wife and 
mother in the polygamous home. When we see the 
thousands of miserable women, who crowd the 
streets of western town during the night, we must 
surely feel that it does not be in western mouth to 
reproach Islam for its polygamy.^^ 
Thus, if our learned judges take the precedent of America 
about morality, the Muslims cannot be obliged to do so because 
Islam cannot achieve anything indirectly which it prohibits 
[ 140] 
Uniform Civil Code: Judicial Approach 
directly. America and other western countries pretend monogamy 
but they practise polygamy. 
The observation of Justice Kuldeep Singh that Article 44 is a 
decisive step towards national integration seems somewhat 
untenable. Delievering the main judgement, he proceeded to hold : 
"Those who prefer to remain in India after partition 
fully knew that the Indian leaders did not believe in 
two nation or three nation theory." 
This part of judgement is assailable. However, it is not a new 
assertion. This argument was put forward during the debate on 
Uniform Civil Code on the Draft Constitution where K.M. 
Munshi^*', M.R. Masani, Aladi Krishna lyer^' advocated about 
Uniform Civil Code. Justice R.N. Sahay although, concured with 
his companion Justice Kuldeep Singh but he was alive to the 
sensitivities, realities and magnitude of the problem. When he 
observed : 
"The pattern of debate, even today, is the same as 
was voiced forcefully by the members of the minority 
community in the Constituent Assembly. If, the non 
implementation of the provisions contained in Article 
44 amounts to great failure of Indian democracy' 
represents one side of the picture, then the other side 
claims that, 'logical probability appears to be that the 
code would cause dissatisfaction and disintegration 
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than serve as a common umberella to promote 
homogenity and national solidarity. 
Justice R.N. Sahay evaluates religious freedom and 
secularism in the following words : 
"Religious freedom, basic foundation of secularism, 
was guaranteed by Article 25 to 28 of the 
Constitution. Article 25 is very widely worded. It 
guarantees all persons, not only freedom of conscious 
but right to profess, practise and propagate 
religion."^^ 
Justice R.N. Sahay also explains 'religion' : 
"What is religion? Any faith or belief. The court has 
expanded religious liberty in its various phases 
guaranteed by overt acts of the individual. Religion is 
more than mere matter of faith. The Constitution by 
guaranteeing freedom of conscience ensured in 
aspects of religious belief and external expression of 
it were protected by guaranteeing right to freely, 
practise and propagate religion. 
Reading and reciting holy scriptures, for instance, Ramayana 
or Our'an or Bible or Guru Granth Sahib is as much a part of 
religion as offering food to deity by a Hindu or bathing the idol or 
dressing him and going to temple, mosque, church or 
Gurudwara.'" However, Justice R.N. Sahay favours the 
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implementation of Uniform Civil Code when he observed that 
'religious practises, violative of human rights and dignity and 
sacerdotal suffocation of essentially civil and material freedoms, 
are not autonomy but oppression. Therefore, unified code is 
imperative both for protection of the oppressed and for promotion 
of national unity and solidarity.^^ 
But while advocating the desirability of a Uniform Civil Code 
he again gave a sensible root for the attainment of the objectives 
contained in Article 44 when he says that 
"the desirability of Uniform Code can hardly be 
doubted. But it can concretise only when climate is 
properly built up by elite of the society, statesman 
amongst leaders who instead of gaining personal 
milage rise above and awaken the masses to accept 
the change."^'' 
He advised the government to entrust the responsibility to the 
law commission which may in consultation with minority 
commission examine the matter and bring about the 
comprehensive legislation in keeping with modern day concept of 
human rights for women. 
Eminent jurist and an expert of constitutional law H.M. 
Seervai's opinion about the Sarla Mudgal case is as follows : 
"It is unfortunate that supporting or opposing a 
Uniform Civil Code should do so without reference to 
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our Constitution and the law governing the two very 
large communities in our country - Hindus and 
Muslims. It becomes necesary to say this because of 
the amazing order passed (in Sarla Mudgal case). The 
Supreme Court cannot enforce the mandate of Article 
44 consequently the aforesaid order is null and 
void."^5 
His concluding observation is also quite germane. Those 
who have studied Hindu law and Mohammadan law will realise that 
a common Civil Code for the Hindus and the Muslims alike is an 
impossibility. To speak of Hindu Law might suggest that there is 
one law applicable to all Hindus, but this is not so. Before 1955-
56, Hindu law was divided in the first instance between two main 
schools, namely, the Mitakshara and Dayabhaga school ... There 
is no Common Civil Code governing marriage among Hindus ... 
Mohammadan law (also) does not uniformly apply to all 
Mohammadans. All Hindu law Acts provide in identical language 
that "nothing in those acts shall apply to members of scheduled 
tribes... A Common Civil Code is, therefore, a mirage.''^ 
Partha S. Ghosh comments on Sarla Mudgal judgement in 
following words : 
"Here are some hard facts one, there was stiff 
resistance to the passage of Hindu code Bill of 1955. 
Two according to the Indian census report of 1961 
I 144 1 
Uniform Civil Code: Judicial Approach 
the percentage of Hindus having more than one wife 
was more than that of the Muslims. Three, almost all 
Hindus still solemnize their marriags through religious 
customs although there is a civil wayout through the 
Special Marriages Act of 1954. The point here is that 
Indians in general are religious people and minorities 
are more so as they are everywhere. To force them to 
succumb to majoratarian pressure is not only bad 
politics it is also bad ethics. Let the demand (for 
Uniform Civil Code) come from the communities 
themselves. The role of the state should be that of a 
catalyst not that of a dictator."^^ 
As far as the order of the court, directing the Government of 
India to file an affidavit within a stipulated time, indicating therein 
the steps taken and the effort made, by the Government of India 
towards securing, a "Uniform Civil Code", is concerned, it is 
nothing but the violation of judicial restraint envisaged by the 
doctrine of "separation of powers" - which is an inherent 
characteristic of the Constitution of India. 
Though, the principle of uniformity, to be applied in making 
civil laws is fundamental in the governance of the country but if -
for any valid and important reason the state can not apply the 
principle of uniformity while making civil laws, no court in the 
country in any way have the principle enforced. The Constitution 
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leaves it, entirely and exlcusively to the wisdom of the state when, 
how, in what way, and to what extent, it can and should apply the 
principle of uniformity in making civil laws. 
It is submitted that the solution to be problem of unlawful 
bigamy lies in suitably amending the Hindu Marriage Act, 
improving the now cumbersome and vexatious judicial process 
for divorce, and properly codifying the true principles of the 
Muslim Personal Law. Constitutionally tenable, these steps will 
surely bear fruit. 
E. Ahmedabad Women Action Group Case^' 
After the judgement in Sarla Mudgal's case yet another 
verdict in the form of 'ratio decidendi" came in 1997 and some 
significant issues about the Muslim Personal law were raised by 
the petitioners in this case. A petition was filed, as a public 
interest litigation, which the Supreme Court disposed off with 
other two petitions filed by Lok Sevak Sang and Young Women 
Christian Association, raising similar questions about laws 
applicable to Hindus and Christians, respectively. The petition, as 
regards the Muslim Personal Law urged upon the court : 
(A) To declare Muslim Personal Law which allows polygamy as 
void as offending articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution. 
(B) To declare Muslim Personal Law which enables a Muslim 
male to give unilateral talaq to his wife without her consent 
and without resort to judicial process of courts, as void, 
offendings articles 13, 14 and 15 of the Constitution; 
[ 146] 
Uniform Civil Code : Judicial Approach 
(C) To declare that the mere fact that a Muslim husband takes 
more than one wife is an act of 'cruelty' within the meaning 
of clause Vlll(f) of Section 2 of the Dissolution of Muslim 
Marriages Act 1939; 
(D) To declare that the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on 
Divorce) Act, as void as infringing Articls 14 and 15; and 
(E) To declare the provisions of 'Sunni' and W/j/a' laws of 
inheritence which provide for lesser share for females as 
compared to the shares of males, void as discriminating 
against female only on the gound of sex. 
The other two petitions prayed for similar relief regarding 
Sections 2(2), 5(ii) and (ii), 6 and explanation to Section 30 of the 
Hindu Succession Act, 1956; Section 2 of the Hindu Marriage 
Act, 1955; Sections 3(2), 6 and 9 of the Hindu Minority and 
Guardianship Act, 1956 read with Section 6 of the Guardians and 
Wards Act, 1890, Hindu spouses unfettered right to make 
testamentory disposition; Sections 10 and 34 of the Indian 
Divorce Act, 1869 and sections 43 to 46 of the Indian Succession 
Act. 
The court did not dispose off any of the petition on merits 
because these issue involved state policies and, according to the 
court, they are best dealt by with the Legislature. The court, in 
this case, realizing the complexities involved in the issue raised 
before it and also knowing full its powers and limitations, refused 
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to oblige the petitioners by observing, at the outset that : 
"These writ petition do not deserve disposal on 
merits in as much as the arguments advanced by the 
senior advocate before us wholly involved issues of 
state policies with which the court will not ordinarily 
have any concern."^"^ 
The court supported its judgement in this case on the basis 
of its observations in earlier decisions, where the court had held 
that ''The remedy lies somewhere else and not hy knocking at the 
doors of the court. " The court quoted a number of significant 
judgements where similar isues came before it for adjudication. 
One such earlier petition was Maharishi Avadesh vs. Union of 
India.''^ In this case the Supreme Court of India dismissed a writ 
petition under article 32 of the Constitution. The relief prayed in 
this case were as follows : 
(a) to issue a writ of mandamous to respondent to consider the 
question of enacting a common civil code for all citizens of 
India; 
(b) to declare the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on 
Divorce) Act, 1986 as void being arbitrary and discriminatory 
and in violation of Articles 14 and 15, and Articles 44, 38, 39 
and 39A of the Constitution of India; and 
(c) to direct the respondents not to enact Shariat Act, 1937 in 
respect of those adversely affecting the dignity and rights of 
Muslim women and against their protection. 
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The court dismissed the petition saying that '^These are all 
matters for Legislature. The court cannot legislate in these 
matters. "''^  
The court had, for the same reasons in Reynold Rajmani Vs. 
Union of India,"^^ refused to add any new grounds of divorce, like 
divorce by mutual consent, to those already specified in the 
Indian Divorce Act. It was emphasized that the court can give the 
fullest amplitude of meaning to the existing provisions, but 
cannot extent or enlarge legislative policy hy adding a provision 
to the statute which was never enacted there. The court further 
emphasized the previously established trends in different cases 
explaning the fact that making law or amendment to a law is a 
slow process and the Legislature attempts to remedy where the 
need is felt more acute. It would be inexpedient and incorrect to 
think that all laws have to be make uniformly applicable to all 
people in one go. The mischief or defect which is most acute can 
be remedied by process of law at stges.^'' In this case validity of 
Sections 15, 16, 17, 29 (5) and 144 of the A.P. Charitable Hindu 
Rehgious and Endowments Act, 1987 were challenged. One of the 
questions before the court was whether it is necessary that the 
Legislature should make law uniformly applicable to all religious 
or charitable or pubic institutions and endowments established 
and maintained by people professing all religions. 
The court said ; 
"A uniform law, though is highly desirable, enactment 
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thereof in one go perhaps may be counter productive 
to unity and integrity of the nation... Making law or 
amendment to a law is a slow process and the 
legislative attempts to remedy where the need is felt 
most acute. It would, therefore be inexpedient and 
incorrect to think that all laws have to be made 
uniformly applicable to all people in one go." 
In another case'^ cited by the court while upholding the 
validity of the Bombay Prevention of Hindu Bigamous Marriages 
Act, 1946. The Bombay High Court held that : 
"... in a democracy the Legislature is constituted by 
the chosen representative of the people. They are 
responsible for the welfare of the state and it is for 
them to lay down the policy that that the state should 
pursue. Therefore it is for them to determine what 
legislation to put on the statute book in order to 
advance the welfare of the state." 
The court also held that, 
"Article 14 does not lay down that any legislation that 
the state may embark upon must necessarily be of an 
all embracing character." So far as the question of 
applicability of Part III of the Constitution to the 
personal laws, is concerned, both Chagla C.J., and 
Gajendragadkar, J., were of the opinion that "the 
personal laws do not fall within Article 13(1) at all." 
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The Supreme Court in Krishna Singh Vs. Mathura^^ opined 
that in process of applying the personal laws of the parties, the 
judges of the high court 'could not introduce their own concept 
of modernity'. In view of the Supreme Court, the Constitution 
maintained the position of Personal laws 'status quo'. In this case 
the Supreme Court, while considering the question whether a 
'sudra' could be ordaned to a religious order and become a 
'sanyasi' or 'yati^ and therefore installed as 'MahanC of the 
Garwa Ghat Math according to the tenets of the Sant Mat 
Sampradaya, Observed : 
"... Part III of the Constitution does not touch upon 
the personal laws of the parties. In applying the 
personal laws of the parties He (Judge) could not 
introduce his own concepts of modern times but 
should have enforced the law as derived from the 
recognised and authoritative sources of Hindu law, ...^ .^ 
Thus, Part III of the Constitution does not touch upon the 
personal laws of the parties and in applying the Personal laws, a 
judge may not introduce his own concepts of modern times but 
enforce the law as derived from recognised authoritative sources 
of that law. 
Moreover, regarding the observation of the Division Bench in 
Sarla Mudgal Vs. Union of India''^ that : 
"Marriage, succession and like matters of a secular 
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character cannot be brought within the guarantee 
enshrined under Articles 25, 26 and 27". 
The Supreme Court in the case clarified that in that case none 
of the decisions referred to above were placed before the Division 
Bench as they found no mention in the seperate judgements of 
Kuldeep Singh and R.N. Sahay, J.J. The question regarding the 
desirability of enacting a Uniform Civil Code did not directly arise 
in that case. The question in that case mainly related to embracing 
of Islam by a Hindu husband and his solemnization of a second 
marriage, etc. Regarding Uniform Civil Code, Sahay, J. in his 
seperate but concurring judgement, opined that while it was 
desirable to have a Uniform Civil Code the time was not yet ripe 
for that. Accordingly, the decision in Saria Mudgal ultimately 
centered around the main questions and the observations on the 
desirability of enacting the Uniform Civil Code were only by way 
of 'Obitor dicta'. 
Thus, the most important and the most appreciable part of 
the judgement is that the Supreme Court held that the 
observations made by Justice Kuldeep Singh "were incidently 
made".^^ 
Apart from these cases the court in Ahmadabad Women 
Action Group also referred to its opinions expressed in two more 
cases, Madhu Klshwar Vs. State of Bihar^'^ and Anil Mahsi Vs. 
Union of India."^^ In Mahdu Kishwar the court gave depiction of 
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customary diversity existing among different people and religions 
of the country and held the view that enforcing of equality 
principle by judicial activism was difficult and arduous tasks. An 
activist court is not fully equipped to cope with the details and 
entricacies of legislative subject. 
In Anil Kumar Mahsi case the court, in an illustrative way 
explained that the total uniformity between the spouses might not 
be probable and refused to declare section 10 of the Indian 
Divorce Act as violative of the Article 14 of the Constitution. 
The court in this case did not look into the constitutionality 
of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 
1986 because that issue was already pending before the 
Constitution Bench. Thus, the court did not dispose off any of 
the issue involved in the case on merits. Instead declared them as 
involving state policies which fell within the ambit of the 
Legislature. 
Justice Ahmadi in this case has rightly mentioned that the 
court should mentioned the 'self restraint' of the judiciary 
particulary in a matter relating to Personal laws which happens to 
be an extremely sensitive issue in India. The judgement of the 
apex court is a welcome decision and it should be appreciated 
because it shows the commitment of the judiciary to the doctrine 
of "Separation of Power" which is the backbone of any modern 
democratic state. 
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Summary 
No single Article of 'Directive Principles of State Policy' 
has attracted such high pitched controvercy as 'Uniform Civil 
Code' under Article 44, which reads as, "the state shall 
endeavour to secure for citizens a Uniform Civil Code throughout 
the territory of India". 
Some court cases have been discussed in this chapter which 
attracted attention of affected groups. In these cases either the 
constitutionality of personal laws has been challenged or the 
courts have taken suo-moto action in favour of enactment of 
Common Civil Code. 
The first such case was State of Bombay vs Narasiioppa 
Mali in which modifications in Hindu law were challanged on the 
grounds that they violate Articles 14, 15 and 25 of the 
Constitution. Arguements were put forward that marriage among 
Hindus is a part of religion and having a son is regarded as 
spiritual benefit. Hence, polygamy was justified but these 
arguments were rejected by Gajendra Gadkar J. The court opined 
in favour of adoption of a son rather than for a second marriage. 
Chagla C.J. also upheld the validity of Bombay Act relying on 
Davis vs. Beason case. The court kept itself aloof and left the 
issue of Uniform Civil Code for Legislature. 
Like Bombay Act, the Madras Hindu (Bigamy and Divorce) 
Act of 1949 was also challanged on the same grounds. The court 
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observed that while religious beliefs were protected by the 
Constitution, the religious practices can be regulated by state. In 
the case of Ram Prasad vs. State of U.P. also the Allahabad High 
Court upheld the statutory provisions prohibiting bigmay among 
Hindus. 
Much controversial Shah Bano case was filed under section 
125 CrPC in 1978 at Indore. The case went up to the Supreme 
Court. Chief Justice Chandrachud delivered the judgement on 
behalf of five judges Bench. The learned judge made certain 
observations for Muslim Personal Law and Uniform Civil Code. 
The court strongly criticized Government of India for its sheer 
inability in enacting Uniform Civil Code. Later All India Muslim 
Personal Law Board also intervened arguing that interpretation of 
Shariah and Our'an by the Court is unwarranted. The judgement 
provided ammunition to Muslim bashers and communalised the 
atmosphere. Thus judicial self restraint is needed on such matters. 
Another case for discussion is related to Christian Personal 
Law. Justice O. Chinappa Reddy delivered the judgement without 
considering Christian Personal Law or the wishes of Christian 
community. 
In Sarla Mudgal case the personal laws of Hindus, Muslims 
and Uniform Civil Code were touched and the judgement favoured 
the enactment of Uniform Civil Code. 
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After the Sarla Mudgal case, another case, through Public 
Interest Litigation (PIL) raised some issues about the Muslim 
Personal Law. Issues covered were polygamy, unilateral talaq, 
Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act 1986 and 
inheritance laws. This PIL was filed by Ahmedabad Action Group 
and disposed off by Supreme Court alongwith two other petitions 
filed by Lok Sevak Sang and young Women Christian 
Association. The court did not dispose off any of the case left 
them for legislature. In this case, the court tried to restore original 
constitutional position of Uniform Civil Code. 
Thus it is clear from the discussions in this chapter, that 
whenever the constitutionality of any provision(s) of any personal 
law was challenged on the ground of being violative of 
fundamental rights, the court exercised self-restraint and left the 
matter for the wisdom of the legislature saying that it is a matter 
of state policies, with which the court is not ordinarily, 
concerned. 
However, it is equally true that on many occasions the court 
unnecessarily stepped into the shoes of an activist, emphasizing 
the desirability of the enactment of a 'Uniform Civil Code'. This 
happened mostly when the issues involved in the cases did not at 
all require such incidental observations. Sometimes, even side-
stepping the issues involved in the case, the court made un-called 
for remarks about 'Uniform Civil Code'.*^ 
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Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles 
of State Policy 
This chapter is intended to be an analytical note on 
Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles and their source. The 
researcher has taken into account the legislative history well 
categorised into three periods. In fact, it has been tried to 
demolish the myth that Directive Principles of State Policy can 
override Fundamental Rights. 
The Directive Principles of State Policy contained in the Part 
IV of the Indian Contitution is borrowed from the Constitution of 
Ireland which had copied it from the Spanish Constitution. Part 
IV of the Indian Constitution sets out the aims and objectives to 
be taken up by the states in the governance of the country. The 
idea of a welfare state envisaged in our Constitution can only be 
achieved if the states endeavour to implement them with a high 
sense of moral duty. The key to the directive principle is found in 
Article 37 which runs : 
"The provisions contained in this part shall not be 
enforceable by any court, but the principle there in lay 
down are nevertheless fundamental in the governance 
of the country and it shall be the duty of the state to 
apply these principles in making laws." 
Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles of State Policy 
"Article 37 thus confers no enforceable rights on any 
person nor imposes no enforceable obligation on the 
'state', as widely defined in Article 12. The word 
'fundamental', in the governance of 'the country' is 
described in rhetorical language, hope, ideals and 
goals rather than the actual reality of government. The 
principal object in enacting the directive principles 
appears to have been to set standards of achievement 
before the legislature and executive, the local and 
other authorities, by which their success or failure 
could be judged. It was also hoped that those failing 
to implement the directives might, receive a rude 
awakening at the poles."' 
In this chapter an attempt has been made to scrutinise 
supreme court's decisions on Directive Principles, which fall into 
three periods. 
A. Champakam Dorai Rajan^ to Chandra Bhawan case^ 
B. Chandra Bhawan case to Minerva Mills case."* 
C. Post Minerva Mill's cases 
A. First Period (Champakam Dorai Rajan to Chandra 
Bhavan) 
Champakam Dorai Rajan case^ 
In this case a government order reserved certain seats for 
admission into a medical college on communal lines comprising 
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non-Brahmins, Backward Hindus, Brahmins, Harijans, Anglo 
Indian and Indian Christians and Muslims. 
It was challenged on the ground that it was violative of Art. 
29(2). The order was justified on the ground that it implemented 
the Directive Principle in Art. 46. Rejecting this contention, S.R. 
Das J. said : 
"The Directive Principles... which by Art. 47 are 
expressly made unenforceable by a court, can not 
override the provisions found in Part III which 
notwithstanding other provisions are expressly made 
enforceable by appropriate writs, orders and direction 
under Art. 32. The chapter on Fundamental Rights is 
sacrosanct and not liable to be abridged by any 
legislative and executive Acts or Order except to the 
extent provided in the appropriate Art. in Part III. The 
Directive Principles ... have to be conformed to and 
run as subsidiary to the chapter on Fundamental 
Rights". 
Justice Das further held that if a law made in implementing 
Art. 47 could override Fundamental Rights, Art. 16(4), which 
conferred a power to reserve seats in public employment for any 
backward class of citizens would be redundant. 
Hanif QureshVs case (1959)« 
In this case, there was a direct conflict between the right to 
carry on butcher's business (Art. 19(1) (g) and Art. 48 Directive 
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Principles. In this case the prohibition of impugned Acts directly 
affected the business of the petitioners, who were butchers, 
because 
"The last part of the Directive Principles embodied in 
Art. 48 requires the State to take steps for prohibiting 
the slaughter of the specified animals and this 
Directive can be carried out by prohibiting the 
petitioners and other butchers {Kasai's) from 
slaughtering them^" 
Justice S.R. Das said : 
"The Directive Principles can not override this 
categorical restrictions imposed on the legislative 
power of the state. A harmonious interpretation must 
be placed upon the Constitution, and so interpreted it 
means that the state should certainly implement the 
Directive Principles but must do so in such a way as 
not to take or abridge Fundamental Rights." Chief 
Justice Das further held "That the total ban on the 
slaughter of she - buffaloes, bulls and bullocks (cattle 
or buffalow) after they cease to be capable of yielding 
milk or of breeding or working as draught animals 
could not be supported as reasonable in the interest 
of general public." 
Das C.J. held the aforesaid "total ban" ureasonabie for the 
following reasons: 
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(a) the unfit and useless cattle kept alive were allowed to run 
wild and they were a danger to men and crops; 
(b) Old and unfit cattle were left to fend for themselves in 
"concentration camps" and were left to a process of slow 
death which did the no good; 
(c) the presence of a large number of old and useless cattle had 
an adverse effect on the breed of cattle; 
(d) useless cattle consumed fodder which was much needed for 
fit cattle; 
(e) to spend Rs. 19 per head in preserving useless cattle when 
the expenditure on national education was Rs. 5 per capita 
(as opposed to Rs. 104.6 and Rs. 223.7 per capita expanded 
in the United Kingdom and the United States respectively) 
was "illogical and extravagant bordering on the 
incongruous".^ 
(f) because of its cheapness, beef and buffalow meat were the 
principle source of much needed protein consumed by the 
poorer people of certain communities who would be 
deprived of essential protein by such prohibition; 
(g) such prohibition would deprive to 2,00,000persons and their 
families of their livelihood. 
The judgement also shows a contravention of the Directives 
in the earlier part of Art. 48 and of the directives in Arts. 41,45 
and 47. 
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Thus, reasons (a) to (d) show a contravention of that part of 
Art. 48 which speaks of the state organizing animal husbandry of 
modern and scientific lines and of preserving and improving the 
breed of cattle. 
Reason (e) above shows the contravention of Art. 45, 
because money which can be spend on providing free and 
compulsory eduction was illogically and extravagantly spent on 
maintianing cattle. Reason (f) shows a violation of Art. 47 when it 
speaks of raising the level of nutrition and living standard of 
people, and reason (g) shows violation of Art. 47 and also of Art. 
41 which speaks of the state making effective provision for 
securing the right to work. The prohibition would destroy the 
right to work of over 2,00,000 persons without providing them 
alternative work. 
Thus the implementation of a part of Art. 48 violated other 
parts of the same Article, besides violating the directive principles 
in Arts. 41,45 and 47.'o 
In In re Kerala Education Bill 1957 Das C.J., held that the 
fundamental right conferred by Art. 30 had been expressely 
conferred on minority communities, and as long as the 
Constitution stood they could not be taken away. Directive 
Principles about free and compulsury education could not be 
implemented at the expenses of minorities; the state could 
implement the directive principles in Art. 45 by making good the 
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loss suffered by minorities educational institution as a result of not 
charging for. He further observed that the provisions of the Bill 
which required school belonging to minority community not to 
charge any fees in primary classes "would in a fact make it 
impossible for an educational institution established by a minority 
community being carried on." 
The Supreme Court further observed that though the 
Directive Principle can not override the Fundamental Rights, 
nevertheless, in determining the scope and ambit of fundamental 
right the court may not entirely ignore the directive principle but 
should adopt "the principle of harmonious construction and 
should attempt to give effect to both as much as possible." It 
must be noted that there was a direct conflict between the right of 
minority communities and the Directive Principles in Art. 45, and 
no question of the reasonableness of restrictions arose in this 
case, as it arose in Hanif Qureshi's case.'^ 
B. The Second Period (Chandra Bhavan to Minerva Mills) 
In Chandra Bhawan's case^^ Hedge J. made the following 
observation : 
"... It is a fallacy to think that under our Constitution 
there are only rights and no duties. While rights 
conferred under Part III are fundamental, the 
directives given under part IV are fundamental in the 
governance of the country. We see no conflict on the 
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whole between the provisions contained in part III and 
part IV. They are complementry and supplementary to 
each other." 
It was a strange observation because there was a no question 
of direct conflict between the directive principle in Art. 43 and 
fundmental right, under Art. 40 and Art. 19. Moreover none was 
argued before the court. These observations are, therefore, 
'obiter' and they can not overrule the three' cases discussed 
above laid down the position of directive principles vis-a-vis 
fundamental rights. It may, however, be stated that the observation 
"we see no conflict on the whole between" the provisions 
contained in Part III and Part IV" tells us nothing as to what is to 
happen if a conflict does arise. Secondly, the dichotomy between 
part III, which confers rights, and part IV, which is said to impose 
duties, is untenable if "rights" and "duties" are used in their 
legal sense. A law "implementing the directive in Art. 4 3 " which 
imposes a duty on employers to pay a minimum wage, confers a 
right on workmen to claim a minimum wage. 
In the draft Constitution prepared by the Constitutional 
Advisor, Sir B.N. Rau,'^ Part III was entitled "Fundamental 
Rights including Directive Principles of State Policy". Chapter I 
was "General" and Art. 10 therein stated that "the principles of 
policy set forth in Chatper III of this part are intended for the 
guidance of the state. While the principles are not enforceable in 
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any court, they are nevertheless fundamental in the governance of 
the country and it shall be the duty of the state to apply these 
principles in making laws". Chapter II was entitled "Fundamental 
Rights" and containted Arts. 1 to 30. Chapter 111 was entitled 
"Directive Principles of State Policy" and these principles were 
set out in Arts. 31 to 41, Sir B.N. Rau had discussions in Dublin 
with President De Valera on the working of the directive principles 
in relation to fundamental rights under the Irish Constitution,'* 
and, as a result of his discussion, Sir B.N. Rau suggested the 
following amendements in the draft Constitution : 
At beginning of cl. 9(2) [now Art. 13(2)] insert the words 
"Subject to the provisions of Cl. 10" [which emphasised the 
fundamental nature of directive principles].^ To clause 10 add the 
following : 
"No law which may be made in the discharge of its 
duty under the first paragraph of this section, and no 
law which may haye been made by the state in 
pursuance of principles of policy now set forth in 
Chapter III this part shall be void merely on the 
ground that it contravenes the provisions of (Cl.) 9, 
or is inconsistent with the provisions of Chapter 111 
of this part."'^ 
He said that the object of these amendments was : 
"... to make it clear that in a conflict between the 
rights conferred by Chapter II (Fundamental Rights) 
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which are for the most part rights of the individual 
and the principles of policy set forth in Chapter III 
which are intended for the welfare of the state as a 
whole, the general welfare should prevail. Otherwise, 
it would be meaningless to say as clause 10 does say 
that these principles are fundamental and that it is the 
duty of the state to give effect to them in its laws."'" 
The minutes of the Drafting Committee show that these 
amendments were either not considered or not accepted.''^ In any 
event, the amendments were not made in the Constitution, as 
finally enacted. The relevant documents show that between those 
who wanted to make the directive principles justiciable and those 
who wanted to make them non-justiciable, the latter won the day.^ ° 
Therefore, it is not surprising that the amendments suggested by 
Sir B.N. Rau to give primacy to directive principles over 
fundamental rights in case of conflict, were not adopted. It is 
necessary to add that because directive principle have received 
increasingly greater importance since the Constitution was 
enacted, it would be inaccurate re-writing of history to say that 
the framers of our Constitution gave primacy to directive 
principles over fundamental rights.^' 
Theoretically, a merely declaratory Bill of Rights was open to 
the framers of our Constitution, but the practical compulsion of 
our fight for independence made a judicially enforceable Bill of 
Rights inevitable. In our Constitution fundamental rights are strict 
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rules of law limiting legislative and executive power. This is 
emphasized first by Art. 13 (2) which expressly delcares that any 
law made in contravention of fundamental rights is protanto void 
and, secondly, by Arts. 32 and 226 which confer on the Supreme 
Court and the High Courts respectively the power to grant relief 
against the violation of fundamental rights by the issue of 
appropriate writs. As pointed out by Prof, de Smith, fundamental 
rights could have been made merely declaratory by putting them 
in the preamble, or including them in directive principles of state 
policy. We will revert to this contrast between fundamental rights 
and directive principles later.-^ ^ 
In the result, Part III of our Constitution was entitled 
"Fundamental Rights", and Part IV was entitled "Directive 
Principles of state Policy". This separation of fundamental rights 
and directive principles emphasizes the fact that they are in their 
nature and effect essentially different.^^ 
An important aspect of directive principle of state policy is 
that even if Part IV had not be enacted, the objective of the 
Constitution set out in the Preamble would have to remain; so that 
justice, social, economic and political would have remained as an 
objective of the Constitution. The reference to justice, social, 
economic and political in Part IV is followed by detailed 
provisions which are believed to bring about social, political and 
economic justice. If the directive principle are to be applied in 
making laws they rightly assume the existence of legislative power. 
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In our own Constitution legislative powers are plenary except to 
the extent that they are fittered by fundamental rights and other 
Constitutional limitations. Therefore, even without directive 
principles. Parliament and State legislature can in the exercise of 
their legislative powers enact laws with respect to matters 
mentioned in the directive principles. 
Minerva Mills case'^^ is a very revolutionary judgement 
relating to the inter relation between Part III and Part IV of the 
Indian Constitution. The case was heard by a five judge 
Constitution Bench. The brief facts of the case are as follows : 
The Minerva Mills, a limited company, owned a textile 
undertaking in Karnataka. The undertaking was nationalised and 
taken over by the Central government under the provision of the 
Sick Textile Undertaking (Nationalisation) Act., 1974. The 
petitioners challenged the Constitutional validity of the said Act. 
the petitioners further challenged the Consitutionality of the 39th 
(Amendment) which inserted the impugned Nationalisation Act as 
Entry 105 of the IX Schedule to the Constitution. 
The moot question came before the Supreme Court was the 
Constitutional validity of Art. 3IB. Finally, the petitioners 
challenged the Constitutional validity of Sections 4 and 55 of the 
Constititon (42 Amendment) Act, 1976. The Constitution Bench 
decided only the challenge to the said sections 4 and 55. Section 
55 inserted the following sub-articles (4) and (5) in Art. 368 : 
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"(4) No Amendment of this Constitution (including 
the provisions of part III) made or purporting to have 
been made under this article (Whether before or after 
the commencement of section 55 of the Constitution 
(Forty-Second Amendment) Act, 1976] shall be called 
in question in any court onany ground. 
(5) For the removal of doubts, it is hereby 
declared that there shall be no limitation whatever on 
the constituent power of parliament to amend by way 
of addition, variation or repeal the provisions of this 
Constitution under this Article." 
The majority judgements was delivered, by Chandrachude 
C.J. for himself and Gupta, Untwalia and Kailasam J.J., and 
Minority Judgement by Bhagwati J. In majority judgement the S.C. 
were held that Sections 4 and 55 of the Amending Act were void. 
Bhagwati J. partially agreed with majority opinion that the Section 
55 was void, and Section 4 was valid. The attempt to confer a 
primacy upon the directives as against the fundamental rights has, 
however, been foiled in two respects : 
(a) It has struck down the widening of Art. 31C to include any 
or all of the Directives in Part IV, on the ground that such 
total exclusive of judicial review would offend the 'basic 
structures' of the Contitution. In the result. Art. 3IC is 
restored to its pre-1976 position, so that a law would be 
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protested by Art. 31C only if it has been made to implement 
the directive in Art. 39(b)-(c) and not any of the other 
Directives included in Part IV. 
(b) That there is a fine balance in the original Constitution as 
between the Directives and the Fundamental Rights, which 
categories of provisions, instead of giving any general 
preference to the Directive Principles. 
Further, Chandrachud C.J. referred to the history of India's 
struggle for independence, and to the Constituent Assembly 
Debates, to show how deeply our people valued their personal 
liberties which were regarded as indispensable, and as an integral 
part of our Constitution. He then traced the history of the demand 
for fundamental rights, and referred to the following observations 
of the 'Motilal Nehru' Committee : 
"It is obvious that our first care should be to have 
our fundamental rights guaranteed in a manner which 
will not permit their withdrawal under any 
circumstances ... Another reason why great 
importance attaches to a declaration of rights is the 
unfortunate existence of communal differences in the 
country. Certain safeguards are necessary to create 
and establish a sense of security among those who 
look upon each other with distrust and suspicion."^^ 
After referring to the Sapru Report, 1945, Chandrachud C.J. 
observed : 
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"To destroy the guarantees given by Part III in order 
purportedly to achieve the goals of Part IV is plainly 
to subvert the Constitution by destroying its basic 
structure. "^^ 
He further observed : 
"The goals set out in part IV have, therefore, to be 
achieved without the abrogation of the means 
provided for by Part III. It is in this sense that Parts 
III and IV together constitute the case of our 
Constitution and combine to form its conscience. 
Anything that destroys the balance between the two 
parts will ipso facto destroy an essential element of 
the basic structure of our Constitution.'^^ 
In our Constitution there are additional grounds why the laws 
designed to secure social welfare on the lines of the directive 
principles in Part IV should not override fundamental rights. Part 
IV deals with only one of the several objectives of our 
Constitution as set out in the Preamble, namely. Justice, Social, 
Economic and Political.^^ But the Preamble sets out other 
objectives, which, if not more important than justice, social, 
economic and political are not less important; and it is reasonable 
to suppose that the framers of our Constitution could not have 
intended that laws designed to secure one objective should be 
allowed to destroy all or any of the other objectives. 
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C. Third Period (Post Minerva Mills Cases) 
The decision of the court is in accordance with the spirit of 
the Constitution. But in Sanjeev Coke Mfy. Co. v. Bharat 
Cooking Coal Ltd?^ the Supreme Court expessed doubt on the 
validity of the decision in Minerva Mills case. A five judges Bench 
held that the question regarding the validly of Section 4 of the 
42nd Amendment was not directly at issue in Minerva Mills case 
and therefore, determination of that question was uncalled for and 
'obiter' and since the validity of Art. 31C, as originally introduced 
in the Constitution, had been upheld in Kesavanand Bharti's case, 
it should lead to the conclusion that Art. 31-C as amended by the 
42nd Amendmend is also valid. 
It is submitted that the court has only expressed doubt about 
the validity of Minerva Mills decision but has not expressly 
overruled it, and therefore the decision regarding invalidity of 
Section 4 and 42nd Amendment in Minerva Mills case remains 
valid until it is overruled. This decision has again created 
conclusion which has been finally settled in earlier decisions that 
there is no conflict between foundamental right and directive 
principles and both are supplementry to each other. ^ ' 
We must now consider decided cases on the Articles in Part 
IV. However, we must bear in mind that those decisions are based 
on a view of a relation of fundamental rights by themselves and 
vis-a-vis directive principles of state policy which according to 
the present writer, is clearly wrong.^^ 
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The confusion created by the Sanjeev Coke Mfg. Co. Case" 
has been removed by decision of the Supreme Court in State of 
Tamil Nadu V.L. Abu Kaur Baf\ When the court held that 
ahhough the directive principles are not enforceable yet the court 
should make an attempt at harmonising and reconciling the 
directive principles and the fundamental rights and any collision 
between the two should be avoided as far as possible. The reason 
why the founding fathers of our constitution did not advisely 
make there principles enforceable was, the court said, perhaps due 
to vital consideration of giving the Government sufficient latitude 
to implement these principles from time to time according to 
capacity, situations and circumstances that may arise. 
In Unni Krishnan. J.P.V. State of A.P.^^ B.P. Jeevan Reddy 
J. stated the law thus-
"It is thus well established by the decisions of this 
court that the provisions of Part III and IV are 
supplementary and complementary to each other and 
that fundamental rights are but a means to achieve 
the goal indicated in part IV. It is also held that the 
fundamental rights must be construed in the light of 
the directive principles". 
In Bandhua Mukti Morcha V. Union of India^^\ the Court 
has also held that though the directive principles are unenforceable 
by the courts and the courts cannot direct the legislature or 
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executive to enforce them, once a legislation in pursuance of them 
has been passed, the courts can order the state to enforce the law, 
particularly when non-enforcement of law leads to denial of a 
fundamental right. 
It is now universally recognised that the difference between 
the fundamental rights and the directive principles lies in this that 
the fundamental rights are primarily aimed at assuring political 
freedom to the citizens by protecting them against excessive State 
action while the directive principles are aimed at securing social 
and economic freedoms by appropriate action. The fundamental 
rights are intended to foster the ideal of a political democracy and 
to prevent the establishment of authoritarian rule but they are of 
no value unless they can be forced by resort to courts, so they 
are made justiciable. However, notwithstanding their great 
importance the directive principles cannot in their nature of things 
be enforced in a court of law. It is unimaginable that any court 
can compel legislature to make a laws then parliamentary 
democracy would soon be reduced to a oligarchy of judges. It is 
for this reason that the Constitution says that the directive 
principles shall not be enforceable by courts.^ ^^ 
The Directives, however, differ from the fundamental rights 
contained in part III of the Constitution or the ordinary laws of 
the land, in the following respects. 
D. Directive Compared with Fundamental Rights 
(i) While the Fundamental Rights constitute limitations upon 
state action, the Directive principles are in the nature of 
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instrument of instructions to the Government of the day to 
do certain things and to achieve certain ends by their actions. 
(ii) The Directives, however, require to be implemented by 
legislation, and so long as there is no law carrying out the 
policy laid down in a Directive, neither the state nor an 
individual can violate any existing law or legal right under 
colour of following a Directive. 
(iii) The Directives are not enforceable in the courts and do not 
create any justiciable rights in favour of the individuals. 
From the stand point of the individual, the difference between 
the Fundamental Rights and the Directives is that between 
justiciable and non-justiciable rights- a classification which has 
been adopted by the framers of our constitution from the 
Constitution of Eire. Thus, though the Directive Principle under 
Art. 43 enjoins the state to secure a hving wage to all workers, no 
worker can secure a living wage by means of an action in a Court, 
so long as it is not implemented by appropriate legislation. In 
other words, the courts are not competent to compel the 
Government to carry out any Directive, e.g., to provide for free 
compulsary education within the time limited by Art. 45 or to 
undertake legislation to implement any of the Directive 
Principles'^. 
(iv) It may be observed that the declarations made in Part IV of 
the Constitution under the head 'Directive Principles of state 
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policy' are in many cases of a wider import than the 
declarations made in Part III as 'Fundamental Rights'. Hence 
the question of priority in case of conflict between the two 
classes of provisions may easily arise. But while the 
Fundamental Rights are enforceable by the Court (Arts 
32.226(i)) and the court are bound to declare as void any law 
that is inconsistent with any of the 'Fundamental Rights', the 
Directives are not so enforceable by the court (Art.37), and 
the Court cannot declare as void any law which in other wise 
valid, on the ground that it contravenes any of the 
;Directives'. Hence in case of any conflict between Parts III 
and IV of the constitution, the former should prevail in the 
Court. ^ ^ 
The analysis about the character and legal effect of 
Fundamental Rights and Diretive Principles of State Policy has 
clearly shown that the current fashionable view of their inter-
relation is untenable. It is not necessary to repeat what had been 
stated earlier, but a brief summary of preposition may be 
enumerated. The following propositions emerge from the 
discussion : 
(a) Our Constitution is the supreme or fundamental law because 
all laws and executive action contravening the Constitution 
are void. Consequently, fundamental rights are part of 
fundamental laws. Directive Principles, although provided in 
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the text of the Constitutions are not a part of the fundamental 
law, for they are not laws at all. No law executive action 
violating directive principle is void/" 
(b) Directive Principles are moral precepts which have an 
educative value, depending on their efficacy, the moral 
character and sense of duty of persons to whom the 
directives are addressed. 
(c) If fundamental rights had not been enacted, the result would 
have been disastrous, our liberal democracy could have been 
converted into a police state as happened during the 
operation of Emergency from 25 June 1975 to 21 March, 
1977. 
(d) If Directive Principle had not been enacted, nothing would 
have happened. For, government exist to work for the social, 
political and economic welfare of the governed, and 
legislative executive power enable them to do so. the welfare 
state has been created in many states whose constitution do 
not include directive principles, as experience from the 
example of England, U.S.A. and Canada. 
(e) Proposition in (c) and (d) above show that the similarity of 
fundamental rights and directive principles being two wheels 
of chariot so that if one is snapped the other would loose its 
efficacy is misleading and has infact misled the judges. 
(f) Fundamental Rights are not selfish individual rights but have 
a large social, political and economic content. Fundamental 
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rights carry with the duty not to use them to injure others or 
the states., or, to put it in move technical terms, fundamental 
impose the duty not to transgress the permissible limit, of the 
restriction put on those rights by law. 
(g) Fundamental Rights have brought about a social, political and 
economic revolution by subjecting legislative and executive 
despotism to the discipline of fundamental rights in order to 
protect basic human rights and values. Secondly, the equality 
provisions of our constitution relating to 'untouchability' 
have brought about a social revolutions, for, untouchable 
were restored to human dignity and were put on the same 
level as "High Caste Hindus", to use a familiar expression 
for lack of better words. Further, discrimination in their 
favour was expressively permitted. 
(h) Neither the enactment nor the existence of directive principles 
can bring about a social revolution, because their efficacy 
depends upon implementation by govenrment. These may 
belong to different parties, may be composed of cable 
mediocre or incapable person, of, persons who possess 
integrity and are incorruptible and persons who lack integrity 
and are corrupt. Further, from their very nature, all the 
directives were not intended to be implemented all at once 
and immediately. Several directives conflict with each other 
and there is also a conflict within individual Directives, and 
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Part IV contains no guidance as to how that conflict is to be 
resolved. Further, the emphasis of directive principle 
depends upon, financial and human resources and skills. 
(i) It may be stated here, although it has not been set earlier, that 
the directives like "A Living Wage" or "The Right to 
Work" are incapable of fulfilment either immediately or in the 
forseable future. The right to work, which means the right to 
gainfull employment has not been available even in the most 
wealthy and advance democratic countries. For, there is a 
larger or smaller number of people employed in all of them. 
As to a "Living Wage", the Supreme Court has held that it 
is an ideal which can not be realised inforseeable future, 
infact living wage has been likened by the supreme court to 
the horizon which risist as we draw near. For what is a living 
wage at one time may sink to the level of fair wage at another 
time. 
(j) Since Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles are the 
part of the same constitutions, although their legal status is 
different, and attempt must be made to harmonize laws made 
to implement directive principle with fundamental rights. In 
the case of an irreconciable conflict, fundamental right must 
prevail over the law implementing directive principles 
because such a law would be covered by Article 13 (2) and 
would be void. 
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Summary 
The Directive Principles of State Policy of Indian 
Constitution have incorporated points from the Constitution of 
Ireland which is itself an end result of copying Spanish 
Constitution. Directive Principles are in the Constitution to guide 
the State in the governance of our nation as a "welfare State". 
Article 37 clearly tells that, "The provisions shall not be 
enforceable by any court but the principles should be the guiding 
force in making the laws." 
The critical analysis clearly shows that attempts of 
propagating the views that Fundamental Rights and Directive 
Principles are inter-related are untenable. Directive Principles are 
moral guidance to State for enacting the laws. It is also proved 
that the soul of the Constitution is that Fundamental Rights are 
above Directive Principles and in case of any conflict between the 
two former should be accorded periority or the later. 
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Hindu Law Reform : The Goal of Uniformity 
and Gender Justice 
In this chapter attempt has been made to trace the legislative 
history of the Hindu law reforms proposals with the aim of 
identifying the reasons of those reforms with respect to women's 
legal rights and also scrutinising the areas where legal equality has 
not yet been achieved. For the purpose of studying the legislative 
process of Hindu law reform, it is necessary to critically analyse 
the official reports, expert's committee reports and Parliamentary 
Debates.^ Many people were involved in this process who, strictly 
speaking, were not part of the government or the state but they 
were working in close cooperation with the government, they were 
part of the state. They were influential people who framed the 
reform proposals which form the basis for further debate and 
state action. 
A detailed analysis of the process of Hindu law reforms 
reveals the reasons that were put forward to justify the denial of 
equal rights to women. If we go through the statements made by 
state functionaries about the basis of their authority then discover 
the perceptions of these political leaders about the relationship 
between the state and religion. The behaviour of the state shows 
that the state wanted to give women more legal rights, it was never 
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the intention to give complete legal equality to women. The state 
meant to improve the position of women as a component of its 
plan of modernisation, but it did not intent to upset or alter, in any 
substantial manner, the power structure of the family. The state 
assumed the authority to modify certain rules of Hindu law. The 
following vexed questions have been discussed in this chapter -
1. How consistently did the state persue its professed aims and 
what kind of opposition was generated to them? 
2. How did the state respond to opposition? 
3. What was the significance (implied or explicit) of the 
justifications of state action for the rights given to women? 
A. Hindu Law Reforms 
Under the Government of India Act, 1935 the Indians got an 
opportunity to have a representative Legislature. In 1937, G.V. 
Deshmukh, introduced a bill in the Federal Legislative Assembly 
on the Hindu women's right to property. When enacted, this bill 
purported to give the Hindu widow and widowed daughter's-in-
law in the property of deceased male. However, daughter's were 
excluded from its purview and due to this certain difficulties 
arose. Even after the Act was amended with retrospective effect 
in 1938, there were still several separate bills introduced in the 
federal Legislative Assembly to amend the Act. Mostly private 
bills were rejected. 
A Hindu Law Committee was appointed to suggest the 
modifications. The first Hindu Law Committee presented its 
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report in 1941. Although, it was asked to recommend changes in 
the Hindu women's Right to Property Act of 1937 and 1938, it 
presented a report with very different recommendation but not 
accepted. Because the Hindu Law Committee suggested that 'The 
better plan would be to leave the Acts to their operation for the 
present and enact a Comprehensive Law'} The first Hindu Law 
Committee prepared two bills, one dealing with succession and 
other with marriage. These were referred to separate joint 
committees. The joint committee on the succession bill suggested 
changes and recommended that the bill be recirculated while the 
joint committee on the marriage bill did not present a report.^ 
Upon the recommendation of the joint committee on succession 
bill the Hindu Law Committee was reappointed by the 
Government of India by a resolution passed on 20.1.1944. The 
Committee, with the dissent presented a Hindu Code Bill along 
with its report in 1947. The Hindu Code Bill was divided into five 
parts, dealing with marriage and divorce, intestate succession, 
minority and guardianship, maintenance and adoption and the 
Mitakshara joint family.'' In persuance of the report the Hindu 
Code Bill was introduced in the Federal Legislative Assembly on 
11 April, 1947. 
The partition of India on 15th August 1947 polarised the 
population on the basis of religious affiliations on both the sides. 
Even so, the political leaders of the newly independent state of 
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India decided to go ahead with the process of reform of Hindu 
law. The law ministry rearranged the Hindu Code Bill and this 
draft was referred by the government to a 'Select Committee' of 
the Constituent Assembly. The 'Select Committee' presented its 
report containing the revised Hindu Code Bill on 12 August 1948. 
This Hindu Code Bill was inconclusively debated by the Provincial 
Parliament and lapsed when that Parliament was dissolved in 1951. 
When the first elected Parliament assumed office in 1952 the 
government decided to split the Hindu Code Bill and introduce it 
as several separate bills. The Special Marriage Bill, The Hindu 
Marriage Bill, The Hindu Succession Bill, The Hindu Minority and 
Guardianship Bill and The Hindu Maintenance and Adoption Bill 
were all passed by 1956.^ 
It is interesting to note that the codification and reform of 
Hindu Law was not taken up in response to Public demand; rather 
the state had initiated the reforms in Hindu Personal Law, inspite 
of the opposition by the orthodox Hindu leaders assumed the 
responsibility for reform on its own initiative on different 
occasions the state justified its actions and explained the basis of 
its authority to reform Personal Laws in different ways. 
B. Demand for Change 
The demand of the reform of Hindu Law was made by a few 
social reformers and they started this work but without a 
systematic plan of action. These were certain members of the 
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Federal Legislative Assembly who were interested in changes to 
some aspects of Hindu Law and when gradually the control of the 
government passed into the Indian hands these Indian political 
leaders. Without bothering to the stiff opposition, carried their 
work of reforming Hindu Law to bring about social change with 
determination. 
C. The First Hindu Law Committee 
The first Hindu Law Committee which was appointed by the 
government enlarged its jurisdiction and went much beyond the 
terms of the reference. The first Hindu Law Committee based its 
opinion which permits the codification of Hindu Personal Law. In 
its report it relied on the authority of some of the scholars who 
had expressed their ideas in treatises and supported the move by 
writing to eminent people to elicit their views about codification. 
The questionnaire was distributed to judges, distinguished lawyers 
and citizens, members of the Central Legislature, High Court bar 
libraries, heads of religious institutions, women's associations, 
pandit's associations and others. Copies of questionnaire were 
published in the papers and some women associations had it 
translated into the vernacular.^ The report of the first Hindu law 
Committee cited the favourable public opinion where it was 
available but it did not follow the policy that a proposal would 
not be recommended if the majority of public opinion was 
opposed to such a change. The government accepted its report 
and the bill prepared by the First Hindu Law Committee because 
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'the report had a favourable reception.^^ However, it was keen to 
dispel the objection that it was rushing with the reform of Hindu 
Law when political conditions were so extraordinarily disturbed. 
The law member of the Central Government, Sultan Ahmad 
refuted the charge that the government was hurrying the Assembly 
and said that the government was simply giving effect to the 
desire of some Hindu legislators, who had introduced various bills 
to reform certain areas of Hindu Law. Sultan Alimad further 
claimed the support for codification from the fact that in the 
course of support for codification from the fact that in the course 
of discussing the motion to refer the succession bill to the joint 
committee, the majority of the representatives (of Hindus) had 
shown themselves to be in favour of reform. Twelve elected 
assembly members made speeches on Part I of the Hindu Code. 
Sultan Ahmad described eight in favour, three against and one 
sikh member as undecided about reforming and codifying Hindu 
Law.^ 
The law member also argued that a number of bills to amend 
the Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, 1937 and 1938, had 
made the rights of women so uncertain that it was important to 
enact part one of the Hindu Code Bill. The Hindu Law Committee 
was reconstituted by the government to complete the task of 
preparing Hindu Code Bill and a second Hindu Law Committee 
was constituted. A draft was prepared for the Hindu Code and 
this draft was prepared for the Hindu Code and this draft was sent 
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to few lawyers, of whom nine are reported to have sent their 
replies to Hindu Law Committee.^ 
The Committee, to gather the public opinion, toured the 
country. It was met with black flag protest demonstrations and the 
women constituted a substantial number of demonstrators. A 
substantial number of people who came before it to give evidence 
opposed the suggested changes. All these factors forced the 
committee to put forward a strong justification for continuing to 
advocate changes in Hindu Lav/. The Committee classified the 
public opinion into three categories. According to this 
classification, the first category comprised those people who 
where extremely orthodox hence opposed to the entire idea of 
reform and codification. The second category comprised of those 
people who were ultra-progressive and who wanted one uniform 
territorial law for the entire population. However, the bulk of the 
Hindu community occupied a middle position. Archana Parashar 
observed : 
"By this observation the committee probably meant 
that the bulk of Hindus were neither against nor in 
favour of reforms and, therefore, the committee could 
recommend that the Legislature proceed with the 
reforms. But the conclusion about the attitude of the 
bulk of Hindus was not based on concrete evidence, 
as the members of the second Hindu Law Committee 
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had no means of determining the opinions of most 
Hindus. With regard to the opinions tendered to the 
committee, it decided that the 'quality' of opinion 
which favoured codification decidedly outweighed 
that which was opposed to it. In a similar manner the 
opposition from women was dismissed with the 
observation that : 
"(Those) women opposing seemed to us to be merely 
reflecting the views of their menfolk." 
According to the Hindu Law Committee, the reason for 
introducing the changes was that the existing Hindu Law had 
assumed a harshness which its authors never intended and the real 
question to be considered was not how many or how few 
demanded change but whether the proposals themselves were in 
principle correct and worthy of acceptance. Thus, the second 
Hindu Law Committee was of the view that the Legislature had 
the right to decide what changes were needed in the law and when. 
Ambedkar, the first Law Minister of independent India, justified 
the Hindu Code Bill as necessary to save the Hindu system from 
decay and stagnation. He exorted his fellow Legislators that if 
they wanted to maintain the Hindu system, Hindu culture, Hindu 
society, they should not hesitate to repair where repair was 
necessary. i« Obviously it was assumed that the state had the right 
or even the duty to determine that reforms were needed. The 
government rejected the objection that public opinion should also 
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be taken into consideration on the ground that the Parliament 
would not be able to function if it had to subject everytime to 
thQ'Vote of the ignorant people outside who do not know the 
elementary facts of law making' }^ As far as the role of Congress 
party in reforming the Hindu Personal Law is concerned the 
Congress members, in the beginning had not played any decisive 
role in the debate on Hindu Law reform. The reason for not taking 
part in the debate that the Congress Party had boycotted the 
Legislative Assembly when the Hindu Law reform was being 
debated. The manifestos of the Congress party in the pre-
independence period also did not make any specific reference to 
the reform of Hindu Law. 
However, the Congress dominated Constituent Assembly 
made it very clear that Hindu Law reform was one of its top 
priority. Dr. Ambedkar and Pandit Nehru - Law Minister and the 
Prime Minister respectively, were strong proponents of Hindu 
Law reform at this stage. But the task of the government was 
made very difficult due to the division amongst the members of 
the Congress Party itself. At one stage Dr. Rajendra Prasad, the 
then President of India threatened to refuse to give presidential 
assent to the Hindu Code Bill. Eventually, the government decided 
to abondon the Hindu Code Bill for the time being, and as a 
consequence, Ambedkar resigned from the government.'^ Pandit 
Nehru declared the first general election to take the mandate for 
reforming Hindu Code Bill. He was of the view that after the 
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general election the newly elected government would be able to 
counter the objection that the Legislature did not have a public 
mandate for the enactment of Hindu Code Bill. 
In the first elected Parliament the government introduced the 
component Bills of the Hindu Code individually and with many 
modifications. As the Constitution had been adopted by this 
stage, the government justified each bill as an effort to make 
Hindu Law conform to the provisions of the constitution.'^ The 
Special Marriage Bill had formerly been a part of the Hindu 
Marriage and Divorce bill but was dissociated from Hindu Law at 
this stage. The Law Minister explained that the vmderlying purpose 
of this bill was that religious differences should not prevent two 
people from marrying and unlike the Special Marriage Act, 1872, 
their marriage should not affect their religious beliefs.''' This 
observation indicates clearly that the government had decided to 
update the Special Marriage Act, and was acting entirely on its 
own initiative. 
The Hindu Marriage and Divorce bill was important in the 
government's view not only for its specific provisions but, even 
more importantly, because it represented an essential aspect of 
national development, namely social progress.''' The other major 
reason for introducing this bill was to reiterate that society has 
changed completely and Hindu Law needed to be changed in 
order to continued to be relevant. It was also pointed out that the 
individual matters of faith and religion could not be allowed to 
[ 197 ] 
Hindu Law Reform : The Goal of Uniformity and Gender Justice 
hold up social progress. It was also pointed out that the Hindu 
Law was scattered in many diverse judicial decisions and different 
schools of Hindu Law have made it very complicated. That's why 
the codification of Hindu Law was of utmost importance. 
The Hindu Minority and Guardianship bill was introduced 
with the explanation that it was intended to preserve some special 
features of guardianship amongst Hindus.'^ And because, at one 
time or another, all branches of Hindu Law had to be codified. 
The Hindu adoption and maintenance bill was introduced as the 
remaining part of the Hindu Code Bill. The justification given was 
'bringing the law into conformity with the Constitution'. 
While introducing the Hindu Succession bill, the Law 
Minister said that by passing the Hindu Marriage Act, the House 
had not only accepted the principle and necessity of having one 
Uniform Code for the Hindus, but also the responsibility of 
passing other parts of the Code.^ "^  In addition to the arguments 
for the Hindu Marriage Bill, it was argued that this measure would 
give economic equality to women. The Law Minister stated that 
an examination of the opinion submitted to the state government 
revealed that except for the extreme orthodox view which is 
opposed to any reform being made ... enlightened opinion is in 
favour of the general principles underlying this bill.'^ He also 
noted that all women members of this House and all the 
enlightened women outside had supported the bill. The argument 
that Hindu Women, if consulted, would have opposed the measure 
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was forcefully countered by the state. The Law Minister answered 
that the matter of giving property right to women could not be 
decided by consulting women. He said that knowing the women 
as they are, it would amount to taking advantage of their illiteracy 
and of their economic dependence to use such an argument; by 
the same logic when 'sati abolition' and 'widow remarriage laws' 
were to be enacted, if women had been asked their opinion about 
widow remarriage and sati they would not have favoured them, 
yet that would not mean that these laws were not needed.'^ 
Thus the state took upon itself the responsibility of modifying 
those features of Hindu Law which, according to its view, needed 
to be changed. Public opinion was considered to be in favour of 
change, in view of the Congress victory in the general elections. It 
was widely believed that because the Congress won the first 
general elections it had acquired the mandate of the population for 
Hindu Law reform. However, the Congress election manifesto did 
not mention reform of Hindu Law as one of its point. Nehru was 
forced to address the issue when the opponents of reform fielded 
against him a sanyasi (a renunciate) who symbolically represented 
orthodox Hinduism.^° The views of supposed beneficiaries of the 
reforms - women and untouchables were not considered 
important. The state had assumed the role of social reformer but 
patternalism in the performance of that role was also taken for 
granted. In this the state was continuing the tradition of pre-
independence governments where the task of the state (and state 
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laws) was to 'improve' the life's circumstances of the population. 
However, the British administrators had, for a long time, 
professedly avoided reforming religious Personal Laws because 
state interference in religious matters was considered in 
appropriate and also because that might impede the natural 
development of indigeneous people.^' Instead the nationalist 
government based its actions on the need to modernise the nation. 
The range of arguments used by the state to recommend and make 
reforms, on its own initiative and in the face of stiff opposition, 
clearly establishes the importance which the state attached to 
Hindu Law reform. Parallel to the state's effort to establish the 
need for reform were the arguments advanced to claim the 
authority to alter religious laws.^^ 
D. Source of Authority for Change 
The first Hindu Law Committee report was instmmental in 
giving the idea of codifying the entire Hindu Personal Law which 
would give women legal equality. In persuance of this that men 
and women should have equal human rights, the committee 
prepared two bills dealing with intestate succession and marriage. 
The decision to codify the entire Hindu Personal Law was in 
marked contrast from the poHcy followed by the Britishers in the 
last two centuries that state would least interfere in religious 
Personal laws of different communities. We find the changing 
attitude of the First Hindu Law Committee, the Second Hindu Law 
Committee report and the attitude of the government changing 
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from time to time. For example, tiie First Hindu Law Committee 
report introduced the idea of codification of the whole of Hindu 
Law, then demonstrated the capacity of the Legislature to do the 
job, and then went on explain the aims of codification. The 
Committee suggested that it would not improve a lot of women 
folk if isolated reforms are introduced in Hindu Law rather it 
would be feasible to enact a complete code replacing the existing 
Hindu Personal Law. The authority to do so was derived 
indirectly, by citing examples of ancient law givers and 
commentators. It was mentioned in the report that in the old age 
the task of codifying the law from time to time was performed by 
successive Law givers and Commentators. These authors impHed 
the process of judicious selection and exposition of the texts in 
order to mould the orders of the law to the needs of the time, 
while appearing to make no changes.^^ The first Hindu Law 
Committee likened the Legislature to the ancient smritikaras and 
commentators and even went to the extent of suggesting that 'The 
Legislature must, like our law makers of old, deal with the 
subject as a whole, weaving each part in its proper relation to 
other parts, and bringing to discharge of this task 
comprehensive scholarship as well as zeal.-^'' 
After justifying that the modern Legislature was the 
successors to the commentators the First Hindu Law Committee 
suggested modifications of the following topics and gave 
justification for the changes : 
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1. Under pre-reform Hindu Law provisions a widow was not 
entitled to own property as absolute owner except some 
specified kinds of property classified as stridhana. Her 
interest in the property left by her husband extended only to 
a right to enjoy the property without the right to alienate it, 
except in some specified cases. This was known as the 
widow's limited estate. The committee recommended the 
abolition of the limited estate of the Hindu widow on the 
ground that it was created by a decision of the Privy Council 
in Kasinath Bisack vs. Hurrosundery Dosse}^ Although 
there were scholarly opinions both for and against the 
proposition that the 'smritV authorise the hmited estate for 
Hindu women, the First Hindu Law Committee report 
supported the abolition of the doctrine on the basis that 
'smriW did not unequivocally authorize such limitation. 
2. The changes in the case of sacramental marriage was 
explained as an effort to ^restore the ancient law at its best'. 
The recommendation of the committee to abolish polygamy 
was based on the explanation that it was not a prevalent 
practise and it was not suitable for modern day women. It 
was also expected from the committee to abolish Sagotra^^ 
marriage which worked harshly against women whose 
marriages were declared invalid under them but the committee 
did not recommend abolishing those rules but suggested the 
application of the factum valet rule, meaning that once a 
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marriage has been celebrated it would not be declared void 
for contravening the sagotra requirement. 
The Legislative Assembly Debates reveal that the government 
justified its actions as in consonance with the \smritis\ Sultan 
Ahmad the law member claimed that the government was simply 
following the directions indicated by the traditional law givers. He 
argued that the traditional Hindu system may not have given 
extensive property right to women but at the same time most 
'smritis' did not intentionally slight women or deprive them of 
their right to succession. Renuka Ray a woman member of 
Legislative Assembly went further and claimed that in ancient 
times Hindu women were entitled to property rights and that they 
had lost these because of mterpretations given to the rules by later 
jurists and under the British judicial system.^ "^ 
From the above it is clear that the Hindu Law Committees' 
main argument was that they reflected the true rules of the 
smritis. The joint committees report modified some aspect of the 
Succession bill prepared by the first Hindu Law Committee. In its 
report the joint Committee addressed the matter of the alleged 
incapacity of women as a class capable of inheriting and the 
impropriety of granting women an absolute estate. The committee 
mentioned with approval the 'sutrakaras'' and 'smritikaras'' (The 
authors) who supported the right of women to hold property and 
their right to have a share in inheritence from the property of their 
husbands. Thus the joint committee established the legitimacy of 
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its proposals to make females co heirs on the basis that Vedic 
literature did not support the theory of total exclusion of women 
from property rights. Similarly, with regard to the theory of 
limited ownership it examined the texts and relied on the 
authority of Golapchand Sarkar Shastri to decide that the text 
had been misread by the courts and wrong conclusions reached. 
In doing so the joint committee unambiguously reiterated the 
supremacy of the Vedic texts and the task of the legislators was 
seen to restate the correct law as embodied in the Vedic text. It 
made no specific reference to the previous practise of the 
government to refrain from interferring with religious personal 
laws. 
The whole exercise was vigorously opposed by orthodox 
Hindus on the following grounds. 
1. They questioned the need and legitimacy of the codification 
itself. 
2. Codification is necessary where the law is unsettled but since 
various schools of Hindu Law possess written as well as the 
fact that they have been explained by the highest judicial 
tribunals, there was no need to codify Hindu Law. 
3. The third argument put forward by the opponents of the 
reform was that no other country had put the whole of the 
Personal law of any community in a court and it was not right 
to use legislation to effect fundamental changes in the 
structure of law. 
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4. In any case codification would make Hindu law a command 
of the sovereign and would this result in stopping its natural 
growth. 
The second Hindu Law Committee tried to answer all the 
objections raised against the reformation of Hindu law and straight 
away based its authority on the provisions of Government of India 
Act, 1935. It established the authority to legislate upon matters 
mentioned in the Hindu Code Bill on the ground that matters like 
succession, marriage and divorce, infants and minors and 
adoptions were specifically included in the concurrent Legislative 
List. The next argument in defence of reforming Hindu Personal 
Law was that in the past the Hindu law of succession and marriage 
had already been modified by the central legislature and their 
validity had not been questioned by anyone so far. In claiming 
such sweeping authority for the legislature under the Government 
of India Act of 1935, the second Hindu Law Committee showed a 
marked change from the stand taken by the first Hindu Law 
Committee and by the joint committee but the second Hindu Law 
Committee also assesed that the draft code which it prepared 
reflected the spirit of ancient law much better than the law as now 
administered.^" 
We find no general discussion in the report of the 'select 
committee' of the Constituent Assembly about the basis of the 
authority of the Legislature but the justifications given for 
individual modifications provide us the information that the state's 
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interest was also the basis of the change were not even making an 
effort to find justification for a proposed change within the 
traditional Hindu system and that the basis of the rule was stated 
to be the interests of the state. 
While introducing this report into the Constituent Assembly 
Ambedkar explained the main changes in corporated by the 
'select committee'. Changes in Marriage law were put forward as 
enabling measures and an assurance was given that there was '«o 
violation of shastra and no violation of smriti at all',^^ 
Monogamy for all Hindus was recommended on the grounds that 
under the Dharamshastras the Hindu husband did not always 
have an unfettered, unqualified right to polygamy. Authority of 
precedent was claimed as well as prior legislation in some states 
had already made the Hindu marriage a monogamous union. More 
importantly the modification in marriage law was justified on the 
ground that in the existing law, custom had been allowed to 
trample upon the text of shastras which were all in favour of the 
right sorts of marital relations.^^ This type of reasoning suggest 
that since the state was upholding the superiority of the true 
principles embodied in the shastras, its reform proposal would be 
directed towards making the law conform to those ideals.^ -^ 
India gained independence on August 15, 1947 and the 
constitution was adopted on 26th November 1949 and enacted on 
26th January 1950. The constituent Assembly was redesignated as 
Provisional Parliament. This provisional Parliament was dissolved 
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in 1951 and the first elected Parliament met in 1952. During this 
period the provisional Parliament could only discuss the 
applicability of Hindu Code bill and the relationship between the 
Constitution and religious law. It was again argued that the 
Constitution does not permit the discrimination between people on 
religious grounds. Hence, the government has no power to reform 
Hindu Personal law. One member said that enactment of such a 
law for only one community would amount to a secular state 
encouraging communalism.^'* The government defended its action 
through the Law Minister who stated that, 
"My ideals are drawn from the Constitution. We are 
bound to examine every social institution that exists in 
the country and see whether it satisfies the principles 
laid down in the Constitution."^^ 
The government emphasized that the Constitution permitted 
it to treat different communities differently without attracting the 
charge of practising discrimination. He further explained that the 
reason that there was no reform of Muslim law or that of other 
religious communities was that these communities had not been 
consulted and it would be unfair to impose reforms on them 
without consultation.^^ The Law minister also declared that the 
state had power to interfere in the personal law of any community 
and he defended his statement on the basis of the Constitution of 
India. 
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Thus, the state made it very clear that the religious laws were 
not beyond the control of the Constitution and all religious 
Personal laws would eventually conform to the Constitution. The 
state on this basis claimed that the Constitution demanded that all 
laws be in conformity with its principles hence it was imperative 
to remove all the defects of Hindu Personal Law and make it 
inconformity with the Constitution. 
Most of the reform proposals were explained as bringing 
Hindu Law into conformity with the Constitution. During the 
discussion on the Hindu marrige bill the Law minister observed : 
"Why is it necessary to go to the length of finding 
out what was stated in certain smritis 2000 years ago? 
The ancient law as it prevailed several centuries back 
is not in existence and in no case can it be 
resurrected."" 
It does not mean that the state projected itself as acting 
against the scriptural Hindu law. State lost no opportunity to 
defend its actions as in conformity with the Hindu scriptural texts. 
Many proposals were either claimed to be supported by the 
ancient smritis or to embody the 'correct' version of the smritis 
rules. For example, the proposal where by the daughter was 
introduced as a simultaneous heir to the property of the Hindu 
intestate was explained as neither contravening contemporary law 
nor what was done in the past.-^ ^ The government even exhorted 
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the modern day 'shastris'' to be true to their tradition and support 
the measures which were designed to ''restore to women the rights 
which they had once enjoyed under the then prevailing 
shastras'^^. 
While introducing the Hindu Marriage Bill in the Lok Sabha, 
it was mentioned that the real progress of the coutnry could not 
only be political or economic but the social progress was also 
important. The Constitution was aimed at achieving social and 
economic justice and this bill was designed to give social equaHty 
to Hindu women in one area. It was explained that since every 
aspect of the condition of Indian women could not be improved 
at once, a beginning was being made in the area of marriage (The 
criticism that without first ensuring economic rights granting 
better marriage and divorce right would not really change the 
position of women was rejected by the government was absurd.'^ ^ 
In the Lok Sabha, the Hindu Succession Bill was also projected 
as a measure concerned with questions of social emancipation and 
progress. It was argued that a society cannot progress if half part 
of it is reduced to the position of bond slaves'*' and, although, 
reform of succession law may not achieve total economic 
emancipation it was of substantial consequence. Thus, the need 
for social progress provided the state with the authority to change 
the religious law which, in any case, was not accepted as the 
embodiment of religion.''^ 
[ 209 ] 
Hindu Law Reform : The Goal of Uniformity and Gender Justice 
The progress of Hindu Law reform proposals through 
various stages shows a gradual change in the basis of authority 
which the state claimed in order to reform the law. The first Hindu 
Law Committee claimed to be working in this the Hindu religious 
system but by the time several Hindu Law Acts were passed, the 
state was unambigously asserting its right to decide which rule 
was to be modified and in what manner. 
The difference in the position of the government of 1941 and 
the democratically elected national government of 1952 was that 
the later did not even bother to look to the religious text for 
specific support. Instead it sought to legitimise its actions 
primarily by reference to social progress criteria and, in the final 
analysis, the religious sanctity of any rule was not a bar to the 
authority of the state to modify it. This change in stand in turn 
indicated that the state had assumed the role of social reformer 
and it also indicated that it viewed legal reform as the appropriate 
technology for bringing about social change. In view of the fact 
that the state showed a strong persistence in reforming Hindu law 
it implied that law reform was the appropriate means, or at least 
one of the appropriate means, for achieving sex-equality and 
uniformity which were the two main professed aims of Hindu law 
reform were expected to result in, or even assist in, social 
transformation can be gathered from a close analysis of the 
substance of the reform proposals.'*-' 
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£. Applicability of Reformed Hindu Law 
One of the main goals of Hindu law reform was to introduce 
uniformity. This aim may primarily have been designed to lessen 
the complexities of the Hindu law but one of its obvious effect 
was to enlarge the area covered by the reformed law. To achieve 
the first objective the state also tried to achieve the second 
objective i.e. to enlarge the ambit of reformed Hindu Law. In the 
following section the applicability of the reformed Hindu law and 
the uniformity in the reformed Hindu Law shall be discussed one 
by one. 
(i) Who is a Hindu? 
The main task of the first Hindu Law Committee was to cover 
as broad an area as possible under the Hindu Code and it did not 
try to define the term 'Hindu' or specifying the categories of 
people which were to be governed by Hindu law. The bill on law 
marriage, in Section 8, mentioned the requisites for a civil 
marriage : that a civil marriage can be contracted under this Act 
by any person professing the Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh or Jain 
religion. In other words this was an attempt to say that the 
Buddhists, Sikhs and Jains are all 'Hindu'. The second Hindu Law 
Committee enlarged the definition of 'Hindu' and made it clear 
that the Hindu Code Bill will be applicable to all persons 
professing the Hindu religion in any of its forms or developments, 
including Virasaivas or lingayats and members of the Brahmo, 
the Prasthana and Arya Samaj. It was also to be applied on 
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persons professing the Buddhists, Jain or Sikh religion. Then the 
next move was to give the definition of Hindu a negative meaning 
rather than a positive meaning. The next sub section made it 
explicit that the Hindu Code Bill would cover any person who was 
not a Muslim, Christian, Parsi or Jew by religion. The illustration 
attached to the section made it clear that the Buddhists, Jains or 
Sikhs have merely deviated from the orthodox practises of Hindu 
religion but have not embraced the Muslim, Christian, Zorotrian 
or Jewish religion. This move was opposed by certain sections of 
the society, for example, Virasaivas" demand to be treated on the 
same footing as the Sikhs and Jains was accepted with the 
explanation that 'm view of strong sentiments felt hy Virasaivas 
on this matter, it is desirable to meet their wishes to the largest 
extent possible."^^ The protest of the Buddhist that they did not 
wish to be governed by Hindu Law was not accepted. Similarly, 
the contentions of the Jains that there should be separate Code of 
Law was also rejected that the differences between the Hindus and 
the Jains were not fundamental in religion and they were the part 
of the Hindu rehgion.'*^ From the above it is clear that the Hindu 
law reformers wanted to enlarged the definition of 'Hindu' and the 
aim of the second Hindu Law Committee was to cover as many 
people as possible under the Hindu Code Bill. 
To further consolidate the definition of Hindu the word 
'professed' was removed from the definition of the word 'Hindu' 
as suggested by the second Hindu Law Committee. Dr. Ambedkar 
[ 212 ] 
Hindu Law Reform : The Goal of Uniformity and Gender Justice 
explained in the Constituent Assembly that the second Hindu Law 
Committee had defined a Hindu who 'professed' the Hindu 
religion, but that the 'Select Committee' had removed 
'professed'. He further explained that this was done in order to 
prevent people from escaping the application of the Hindu Code 
Bill on the excuse that they did not 'profess' the Hindu religion. 
The intention of the state was that the Hindu Code Bill should 
cover every person who belongs to the Hindu faith but who may 
not necessarily be an active follower of the same.''^ In the Lok 
Sabha, during the debate on the Hindu Code Bill the government 
tried to dissociate the definition from its religion connotations and 
sought to explain that 'Hindu' denotes a particular religion. The 
Law Minister said that the word 'Hindu' did not denote any 
particular religion or any form of worship or any particular 
community. Therefore, it should be a mistake to equate Hinduism 
with religion, instead it should be called a culture - a synthesis of 
all the varied beliefs, customs and practises of different people.''' 
From the above it is clear that the state's intention was to 
enlarge the definition of the word 'Hindu' although, the 
government sometimes justified it on the basis of religion and 
sometimes on the basis of culture. The state on the one hand 
wanted to cover as many people as possible in the term 'Hindu' 
and on the other hand also wanted to be secular and this is evident 
from the final definition of the word 'Hindu'. 
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(ii) Uniformity 
The next move of the state was to achieve a high degree of 
uniformity in Hindu Law. Sometimes the reform proposals were 
offered in order to replace the simultaneous existence of various 
schools of law with a single law. Sometimes the proposals 
replaced the provisions of one school by another school and 
sometimes introduced novel provisions which were untraceable in 
any existing school of Hindu Law. The next device to introduce 
uniformity was to curtail the scope of custom by statutory Hindu 
Law. The first Hindu Law Committee did not see the existence of 
various schools as an obstacle to codification. It only supported 
the codification of entire Hindu Personal Law. It recommended 
that before making fundamental changes it was necessary to 
survey the whole field and enact a code for the entirely. If 
however, that was not possible then atleast those branches which 
would be affected by the contemplated legislation should be 
codified.'** They repeated the famous statement made by 
Macaulay that the aim of codification should be uniformity, 
where possible and divergence, where inevitable.'*^ 
When the Hindu Code Bill was debated in the provincial 
Parliament, objections were raised that only a handful of 
Brahmins, kshatriyas and vaishyas were governed by Manu's 
laws while the rest of the community was not; therefore, the repeal 
of all 'customs' would result in hardship to those who were 
governed by their own customs, furthermore, they constituted 
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almost eighty percent of the community.^'' It was also pointed out 
that it would be unwise to destroy the traditions of the greater 
majority of the community especially when the did not conflict 
with any law^^ and when the people governed by the customs had 
not demanded change.^^ These objections were rejected by the 
government on the following grounds. 
1. Any one who press that custom should override this 
particular Code would have to prove that custom was more 
progressive than the provisions of the Code." 
2. The power to exempt any custom from the purview of Hindu 
Code Bill was possessed only by the Parliament and the 
Parliament has power to make exceptions in favour of 
customs. 
3. To allow customs to continue to operate along with enacted 
laws would result in an erosion of the power of Parliament.^'* 
4. The state law was more progressive in nature. A demand that 
Hindu Code bill be made optional was turned down on the 
ground that an optional Code would not be of much use to 
women as they would not be able to exercise this option 
provided in the legislation.^^ Yet the same government 
disallowed the application of the Malabar group of laws even 
though women under those laws had more rights than under 
the proposed Hindu Code Bill.^^ Significantly, the result of 
the decision in both cases was to give the 'uniform state 
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code procedure over other laws, although the first measure 
was justified as protecting the interest of the women while in 
the second the disadvantage to the women was completely 
ignored. Obviously the objective of better rights for women 
was persued less consistently than the obejctive of a Uniform 
Code." 
Upon the demand of certain states that the Hindu Code Bill 
should not be apphed to them the Ambedkar emphasized that he 
would never agree to exempt any province from the operation of 
this law 
"Let there be no doubt about it at all that the Hindu 
Code shall be a Uniform Code throughout India. 
Either I will have this bill in that form or not have it at 
all."5« 
The legal journals carried articles both supporting and 
condemning the idea that a Uniform law would create a unified 
nation. Whether the Uniform Law applicable to all Hindus would 
divide the nation or would create a unified nation became an issue 
of heated debate in the press and legal journals. The opponents of 
the Hindu Code Bill were of the view that the unity of the country 
could only be forged by a Uniform Civil Code for the entire 
population and not by a code for Hindus only. Objections were 
also raised that Hindu Law reform should be the concern only of 
Hindus. Non Hindus should have no say in that matter and thus 
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the non-Hindu legislators should not participate in the reform 
process. 
After the election the Hindu Code bill was more openly 
projected as a means to unify the nation but the proposals for 
achieving uniformity were less far reaching than at the previous 
stage. The government explained that the Hindu law reform was 
being brought forward with a certain specific ideology which 
included the 'the aim to bring together what are termed 
Hindus'". It also said that the former foreign government could 
allow diverse schools of law to operate simultaneously as it was 
not interested in consolidating the society, but a national 
government could not ignore its legislative duties.^'' 
Summary 
Thus, it becomes obvious that under Hindu Law Reform bill 
the aim of Uniformity of law was consistently proclaimed but only 
partially achieved. Selective concern only for some customs or 
institutions was not explainable except as a compromise in the 
face of stiff opposition. For example, the Hindu adoption and 
maintenance bill, when originally introduced in the Lok Sabha, did 
not contain any exceptions. In the later stages the government 
made a compromise and allowed the continuance of customs 
which permitted adoptions over the specified age and even of 
married persons."^' However, the government itself was not making 
concerted efforts to achieve uniformity. In many instances the 
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government retracted from the pre election Hindu Code Bill 
proposals and incorporated various exceptions to the rules with 
the result that many customs and institutions of traditional Hindu 
law continued in operation. But when the Joint Committee or the 
Rajya Sabha reduced the scope of these exceptions, the 
government supported the changed proposals and even managed 
to have them enacted. The foremost example of this was the initial 
exemption for joint family property governed by Mitakshara law 
from the perview of the Hindu Succession Bill. Understandibly the 
government was wary of generating the kind of opposition that 
had compelled it to abandon the Hindu Code bill in 1951. At the 
same time, however, it is difficult to accept that at the time of first 
introducing the bill the government was not sure of its capacity to 
carry through some of the reform measures but succeeded in 
actually enacting them into law after these proposals had been 
altered and made more radical by the Joint Committee or by the 
Rajya Sabha." 
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Reforms in Minority Personal Laws 
In this chapter attempt is made to trace the legislative history 
of Personal Law in India as well as the legislative history of the 
religious personal laws of the Parsis and the Christians. Under the 
religious Personal laws of the minorities, women had fewer rights 
than men, except in the case of Parsi law, there was also a 
considerable amount of diversity in the laws governing Christians 
and Muslims; yet the state has not sought to reform these laws on 
the very same grounds that it claimed to reform Hindu Personal 
Law. State's actions illustrate how the reform of religious personal 
laws is bound by considerations of 'national integration' and the 
political stability of the state. The effect of non-reform of 
religious personal laws of any community on women is a 
secondary consideration in reaching a final decision about law 
reform. However in view of the constitutional guarantee of the sex 
equality and the state's proclaimed adherence to the principles of 
the Constitution, the state has to justify preserving legal rules that 
discriminate against women. It, therefore, relies on the argument 
that the minority communities need special consideration. The 
result of his consideration is that their personal laws are not 
reformed at the initiative of the state. The policy of the state 
appears that the state would reform them if the demand to do so 
Reforms in Minority Personal Laws 
came from the relevant communities. Thus, the decision whether 
to reform religious personal laws is linked to the minority status 
of these communities rather than to considerations about the 
position of women. Moreover, in a democratic country like India 
the state is unlikely to be able to disregard the claims of the 
minority communities for special protection and this results in 
questionning the personal laws to ensure legal equality for women 
by the minorities, if the state tries to reform them. Due to the fact 
that these communities are unlikely to cease being minorities, 
women belonging to such communities face the prospect of 
continuing legal inequality perpetuated by religion and upheld by 
state. In the following pages it has been tried to trace the activities 
of the state with regard to the reform of minority religious 
personal laws. Since there has been very little legislative activity 
with regard to minority religious personal laws, I the researcher 
has relied on legislative debates where ever available, and 
supplement them with the debate carried on outside the Legislature 
to analyse the arguments about the nature of religious personal 
laws and the authority of the state to modify them. There has been 
only a little activity directed towards reform of the Christian and 
Parsi religious personal laws. This will be taken up at the end of 
the Muslim Personal Law section. 
A. Legislative Activity with Regard to Muslim Personal Law 
Muslims, like the Hindus, used the opportunities provided by 
the Government of India Act, 1935 to modify some aspects of 
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their religious personal laws. Before detailing their activity in the 
Federal Legislative Assembly, a brief account of the political 
activities of Muslim political leaders will be useful. At this stage 
the Ulema, i.e., the religious clerics, and the Muslim League were 
the two prominent groups articulating the interests of the Muslim 
community.' These two groups represented the one section 
Ulema who claimed responsibility for safeguarding the Islamic 
Shariah and giving the Muslim community religious and political 
guidance according to Islamic principles and commandments.^ 
The Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind was of the view that the Shariat 
should be correctly understood and interpreted only by the Ulema 
who were its rightful custodians. They believed that the correct 
leadership for Muslims could only come from them. The Muslim 
League, on the other hand, was concerned with the political and 
economic demands of the Muslims bourgeois vis-a-vis its Hindu 
counterpart. It relied on the support from the middle class and 
rich land owners. After the elections under the Act of 1935, the 
initiative to change the Muslim Personal law was taken by the 
Ulema. One of the most important activities taken by the Jamiat-
ul-Ulema-i-Hind was the introduction of the Shariat Application 
Bill into the Federal Assembly.^ 
The Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937 is 
by far the most important legislation in the closing years of the 
British rule in India. The Act almost abolished the legal authority 
of customs among the Muslims of British India. Unlike most of 
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India, the populations in Punjab, the North West Frontier Province 
and the Central Provinces were governed by these respective 
customary laws. The Muslim leaders and religious scholars 
became concerned with the fact that the Muslims in these areas 
were not following the rules of succession and inheritence 
enjoined by the Shariat. They were influenced by local customs 
and usages that allowed the Muslims to bequeath their entire 
property to their male heirs and thus avoid giving all the heirs their 
due shares as specified by Islamic law. Because they were 
influenced by local customs and usages. 
In 1925 the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind passed a resolution 
disapproving the practice of certain Muslims adhering to customs 
contrary to Shariat. A bill was prepared by the 'Jamiat' and was 
introduced in the Legislature of the North-West Frontier Province 
and later enacted as the North-West Frontier Province Muslim 
Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1935. Later on it was 
desired by the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind to get a law passed having 
a countrywide application over the whole Muslim population. A 
bill was prepared in consultation with the executive commitee of 
the Jamiat and introduced by H.M. Abdullah in the Federal 
Legislative Assembly in 1935. A motion was introduced by the 
Government of India's Home member. Sir Henry Craik to circulate 
the bill to elicit public opinion.^ It was published alongwith the 
statement of objects and reasons, by the Government of India to 
gather public opinion.^ 
[ 226 ] 
Reforms in Minority Personal Laws 
Objects and Reasons 
The statement of Object and Reasons presented various 
causes for the introduction of the Bill, which run as follows :-
"For several years past it has been the cherished 
desire of the Muslims of India that customary law 
should in no case take the place of Muslim Personal 
Law. The matter has been repeatedly agitated in the 
press as well as on the plateform. The Jamiat-ul-
Ulema-i-Hind, the greatest Muslim religious body has 
supported the demand and invited the attention of all 
concerned to the urgent necessity of introducing the 
measure to this effect. Customary law is a misnomer 
in as much as it has not any sound basis to stand 
upon and is very much liable to frequent changes and 
cannot be expected to attain at any time in future the 
certainty and definitness which must be the 
characteristic of all laws. The status of Muslim 
women under the so called customary law is simply 
disgraceful. As the Muslim women organisation have 
condemend the customary law, as it adversely affects 
their rights, they demand that the Muslim personal law 
(Shariat) should be made applicable to them. The 
introduction of the Muslim Personal Law will 
automatically raise them to the position to which they 
are naturally entitled. In addition to this, the present 
[ 227 ] 
Reforms in Minority Personal Laws 
measure, it enacted would have very salutory effect on 
society, because it would ensure certainty and 
definitness in the mutual rights and obligations of the 
public. Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) exists in the 
form of a veritable code and is too well known to 
admit of any doubt or entail any great labour in the 
shape of research which is the chief feature of 
customary law." 
The position of Muslim women, in few cases, was seriously 
undermined by the then prevailing customs. Inheritence in 
particular continued to be ruled by customs, often excluding 
women, among numerous communities of Muslims. The Shariat 
Bill aimed at correcting such defect."^ The bill was introduced as 
an aid to ensure certainty and definitness in mutual rights and 
obligation by the application of Shariat. The mover of the bill 
supported it on the ground that it would secure uniformity of law 
among Muslims throughout British India.'' 
In the Federal Assembly it was also mentioned that the 
Muslim women of Punjab condemned customary law as it 
adversely affected their rights and demanded the application of 
Muslim Shariat Law.^ 
Further reason for introducing the bill was that the Muslim 
Community was bound in conscience to follow its Personal Laws 
and so 'The existence of the legal state of things which allowed 
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not only deep evasions but defiance of that law is a matter which 
is deeply resented by the community. '^ The Federal Legislative 
Assembly sent the bill to a select committee and considered the 
Select Committee's Report and the bill in September 1937.'" 
During the discussion in the Federal Assembly prior to sending 
the bill to the select committee, most of the speakers who 
favoured the enactment of the Shariat Bill mentioned the 
advantages to be gained by Muslim women. The point was made, 
however, that the opinion sent by the local governments to the 
federal legislature did not contain any opinion by women's 
organisations." The Home member of the Government of India 
made it explicit that the Shariat Bill if enacted would not affect 
agricultural properties as the Federal legislature was not competent 
to make laws concerning such property. He also mentioned that it 
would be wise to consider carefully whether individuals should be 
given the option to decide whether they wanted to be governed by 
the Shariat.^^ 
When the Federal Assembly considered the report of the 
Select Committee, supporters of the Bill repeatedly asserted that 
it was designed to do justice for women. It was also made clear 
that Muslim women had expressed their strong support for the 
measure.'^ Muhammad Ahmad Kazmi claimed that the Bill was 
necessary primarily because Muslim women were being denied 
their rights in matters of succession. He also accepted that the Bill 
was extremely limited in its scope as it did not apply to 
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agricultural land which constituted about 99.5% of all property 
available in India. According to him the idea behind seeking the 
sanction of the House was that in addition to giving some little 
relief to the females of the country, the 'representative House for 
the whole of India' should accept the principle that Muslim 
Personal law should be applied to Musim.^"^ 
However, at this stage some members sought two important 
modifications to the Bill. An objection was raised against 
invalidating the existing laws which gave protection to the 
Zamindars (big land holders) and ensured that their property 
could not be divided. It was argued that since protection has been 
given to a certain class of people, i.e. the land holders, to ensure 
that their property was safeguarded against division, this right 
should not be taken away only from Muslim land holders. 
Mohammad Yamin Khan claimed that these laws have been made 
with the full concurrence and common consent of the Musalmans 
for protection of their interests.'^ In response, the government 
explained at it intended to modify the bill so that laws which it 
had passed on various aspects of usage and custom would remain 
vahd. This action was described by the supporters of the Bill as 
denying justice to women and he cautioned that '7b take shelter 
under the laws which have been passed by the various 
legislatures in India where they (women) had no hand would not 
be a good thing. '^  
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Jinnah supported the Bill on the ground that it would enable 
women to own property and 'the economic position of women is 
the foundation of her being recognised as equal of men and share 
the life of men to the fullest extent.''^ He proposed an amendment 
that individual Muslims should be given option to decide whether 
they wanted to be governed by Shariat or by customary law. In 
support of his argument he said that Cutchi Memons Act, 1920, 
gave a similar option to individuals, and more than half of that 
community had elected to be bound by the Act. The reason for 
the support of Jinnah was that he was not a traditionalist himself 
and also he was trying to protect the rights of rich landowners. 
Although this amendment was strongly opposed by the Jamiat but 
it was finally carried in a modified form. The final Bill which was 
enacted later on gave individuals an opfion to be governed either 
by the Shariat or by their customary law only with regard to 
adoption, wills and legacies.** Except these three matters Muslims 
were to be governed by Islamic Shariat Law in all other matters 
mentioned in Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act.'^ 
The object of Section 2 is firstly, to abrogate custom and 
usage which may be contrary to the principles of Islamic law and, 
secondly, to grant certain exceptions. Fyzee says that the words 
'intestate succession' clearly show that the power of testamentary 
succession enjoyed by certain communities is not taken away. 
These communities are Khojas and Memons. Thus, they may 
allow a custom which allows the disposition of even whole of 
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property by way of will, and which is clearly unlslamic. On the 
other hand, if a female receives property and by customary law 
the property is to revert to heirs of the last male owner, such 
custom being contrary to Islamic law, is abolished and she holds 
it in all respects as an heir under Muslim law.^" 
In conclusion, the enactment of Shariat Act resulted in the 
express acceptance by the state legal system of the principle 
(with some exceptions) that Muslim ought, in personal matters, 
to be governed by the Shariat and not by custom. The slate, in 
this way, contributed to enhancing the Islamization of the 
Muslim Community. Islamization is here used to describe the 
increased tendency of the Muslim community to create a distinct 
identity separate from majority Hindu community.^' In the words 
of Archana Parashar : 
"The political situation at the time was conducive to 
heightening the distinction between the Hindus and 
Muslim. The Governement of India Act, 1935 has 
accepted the principle of communal representation 
and the Muslim League was specifically representing 
Muslim's interest. However, a homogeneous Muslim 
popultion did not exist as the Muslim community and 
groups and the Ulema relied on the Shariat, or the 
orthodox Islamic principles, to forge a common 
identity. The customary practices of various Muslim 
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groups, in addition to deviating from orthodox Islamic 
law, were invariably the pre-conversion customs 
retained by the Hindu convert to Islam. It was, 
therefore, to be expected that the Vlcma considered 
it crucial that all custom be denied judicial 
recognition."^^ 
Due to the difference of attitude between the Muslim League 
and Jamiat the government was able to retain certain custom which 
were clearly against the Islamic Law (Shanat). Muslim League 
which was representing the interest of wealthy land owners helped 
the government to retain certain customs of Khojas and Memons 
against the wishes of the Ulema of the Jamiat. 
Thus, uniformity in Islamic law was not achieved except in a 
very limited way, and the advantages gained by women were 
important more for their symbolic value. The enactment was 
important because it set the pattern for the Muslim leaders' 
subsequent legislative activities in post independence India. The 
government at this stage was neutral, in the sense that it allowed 
(within bound) individual communities to enhance or diminish the 
scope of their religious personal law." 
B. The Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939 
The Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939 is another 
milestone in the Legislative history of Muslim Personal Law. The 
Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939 may be said to be 
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another attempt by '^ he Ulema to utilise the legislature to 'rectify' 
the prevailing situation in regard to the Muslim women to dissolve 
their marriages. Although, the Qur'an explicitly permits the 
dissolution of marriage by women in case of necessity, there are 
various school of thoughts about the conditions under which this 
permission can be i used and there is no agreement about the 
procedure to be followed. Under Hanafi Law a women's 
marriage would stand dissolved on her apostatising from Islam. In 
India the majority of the Muslims follow the Hanafi law. In the 
absence of any other alternative for release from a difficult 
marriage, many Muslim women who wanted to get release from 
marriage got converted to another religion, hence getting their 
marriage dissolved. JThe judicial attitude in India was that this was 
a valid dissolution of marriage. The classical Hanafi law of 
divorce was causing hardships as it consisted no provision where 
by a Hanafi wifej could seek divorce on such grounds as 
disappearance of the husband his long imprisonment, his neglect 
of matrimonial obligations etc. Finding no other way to get rid off 
undesired marital bounds, many Muslim women felt compelled by 
their circumstances to renounce their faith. This was causing great 
trouble to the Ulema that the Muslim women were apostatising 
from Islam. They decided to take action to rectify the sitution. 
The 'Jamiat' decided to have a law enacted empowering Muslim 
judges to dissolve a Muslim marriage on the application of a 
woman in those circlumstances in which it was causing hardship 
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to them. Mohammad Ahmad Kazmi introduced a bill in the 
Federal Legislative Assembly in 1936.^'' The Bill was prepared by 
the leading Ulema of the Jamiat which was based on Al-Hilat Al-
Najizalil Halilat Al-Ajza (a lawful devise) - A book written by 
Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanvi. This book was published in 1932 and 
the compiles of the book recommended that Muslim members of 
the Federal Legislature should introduce a bill based on the book. 
The compiler of the book belonged to the world famous Deohand 
School and during the preparation of the book he had gathered 
opinions from other religious scholars in India and Hejaz.^^ 
The main feature of the bill was that for the purpose of 
dissolving the marriage at the instance of a Muslim women, it 
accepted that the principles of Maliki Law be applicable to all 
Muslims. In preparing the bill the principle of 'Takhayyur' or 
eclectic choice was adopted which permits the replacement of the 
school of Islamic law with another in certain circumstances. The 
bill was sent to a 'Select Committee' and the Federal Legislative 
Assembly considered it in 1939. 
The statements of Objects and Reasons^ *^ attached to the bill 
several reasons for introducing the bill. The main reason was said 
to be that the existing law had caused 'unspeakable misery to 
innumerable Muslim women in British India'. The statement of the 
Reasons and Objects of this Act indicates the circumstances in 
which the Act was passed : 
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"There is no provision in the Hanafi Code of Muslim 
Law enabling a married Muslim women to obtain a 
decree from the courts dissolving her marriage in case 
the husband neglects to maintain her, makes her life 
miserable by deserting or persistently ill treating her 
on certain other circumstances. The absence of such 
a provision has entailed unspeakable misery to 
innumerable Muslim women in British India, the 
Hanafi Jurists, however, have clearly laid down that in 
cases in which the apphcation of Hanafi Law causes 
hardship, it is permissible to apply the provision of 
the Maliki, Shafei and Hanbali law. Acting on this 
principle the Ulema have issued the fatwas to the 
effect that in castes enumerated in clause 3, part A of 
this Bill, a married Muslim women can obtain a decree 
dissolving her marriage. 
As the courts are sure to hesitate to apply the 
Maliki Law to the case of a Muslim women, legislation 
recognising and enforcing the above mentioned 
principle is called for in order to relieve the suffering 
of countless Muslim Women." 
In the Federal Assembly, the Bill was described as 
constituted of three parts. It gave grounds for dissolution of 
marriage, described the effect of apostasy on the marriage tie, and 
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provided for the authorized court personnel to dissolve a Muslim 
marriage. The Bill clearly enumerated the grounds on which the 
Muslim women could seek a divorce.^'' 
During the debate in the Legislature it was repeatedly 
mentioned that legislation was necessary because the courts 
continued to follow precedents set by themselves on an incorrect 
understanding of Islam, despite the fact that the Muslim 
community had expressed its dissatisfaction over their view. 
The mover of the Bill explained that there are three schools 
of apostacy. The only school that held that apostasy dissolved 
marriage was the Bokhara school. But the view also contemplated 
imprisonment or detention of a woman until she returned to Islam. 
The Ulema were of the opinion that to adopt the first part and 
leave out the other, as was being done by the British courts, was 
not proper. Furthermore, since the enactment of the Caste 
Disabilities Removal Act, 1850, the forfeiture of civil rights that 
could have been imposed on a woman at apostasy had been 
removed. In Kazmi's view now that inter-marriages between 
different communities were encouraged and freedom of religion 
was advocated, the Muslim community could not support the 
contrary position that apostasy by a woman should put an end to 
her relations with her husband. 
Moreover, he argued that what had been prescribed as a 
punishment by Islam should not be allowed to be turned into a 
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right by the legislature or the courts.^* Kazmi sought further 
support from the fact that the consequences of apostates in other 
rehgions were similar to those being prescribed in the present Bill, 
i.e., no community gave the apostate the right to automatically 
dissolve the marriage by her (or his) unilateral act. It was claimed 
that public opinion also supported the view that mere apostasy 
from Islam would not dissolve a Muslim woman's marriage. Syed 
Gulam Bhik Nairang disclosed that he had sent questionnaire to 
89 Ulema, 65 of whom have replied. Except for one or two the 
rest were of the opinion that the true doctrine of Muslim law was 
that marriage was not dissolved on apostasy^'^ When the Bill was 
under discussion, prior to being sent to Select Committee, the 
government had pointed out that it should be made clear that the 
bill was not applicable to 'Shias' whose law was different from 
that of the 'Sunnis\ But later on the 'Shias' were also included 
into the Act because the government did not raise any objection. 
As far as the clause that only a Muslim judge would have authority 
to dissolve a Muslim marriage was not accepted by the 
government. 
The government had already made it clear that if the Muslims 
insisted for the inclusion of clause relating to the Muslim judges 
the government would oppose the Bill as a whole. The main 
reasons enumerated by the government was that if the clause is 
included in the Bill it would amount to casting aspersions on the 
judicial honesty of the judges. It was denied by the Muslim 
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members that they did not mean casting aspersions on the judges 
or they doubted the integrity of the judges but they said that under 
Shariat a non-Muslim judge could not be appointed for such 
purpose. But when the government showed no signs of accepting 
these claims the Muslim members acquised and explained that 'It 
is better to have a measure at the present stage as it is, rather 
than insist on a thing which does not appeal to the country at 
the present time.^^ This was an important admission as it indicated 
that if there was no possibility of their demand being met, the 
Muslim religio-political leaders would make compromises and 
accept Legislative provisions that went against the Shariat.^^ 
When the Ulema found that the final shape of the Act was 
not in consonance with Shariat they tried to stop the law coming 
into effect by sending a petition to the viceroy to withold his 
assent. But they could not succeed. The reason for not getting 
success was that the Muslim League did not support them in their 
effort to retain the provision that only Muslim judges should have 
the competence to dissolve Muslim marriges. The importance of 
this Act cannot be undermined in the sense that this Act, for the 
first time, gave the Muslim women of India the right, although 
limited, to ask for the judicial dissolution of the marriage. The Act 
also helped Muslim women from taking the extreme step of 
renouncing Islam to get their marriages dissolved. The role played 
by the Ulema in introducing the Shariat Bill and the Divorce Bill 
in the Federal Legislative Assembly illustrates clearly that when 
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political representation first became available to Indians under the 
Act of 1935, the Muslim religio-political leaders were willing to 
use the Legislative process to modify existing personal law 
practices. The Ulema efforts to have all Muslims govenred by the 
Shariat and to provide as limited right of divorce to women so 
that they do not apostatise from Islam are all ilustrations of the 
use of the political process to confirm the hold of religion on the 
lives of the people.^^ 
In view of the above reasons, the Dissolution of the Muslim 
Marriage Act, 1939 was passed. It is applicable to all Muslims in 
India who may otherwise adhere to Hanafi, Shafii, Ithna Ashri or 
Ismaili law. The Act is enforced throughout India except in the 
state of Jammu and Kashmir, where a parallel enactment by the 
name of Jammu and Kashmir State Dissolution of Mulsim 
Marriages Act, 1942 is enforce. The words used by section 2 of 
the act as follows : 
'Women married under Muslim Law' and not 'a Muslim 
women'. This protects women who have already abjured Islam in 
the hope of getting their marriage dissolved and are thus no longer 
Muslims; they also can get their marriage dissolved on any of the 
grounds given in the Act. The Act consolidates and clarifies the 
Muslim law relating to suits for dissolution of marriage by women. 
It is applicable to all Muslims but the provisions of the Act 
have to be applied by taking recourse to ordinary process of the 
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civil courts of the country. An appeal against order of the sub 
ordinate court is competent under section 96 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure." 
C. The Special Marriage Act, 1954 
After the partition of India the Muslim leaders who had 
identified with Indian nationahsm joined the process of nation 
building, but the bulk of community, neither trusting nor trusted 
remained aloof and "it continued to cower, rejected, mistrusted 
and afraid.^ "*' The greater proportion of those Muslims who 
remained in India were in the unenviable position of being 
identified with Pakistan while being citizens of India. They were, 
in the eyes of the majority community voted for the creation of 
Pakistan, hence not entitled to any special status in independent 
India. Due to this problem the Muslims started thinking about 
group solidarity and this group solidarity in turn raised suspicion 
about their bonafides and their loyalty to nation. In such changed 
circumstances in post partition independent India the religious 
identity of the Muslims became very important and a common 
religious Personal Law constituted an important component of 
that group solidarity and identity. It is against this background that 
the response of the national politician to the issue of reforming 
Muslim Personnal Law has to be understood. The state wanted to 
reform Hindu Law and give women legal equality and to make 
Hindu Law in conformity with the Constitution. It was also 
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expected from the state that Muslim Personal Law, i.e. Shariat 
which gave lesser rights to women than man in corresponding 
situation should also be modified on the lines of Hindu law. But it 
was very difficult for the state to integrate into one nation. 
Population bitterly divided along religious lines. The goverment 
was not in a position to introduce changes in Muslim Personal law 
as it might be interpreted as persecusion of minorities, especially 
the Muslims. The policy adopted by the state in the post partition 
India was to 'encourage' the minorities to integrate and become 
part of the Indian nation voluntarily and not by coercion. The 
statements and the speeches of the national leaders of that time 
bear testimony to the above assertion. At that time, any attempt to 
reform or replace Muslim Personal Law would have been counter 
productive thus, harming national unity and integrity. Although, the 
government always asserted that under the Indian Constitution it 
had every right to change religious Personal Laws but in practice 
it did nothing to alter or change the Muslim Personal Law as it did 
with Hindu personal Law. 
In the following pages the government's activities and the 
statements of national leaders with regard to Muslim Personal law 
will demonstrate that the government gave utmost priority to 
integrate the minorities especially the Muslims into the national 
mainstream rather than to provide equality for women. The 
government attitude was that the Shariat is immutable and the 
government would interfere in the matter for change only when a 
demand is made by the community itself. 
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This vexed question of changes in Personal laws again came 
up for discussion during the debate on the Special Marriage Act, 
1954. During the debate in the Lok Sabha Kazi Ahmad Hussain 
argued that Muslims were a large minority in the country and the 
views of their representative must be heard and accepted on any 
change that might be made to their Personal Law. He expressed 
the fear that the Bill would result in the curtailments of the rights 
of property and divorce which Muslim women then enjoyed.^'' 
Another objection that was raised during the debate was that, if 
enacted, this law would encourage to circumvent their religious 
laws and obligations. 
Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, the then. Prime Minister of India 
explained that : 
(1) He did not wish to hurt any one's religious feelings but it 
appear to him that the extra ordinary reverance shown to 
what was called Personal Law seemed to be completely 
misplaced, whether it be a Hindu Personal Law, Muslim or 
any other, 
(2) It was admitted that society has changed (which was 
undeniable) then it was not wise to bind with a certain social 
organisation which might have been good at one time but did 
not suit a later stage.^^ 
Finally, the Government of India did not make any exceptions 
for the Muslims and the Act was passed. After passing of the Act 
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all Muslim orthodox parties severely criticised the passage of the 
Act and demanded that no Muslim should be allowed to marry 
under its provision. The main argument, in the words of Mohd. 
Ismail, was that -
"Muslims hold religion as the most vahiable thing in 
life and their whole life is governed by their religion 
and they cannot conceive of the possibilities of the 
abrogation of Shariat law on any account."" 
The Muslim League passed another^ ** resolution in March 
1955 expressing grave concern over the enactment of Special 
Marriage Act and the government's refusal to exempt the Muslims 
from the perview of the Act. The Muslim league warned Muslims 
that this Act was only a beginning in the move to inroduce a 
Uniform Civil Code in the country. The resolution added that : 
"This meeting reiterates that the Personal {Shariat) 
Law of Muslims is a vital part of their religion and the 
substitution of it by any other law is a direct negation 
of the religious freedom guaranteed to them in the 
Constitution. "3^ 
Thus, not only were the Muslim leaders asserting that the 
Parliament could not interfere with the Shariat they were also 
asserting that Parliament should not do anything to 'encourage' 
Muslims to leave their religion. The implication of this argument, 
although not specifically articulated, was that the government was 
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expected to facilitate the control of religion over individuals. The 
state at this stage declined to accept the Special Marriage Act 
claims about the sanctity of all religions were ignored, helped to 
discount the Muslim members' claims but at the same time the 
state did not unequivocally declare its right to modify the religious 
Personal law of any community; instead it publicised the Special 
Marriage Act as a secular law which had nothing to do with the 
religious law of various communities.'*" 
D. Hindu Law Reform Acts 
At the time of the debate on Hindu Law reform bills in the 
Parliament and before that when the Hindu Code Bill was debated 
in the Constituent Assembly the government was repeatedly faced 
with the argument that a secular state should not legislate for only 
one religious community i.e. Hindu Community. Another argument 
vehemently put forward that if Hindu law was being reformed 
because it discriminated against women why not Islamic Law. 
Islamic law should also be reformed as it also discriminated 
against women. During the debate in the Constituent Assembly 
some members argued that if it is admitted that everyone has equal 
citizenship righs irrespective of their religion then the government 
should have introduced a bill that applied to every citizen and not 
to Hindus only.'" After the adoption of the Constitution it was 
again pointed out by the opponents of the Hindu code Bill if 
monogamy was a desirable principle it should be made the rule 
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for every community including the Muslims. Similarly it was also 
argued that the benefits being bestowed on Hindu community 
should be extended to all the communities living in India. 
One Muslim member Khwaja Inaitullah said that secularism 
did not mean that the same Personal laws should be framed for all 
communities. He suggested that Hindu law was being modified 
only because it had been undergoing changes but Muslim law had 
not chnge for the last 1350 years, nor was it likely to be changed 
in the days to come, since Muslims believed that their laws for 
marriage and division of property was made by God.''^ 
The government's stands response was of a changing nature. 
The government claimed, after the first election that the 
government could not shirk the task of bringing in a law that 
would be applicable to everyone irrespective of religion. Later on 
the government also assured the Muslim community that it could 
not change or reform Islamic community at the moment because 
the Muslim community was not taken into confidence on the 
subject and it would be undesirable to initiate the process without 
consulting the people concerned.''^ If we go through the attitude 
of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar in the Constituent Assembly and later on 
as the Union Law Minister we find a change in his opinion. In the 
Constituent Assembly, Ambedkar had emphatically stated that 
being a secular state did not mean that the state had to draw back 
from regulating the lives of various communities governed by their 
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own special laws.'*'' But when, after the enactment the Indian 
Constitution the government's emphasis on consulting with the 
Muslim community as a crucial factor the Union Law Minister 
changed his views and explained that a secular state did not apply 
that the sentiments of the people should not be taken into 
consideration. Dr. Ambedkar said : 
"We are not here to flout the sentiments of the people.'"''' 
This answer of Ambedkar met with the response from Syama 
Nandan Sahaya that while the Law Minister had shown concerned 
for non-Hindus, he did not seem to have any regard for the 
feelings of Hindus.'"^ 
However, the government did not indicate whether it was 
going to initiate the process of consultation within a specified 
time. The significance of the government statements regarding the 
state's competence or authority to modify Muslim Personal Law, 
is that the community was to be given the option to decide when 
or if they would agree to have there religious Personal laws 
confirm to the Constitution.''^ 
As we have already seen that during the debate on Hindu 
Code Bill and later the Hindu Law Reform Bills in the Constituent 
Assembly and the Parliament the opponents of the Bill had raised 
the point that a secular state should legislate for all religious 
communities and not only for the Hindu community which is the 
majority community. 
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On all such objections the answer of the government was that 
this was the first step for bringing uniformity and finally the 
government would try to enact a Uniform Civil code.''*' But we will 
see later that the government's stand underwent a major change 
when the Criminal Procedure Code was discussed in the Lok 
Sabha in 1973.'^ ^ It reflects that either the government did not want 
to enact a Uniform Civil Code or it was not in a position to enact 
such a code due to several factors including the religious 
sentiments of the Muslim community and the political expediency 
both. 
E. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Controversy 
Relating to the Definition of 'Wife') Section 125(1) 
Explanation (b) 
In 1973 the government introduced a new Criminal Procedure 
Code Bill in Parliament to replace the old Criminal Procedure 
Code of 1898 mainly to provide a uniform law of maintenance.' 
Under section 488 of the code of 1898 a wife could obtain 
maintenance from her husband in summary proceedings, but due 
to the meaning of the word 'wife' the proceedings were dropped 
when a husband divorced his wife. In this situation the divorced 
wife was not entitled to get any maintenance from her former 
husband. This state of affairs was very common in cases of 
Muslim wives. Whenever the magistrate ordered maintenance 
allowance in favour of wife the husband was at liberty to defeat 
the provision of law and the order of the court by pronouncing 
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divorce. That's why one of the matters dealt within the Criminal 
Procedure Code Bill was the maintenance of divorced wife. Thus 
when the Cr.P.C. bill was introduced in the Lok Sabha the 
government took cognizance of this difficulty faced by Muslim 
wives and provided an explanation to the section 125(1) that 
under the maintenance provision the word 'wife' would include 
within its meaning a divorced wife. 
The definition of the 'wife' as given in Explanation (b) of 
Section 125 (1) of the Cr.P.C. is noteworthy for the purpose of 
the analysis. 
"Wife includes a woman who has been divorced by 
or has obtained a divorce from her husband and she 
has not remarried." 
The definition of the wife is objectionable to the scholars of 
Islamic jurisprudence as the same is foreign to Islamic concept of 
wife. The definition of the wife given in earlier code^", thus, have 
been replaced by a new definition. On the basis of legal fiction, 
the two strangers being of opposite sex are treated to be husband 
and wife under section 125 of the Cr.P.C. for the purposes of 
maintenance even after divorce. When the bill was being debated 
in the Parliament it was objected to tooth and nail by Muslim 
members in the legislative house viz., Ibrahim Sulaiman Seth, 
G.M. Banatwala, C.H. Koya and others. They objected the 
explanatory clause defining the term 'wife' and they advanced 
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potent advocacy that Muslims must be exempted from the ambit 
of the definition of the wife. 
Ibrahim Sulaiman Sait of the Muslim League objected to 
Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. Bill which was to replace Section 4, of 
the older Cr.P.C.*' He claimed that the provision erodes the rule 
of Muslim Personal Law under which the term 'wife' does not 
include a divorced wife. Furthermore, under Islamic Law 
maintenance is payable to a divorced woman only for three 
months or three menstrual periods after the divorce (to determine 
whether or not she is pregnant to the husband or if she is pregnant 
at the time of divorce, then she is to be supported by the husband 
while the pregnancy lasts. The member said that since Muslims 
are governed by their personal law they have to follow it, and if 
the provision is not deleted from the Cr.P.C. then atleast Muslims 
should be exempted from its perview. In the opinion of Sait 
Muslim Personal Law includes specific procedures with regard to 
all matters concerning the life of a Muslim and these directives 
have been laid down by God himself in the Our'an. Hence, he 
could not support the proposed explanation to the section, as it 
was opposed to Muslim Personal Law. This was a significant 
claim with respect to the relationship between Religious Personal 
Laws and the Constitution which almost went unchallenged in the 
Lok Sabha." 
Sait also reminded the Prime Minister and the Congress 
Parliamentary party which had given repeated assurances that 
[ 250 ] 
Reforms in Minority Personal Laws 
there would be no interference with Mushm Personal Law.''^  With 
Sait, another member of Mushm League, Mohd. Koya, tried 
unsuccessfully to introduce an amendment to the effect that the 
explanation to section 125 that 'Wife includes a divorced wife' be 
deleted. Koya asserted that he thought it was against common 
sense that he could be asked to maintain a divorced wife until she 
married again and it was not his duty to find her another 
husband.-'''' 
The Law Minister pointed out that the explanation in section 
125, Cr.P.C. did not affect the civil status of the husband and wife 
in any manner and besides this made the following observation '^ 
"We have received a lot of representations which 
show that after divorce, women are generally in a very 
bad plight and it is a very difficult social and 
humanitarian problem...; I do not think that Muslim 
Personal Law comes into the problem." 
He explained the reason for introducing the explanation to 
section 125, thus : 
"The Government had received information (the 
post-divorced circumstances of woman were 
economically stringent and therefore) after divorce 
women were in bad economic circumstances and on 
humanitarian grounds, they should have some help." 
[ 2 5 1 ] 
Reforms in Minority Personal Laws 
He explained that 'A helpless lady (alongwith some other 
categories of people) is given relief no one could really say it was 
againt the Muslim Personal Law. Infact it was consistent with the 
humanitarian traditions of Muslim Personal law.^ ^ The government 
did not directly address the claim made by Sait that Muslim 
Personal Law had laid down directives for all matters and being 
divinely ordained these could not be altered. It had the 
opportunity to articulate its stand vis-a-vis its capacity to reform 
Muslim Personal Law, but it chose to treat the subject as not 
concerned with Personal law. 
Rejecting all the pleas and amendments the section on 
maintenance was adopted by the Lok Sabha on 30th August, 
1973. However, the Muslim religious and political leaders exerted 
sufficient pressure on the government to reconsider the Cr.P.C. 
Bill, Press media especially urdu was adopted as potent tool to 
oppose the proposed amendment of Section 488, Clause 3 of the 
then existing Cr.P.C. During that political situation, the resentment 
of Muslims was duly recognised. Meanwhile, various religious-
political organisation sent letters to the then Prime Minister, Mrs. 
Gandhi protesting inclusion of the explanation to Section 125 in 
the Cr.P.C. Bill." As a rare instance "In the legislative history of 
India, discussion on the draft of the (new) Criminal Procedure 
Code was reopened at the instance of the then Prime Minister 
Mrs. Indira Gandhi in Parliament at a very unusual stage."-'' 
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The Cr.P.C. bill was again taken up for discussion in the Lok 
Sabha on Uth Dec. 1973 and the decision of 30th August, 1973 
was rescinded by the government. The effect of such recision was 
that the clause and all the amendments concering it were reopened 
for discussion." 
During the debate in the Lok Sabha Jyotirmoy Basu 
described the importance and significance of seciton 125 for 
Muslim women. In support of his contention he cited certain 
versus of the Holy Our'an and claimed that the Our'an provides 
maintenance to the divorced women on a reasonable scale. He 
also criticised the Privy Council decision in A}^ha Mohamed Jafar 
vs. Koolsum Bihi.^^ 
The government finally succumbed to the pressure of the 
Muslim community and the law minister himself moved an 
amendment to section 127 and explained its purpose thus : 
"Under the customary or personal law of certain 
communities certain sums are due to a divorced 
women. Once such a sum was paid, the magistrate's 
order giving maintenance (under section 125) could be 
cancelled."^' 
The law minister was making a reference to Muslim Personal 
Law, under which the prospective husband promises to pay a 
specified sum to the wife at the time of the marriage. The sum is 
called dower or Mehr and the usual practise is that the sum is 
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paid to the wife at the time of divorce. Mr. Jyotirmoy Basu 
asserted that by this political move in the shape of the amendment 
the spirit of section 125 has been fully negatived. However, the 
amendment was accepted by the Lok Sabha." 
Thus, in the form of section 127 clause 3(b) exception was 
added during the debate. It is abundantly clear by the perusal of 
the legislative history that section 127 clause 3(b) was brought to 
safeguard to Muslims and their Personal laws. In the words of 
Tahir Mahmood : 
"In the wake of mounting opposition by the Muslims, 
Mrs. Gandhi (the then Prime Minister) rather created 
history by ordering reopening of discussion of the 
disputed position of the Bill at a very unusual stage. 
Finally, a saving clause (Section 127 clause iii(b) in 
effect protecting the Muslim Personal Law was 
inserted in that position."" 
He further observed : 
"The position as finally enacted laid down that 
though the courts could grant maintenance to a 
divorced wife, at the time of so doing, they should 
give due consideration as to whether she had already 
realised from the husband her post-divorce 
entitlement under the personal Law of the parties.''^ 
This was obviously meant to protect Muslim Personal 
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Law on the point as traditionally interpreted. The way 
in which the amendment as originally proposed, was 
modified, seemingly satisfied the orthodox Muslims/'^ 
Archana Parashar comments on the whole exercise in the 
following words : 
"The consequences of this decision were far more 
significant for women than for men as provisions of 
religious personal laws more often discriminate 
against women. The govenrment did not give any 
explanation for the decision to abandon its pursuit of 
a humanitarian goal, that is, to prevent undue hardship 
to divorced Muslim women. When the initial proposal 
for modifying the Cr.P.C. was made, it was 
recognised that Muslim women were in a particularly 
vulnerable position because of the case with which a 
Muslim man could divorce his wife. When the 
modified Sections 125-27 Cr.P.C. were accepted there 
was no change in the right of the Muslim husband to 
divorce his wife extrajudicially or of the right of the 
wife to receive dower or Mehr and the particular 
difficulty faced by Muslim women remained 
unchanged. The only outcome of the exercise was that 
the government was seen to subordinate the interest 
of women in the face of opposition from the male 
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religio-political leaders of the Muslim community. 
From now on the Muslim leaders seem to have Carte 
blanche with regard to matters claim to be governed 
by their personal law. Not only did they object to 
mandatory provisions but also to purely enabling 
provisions hke those in the adoption bill."^^ 
F. The Adoption Bill, 1972 
The legislative history of Adoption bill dates back to 1956 
when an attempt was made by Mrs. Jayshree Raiji to introduce 
the adoption of children bill into the Lok Sabha in 1956. But she 
could not persue the bill as she was persuaded to withdraw the 
bill when the Union Law Minister promised that the government 
would introduce a bill shortly. Acting on this promise, though 
after about 10 years, in 1965 the Indian Council For Social 
Welfare, in collaboration with the Indian Council of Child Welfare 
and other welfare organisations, prepared the Adoption of 
Children Bill. The Draft of the bill was sent to the Union Law 
Minister and members of Parliament. The following years Mrs. 
Tara R. Sathe introduced the adoption of Children Bill into the 
Upper House. But this bill could not be enacted as law. Again a 
new bill was introduced into the Rajya Sabha in 1972. The 1972 
bill was referred to a joint committee in order to decide whether, 
among other things, it should apply to all sections of Indian 
society.'^'' 
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The report of the joint committee recommended that the bill 
should be made applicable to all Indians except 'scheduled 
tribes'. The three Muslim members of the joint committee were 
not in agreement with the recommendation of the joint committee 
as they were of the view that Muslims should also be excluded 
from the perview of the proposed law. Due to the dissolution of 
Lok Sabha in 1977 no discussion or debate took place on the 
adoption bill. The Janata Government introduced a new adoption 
Bill but withdraw it from following opposition from the Muslim 
community. The term of the new Janata Government was very 
short and it could not complete its full five years term. Hence, no 
new bill could be introduced by the Janata Party government. The 
Congress government regained office in 1980 and reintroduced 
the adoption bill in the modified version which excluded Muslims 
from its perview. This exclusion of Muslims from the perview of 
adoption bill was condemned widely.^ * To ascertion the views of 
Muslims community and other minorities the bill was referred to 
the Minority Commission for its view. The adoption bill was 
designed to give every individual the right to adopt a child. A 
necessary condition for adopting a child was that the consent of 
other spouse was necessary, if the person adopting was married. 
The procedure for adoption was provided and the effects of 
adoption enumerated.^^ 
The main reason for the opposition to the bill by the Muslim 
religious scholars and political leaders was on the ground that the 
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provisions of the proposed law conflicted with the tenets of Islam. 
There were three sepecific objections against the adoption bill : 
(1) That under the adoption bill one of the legal consequences of 
the adoption was that the adopted child took the name of the 
adopting family. The Muslim leaders objected that the 
Our'arf^ prohibits such a change of name and this 
prohibition is not a mere recommendation but is mandatory. 
(2) The second legal consequence of adoption under the bill was 
that under it, the adopted child could not make specified 
matrimonial alliances. This amounted to declaring some 
relations as haram (Prohibited) but under Islamic principles 
Allah alone has the prerogative of declaring things and acts 
as halaal (Permitted) and haram (Prohibited). According to 
Muslim leaders by prohibiting relationships which Allah has 
permitted the Legislature was claiming authority which under 
Islamic law is possessed only by Almighty Allah which is 
not permitted under Islam. 
(3) Since the adoption bill provided that the adopted child would 
become heir to the property of the adopting parents, this 
would naturally alter the shares of the heirs hence would 
amount to an interference with the scheme of succession 
provided by the Shahat. According to these Muslim religio-
politial leaders would be totally against Islamic Law as the 
scheme of shares to the heirs has been expressly provided 
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for in the holy Qur'an'K They also cited an incident relating 
to the Prophet Mohammad (SAW). The Prophet Mohammad 
(SAW) had adopted his slave as his son and named him after 
himself. It was to annul this act that the later verses were said 
to be revealed. There is a tradition, reported by Saad-Bin-
Abi-Waqas and recorded by Bukhari to the same effect.^ ^ 
The above opposition of the adoption bill did not mean that 
the Muslim community was unanimous in its opposition to the bill. 
In 1978, when the government withdraw the bill, the Indian 
Council of Social Welfare organised a public meeting in Bombay 
which was attended, among others by Justice Chagla, former 
Chief Justice of Bombay High Court and later Minister for 
Education, Govt, of India. The meeting was presided over by 
Justice Hidayatullah, a retired Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. 
Justice Chagla said that the bill was of a purely optional nature 
and it was not forcing any Muslims to deny their faith. Asaf A. 
Fyzee, a prominent Muslim jurist said that the Muslim opposition 
failed to appreciate that the Our'an had provided full direction on 
what should be done for orphans and the opposition to the 
adoption bill by the Muslims was in a sense denial of protection 
to the neediest children on purely obscurantist ground. 
Some Muslim lawyers suggested that the government could 
modifiy the bill slightly and leave no ground for Muslim leaders to 
oppose it. The Chairman of the Minority Commission, Justice 
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Hamidullah Beg, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, suggested 
that the government should not exlcude the Muslims from the 
perview of the adoption bill. Instead everyone should be given the 
option to declare that adoption is not contrary to their religious 
beliefs.^^ A common thread running through ail these suggestions 
however, is that they give credence to the claims that the religious 
personal law cannot be modified and in effect they accept that 
religions have supremacy over the authority of the state and the 
Constitution.^'' The objection of the Muslim religio-poiitical 
leaders rested primarily on the ground that Islamic law is 
immutable. Allah alone is the law giver and he has communicated 
these laws through the Our'an and Hadilh. It is, therefore, 
beyond any human agency's power to alter these laws and 
Parliament cannot assume the authority to do so. By agreeing to 
exempt the Muslim community from the perview of the Adoption 
Bill, the government gave tacit ascent to this ground. This stand 
of the government bears comparison to its conduct when enacting 
the Special Marriage Act, of 1954. Just like the Special Marriage 
Law, the Adoption Law was to be an enabling law, i.e., anyone 
who choose could take advantage of it. There was no compulsion 
for anyone who feh that it conflicted with their religion to exercise 
the legal rights given under the adoption bill. In 1954 the 
government had not accepted the claim made by some Muslim 
members that the Special Marriage Act would encourage Muslim 
to leave the fold of Islam, but in regard to Adoption bill the 
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government in effect took over the responsibility of ensuring that 
no Muslim had the opportunity to reject Islamic law. This was, as 
yet, the greatest concession made to the claims of the Muslims 
rehgio-political leaders regarding the operative sphere of religious 
personal laws and the competence of the state to modify them. 
An editorial entitled 'A crying shame'^^ described the reluctance 
of the government to provide a universal adoption law as a 
criminal abdication of responsibility.^^ 
From the above, it is clear that the government made a 
departure from its past commitment when it reformed the Hindu 
Personal Law. The states conduct was not dependent upon the 
particular nature of Islamic and Hindu laws, because the state had 
initially made clear that it had the right to reform any religious 
personal law. But the state during the course of time changed its 
earlier position and said that the state would make reforms in 
Muslim Personal law i.e. Shariat only after taking into confidence 
the Muslim community. Later on even this position was given up 
and the attitude of the state established that the state would not 
make any civil laws that 'allowed Muslims to go outside the 
control of their religious law. In doing so, the state seems to have 
accepted the claim that the Shariat is immutable and parliament is 
not competent to modify it. The position of the government is, 
from the point of view of Muslim community, is in consonance 
with the Muslim Personal law, {Shariat) Application Act, 1937 
which allows Muslims to be govenred by their Islamic law in 
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certain specified matters. But from the women's point of view the 
stand taken by the state is to perpetuate the legal inequality created 
by religion based personal laws. It is significant for women 
because by accepting the religio-political leaders as the 
spokesmen for the entire community, the state has virtually 
ensured that women continue to suffer legal inequality for the 
religio-political leaders are not even suggesting that some aspects 
of the Shariat may be in need of change. Mr. Hamidullah Beg 
opined : 
"The Constitution gives every individual his or her 
religious freedom. It does not give any group the right 
to thrust its views on even one individual. It is 
imperative that members of all minority groups even 
within the minority receive equal treatment with those 
of the majority."''^ 
From the above discussion it is clear that the state's attitude 
towards the reform of minority Personal laws is to some extent 
consistent. The state after reforming the Hindu Religious Laws did 
not reform the minority personal laws. Sometimes the state 
declared that it cannot force the minority community to accept the 
reform in their personal laws and at another time declared that the 
voice or the demand in the change of Personal law should come 
from the community itself. It may be called as the government's 
realisation that any change in the minority personal laws would not 
be beneficial for the state. It may also be termed as political 
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expediency of the ruling party not to touch a very sensitive issue 
of the minority community. It may also be termed as the 
government thinks that the Shariat Act, 1937 and Article 372 of 
the Constitution of India does not permit it to change the minority 
personal laws. 
G. The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) 
Act, 1986 
In 1986 it was the aftermath of Shah Bano's case when the 
parliamentarians had to mend not only to renovate the 
maintenance provision but to pass a full fledged Act relating to 
the maintenance for Muslim divorcee in accordance with 
'Shariaf. When the Shah Bano case was decided by the apex 
judiciary, a great controversy in Muslim circle detonated and the 
Muslims depreciated and depricated to accept the judgement there 
off and further demonstrated that the time of reasoning adopted 
by judiciary was wholly unjustifiable and untenable and could not 
stand the test of logical and cogitative deduction as same is 
contrary to the Shariat. Hence, they joined and envigorated the 
hands of Muslim leadership and came under the banner of All 
India Muslim Personal Law Board, and started a countrywide 
demonstration and protestation and same germinated the 
consensus of the majority of the Muslims of India in favour of the 
move to demand statutory protection of their personal law relating 
to maintenance.^" 
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The process of mobilising Muslim public opinion by referring 
to their religion based personal law and the immutability of the 
Shariat was again repeateted most forcefully in 1985, in response 
to the Supreme Court judgement in what became known as Shah 
Bano 's case.^^ The Muslim Personal Law Board was an intervener 
in the Shah Bano Case.^'' The Muslim Personal Law Board 
strongly criticized the Supreme Court judgement as a gross 
interference with Muslim Personal Law and decided to organise 
the Muslim Community to stop this 'interference'. The Muslim 
Personal Law Board started a countrywide protest on the last 
Friday of Ramadan, a day on which Muslims gather in large 
numbers to offer prayer at the Mosque. The month of Ramadan 
is very important in Islamic caledner year and the last Friday of 
the Ramadan is the most important day of the month. By 
choosing the last friday of Ramadan the Muslim Personal Law 
Board started contiously the protest against this judgement. 
Muslims responded in great numbers and from then a wide 
spectrum of Muslim leaders took up the task of mobilising Muslim 
masses to protest against the Supreme Court judgement. Where 
ever the Muslim leaders went they were able to organise big 
rallies. In Bombay, for instance, more than 300,000 Muslims 
joined a protest march in November IQSS.**' In Siwan, Bihar more 
than 400,000 Muslims joined a conference convened by the 
Muslim Personal Law conference conveners.''^ The pattern was 
repeated all over the country. The demand for recession of the 
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judgement in Shah Banc's case (as well as the earlier cases) was 
primarily based on the reason advanced on all previous occasions 
namely that Muslim personal law is divine and hence not 
susceptible to modification by any human agency. Most Muslim 
leaders claimed that the decision that Section 125 of CrPC was 
applicable to Muslims amounted to a direct contravention of 
'Shariat\ They maintained that the husband's liability to pay 
maintenance came to an end with 'Iddat\ and some went to the 
extent of saying that it was actually a sin to give maintenance after 
this period." The most important reason advanced by the 
agitationists was the interpretation of the Our'an by the Supreme 
Court. They were of the opinion that by interpreting the holy 
Qur'an the Supreme Court was guilty of injuring the sentiments 
of the Muslims and by deciding to interpret the holy Qur'an it had 
taken the role of social reformer and violated the basic rules of 
Shariat. Some religio-political leaders claimed that the inaction 
and the ambigous stand of the government with regard to 
demands of Muslims had endangered the future of Islam in India. 
The following two statements are representatives of the 
arguments used by Muslim leaders who sustained the movement 
to rescind the Supreme Court judgement. Maulana Abul Hasan Ali 
Nadvi, a member of Muslim Personal Law Board, thought that : 
"The problem of the protection of Shariat today is 
the most important problem for the Muslims of 
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India... The Muslim feelings have been deeply hurt by 
the aggressive attack from all sides on the Muslim 
Personal Law. The government's wake and doubtful 
approach and the Supreme Court's judgement have 
made the future of Islam in this country 
dishonourable."^'* 
Maulana Asad Madni issued a Threat that 
"Muslims cannot tolerate any interference in Shariat 
which is divined law. If they are compelled in this 
respect it can lead to undesirable consequences and 
the integrity of the country can be affected.""'' 
(i) The Response of the Union Government 
Mr. G.M. Banatwala, the General Secretary of the Indian 
Muslim League, introduced a private members bill in the Lok 
Sabha designed to overturn the Supreme Court decision in the two 
earlier cases of Bai Tahira and Fazlun Bi}^ Mr. Banatwala's bill 
proposed the exemption of Muslims from the pronounced by the 
Supreme Court focussed the attention of the entire nation on this 
issue and on Banatwala's bill. The initial response of the Union 
Government was to oppose the bill introduced by Banatwala and 
its response was informed by the considered opinion of various 
advisors."^ The legal advisors note, dated 25 May 1985, said that 
the Supreme Court had correctly interpreted the law. In the words 
of the Law Secretary : 
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"The decision of the court cannot be regarded as an 
encroachment on Muslim Personal Law, which is of civil nature 
whereas. Section 125 is a provision contained in the Criminal 
Procedure. In view of the foregoing, the bill to amend Sections 
125 and 127 of the Cr.P.C. should be opposed. This view was 
supposed by the Union Law Minister Ashok Sen and the Minister 
of State for Law on June 2 and June 1, 1985. The Ministry of 
Home Affairs prepared a note, dated 24th July 1985 opposing the 
Banatwala bill even in the Lok Sabha, Arif Mohammad Khan, 
Minister of State for Home Affairs, argued forcefully against any 
move to exempt Muslim men from the perview of Section 125 
Cr.P..C.«« 
When Muslim including Muslim Parliamentarians, Muslim 
leaders of different organisations and prominent Ulema of 
different schools of Islamic jurisprudence showed their 
resentments and mounted the pressure through all legitimate 
forums, the then Congress Government headed by Rajiv Gandhi 
Changed its response. The intensity of the agitation against the 
Supreme Court judgement compelled the government to reverse 
its initial stand. Mr. Z.R. Ansari another Union Minister argued 
forcefully against the Shah Bano judgement for three hours in the 
Lok Sabha. He said that the Shah Bano judgement was contrary 
to Islam.^ '^  Later on Mr. Ansari requested Banatwala withdraw his 
bill so that the govenrment could find a wayout which would be 
proper for all minorities.^" 
[ 267 ] 
Reforms in Minority Personal Laws 
The Bill, entitled the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on 
Divorce) Bill, was introduced into the Lok Sabha in February 
1986.^ * The statement of objects and Reasons accompanying the 
bill explains that since the Supreme Court's decision in Shah Bano 
case has led to some controversy regarding the obligation of a 
Muslim husband to pay maintenance to his divorced wife, 
"opportunity has therefore been taken to specify the 
rights which a divorced Muslim women is entitled to 
at the time of divorce and to protect her interest". 
Introduction of the 'Muslim Women (Protection of Rights 
and Divorce) Bill in the Parliament gave a shock to the 'Pseudo-
Secularist hailers of the Shah Bano judgement for its so 
understood anti Shariat bias. Their ego was badly hurt and they 
came out to misrepresent the newly proposed law to the ignorant 
layman as a frightful national calamity. Passing of the Bill would 
in their opinion herald India's doomsday. Loud criticism was 
made without even caring to read its provisions and 
dispassionately understand the political will and legislative 
intention in the back ground.^^ The bill was described as a 'fraud' 
on the Constitution', 'a slap on the face of secularism' and an 
lawfully unwise step that would provoke the majority community 
to 'communal frenzy'. Its supporters were freely called, 'anti 
nationals, orthodox and lunatic'.^^ 
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The pendency of the bill before the parliament for about three 
months and in this duration same assumed the majority-minority 
conflict divorcing the realities of secular India as enshrined in the 
Constitution of India, but on communal basis. Intellectuals and 
public men of both the communities defended their contention 
barring few exceptions in both the communities. The spokemen 
of the Muslim community advocated that the bill is constitutionally 
justified and entitled to enjoy the protection guaranteed to the 
minorities in Part III of the Indian Constitution, while the 
spokemen of the majority community contended it as anti human 
more violating the principle of equality guaranteed under articles 
14, 15 and 16 of the Constitution and found it discriminatory 
too. '^* 
(ii) The Lok Sabha Debate on Muslim Women Bill 
The govenrment did not take much notice of the opposition 
generated by this bill and on 6 May, 1986 the Muslim Women 
(Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 was passed.'^- An 
account of the Lok Sabha debate enables us to ascertain the 
position of the government and the main issues that were 
discussed during the debate. When initiating the discussion, the 
Law Minister traced the stand of the government since 
independence on the matter of reform on Muslim Personal Law. 
He explained that it had been accepted from the start that Muslim 
Personal Law would not be altered without the community's 
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consent. He relied on a statement made by Ambedkar in the 
Constituent Assembly^* to prove that, even at that stage it was 
acknowledged that the state may not impose uniform laws on 
minorities.^^ 
The Law Minister explained that the Cr.P.C. provisions 
(Sections 125-127) had made specific mentions of the Muslim 
community's practise and had exempted Muslim men from paying 
maintenance to their divorced wife if they had paid the full amount 
payable on divorce. He emphasized that the provision of Cr.P.C. 
was made so that no Muslim persons should be offended. In his 
view, the Supreme Court in delivering the Shah Bano judgement 
had, among other things, forgotten that a Uniform Civil Code, 
even if enacted, may be optional in its application. This reference 
to the Uniform Civil Code as well as other parts of the judgement 
had created great apprehension in the minds of Muslims that their 
religious laws were being tampered with. The Law Minister said 
that the government could not possibly be blind to this anxiety 
among the 'largest' minority community in India.^^ Therefore, the 
government has correctly decided to accept the view held by 
Muslims about their personal law rather than that of those who 
thought secularism demanded that everybody must be 'tarred with 
the same brush'.^' Accordingly the government came to the 
conclusion that since Muslims have a particular understanding of 
their personal law, the government is duty bound to pay attention 
to it. The Law Minister emphatically denied that the government 
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has succumbed to the forces of communalism or fundamentahsm 
because they had merely listened to the 'just' demands of the 
community.'"" 
From the above it is clear that the government defended its 
action for introducing the bill on the basis of safeguarding the 
'wishes' of the minority community. The government felt its duty 
in safeguarding the protection given to the minorities in the 
Constitution of India. But the stand of the Law Minister is 
criticised by Archana Parashar in the following words : 
"In order to legitimise this stand, the Law Minister 
misrepresented the meaning of Ambedkar's statement, 
which was made during the debate on the 
constitutional article dealing with the Uniform Civil 
Code. What the Law Minister failed to point out was 
that the statement was made in response to the 
demand that Muslim Personal Law should be 
exempted from the purview of the Uniform Civil Code 
article. Ambedkar, at that time, had refuted the claim 
that Islamic law had not been modified by the 
legislature and had admitted only that the Uniform 
Civil Code may be initially optional. On another 
occasion Ambedkar had unequivocally stated that no 
community should expect that its personal law could 
remain outside the control of the Constitution."" Thus 
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Amhedkar had made the statement, quoted by A.k. 
Sen, to suggest only that 'in the initial stages' the 
Uniform Civil Code could be optional and I argue that 
A.K. sen misrepresented the actual meaning of the 
statement." 
The Muslim women bill was vehemently opposed in the Lok 
Sabha. The main reason put forward by the opponents of the bill 
was that the bill contravened Articles 14, 15(1), 15(A) (e) and 44 
of the Constitution. The main objection was that this bill denied 
Muslim women their constitutional right to equality. The bill was 
opposed mainly by Madhu Dandwate, Saifuddin Chaudhary, K.P. 
Unnikrishanan etc. K.P. Unnikrishnan charged the governemnt 
with surrendering to those 'dark forces' which insist on an 
expensive jurisdiction of religion and said that the medieval 
religion and social practises were opposed to the social region 
enshrined in the Constitution. He further said that the bill 
contravened the constitutional principles that religious freedom 
should be subject to public order by asserting that the 
constitution allows reasonable classification to be made and a law 
made only for the community is a perfectly valid classification. 
The government further defended its action that the bill was 
to promote the interest of Muslim women and this bill was 
designed to safeguard their interest. Furthermore, the government 
tried to show that the bill was designed to give Muslim Women 
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than were available to them under the provisions of Cr.P.C. The 
law minister and many other member of parliament asserted in the 
parliament that the present bill puts no limit on the amount of 
maintenance that could be paid and the wife would have the 
option to claim maintenance from a number of people. But there 
was no explanation of why the government was singling out the 
women of one community to give them better rights than those 
enjoyed by the rest of the Indian women. If there was any defect 
or inadequacy in the provision of the Cr.P.C. dealing with the 
maintenance, the remedy was to reform the Cr.P.C. rather than to 
single out the women of one community for preferential treatment. 
It was also pointed out that the Waqf Boards, which are ultimately 
charged with providing help to indigent divorced Muslim women, 
are themselves financially mismanaged, and so giving them 
eventual responsibility to provide maintenance for Muslim women 
was merely a cosmetic measure.'"^ 
The debate in the Lok Sabha on the bill was supported by 
the members of various political parties including Congress, 
Janata Party, Muslim League etc. The bill was mainly supported 
on the ground that consideration of national integrity demanded 
that the bill be enacted. It was said in the Lok Sabha that due to 
the activities of the press the atmosphere in the country was 
emotionally charged and the communal background of the 
controversy made it to enact the bill in order to save the nation 
fro disintegration.'"^ Another member of Parliament K.C. Pant 
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explained that: 
"There is need for unity and integration at this time, 
the need to bring communities together at a time when 
fundamentalism is growing all around us." 
Begum Abida Ahmad, a Muslim women member of 
Parliament, argued that the bill maintained the self respect of 
women and even enhanced it, and she asked why any self 
respecting woman would beg maitnenance from someone who had 
divorced her and thrown her out of his house.'"'^ It was also 
asserted by many member of Parliament in the Lok Sabha that it 
can conduct its own affairs, have its own way of life, preserve its 
own cultural and religious identity and have the complete freedom 
to practise its own religion.'"'' A considerable number of ruling 
party members were also of the view that 'if Muslims are satisfied 
then no one else may have a say in the matter'. Sheila Dixit took 
the view that if the vast majority of a community believed that 
their women already had enough protection there beliefs and 
sentiments had to be honoured."*^ Another member of Parliament 
Saifuddin Ahmad was of the view that such an attitude was bound 
to separate the Muslims from the mainstream of the community. 
But his stand was not shared by most Muslim members and many 
of them applauded the efforts of the government to secure 
national unity and integration. Syed Shahabuddin described the 
measure as : 
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"a symbol of the continuing struggle in our country 
between the forces of coexistence and national 
integration on the one side and the forces of 
assimilation and absorption on the other."'"'' 
Ibrahim Sulaiman Sait, a leading member of the Muslim 
league said that 'In this country which is multi-religious, 
multilingual and multi cultural, the idea of achieving national 
integration through a Common Civil Code is a .... delusion.' 
From the above account it becomes evident that during 
consideration of the bill the main issue of debate the fact became 
obscured that the whole process of protest, communal 
polarisation and the eventual decision of the government to 
overrule the decision of the Supreme Court has been started by 
the issue of a divorced Muslim women's entitlement to 
maintenance. Instead of centring on the issue of disadvantage to 
women, or the relationship between the religious personal laws 
and the state, the debate became focussed on national integration. 
Thus, Rajeev Gandhi, the Prime Minister of India satisfying 
the essence of the democratic norms, honouring the sentiments of 
the Muslim community, paying respect for the religious rights of 
the Indian minority and realising the truth within the framework of 
the Indian constitution that different personal laws of different 
communities, religious and cultures are entitled to coexist and 
continue, passed 'the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on 
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Divorce) Act, 1986' with the view to satisfy the spirit of 
'Shariah' regarding the maintenance. The contents of the Act 
nullify the evil aspects of legislation and judicial pronouncements 
in the area of maintenance of Muslim divorcee which constitutes 
one of the segments of the Muslim Personal Laws in India.'"" 
By enacting it government of India has, according to the 
Muslim view point, demonstrated its respect for the equality of all 
religions on Indian soil and its regards for the religious rights of 
the minorities guaranteed in part III obviously, felt otherwise.'"^ 
It is easy to understand why the government decided to 
accept the religio-political leaders as the sole spokesmen for the 
entire community. These leaders had demonstrated their capacity 
to mobilise large numbers of Muslim masses. Moreover, they had 
succeeded in articulating the idea that members of the Muslim 
community were feeling threatened and alienated from the rest of 
the society and the state because the community percieves that 
their religious personal law was in danger of being obliterated. The 
Supreme Court judgement was depicted as an effort by the state 
to supercede the principles of Islamic Personal Law with state 
law. The support given to the Shah Bano judgement by the 
intelligentia, mostly Hindus but some prominent Muslims, too, 
was portrayed as an effort by the majority to threaten the survival 
and sanctity of Islamic Law. The Muslim leaders argued that the 
sense of persecution suffered by the Muslim community was 
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threatening the integrity of the nation, and that Muslims would feel 
secure only when the government reversed the Supreme Court 
judgment. The Lok Sabha debate on the Muslim Women bill 
makes it clear that the government accepted this claim. The 
enactment of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on 
Divorce) Act was probably meant to reassure Muslims that their 
religious Personal law, (and through that their religion and culture) 
was not in danger of beign wiped out."" 
(iii) Reforms in other minority religious Personal Laws 
In the preceding pages we have seen that the state has been 
reluctant to make changes in the religious Personal laws of 
Muslims. The same is the case with other minority religious 
personal laws i.e. The Christians and the Parsi communities. As 
there has been virtually no discussion about the religious or 
secular nature of these laws, it cannot be said that the non-
interference of the state is due to the immutable nature of these 
Personal laws. Rather, the reason for the state's non-interference 
in the Personal Laws of these communities is their 'minority 
status\ Their minority status is an important factor in the state's 
decision to leave these Personal laws unreformed. The state's 
conduct with regard to the reform of Muslim Personal law has 
been repeated with regard to the Personal Laws of other minority 
communities. In the following pages the researcher will discuss 
the attempted reforms in Christian Personal Law and Parsi 
Personal Law. 
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H. Reforms in Christian Personal Law 
Like other Personal Laws Christian Personal law also 
discriminates against women. Although Christians all over India 
have a uniform law of marriage and divorce extreme diversity 
exists with regard to their succession laws. Christian women, like 
women of other communities, have less rights than men in 
personal matters. Unlike other communities. Christian Personal 
Law consist mainly of state made law. The former British 
government was more confident about legislating for Christians 
than Muslims or Hindus and perhaps the reason for this was that 
they were also having the Christian faith. The promulgation of the 
Government of India Act, 1935, did not result in any legislative 
activity to reform Christian Personal Law. After independence the 
government although prepared two reports'" but did not straight 
away reform Christian Personal Law. The government introduced 
the Christian Marriage and Matrimonial Causes Bill'^ in the Lok 
Sabha in 1962."^ The Lok Sabha debate show no record of any 
discussion on this bill which lapsed in 1971 but it is generally 
believed that the Christian Bishops were opposed to the 
contemplated reforms and the government acceeded to their 
wishes. Since then no legislative activity or any effort by the state 
has been noticed to reform Christian Personal law. 
In 1983 the Law Commission prepared another report on the 
grounds of divorce for Christians but the government has yet to 
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act upon its recommendations. There is no direct information 
available about the government's view on the matter of Christian 
Personal Law reform although the government has been made 
aware of the demand atleast by certain sections of the community, 
for changing their Personal Law. The Joint Women's Programme 
(a branch of the Banglore based Christian Institute for the Study 
of Religion and Society) sent a memorandum signed by nearly ten 
thousand people, to the Union Law Minister asking for the 
removal of laws discriminating against women. 
Subsequently, the Joint Women Programme, along with a 
representative section of Christian women belonging to different 
women. Fellowships of the Chruches in Delhi, presented a 
memorandum to the Prime Minister of India in February 1986 
(4.ii.86). The memorandum claimed to represent the opinions of 
very wide sections of Christian community since the changes it 
listed had been demanded during various meetings held by the 
joint women's programme."'* 
The Supreme Court delievered a land mark judgement in 
Mary Roy's"'' case in 1986 and declared that the Indian 
Succession Act, 1925 superseds the Travancore Christian 
Succession Act, 1916. The result of this decision is that Syrian 
Christian Women now share equally with their brother's in the 
property of their father. Under the Travencore Christian 
Succession Act the share of the daugther was only one quarter of 
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the share of the son subject to a maximum of Rs. five 
thousand."^ 
The Supreme Court further held that the Travancore Act 
became inopertive following the enforcement of the part B State 
Laws Act, 1951 and thus the succession to property left by 
intestate Christian males during the last thirty five years now open 
to dispute. In other words, the judgement had retrospective effect. 
The Kerala Government filed a review petition, seeking the 
elimination of the retrospective effect of the judgment, but it was 
rejected. The reactions of the Christians was the same as the 
reaction of the Muslim in the Shah Bano Case. The Church 
establishment in Kerala also launched a concerted campaign 
against the Supreme Court judgement Priest belonging to the 
Roman Catholic, Jacobite, Church of South India and Kananya 
Churches criticised the judgment in pulpit pronouncements. 
Pamphlets were distributed by churchmen and the meetings were 
organised to mobilise Christian opinion against the judgement. 
The Church of South India priests on two consecutive Sundays 
assured young Christian men that they would continue to get what 
they had been getting all along and the law did not change 
anything. A new Personal law for Christians was demanded hy 
Bishop Abraham Marclemis of Kananya Church. He said that the 
Supreme Court judgement has created an economic impasse for 
the Christian community and this judgment was likely to destroy 
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the whole Christian Community of India. He was very critical of 
the judgement where no property could be transferred without the 
consent of female. The Jacobite Church similarly demanded a 
new personal law for Christians. The Chruch's opposition to the 
application of the Indian Succession Act instead of the 
Travancore Succession Act has no obvious religious basis. 
Apparently one of the reasons why the Churches so vociferously 
opposed the judgement was that a portion of 'Sthdhanam' 
traditionally goes to the Church and if the practise was suspended 
the Churches stood to loose materially."' 
Meanwhile, a private members Bill"* ws introduced in the 
parliament by Professor P.J. Kurien, a senior Christian Congress 
(I) members of Kerala. Significantly, the M.P. who move this bill 
represented a constituency where rich Christian land owners are 
powerful."^ The Bill sought to modify the Supreme Court 
judgment so that it is not given retrospective effect. 
The religious functionaries' solidarity with men rather than 
women in this instance is a clear illustration of how the power of 
religion is used to prepetuate male privilege. Neither the 
Succession law nor the Christian Divorce law is a strict 
application of Canon Law. The Indian Divorce Act, based on an 
outdated English enactment, is still prevented by the religious 
leaders from being modified. No justification is forthcoming either 
from them or the government for this situation.'^" In view of the 
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government's stand in response to the Muslim community's 
demand that the Shah Bano judgment be overturned by legislation, 
it is not impossible that the state may enact the Kurient Bill into 
law if there is sufficient agitation on the part of the Christian 
religions leaders. The significance of the state's agreement to treat 
religio-political leaders as the sole spokesmen of the community 
and to give religious Personal law a status higher than non-
religious civil law can not be understated. The state may in future 
be compelled to accede to similar demands by other communities, 
at the risk of being made to appear inconsistent. 
I. Reform in Parsi Personal Law 
As far as the Parsi Personal Law is concerned a move to 
reform it was taken up by Parsi Central Association in 1923. A 
sub-committee was appointed to suggest suitable changes. The 
sub-committee known as the Parsi Law Revision Sub-committee 
submitted its report in 1927. The Parsi Central Association sent 
five hundred copies of this report to all the Parsi Associations, 
Anjumans, delegates of the Parsi Chief Matrimonial Court, to 
Parsi Jurists and Publicists all over India and even to Parsi 
Associations in China and Persia also. This report was also 
published in the press and certain modifications were also 
circulated for public opinion. A conference was arranged under 
the auspices of the Parsi Panchayat with twenty five Parsi 
Associations taking part. These modifications were approved by 
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twenty one associations and four of them did not support the 
modifications as they were 'ultra conservative' in their views and 
do not as a rule approve of any changes in keeping with the 
changing times.'^' Thus, a bill to amend the Parsi Marriage and 
Divorce Act, 1865 was considered by the Federal Assembly in 
1936. This bill was first introduced in the Council of state in 1934 
by Sir Phiroze Sethna. It was circulated for opinion and a joint 
Select Committee was appointed to consider the bill in 1935. The 
Select Committee reported to the Council of State in 1935 and it 
passed the bill on 13.iii.36. The Federal Assembly considered the 
bill in April 1936.'22 
As far as the applicability of Parsi Personal Law is 
considered it applies to Zoroastrian Children born to Zoroastrian 
parents; and children of a Parsi father and a non-Parsi mother who 
have been admitted to the Zoroastrian religion. If a Parsi woman 
marries to a non-Parsi the child born to her are not admitted as 
Parsis. The difference in rules governing children of non-Parsi 
mothers and fathers is apparently based on a Bombay High Court 
decision.'" It was held in that case that in a marriage between a 
Parsi woman and a non-Parsi man the presumption is that the wife 
will have to accept the religious faith of her husband. It means 
that the children will be brought up according to the religion of 
the father. Thus, this discriminatory definition of who is a Parsi is 
not based on the religious tenets of Zoroastrianism but is due to 
the judgement of Bombay High Court in .S'/> Dinshaw Case. 
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However, one of the priests of the community is reported to have 
said that a Parsi woman marrying a non-Parsi was guilty of 
aduhery and the children if the Union would be illegitimate. 
Similarly, the rules embodied in the Parsi Marriage and 
Divorce Act, 1936 and the Indian Succession Act 1925 applicable 
to Parsis are not even claimed to be based on the tenets of 
Zoroastrianism. As explained above the modifications into the 
Parsi Personal law were brought about by consulting members 
of the community and not merely the religious leaders.^^"^ 
Anklesaria believes that Parsi Personal law is based on Hindu 
customs and the rules of English Common Law. Parsi immigrants 
arived in India in the seventh century and there is little 
documentation of the legal system which governed them when 
they first arrived. They took on Hindu customs and institutions 
like the Panchayat for administration of their affairs and priests 
had the final say in all religious matters. However, Parsi Personal 
Law like all other Personal law has been assumed to be a religious 
law and the community has not been forthcoming with 
suggestions for change until recently. If it is accepted that rules of 
Parsi Personal law are not religious rules. Then there remains no 
justification for continuing with rules that discriminate against 
women. A plausible explanation that can be put forward for this 
state of affairs is that Parsis are a religious minority and the state 
is reluctant to interfere with their personal matters.'-*^ 
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The Government of India has not made much effort to 
modify the Parsi laws, rules that discriminate against women. It 
was, in 1986, for the first time that a Parsi Marriage and Divorce 
Amendment Bill was introduced in the Rajya Sabha (on 24 
November, 1986) and passed by the Lok Sabha and then the 
Rajya Sabha on 3.vii.87. It received the assent of the President on 
25.iii.88, and came into force on 15.iv.88.'^^' The process of 
amending the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936 was initiated 
by the Board of Trustees of the Bombay Parsi Panchayat. It 
submitted recommendations to the government which introduced 
the bill to amend the Act and enacted it in March 1988. However, 
the provisions discriminating againt women continue to exist and 
most of the amendments have been described by Phiroze Vatul, a 
Parsi lawyer, as of 'cosmetic nature'.'^^ 
From the above discussion it is clear that the attitude of the 
state towards reform in Personal Laws of majority and minority 
communities is not same. As far as the Hindu majority is 
concerned the state reformed their Personal Law although still the 
Hindu Personal Law does not treat women at par with men. The 
reform in Hindu Personal Law was an urgent need of the hour and 
that's why the state, to some extent reformed Hindu Personal 
Laws. But as far as the minority religions Personal laws are 
concerned the state just after the partition did not try to interfere 
in that area on the assumption that this endeavour will hurt the 
religious minorities and alienate them from the majority. One more 
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reason for not interfering in minority religious Personal laws was 
that the state did not want to give the impression of coercion in 
the matter of religious laws and whenever the state tried to 
interfere in the personal laws of the minorities that was vehemently 
opposed by the minorities. Upon this attitude of the state Archna 
Parashar comments : 
"The national leader's special consideration for the 
Muslim minority in post partition period was thus not 
based on any constitutional principle. The national 
leaders were not constitutionally bound to treat 
minorities any differently from the Hindu majority. In 
the context of the religious personal laws if the state 
assumed the authority to reform Hindu Personal Law, 
it could have done the same with regard to Muslim 
and other religious personal laws. The decision not to 
reform the minorities' religious personal laws was 
most likely based on the assumption that being a 
minority, it was easy to alienate them by giving the 
impression of coercion in the matter of religious laws. 
As explained above the advantage of giving special 
status to the religious personal laws of Muslims, and 
other minorities, was that the govennent was more 
likely to get the cooperation of the Muslim religio-
political leaders in its task of nation building."'^'* 
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Summary 
Historically, personal laws of the minorities were 
discriminatory to women except Parsi law. While Hindu laws were 
reformed by the State, the same could not be done, as the policy 
was to reform them on the demands of the community concerned. 
Hence, clearly the reform process is based on the minority status 
of the community and not as per the position of women. Some 
efforts have been made in regard to Parsi and Christian laws. 
Legislative Activity with Regard to Muslim Personal Law 
Apart from the general impression Muslims too, like Hindus, 
tried to reform their laws time to time. The Jamiat-ul-Ulema Hind 
was of the opinion that only Ulema can interpret Sharial. While 
the political elites represented by Muslim League considered all 
such questions of reform in comparison to their Hindu 
counterpart. Introduction of Shahat Application Bill in Federal 
Assembly in 1935 was first such an attempt by Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-
Hind. Debates in Assembly brought several contradictions in 
open. Ulema and Muslim League differed on certain points. Bill 
was sent to Select Committee. The result was that some un-
Islamic customs were accepted under the Bill. Khojas and 
Memons were allowed to carry on their customs despite 
objections by Ulema. Although it failed to a Unifonn Islamic Law 
but the enactment set the pattern for the future. 
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Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act 1939 
Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939 was a 
constructive attempt by the IJlema to enhance the position of 
women. There were diverse procedure for dissolution of marriage 
by women according to school of thoughts. Hanafi law permitted 
dissolution on the conversion of women. To stop the practice of 
conversion, Ulema decided to streamline the procedue. In 1936 
Muhammad Ahmad Kazmi introduced a Bill in Federal Legislative 
Assembly which was based on the Al-Hilal-AI Najizalil halilal-
Al AJza of Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanvi. After the consideration of 
Select Committee, the Assembly adopted it in 1939. Final 
enactment of the Act dissatisfied Ulema and they tried to get it 
stalled but failed. Finally it passed and is enforced irrespective of 
school of thoughts. This attempt proves that political and 
religious leaders used legislative opportunities for the betterment 
of their women-folk. 
The Special Marriage Act 1954 
In post-independence India, the policy of government was to 
cover all communities under one law. When the Special Marriage 
Act, 1954 was introduced in the Lok Sabha, Muslim members felt 
some apprehensions and Kazi Ahmad Hussain said in House that 
minorities must heard and their pleas be incorporated for any 
change. In last the Bill did not excluded any community and 
covered all. A heated debate took place and Muslim League 
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expressed grave concern over Special Marriage Act. Despite 
passing out the Bill, it was made clear that Parliament should not 
interfere in Shariat and the Acts of Parliament must not 
encourage Muslims to leave their religion. Special Marriage Act, 
was portrayed as a secular law. 
Hindu Law Reforms Act 
During the debates on the Hindu Code Bill, the government 
often faced the charge of interfering with Hindu Laws. 
Government stand was that this is the first step towards Uniform 
Civil Code. But the later developments show that either the 
government was shying away from enacting Uniform Civil Code 
or their position did not permit them to embark upon such a 
mission. 
The Criminal Procedure Code 1973 
In 1973, Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 was replaced by 
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. It enabled womens particularly 
Muslim women, to obtain maintenance after divorce under sec. 
125 CrPC. It also defined the word "wife" which includes a 
woman who has been divorced by or has obtained a divorce from 
her husband and she has not remarried. Objections were raised by 
Muslim scholars on this definition. Ibrahim Sulaiman Sait opined 
that Muslim Personal Law does not include a "divorced wife". 
After much controvercy, the bill was passed with modifications 
and satisfied the Muslims at large. 
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The Adoption Bill, 1972 
Since 1956, efforts were made to have a perfect Adoption 
Bill. This effort has opposed by Muslim Ulema due to conflict 
with tenets of Islam. In last nothing concrete could be achieved 
as the government accepted that the Shariat Act, 1937 and Article 
372 of the Constitution of India does not allow to change Muslim 
Personal law. 
The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act 
1986 
A bitter socio-politico controversy took place after the 
judgement of Supreme Court in Shahbano case. Muslim masses 
were mobilised to oppose the judgement and Parliament had to 
intervene to alter the judgement by enacting above titlted Act. Lok 
Sabha debates show that opponents of the Bill took refuge behind 
the plea that it will violate Articles 14, 15(1), 15(A) (e) and 44 of 
the Constitution. The supporters were of the opinion that Supreme 
Court misinterpreted Our'an and the judgement was an 
interference. To rectify the mistake done by the Supreme Court 
the Act should be passed. The Bill was passed because socio-
religio leaders managed the public outcry and government wanted 
to respect the views of the Muslims. 
Reforms in Other Minority Religious Personal Laws 
Some reforms were also carried on Parsi and Christian laws. 
Among Christians Succession laws were diverse although their 
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marriage and divorce laws were Uniform. In future government 
may reform Christian laws, if public pressure built because 
Supreme Court judgement in Mary Roy's case in 1986 became 
controversial like Shahbano case. Reform of Parsi laws was taken 
up by Parsis themselves since 1923. 
In short state is trying to achieve equality of men and women 
but its attitude differs for Hindus and minorities due to several 
reasons. 
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Chapter - 9 
Changes in Muslim Personal Law : 
Can Sharia Law be Modified? 
In this chapter, the researcher has tried to analyse the reforms 
in Muslim Personal Law. For meaningful research, it is very 
important to discuss the position of Shariah in context of 
reforms. Ijtihad and sources of Islamic law have been taken into 
account. Emphasis has been laid on contructive analysis and 
attention is given to amendments during the times of Caliphs and 
Imams. 
The problem of reform in Muslim Personal Law in India has 
assumed a highly controversial and complex nature. The 
opponents of reform regard the Shariah law as absolutely 
immutable, while reformists reject their theory. The later feel that 
since the Shariah law had been amended by the Muslim jurists 
themselves, during the first few centuries falling the emergence of 
Islam and many of its principles had been reformed, in the recent 
past, in several Muslim countries. There should be no objection 
to its reform in India as well. The present chapter deals with this 
problem -
(1) Wliether it is pemiitted to have any reforni in Islamic Shariah law, 
(2) If it is so then, what should be the mechanism for such a 
reform. 
(3) What are the areas where such reforms are required in India. 
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A. Whether it is Permitted to have Any Change in Islamic 
Law 
Going through the history of Islam we find that the Caliphs 
and Imams did very much juristic activity in early days of Islam. 
During the life time of Prohphet Mohammad (SAW) there was no 
problem at all as Prophet Mohammad (SAW) was guided by 
Almighty Allah through Angle Gabrael, whenever he faced any 
problem. That is why it is believed by the Muslims that Our'an 
contains the direct words of Almighty Allah and the Sunnah-
whatever Prophet (SAW) said, did or tacitly approved, contains 
the indirect word of Allah. After the demise of the Prophet, the 
Rightly guided Caliphs strictly followed the injunctions of the 
Qur'an and the Sunnah. Whenever they found nothing in the 
Our'an or the Sunnah they exercised their own ^Ray' i.e. reasons 
and judgement. Pages of Islamic History reveals that reforms were 
frequently introduced in the Shariah law by the ancient jurist 
themselves. Caliphs Umar and Ali had overruled some principles 
of law settled by their predecessors. Imam Mohammad Al-
Shaybani had set aside some of the verdicts of his master Imam 
Abu Hanifa : Ghazzali had deviated from certain principles of law 
laid down by Imam Shafei; Shaybani had dissented from some of 
the opinions of Imam Malik and so on. 
These are the facts of Islamic history which needs some 
explanation. 
The Prophet (SAW) of Islam had not come with any "Corpus 
juris'. Neither Our'an, nor the Sunnah had furnished any 
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exhaustive code of law. These 'nusus' had provided only the 
fundamentals of Shariah law. Formation of detailed legal rules 
was left to the Prophet (SAW) during his life time. After his 
demise, the mission was taken over by the Caliphs who were the 
administrative-cum-ecclesiastical heads of the Islamic state, and, 
at a latter stage, by the Ulema, jurists and interpreters of revealed 
law. Through the media of their judgement and fatwas, they filled 
the scriptural skeleton of the law with flesh and blood.' 
The tool employed, for the purpose, by the interpreters of 
law was the exercise of reason the validity of which had been 
decreed by the Prophet (SAW) himself. The exercise of reason 
assumed in the hands of jurists, the form of various sources of 
Islamic legislation. Some of these sources were; 
1. Oiyas (Analogy) 
2. Istehsan (Equity) 
3. 'Urf and 'Ada' (Custom and Usage), and 
4. Masaleh-al-Mursalah (Public Interest). 
Muslim law, thus, underwent a long process of evalution. The 
fabric of law was woven and re-woven with the spindle of juristic 
interpretation or administration. During these period of 
development, Islamic law remained a law in the making. In this 
period, if a latter jurist or interpreter overruled the law settled by 
the precedecessors, it constituted a step towards the development 
of law. Difference of law in this period of Islamic legal history, 
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infact, formed part of the process of legal evolution. So when 
Umar Farooq set aside Siddiqui ruling, abrogated Shaybani a 
Hanafi precedent, Ghazzali overruled a Shafei principle, Tufi 
dissented by a Hanbali verdict or Moosa Kazim deviated from 
Jafari ruling, each of the doctors of law aimed at the further 
systematization of legal principles. All this juristic activity was 
based strictly on the interpretation of the mandatory laws revealed 
by the Our'an or settled by the Prophet (SAW) under divine 
authority.^ 
Due to the above mentioned juristic activity several schools 
of Islamic law were established in different parts of the Muslim 
world. These school were based on the same sources but having 
conflicting doctrines in the matters of detail keeping in view the 
public interest or public welfare. 
The study of the Holy Our'an leads us to the inference that 
there exist only two alternative ways of human behaviour. One 
consists in the obedience of the Holy Prophet (SAW) and the 
other in obeying one's own desires and urges, the former is the 
truth path while the later leads astray and is 'zalar. no third 
alternative is available, Allah ordains : 
And now we have set thee (O Mohammad) on a clear 
road of (our) commandment. So follow it, and follow 
not whims of those know naught. Lo! They can avail 
thee naught against Allah.^ 
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Another verse exhorts the Holy Prophet (SAW) in unequal 
terms to act according to whatever has been revealed to him. Any 
deviation from this course amounts to leaving Allah and opting for 
the obedience to protecting freinds beside Him : 
"Follow that which is sent down unto you from Lord, 
and follow no protecting friends beside him. Little do 
ye recollect.'"* 
Elsewhere in a verse the obedience to Allah and His Prophet 
(SAW) has been defined as an obligatory course of action and a 
reference back to Allah and His Prophet (SAW) in the event of 
disputes has been held as an essential ingredient of Faith {Al-
Iman) : 
"Oye who believe! Obey Allah, and obey the 
messenger and those of you who are in authority; and 
if ye have a dispute concerning any matter, refer it to 
Allah and the Messanger if ye are (in truth) believes in 
Allah and the Last Day. That is better and more 
seemly in the end."^ 
The Holy Our'an has expressly stated in the following verse 
that a believer has no option left once Allah and His Prophet 
(SAW) have taken a decision on any matter : 
"And it becometh not a believing man or a believing 
women, when Allah and His Messenger have decided 
an affair (for them), that they should (after that) claim 
any say in their affair".^ 
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The Holy Prophet (SAW) has similarly termed those 
constituting the greatest trial of the Ummat who ignore Divine 
revelation and alter the permissible into prohibited items on the 
basis of their own desires and intellectual disposition."^ 
The Holy Prophet (SAW) has, thus observed : 
"My people will be divided into numerous groups; 
the most corrupt will be those who decide Dccn 
according to their views - prohibiting on that basis 
what Allah has permitted and legalising what Allah has 
prohibited?^ 
Thus, the Oiir'anic verses and sayings of the Holy Prophet 
(SAW) corroborate the view that we, as Muslims, have no option 
to evade or bypass the Shariat and instead follow our own self 
made laws and codes of behaviour. This always holds true 
whatever the needs of secularism and national integration. And 
what possible justification can be offered to destroy distinct 
cultures, languages, faiths and religious teachings, after all these 
high sounding promises to ensure freedom of religion and 
guarantee protection to all these?^ 
B. Mechanism/Procedure for Change in Islamic Law 
Now we should discuss the second problem. Is there any rule 
for aheration in the Shariat laws to accomodate changing needs 
of time, modern inclinations and the revolution in the social and 
political setup? In this connection, let us understand clearly, that a 
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Muslim is not free to adopt any course of action in violation of 
the limits set by Almighty Allah and the path shown by the 
Prophet Mohammad (SAW). If a Muslim violates the limits 
prescribed by the Our'an and the Sunnah it means he had 
transgressed the limit set by Almighty Allah then he would commit 
a sin which a true believer would never like to adopt. Thus, the 
adoption of a course of action in matters of religion independently 
of text of the Shariat and its principle would certainly defeat its 
objectives and open the way to revolt against Islam and Divine 
commandments. It does not mean that the Islam ignores the 
contemporary trends, social changes and the needs of the time. If 
the Shariat fails to take due congnizance to new situations.and 
the inability of scholars of Islam to provide answer to the newly 
emerging issues and problems, then in course of time it would 
generate dissatisfaction with the religion. In the words of A/lama-
Ibn-Oaiyem : 
"I am of the opinion that right path lies in giving 
adequate and full consideration to the objectives of 
the Shariat and the understanding the spirit of its 
laws, on the one hand, and undertaking a search for 
finding solutions to the new problems and resolving 
the difficulties arising out of the changed in the light 
of the general principles of the Shariat, similitude and 
precedents on the other..." 
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It is this very 'path' that has been chosen by the companions 
of the Prophet (SAW) themselves and by the eminent IJIcma in all 
stages of Islamic history. It has been reported about Hazrat-e-Abu 
Bakar that when some problem came before him. He first of all 
searched for its solution in the Our'an and Sunnah and failing to 
get an answer in these two basic sources he would call a meeting 
of the companions of the Prophet (SAW) for advise and would 
decide the matter in the light of these consultation (i.e. //wc/).'" 
And Omar used to do like wise. If he failed to get anything in 
Al-Kitab and Al-Sunna he would ask : 'did Abu Bakr decide 
anything in this matter'? And if there happened some decision of 
Abu Bakr in this matter. He would decide accordingly otherwise 
he would call a meeting of the knowledgeable among the people 
and consuh them and if they agreed on some opinion he could 
decide accordingly," 
More ever Hazrat Umar has indicated the procedure of 
Ijtehad in a letter to Abu Musa Ashari in the following words : 
"When you come across any issue which, according 
to your knowledge has not been pronounced upon by 
the Book (of Allah) and the Sunnah and you are 
yourself clear of your mind as to what ruling would 
be proper in this regard try to grasp the issue first. 
Find out similar and analogous cases. Then reason 
analogously, draw parallel and go in for what in your 
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opinion would be the (ruling) most desirable to Allah 
and nearest to the truth in that regard.'^ 
From the above ruling of Hazrat Umar it is crystal clear that 
he has laid down a definite procedure to deal with the new 
emerging problem in future. The procedure may be stated in 
following words : 
"The textual or reported precedents of decisions or 
laws relating to different issues that are available in 
Shariat should be kept in view so that issues and 
problems on which the text are silent may be decided 
by striking a similitude between the former and the 
latter. At the same time the subtle difference between 
the above mentioned two categories of precedents has 
to be kept in view to avoid doubts." 
In addition to this he has pointed out the fundamental 
principle that the spirit of Shariat laws and its obejctives should 
never be lost sight so that in the process of drawing conclusions 
within newly emerging issues the interests of the Shariat and its 
aims and objects are not defeated."'^ 
It is also evident from the life account of the companions of 
the Prophet (SAW) that they adopted the same procedure. The 
Ulema and Mujtahideen in every age had been similarly dealing 
with problems relevant to these periods keeping with the view of 
the objective of Shariat and delicacies of their time. The books 
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on Islamic jurisprudence are full of these examples. Hazrat Umar 
himself took numerous decisions taking into account the spirit of 
Qur'an and Sunnah and the expediency of this time. For example 
both during the period of Prophet (SAW) and Abu Bakr, ladies 
visited the mosque but Hazrat Umar could foresee that the said 
practice would lead to evils. The changed circumstances led him 
to the conclusion that the innocence of the eyes characteristic of 
the time after Prophet (SAW) was no more to be found. Keeping 
in view the difference between the desirability of visiting the 
mosque and prevention of vice he stopped the visits of ladies to 
the mosque by an order. Likewise he accorded due consideration 
to the importance oi jehad and the necessities of war on one 
hand, and the need to safeguard Muslim society against corrupt 
practices on the other and set down four months as the maximum 
period for which warriors could stay away from home. This is 
why the author of the book 'Al-Oadah-fi-AI-Islam' has observed 
as follows : 
"Umar strove to grasp the end in whose regard the 
verse was revealed and tried to understand the 
purpose for which the traditions came down and 
adhered to the substance and not the letter 
(thereof)."''' 
Similarly one more example of the IJtehad is the problem of 
paid employment for religious duties pronouncing illegal by the 
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early jurists. Later the system of collective treasury fell into 
disorder, and the conditions worsened to such an extent that the 
only alternative to legalising it was the risk of extinction of 
Our'anic education - a havoc which could not be allowed to 
happen. The scholars of the time appreciated its urgency and look 
into the account the absence of any system of stipends for the 
collective treasury and also the lack of public zeal to ensure its 
continuance through voluntary contribution. In view of the above 
the Ulema and the religious elite of Bulkh legalised the acceptance 
of wages for the teaching and education of Otir'an for in the 
alternative either the teachers of Qur'an and their families would 
be exposed to the danger of liquidation and the ruin of their 
families or the Our'anic education itself could go by default. 
Subsequently payment on such religious services of symbolic 
significance as the call as to prayer and imamat were also ruled 
as permissible.'-'' 
It is stated in Fatawa-e-Hamidiya that : 
"So the later people pronounced on its permisibility 
and some of them allowed also employment for call 
to prayer and imamat for the above stated reason, 
and because both of them are symbols of the Deen 
and in their default lies the demolition of Deen. These 
are examples of exceptions made for necessity since 
necessity legalises what is not permisibie."'^' 
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Thus we are exercising many new situations. They call for an 
answer in the light of the Our'an and Sunnah. Some of these 
newly emerged situations and problems are unprecedented, and 
hence the books of Islamic fiqh are silent in this regard. While 
others, though not new, yet are accompanied with entirely unique 
circumstantial context and hence require re-appraisal in the light 
of Our'an and Sunnah and a new solution harmonious in the 
interest of Shariat. Both of these are only different aspects of the 
function of Ijtehad. 
Now the question arises the reform of Muslim Personal Law 
in India. Shariah, the code of Islamic law is generally regarded as 
immutable. The fundamental principles of Shariah are not open 
to reconsideration by man. In the legal theory of Islam, Allah is 
the only law giver and there exist no other basis of the legal fabric 
than the Divine will. While accepting this theory of immutability it 
should be clearly understood that what is immutable is actually the 
'grundnorm' of the Shariah and not any of its varied 
interpretation. 
C. How to Effect Changes in Islamic Law 
It is, thus, clear that Islamic law by its very nature is 
amendable and changeable. The principles of Islamic 
jurisprudence, the numerous schools of thought in Islamic law and 
the practice of theologians throughout the practice of Islam show 
that Islamic law has always been flexible and adoptable, in order 
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to meet the legitimate and genuine requirements of the people at a 
given time and under specific conditions and circumstances. 
However, Islam being a particular way of living with certain 
objectives and principles guiding human activities and ambitions 
it is not to say that change of every kind would he acceptable in 
Islam. For the purpose of reconstruction of any particular 
principle of Islamic law, one has to make sure that : 
i) The change in issue is not contrary to the basic teachings and 
objectives in Islam, 
ii) Is the change is really in the interest of the society, leading to 
its welfare, happiness and prosperity, and 
iii) The change will have no evil repercussions in the near or 
distant future.'^ 
If the above three conditions, if satisfied then one may 
proceed to find out the ways and means to make reforms in 
Islamic law. Following procedure may be adopted for this 
purpose. 
D. Method of Ijtihad 
According to Islamic law there are four basic sources of 
Islamic law : 
1. Our'an (Book of Allah), 
2. Sunnah (Traditions), 
3. Ijma (consensus of opinion) and 
4. Oiyas (Analogy). 
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The Our'an is the fundamental source of Islamic Shariah 
and direct revelation by Almighty Allah (SAW) to the Prophet 
Mohammad (SAW). It consists of 114 chapters and the number 
of verses are 6666. The versus are of two kinds; 
(a) verses which are mandatory, fundamental and of established 
meaning and, as such, the foundation of the Book, and 
(b) the verses which bear allegorical meaning. 
This implies that the interpretation of the verses of second 
category may be different from man to man, but no interpretation 
should be contrary to what has been laid down in the fundamental 
verses.'" 
Sunnah, is, what the Prophet (SAW) said, did or tacitly 
approved. It is indirect revelation or the indirect words of 
Almighty Allah. Although the main task of the Sunnah is to 
explain the meaning of the Our'an, no Sunnah will be acceptable 
which, in content or spirit, stands opposed to the plain statements 
of the Our'an. 
Ijma and Oiyas together constitute the method of Ijiehad, a 
living source of legislation in Islam. They differ from each other 
in that the former is a collective opinion while the later is an 
individual one. They are sanctioned as sources of Islamic law in 
the Our'an as well as in the Sunnah, and are to be made use of in 
cases where there is no explicit command of God or Prophet 
(SAW).'^ 
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It may be noted for the purpose of our discussion that 
though the Our'an, Sunnah, Ijma and Oiyas are all accepted as 
main sources of Islamic jurisprudence, a point of difference 
between them is that the former two are recognized as absolute 
arguments while the later are arguments obtained by exercise of 
reason and hence not absolute. This is indeed a very significant 
point because it suggests that the door is still open for 
reassessment and re-evaluation of arguments which fall in the 
second category, in a given changed condition of the society. 
Such a reassessment or evalution amounts to iJtihaJ. The main 
tasks of a Mujtahid are : 
(a) to suggest any change or amendment, if possible, in the law 
prescribed by the old doctors of Islamic jurisprudence, in 
order to meet a new situation, and 
(b) to find a solution to new problems arising out of the changed 
social and economic conditions of the world. 
In the former case the Mujtahid will have to go deep into the 
basis of particular principles. If the basis is found to be a verse 
of the Our'an or Sunna a Mujtahid will have to see if the 
injunction concerned is Nasus, i.e., a clear verdict by God or by 
the Prophet (SAW) without assignment of any reason. 
If so, change and no amendment would be possible. If, on 
the other hand, the particular injunction mentioned in the Our'an 
or a Sunnah is based on a reason specified therein or indicated 
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by the Prophet (SAW) or by one of his eminent companions 
(either though words or by action), then it would be the task of a 
Mujtahid to see whether that particular case would be applicable 
to the new situation which he has to face. If a Mujtahid finds that 
a principle of Islamic law is not based on the Our'an or a Sunnah 
and derives authority from mere conjecture and reasoning of a 
jurist interpreter, then he is entitled to express a different opinion, 
provided he is well-equipped and is in a position to argue his view 
point. Thus, he can possibly do even when an old jurist has based 
his decision on an interpretation which he put to a verse of the 
Our'an or to a Sunnah according to his own understanding and 
that interpretation could be refuted on mere reasonable and logical 
grounds. ^ ° 
Some of the important principles of Ijtehad are discussed 
below. Custom and usage play a very important role in the 
formulations of laws it is essential that a person who is not familiar 
with the custom and usage of the time is not eligible to give 
rulings on Islamic law. Some eminent jurists of Islam have 
disussed the importance of custom in the development of basic 
principles of Islamic law. Shah Waliullah of Delhi is one of them. 
Regarding custom and usage Imam Abu Yusuf, an important jurist 
of Hanafi School declares : 
"One who is not familiar with the custom of his time 
is not permitted to give a religious verdict." 
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Public interest is also a deciding factor in Ijtehad. Things 
good for the human society {Masaleh-al-Mursalah) constitute 
another factor determining the merit and value of an issue to be 
decided by the process of Ijtehad. This method of deducing rules 
from the Text Our'an and Sunnah is very prominently used by 
the Maliki School. In addition to the above there are certain other 
rules which are necessary and which provide guidance in the 
process of Ijtehad are as follows : 
a. Permisibility is at the root of all things; 
b. He who is caught between two evils must prefer the lesser 
one; 
c. A safeguard must be provided against an anticipated 
nuisance; 
d. Necessity makes forbidden things permissible; 
e. Prevention is better than cure; 
f. Religion is an easy thing to be practised; 
g. God does not impose upon any person a duty which is 
beyond his capacity.^' 
Further, social harmlessness of a thing, as stated by the 
Prophet (SAW), also counts in Islamic legislation. In this 
connection benefit may be taken even of the practice and 
experiment made by non Muslims." 
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E. How to Reform Muslim Personal Law in India? 
Under Islamic law although the injunctions laid down in the 
Our'an and the Sunnah can not be changed by any human agency 
but where there is ambiguity and where a new problem has arisen 
then the recourse may be taken through IJma and Oiya.s which are 
the two methods of Ijtehad. Ijma is the collective method of 
Ijtehad whi\Q Oiyas is an individual effort. 
Coming to the main problem of our discussion that is the 
Muslim Personal Law and Uniform Civil Code. We must be very 
clear that there are certain aspects of Islamic law which are said 
to be causing hardship to the Muslim community in general and 
women in particular. It is also alleged that there is a gender 
discrimination in Islamic law. Let us see what are those important 
areas where the problem is most burning and where certain kind 
of reform is required. Following are the main areas where reform 
is required. 
1. Polygamy 
2. Triple Divorce 
3. Succession and Inheritance 
1. Polygamy 
Perhaps the most burning problem of our times is polygamy. 
It is said that the Muslim personal law gives liberty to the Muslims 
to contact as many as four wives at a time. But if we go through 
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the Our'an and the history of Arabia we find that according to 
Our'an, monogamy is the general rule and polygamy is an 
exception and allowed for certain exigencies. This is quite evident 
from the very text of the Our'an in which this provision had been 
made. The verse relating to polygamy runs as follows : 
1. "If ye fear that ye shall not deal fairly with the (female) 
orphan wards under you, (do not marry any of them), 
2. but marry other women whom you like, two or three or four; 
and 
3. if ye shall fear the ye shall not act equitably, then marry one 
only (from free women) or 
4. from the female captives under your charge. This will faciliate 
just dealings on your part ."" 
The important point to be carefully noted here is that this 
verse does not enjoin polygamy. It only permits polygamy and that 
permition, too is given on a very strict condition, i.e. if one can 
be equitable between the wives. If one can not do justice between 
the wives he is forbidden to marry more than one wife. It may be 
noted that this verse was revealed after the battle of 'Uhad'' when 
the Muslim community was left with many orphans, widow 
captives. As Abdullah Yusuf Ali in his translation of the Our'an 
points out that : 
"Their treatment was to be governed by principles of 
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the greatest humanity and equity. The occasion is past 
but the principles remain".^'' 
If we go into the history of the Islam then we find that before 
the advent of Islam people generally lived in an age when fighting 
was the order of the day with the resuh that the number of men 
was much less than that of women. Such women were 
unfortunately left to live at a destitute and miserable life. This state 
of affair largely contributed to the continuance of the institution 
of polygamy. Such condition continued to prevail during the early 
period of Islamic history. It is no secret that Muslim were in state 
of perpetual war against an enemy bent upon there extirpation 
women lose their husband and young children lose their fathers. It 
was in order to meet such emergencies than Islam permitted a man 
to have wives more than one. There may be other circumstnaces, 
too, necessitating polygamy. 
So polygamy in Islam is a remedy - is an exception rather 
than the rule. It has its uses and abuses. Islam guides against the 
later and allows the former under restrictions and within stringent 
limits. Polygamy comes under that category of legal principles 
within (Ahkam) which are called Mubahat (permissibles) and as 
such, like other permissible. If there comes a time when a certain 
permissible things begins to be abused and misused for nefarious 
ends shattering the moral structure of the society, then, an Islamic 
state or a Muslim society, as the case may be, would have every 
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right to interfere in the matter by stopping it temporarily and 
putting some restrictions on its operation.^'' In this connection, 
rapid growth in the population of mankind other social and 
economic repercussions of the practice of polygamy may be 
lawfully given consideration. However, the interest of those who 
are genuinely in need of having a second wife must not be 
jeopardized.^^ 
2. Triple Divorce 
Another important area where the need of Ijtchad arises is 
the divorce in general and triple divorce in particular. Allowing the 
practice of triple divorce in India is not in conformity with the true 
Islamic law but the practice, due to certain historical and legal 
reasons, have found a way in India where majority of the Muslims 
follow the Hanafi School of jurisprudence. There is no need to go 
into the historical reasons of triple divorce yet it is an established 
fact that the overwhelming majority of the Muslims in India 
consider triple divorce, due to their ignorance, as the only means 
of divorce available to them. They use it frequently and thus cause 
hardship to thousands of families including themselves. 
Now we would see does Islam permits any reform or any 
restriction on triple divorce and its solution under Islamic law? 
Divorce, another Muhah (permissible thing), was described by 
prophet as {Abghad-Al-Mubahat), the most destestable of the 
permissible things. The practice of the unscrupulous of the 
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Muslim community in this regard has been disastrous to a sound 
social order causing misery to innocent women without any fault 
on their part. It is, a therefore, a demand in certain sections of 
community to consider the Islamic law of divorce with a purpose 
of finding out whether any changes could be introduced therein. 
There is ample ample scope for Ijtehad in respect of this problem 
also. First, it should be kept in mind that according to the Our'an, 
in all disputes arising between husband and wife which may lead 
to breach - two judges are to be appointed from the respective 
people of the two parties.^^ 
These judges are required to try to reconcile the parties, 
failing which a divorce, or khula would be the last resort. This 
implies that though it is husband who has to pronounce a divorce, 
yet certain limitations are placed upon the exercise of this right 
and he is not left free to use it arbitrarily. Ali, the fourth Caliph is 
reported to have told a husband who was under the impression 
that he had the sole right to repudiate his wife that he would have 
to abide by the judgement of the judges appointed under the verse 
referred to above. The Prophet (SAW) also is reported to have 
interferred in the matter, some times by disallowing a divorce 
pronounced by a husband and so restoring the marital relations 
and some times by treating three divorces at one. This shows that 
the authority constituted by law has the right to interfere in the 
matter of divorce. As such, Muslim jurists of any age will be 
entitled to make an amendment or effect a change in the existing 
law of divorce in order to meet an emergency of these time.-*^ 
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The consideration a possible change in the law of divorce 
will be focussed on three points : 
a. Whose pronouncement of divorce would be legally valid? 
b. In what circumstances a divorce would be valid or invalid? 
and 
c. What procedure of the pronouncement of divorce would be 
deemed as valid? 
These points have been extensively discussed by our eminent 
jurists in the books. Their discussions certainly provide a wide 
scope for a Mujtahid in our time to exercise his own judgement 
and discretion in regard to the modern problems of divorce.-'^ 
As far as the womens' right to divorce is concerned this right 
is given to her and is called as Khula.^'^ This is the most 
important right available to a Muslim woman as for as the 
dissolution of her marriage is concerned. It is almost equal to the 
right of husband to dissolve his marriage through divorce. The 
only difference between the husband right to divorce and wives 
right to divorce is that if the husband does not oblige the wife and 
refuses to divorce her through Khula she has to go to the Oazi or 
the court as the case may be. But unfortunately in India this right 
is not available to Muslim women due to the judicial 
misinterpretation of the rules relating to Khula. This lacuna which 
is causing hardships to thousands of Muslims women may be 
rectified by a pronouncement of the Supreme Court or by 
amendment in law by the Parliament. 
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3. Succession and Inheritance 
The third most important aspect of Muslim Personal Law 
which is often criticised by the so called enlightened and 
progressive Muslims and the proponents of a Uniform Civil Code 
is the share of female in property matters and the exclusion of the 
grandson from the property of his grand father if the father 
predeceases. The problem of inheritance and the shares is given 
in Our'an itself. If any supposed injustice is done on the basis of 
clear cut verdict in the Our'an or the Sunnah then no Muslim is 
authorised (rather no human agency is authorised) to effect any 
change in that. If any rule of inheritance has been given by any 
school on the basis of Ijtehad then that may be amended by a 
latter Ijtehad fulfilling all the necessary requirements of a valid 
Ijtehad. 
To conclude the whole discussion we can say that no human 
agency is competent to change or amend any of the explicit 
provisions of the Our'an and the established practice of the 
Prophet (SAW). Every Muslim is bound to have faith in them and 
to severely follow them. A Muslim is also not free to interprete 
the verses of Our'an and the traditions of the Prophet (SAW) 
which run counter to the unanimous interpretation of our 
predecessor. Within the limits prescribed by these Ulema the 
Muslim Personal Law may be reformed, if the circumstances so 
demand. Following are certain guidelines for proposed reform in 
Muslim Personal Law in India. 
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1. A list should be prepared enumerating all such laws which 
give rise to complications and difficulties and which call for 
solution. 
2. If any one of the laws enlisted above are explicitly provided 
in Our'an and Sunnah, it should be presumed that the 
difficulties and complication arise only because of lack of 
proper understanding compliance, or that the society needs 
to be morally toned up. The possibility may, however, be 
considered of subjecting these provisions of certain 
condition and limitations if they did not go against the spirit 
of the Our'an and Sunnah. In most of the Muslim countries 
the changes which have taken place is that they have replaced 
the one provision of any school of Islamic jurisprudence and 
by any other provision of other school. In this regard we 
should act upon the advise of Shah Waliullah, that is, of the 
many opinions and verdict we should prefer that which is 
more in tune with the spirit of the Our'an and the Sunnah 
and which may solve the problems with more satisfaction. 
In this regard Maulana Syed Hamid Ali has formulated the 
procedure : 
"The need of the hour, therefore, is to constitute a 
committee consisting of Ulema representing various 
Muslim sects and organisations and Muslim jurists. 
This committee be entrusted with the task of 
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preparing a draft, leading eventually to the final 
drafting after a free and full discussion over it."-" 
From the Islamic point of view this draft will assume the 
status of law code for Muslims to abide by, yet because of the 
dispensation of things in the country which requires everysuch 
code to get the sanction of the Parliament before it can be 
enforced by the law courts, it will have to be referred to the 
Parliament. The effort will have to be made to get the finalised 
draft passed without any amendments. But if any amendments is 
deemed necessary it should be referred back to the aforesaid 
committee of Muslim IJlcma and jurists." 
Summary 
Reformation in Muslim Personal Law is a controversial issue, 
dividing the community for and against such a process. To 
address the issue meaningfully, several aspects as the permission 
to make any change and the manner for that shift including the 
identified areas must be considered. 
When Prophet Mohammad (SAW) was at the helm of affairs, 
there was no problem. After his demise. Caliphs followed Our'an 
and Sunnah in letter and spirit. They also applied their mind and 
judgement in this regard. Shariah law was amended several times 
during the Caliphat of Umar and Ali. Again in later period, several 
Imams interpreted certain principles according to their analysis. 
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In fact reasoning was the base for all such deviations and 
amendments. Qiyas (Analogy), Istehsan (Equity), IJrf and Ada 
(Custom and Usage) and Masaleh-al-Mursaleh (Public Interest) 
were also the sources. In this way, Muslim Law passed through a 
long process of evolution. Ijtehad is the only way for effecting 
reforms in Islamic law. 
In India, three areas of Muslim Personal Law demands 
attention for reforms. Polygamy, Triple Divorce, Succession and 
inheritance. Polygamy is not a facility but remedy sanctioned in 
Islam. In specified circumstances second wife can be taken. 
Triple divorce may be banned through the process of IJfehad, as 
the practice followed in India is an innovation in Islamic law. 
Inheritance has been clearly discussed in Our'an and it should be 
that way. Above all change must come from within and not by 
outside quarters. 
I 328 I 
Changes in Muslim Personal Law : Can Sharia Law be Modified? 
References 
1. Tahir Mahmood, "Precedent of law reform in Islamic 
History : Relevance for India", in F.R. Faridi and M.N. 
Siddiqui, ed., Muslim Personal Law, p. 164 (1985). 
2. I hid. 
3. HolyC2ur'an,XLV,\^ 
4. Holy Our'an, VII, 3 
5. Holy Our'an, \W, 59 
6. Holy Our'an, XXXIII, 36 
7. Maulana Minatullah Rehmani, "Muslim Personal Law in 
India" in F.R. Faridi and M.N. Siddiqui, Muslim Personal 
Law, p. 71 (1985) 
8. Ilam-al-Moaqqien, Vol. 1, p. 153 
9. Supra note 7 at 71 
10. Supra note 8 at 62 
11. Ihid 
12. Al-Ashbah-Wan-Nazir by Suyyuti 
13. Supra note 7 at 75 
14. Ihid. 
15. Id at 11 
16. Fatwae-Hamidiya, Vol. 2, p. 127 quoted by Maulana 
Minnatullah Rehmani, "Muslim Personal Law in India", in 
F.R. Faridi and M.N. Siddiqui, Muslim Personal Law in India, 
ed., p. 116(1985). 
17. Sayeed Ahmad Akbarabadi, "How to Effect Changes in 
Islamic Law", islamic Law in Modern India, Tahir 
Mahmood ed., p. 116 (1972) 
18. Id. at 115 
19. Ihid 
I 3 2 9 J 
Changes in Muslim Personal Law: Can Sharia Law be Modified? 
20. Id. at 116 
21. Id. at 116 
22. The Prophet (SAW) is reported to have once made up his 
mind to prohibit cohabitation during the period of foster age. 
But he abondoned the idea when he came to know that the 
practice was in vogue amongst the people of Persia and 
Rome without any adverse effect either on the mother or the 
child. 
23. The Our'an, IV, 3 
24. Supra note 17 at 120 
25. Support for this is found in the history relating to the 
legislative policies of Umar b. Khattab, the second Caliph. 
For instance, a Muslim is permitted to marry a Kilahiyya 
women, but when 'Umar came to know that this practice was 
gaining popularity in the community he came forward to ban 
it and said : 
"1 have no right to make an illegal thing legal or vice versa. 
But imagine what would happen to the maidens of Arabia if 
you got fascinated with the beauty of Roman girls". 
26. Supra note 15 at 120. 
27. The Our'an, IV : 35, 130. 
28. Supra note 15 at 121. 
29. Ihid. 
30. Khul'a : The literal meaning of Khul'a is to take off and to 
pull out. Khul'a means that the demand of talaq may be 
made on behalf of the woman from the man. Its one side is 
moral and the other is legal. Even as the Sharia'ah does not 
like the talaq on the moral side, it also does not like the 
khul'a, because the shari'ah's objective is one and the same 
place and notthe separation, and talacj or khul'a is valid only 
as the last remedy. 
Thus, termination of marital relation by the husband in 
consideration for a return agreed upon by the parties is 
[ 330 J 
Changes in Muslim Personal Law: Can Sharia Law be Modified? 
khul'a, whether it is through the word khul'a or by 
mubara 'at, or by the word talaq or any of its synonyms. 
The basis of the khul'a is the following verse of the Our'an: 
"And it is not proper for you at the time of bidding her 
farewell that what you have given her you take it back from 
her. However, this form is an exception that the spouses may 
not be within the compartment of Allah's limits. In such a 
case if you feel that they will both not fear of remaining on 
the divine path, then there is no distress if a common bond is 
signed by them that the woman, by giving something to the 
husband, may obtain separation from him." (Baqarah 2:229) 
If the matter of khul 'a may not be settled mutually and the 
matter may reach the court, then the court has the right to 
obtain the khul'a to keep the limits of Allah intact, by 
command and source. 
In case of not obeying the order the court the example of 
Jahr (compulsion) is found in a decision of Hazrat Ali who 
had written in it to a voilent husband that "you will not be 
left as long as you may also be ready to accept the decision 
of the Hakimin as the woman has been." 
31. Recently, on 26 July, 2001 "A compendium of Islamic 
Laws", containing a sectionwise compilation of the rules of 
Shariat falling into the domain of Muslim Personal Law, has 
been prepared for and on behalf of the All India Muslim 
Personal Law Board. It is based on the most authentic 
principles of the Islamic Law. 
The compendium is available both in Urdu and English. The 
complete operative part of the compendium, running into 440 
sections, has been translated by Professor Tahir Mahmood. 
The English translation has been arranged under five parts 
covering 34 chapters 
32. Maulana Syed Hamid Ali, "Changes in Muslim Personal Law: 
Scope and Procedure", Muslim Personal Law, in F.R. 
Faridi and M.N. Siddiqui, ed., p. 92 (1985) 
I 331 1 
Chapter - 10 
Role of Muslim Thinkersj 
Minority Organisations^ Successive 
Governments^ Political Parties 
and Press 
Chapter -10 
The Role of Muslim Thinkers, Minority Organisations, 
Successive Governments, Political Parties and Press 
If the Academics have failed to study the question of 
Uniform Civil Code in depth, the governments have also failed to 
communicate with the masses on the Uniform Civil Code. In the 
last fifty one years since the Constitution was adopted, the 
government has done little to lead the nation to the Uniform Civil 
Code. The government has not done much to discharge the 
burden of Article 44 of the Constitution of India. No steps have 
been taken to explain the contents and significance of Article 44. 
No measures have been adopted to a fight obscurantists who 
opposed the Uniform Civil Code. It is alleged that the government 
has been giving undue advantage to opponents of the Uniform 
Civil Code by giving weightage to the conservative elements to the 
Muslims Society and this attitude of the Government is only for 
the political games. 
If we go into the history of the congress party the Indian 
National Congress since the pre-partitions days is assuring the 
Muslims that the government had no intention of tampering with 
their personal laws. This is evident from the resolutions passed 
by the Indian National Congress at its various sessions held 
The Role of Muslim Thinkers, Minority Organisations,, 
during the freedom struggle. These assurances continued even 
after the independence of the country. These assurances are 
generally given on the eve of elections and are seen to be well in 
keeping with secularism, Indian style, viz., equal status to all 
religions, opposition parties also can not be praised for their role. 
No party have been above political alliances with communal 
parties or giving membership and prominance to openly communal 
persons living up to the adage that politics makes strange bed 
fellows. During the Muslim Women's Bill controversy, apart from 
Communist Party of India and Communist Party of India Marxist, 
no other party took a principled, unequivocal stand against the 
Bill. Even their past history does not bear scrutiny. In the bye-
elections that took place in the months that separated the Shah 
Bano judgement from the Muslim Women's Bills, no party save 
the two mentioned was able to forget its electoral compulsions.^ 
None of this behaviour is exactly designed to persuade the 
Muslims that the Uniform Civil Code is any more than the sword 
of Damocles having over their community's collective head. 
Indeed they may well ask, as some of their leaders are demanding, 
that Article 44 be repealed altogether.^ 
It is very unfortunate that when five decades have passed 
after the commencement of the Constitution we have nothing like 
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Uniform Civil Code which was considered by our constitution 
makers as a golden letter for the unity and the integrity of the 
country. 
Thus, at this point it is very important to know the opinion of 
various religious communities and the persons who have some 
recognition and identity on behalf of religious sects. The purpose 
to study the public response, is that whether it is the opposition 
from the side of the general public or a small portion of a total 
population for the country which is opposing this directive. 
A. Views of Muslim Thinkers and Minority Organisations 
(i) Arguments against Uniform Civil Code 
There is no denying to the fact that Muslim is first largest 
minority group in India, therefore, it is some what natural to know 
the attitude of the Muslims towards Uniform Civil Code. The 
Advocates of Muslims personal laws argue that their personal law 
is comprehensive and complete code of life. It has its origin in 
Divine Revelation and is, therefore, immutable. Muslim law 
relating to marriage, divorce, and inheritance, it is claimed by the 
critics of a Common Civil Code, has been handed down by the 
Prophet (SAW) and are, in this sense, divine and must, therefore, 
be unquestionably obeyed.^ This is not a new thing that some 
Muslims are opposing Uniform Civil Code. If we go through the 
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history of the incorporation of Uniform Civil Code during the 
debate in the Constituent Assembly we find that it was strongly 
opposed by the Muslim members of the Constituent Assembly. 
They argued that the right of a group or a community or the 
people to follow and adhere to own its personal law is part of the 
way of life of those people who are following such laws; it is their 
religion and part of their culture. If anything is done affecting 
these personal laws it will considered as an interference in their 
age old laws which they are following from generation to 
generation. Thus secular state which we are dreaming to create 
should not do any thing to interfere with the way of life and the 
religion of the people.'* 
The minorities represented in the Constituent Assembly were 
Muslim, Christian, Parsi and Sikhs (on members). There were also 
Schedule Caste and Scheduled Tribe members. The Anglo-Indians 
have given a separate representation. The Buddhists and Jains 
were subsumed under Hindu (general constituency). It is to be 
noted that with the exception of Muslims all other minorities 
either acquiesed silently to the notion of a Uniform Civil Code or 
vigorously supported it.^  It does not mean that all Muslims were 
against the Uniform Code just before the commencement of the 
constitution and after the conclusion of Constituent Assembly 
debate. Among the Muslims Chaudhri Haider is a glaring example 
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of that time who had strongly supported the idea of Common 
Civil Code in the following words : 
"I would therefore strongly urge the necessity of 
having one single Code to be named as the Indian 
Civil Code applicable to everybody living within the 
territory of Indian union irrespective of cast, creed or 
religious persuations. This is the just solution of 
communal problem. It appears to be solution in the 
interest of the unification of the country for building 
up one single nation with one single set of laws in the 
country." 
Let us discuss some statements of Mulsim politicians and 
others who are opposed to the implementation of Uniform Civil 
Code in India. Mr. Bukhari of Muslim League stated on the floor 
of the Maharashtra Legislative Assembly in July 1972 that Indian 
Muslims would never concede to Parliament, or any State 
legislature, the power to legislate on matters relating to Islam. Mr. 
Bukahri teared that if attempts were made to infringe Muslim 
Personal law through legislation, it might endangers peace.^ 
Ibrahim Sulaiman Sait, MP and the President of Indian Muslim 
League has been in the forefront of the protest by Muslim 
fundmantalists in Shah Bano case. He was also a leading light in 
the subsequent efforts by the orthodox to have the law changed. 
f 336 J 
The Role of Muslim Thinkers, Minority Organisations,... 
Ibrahim Sulaiman Sait remanded that Sec. 125 of Cr.P.C. be 
amended to exclude Muslim and G.M. Banatwala on July 27, 1985 
had introduced a private member's bill for amendment of Sections 
125 and 127 of the Cr.P.C. to ensure that no court even again 
interfered in Muslim Personal Law. Mr. Abdul Samad of the 
Muslim League was of the views that nothing could be more 
heinous for a Muslim woman than to look up to her ex-husband 
for monthly dole. "It is Haram under Islamic Law".^ 
The All India Muslim Personal Law Board has also strongly 
defended the Muslim Personal Law and opposed the court 
judgement. The meeting of the Muslim Personal Law Board, held 
at Hyderabad in April 1973, expressed its determination to resist 
any change in the Muslim Personal Law. Two retired' judges of 
Patna and Madras High Courts, Mr. Khalil Alimad and Mr. Bashir 
Ahmad respectively (both members of the Board) told newsmen 
that the Board was determined to protect and safeguard the rights 
of the minority community. They also out lined the Boards future 
programme which would among other things, include the study 
and review of the Anglo-Muslim law from time to time to bring it 
in conformity with the Shariah.^ 
Maulana Syed Abul Hasan Ali Nadvi, President of the All 
India Muslim Personal Law Board, discloses that a Muslim 
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Personal Law Code with notes on Islamic legal terms and 
concepts is being compiled by the Board itself. The Maulana is 
not opposed to the optional Uniform Civil Code proposed by the 
government. However, he states that the Personal Law Board 
stands for continued application of Islamic law to Muslims even 
after the enactment of such a code, since there should be no 
compulsion in such matters in a democratic country.'" 
At a press conference in Goa on August 25, 1986, Mr, Shaikh 
Abdul Sattar, Secretary of All India Muslim Personal Law Board 
took the stand that Shariah laws should be made applicable to all 
states and Union territories in the country, including Goa. Strongly 
disputing the claims that dominant section of the local Muslim 
community, including a large number of women and youth, 
favoured retention of the old Portuguese to laws and were 
opposed to the Shariah laws due to easy availability of divorce 
and re-marriage under it, Mr. Sattar asserted that overwhelming 
majority of Muslim in Goa were with them and opposition to 
Shariah laws, if any, came only from a small section of 
misguided elements. He added that Shariah laws were based on 
Divine dictates and should be expected without questions by 
devout Muslims.'^ Another Muslim political party that is All India 
Majhs-e-Ittehadul Muslimin, in its annual conference held at 
Hyderabad in April 1973, urged that government adopt a 
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resolution in parliament or publish a white paper, categorically 
stating that it would not effect any change in the Islamic Shariah 
and the Muslim Personal Law.^ ^ 
Speaking at a symposium on Common Civil Code organised 
by the Jamat-e-Islami Hind in Bombay in January, 1986, 
Maharashtra Jamat-e-Islami President Maulana Rashid Usmani 
said a Uniform Civil Code would not help the country and that it 
would be foolish to think that such a code would help curb 
communal riots and tensions.^^ 
The working committee of Jamiat-e-Ulema passed a 
resolution on Muslim Personal law in April 1970 stating the 
Muslim considered the Personal Law to be essential part of their 
religion and stand, therefore, for status quo}"^ 
The opponents of Uniform Civil Code have been holding the 
public meetings from time to time in different districts of the 
country to defend Muslim Personal Law by which they have tried 
to convince the Muslim masses that a Uniform Civil Code is 
injurious to their culture and religious freedom. It will be essential 
and interesting to refer these meetings in brief. 
In May, 1972, a Muslim Personal Law Public meeting was 
held at Meerut in defence of the Muslim Personal Law by the 
Jamaitul-ulema.'^ 
In Sept. 1972, at Hyderabad, a discussion was sponsored 
under the auspices of the Muslim youth association for voicing 
opposition to any change in Muslim Personal Law.'^ 
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In Dec. 1972, at Bhiwandi in Maharashtra state, a public 
meeting was convened by the Mohammadia Educational Society.'^ 
In Dec. 1972 a huge All India Muslim Personal Law 
conventions was held in Bombay. The Jamat-e-Islami (Andhra 
Pradesh), Amarat-e-Sharia, Bihar and Orissa, Awami Tanzeem 
(Patna), Deeni Taleemi Council (Uttar Pradesh), All India Muslim 
League, Jamait-ul-Ulema-Hind, Anjumane-Mhdvia Idarah-e-Ainul 
Hudda Sunni Khoja Jamat, all these organizations voiced their 
opposition to change in Muslim Personal Law.'^ 
In additional to the above public meetings Muslim women's 
Conferences were also held in defence of Muslim Personal Law. 
About 2,000 Muslim women of Bombay and Thana expressed 
opposition to any change in the Muslim Personal Law, at a 
meeting organised by the Jamaat-e-Islami in 1972.'^ 
An all Maharashtra Muslim Personal Law Women's 
conference was held in Bombay on April 30 and May 1, 1973. 
This meeting endorsed the resolution passed by the All India 
Muslim Personal Law convention held at Bombay in Dec. 1972, 
viz. : 
1. "That the Muslim Personal Law the integral part of the 
Muslim faith and religion and no Muslim has a right to 
deviate from the Shariah laws-
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2. That the commandments of the Shariah are based on divine 
revelation and, therefore, no parliament has the right to 
amend or annul Muslim Personal Law; 
3. That the introduction of Uniform Civil Code are any 
legislation which would make Muslim Personal Law 
ineffective is contrary to the International Charter of Human 
rights"2o. 
Maulana Habibur Rehman, in his Article 'Muslim Personal 
Law or Islamic Shariah' says that there is no need of change in 
Muslim Personal Law. Since it had been framed by taking into 
consideration all the situations and hence Muslim Personal law has 
the capacity to deal with all the situations.^' 
The well known authority, Mohd. Yunus Saleem, has pointed 
out as regards Muslim countries where refonns are said to have 
been introduced that no where is maintenance awarded to a 
divorcee till she re-marries (except perhaps communist South 
Yemen). He questioned the Supreme Court's authority to 
unnecessorily doing beyond the terms of reference to held that the 
amount of unpaid dower was not payable to Muslim women on 
divorce but as a mark of respect, ignoring the fact that fixation of 
dower amount was different from its payments. In India, in a 
majority of cases the declared dower remains and paid till 
dissolution of marriage either on account of death or due to 
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divorce. Does it mean that a husband who does not pay the 
deferred dower to his wife during the life time has no respect for 
his wife?^^ 
Asghar Ali Engineer, a progressive Muslim scholar says 
about Common Civil Code^^ : 
"....As for a Uniform Civil Code, there are several 
fonnidable problems, even if it is treated as panacea 
for women's problems which it is not. First the 
minority communities of Muslims, Christians and 
Parsis are not politically and religiously prepared to 
accept any such enactment and no government 
wishing to be re-elected can run such a grave risk. The 
difficulty in such a enactment is not restricted to the 
opposition from the minorities alone. The problem 
becomes much more complex when we realise that the 
majority community is also far from being 
homogeneous in respect of its customs, traditions and 
laws.... " 
Jamat-e-Islami Hindi^ '* a powerful Muslim organisation passed 
resolutions on July 5, 1995 on the ruling of Sarla Mudgal case : 
"The Central Advisory Council (CAC) of the Jamat-
e-Islami Hind takes with concern the way being paved 
for implementing Uniform Civil Code... and strongly 
supports the resolution of Muslim Personal Law 
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Board (calling upon the government to delete Article 
44 or introduce an exemption clause to indicate that a 
Uniform Civil Code would not be imposed upon 
Muslims and reluctant minorities).... It seriously feels 
that voice having been raised from time to time to 
implement Uniform Civil Code in the country is a 
matter of serious anxiety and torment- and rightly so 
- for the Indian Muslims .... The CAC also calls upon 
the Indian Muslims to raise the voice against the 
Uniform Civil Code in a peaceful, democratic and 
dignified manner and mould their social life in 
accordance with the Islamic laws.... 
All India Muslim Personal Law Board^^ in its 13th session 
held on 28-30 Oct., 1999 at Mumbai passed the following 
resolution on Uniform Civil Code : 
"The Board feels that inspite of ... non-inclusion of 
Uniform Civil Code in the agenda of the government, 
direct or indirect efforts would be made in this 
direction because the BJP, which ... is the biggest 
component of the ruling Alliance has not dropped this 
subject from its agenda and (calls upon) the Muslims 
to be watchful and be ready to resist any effort to 
affect changes in the Muslim Personal Law, by 
indirect or parallel legislation. 
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(Reiterates its view) to the Government, the political 
parties and the countrymen in general that the Muslim 
Personal Law i.e. the Islamic Family Laws are an 
integral part of the religion of Islam, .... Muslims and 
other communities have deep attachment to their 
religion-based family laws, it is in the interest of the 
country to create confidence in them that there is no 
threat to ... their distinct identity and therefore."^^ 
All India Muslim Personal Law Board also demanded that 
any uncertainty about the continuance of the personal laws be set 
to rest by the Government. 
(ii) Arguments in Favour of Reform of Muslim Personal Law 
We have seen in the preceding paragraphs that a big majority 
of the Muslims are not in favour of reform in Muslim Personal 
Law and they are opposed to the enactment fo a Uniform Civil 
Code in India. Muslims are divided on the question of reform of 
the personal law. The orthodox Muslims opposed the reform the 
personal law and the liberals are in its favour. The liberals (or 
secularists) do not enjoy the confidence and respect as religious 
scholars are of the community in general. They are often criticised 
for their malafide attempt to degrade Islam in order to be 
recognized by the Hindus as 'hberal' and 'progressive'. Late 
Hamid Dalvai strongly advocates Common Civil Code under 
which all marriages should be registered. The status of all married 
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women should be governed by the Common Civil Code. Dalwai 
wants 'purdah' to be legally banned and family planning to be 
made compulsory. Muslims, who opposed reforms on the ground 
of religion, according to Hamid Dalwai, should be governed 
strictly according to Shariah law in its entirety. For example, a 
Muslim caught stealing should have his hands cut off in public. 
Similarly, a Muslim who speaks a falsehood, should be publicly 
whipped or a Muslim women found guilty of adultery should be 
stoned to death in public.^'' Mr. Dalwai further pointed out that 
the main purpose of the organisers of the All India Muslim 
Personal Law convention was not so much to discuss the personal 
law as to hatch some kinds of conspiracy against India. The 
majority of the organisers he asserted, were anti-national elements 
who wanted to create a 'Pakistan' in India for Muslim under the 
guise of discussing the Shariah laws.^^ 
Eminents citizen Dr. Zahir Alimad Saeed lamented : 
'The Muslim women will be pushed back by two 
centuries while the country is poised to take a leap to 
the 21st century. Having a accepted sec. 125 all these 
years, why does the Muslim male wants to shirk the 
responsibility of maintenance now.?"^^ 
Ansar Harwani, former M.P., and veteran freedom fighter said 
on March 3, 1986, that Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi who claims 
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have broken many traditions had upheld the Congress tradition of 
not sacrificing Muslim votes. Commenting on the Bill, he said, 
"I have no doubt that Mullah will hail Mrs. Gandhi 
as a defender of their faith and will give him full 
support." 
Founder Chairperson women India trust, Kamila Tiyyabji 
says there is no conflict between Personal Law and Civil Laws. 
The Shariah is a very lose and humane document. The only 
problem is that for centuries it has been interpreted by male 
chauvinist to suit their interest. I am amazed that Rajiv Gandhi has 
accepted its chauvinist interpretation of maintenance and given 
into the fundamentalist on this issue.^^ 
On March 8, 1986 in New Delhi the Indian Federation of 
Women Lawyers passed a resolution stating that the Bill will 
undermine the secular nature of the Republic adopted in the 
preamble of the constitution by the 42nd Amendment. A 
Federation press release said the provisions of the bill in so for as 
they provide for maintenance to be paid by the state exchange in 
the event of the failure of the other categories mentioned there in 
is 'highly discriminatory'. It discriminated between Muslim 
divorced women and divorced women of other communities.^^ 
Najma Heptullah has gone on record saying that only 3% of the 
Muslim women are divorcee whereas the fact is that one in every 
four house holds has a divorcee and practically every family is 
effected. The Bill provides no real protections to these women. 
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They will be pushed into the hands of the Maulvies. The 
Wakf Boards and its finances are controlled by the fundamentalist. 
If the government similarly intends to help divorcees, it should 
bring these Boards under government control.-'^  
The SAHELI, a relatively new organisation in the field of 
women welfare in a memorandom submitted to president Gyani 
Zail Singh, urged him not to give his assent to the Muslim 
Women's Bill. This is a naive hope, a course, as the president is 
cosntitutionally obliged to sign eventually, but it is a measure of 
SAHELIES' feeling against the Bill." 
The Indian Law Institute, New Delhi, sponsored a seminar on 
Jan. 1972 at Delhi on "Muslim Personal law in Modern India". 
The seminar asserted that certain changes in Islamic Personal Law 
in India were necessary and stated that such changes are possible 
and derivable within the general framework of Islamic Shariah. 
Mr. A.A. Fyzee, a well known authority on Islamic Law said 
at a public meeting organised by the secularist -
"A secular state must keep the idea of a Common 
Civil Code before the people. But such a reform calls 
for voluntary effort. The government would not act 
until the Muslim community itself acted on it".^ "* 
Prof. Fyzee, an enlightened Muslim intellectual is of the view 
that the proper course for the government is to appoint a 
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commission to put forward prosposals for a Uniform Civil Code, 
in which representation of the major communities, such as, 
Hindus, Muslims, Christian, Zoroastrians and Sikhs would be 
included. Justice M.H. Beg at a symposium in Tellichelli March 
1973, spoke in support of prohibiting polygamy by law and 
favoured judicial intervention in divorce. He wanted separation of 
religion from strictly social, economic and legal matters. He 
desired a Coimnon Civil Code to be enacted in which all that was 
good in Muslim Personal law should be incorporated.^^ 
Mr. Asghar Ali Engineer, Director, Institute of Islamic Studies 
is of the opinion that the bill is not only a retrograde measure but 
is totally unlslamic in sprit.^^ He criticised the Indian government 
for yielding to the pressure of a orthodox Muslims and accepting 
their 'dictates' on the question of Personal law much against the 
"Constitutional Principle of Secularism."^'' Engineer finds that 
the general feeling among Muslims is that a Common Civil Code 
is synonyms with a Hindu Code, specially when the demands 
come from coimnunal Hindus. 
"Secularist and nationalist have done nothing to allay 
these fears" he says. Engineers feels that there is no 
need for a Common Civil code. 'What is important is 
justice to women. A long as it can be done within the 
frame work of Muslim Personal law, why abolish it? 
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he asks. The current controversy (On Shah Bano) is 
political and not religious."^^ 
Specking at a seminar on Uniform Civil Code held in Cochin 
on Dec 5, 1985 Miss Sona Khan, Senior lawyer of the Supreme 
Court, pointed out that whenever there was reform movement 
within the Muslim community, the flmdamentalist had opposed it. 
The affluent women have always been left untouched by these 
sections. The poor women are their targets of attack.^^ Miss 
Sona Khan further said that the Present demand of the Common 
Civil Code at this juncture had pushed back its enactment by 
another 20 years. The Uniform Civil Code must be welcomed with 
open arms, she added. 
Former Indian Cricket Team Captain, Mansoor Ali Khan 
Pataudi has said that the furore against the Supreme Court 
judgement should be viewed in the background of the 'insecurity' 
felt by India Muslims. He said for various reasons Muslim in India 
do not have the same opportunity for education, employment and 
advancement as the other communities have. The Shah Bano 
judgement was used by many public for furthering this feeling of 
insecurity. The crisis of the moment is not the Bill or the Shah 
Bano case but a sense of insecurity among minority community. 
As for the Bill before Parliament Mr. Pataudi said that it had been 
hastly drafted and should be considered more carefully.'^ * 
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The fact can not be denied that the Muslim reformists 
disapprove Muslim Personal Law because of the havoc it has 
wrought whenever its operates. The law is frowned upon due to 
the fact that it makes divorce easily available and permits easy 
remarriage. Unfortunately liberal Muslim opinion lacks a specific 
forum. Needless to say, the advice and suggesstion given by 
Muslim reforms, academics and intellectuals has left conservatives 
and those in favour of the status quo unmoved, since the liberal 
opinion in the community is unfocussed, there being no group, 
party, and institutions through which sentiments can be effectively 
expressed. 
B. Role of Successive Governments 
The controversy over the Uniform Civil Code is not 
something new. It came into prominence since the inception of the 
Indian Constitution. Article 44 of the Indian Constitution says that 
the state shall endeavour to secure for all the citizens of India a 
Uniform Civil Code. But unfortunately this Article is very often 
opposed by one section of coimmmity or the other. Hence the 
Government has consistently maintained that the initiative for 
formulating a Uniform Civil Code must come from the 
communities themselves and that it will not move in the matter 
until they are ready to accept a Uniform Civil Code. In this way 
the state instead of making any serious attempt in this direction 
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tends to adopt an indifferent attitude ostensibely as a matter of 
political expediency.''^ In the following section the researcher 
traces the conduct of state in the legistature with regard to the 
Uniform Civil Code. 
When the Hindu Code Bill was introduced in the Parliament, 
the question of secularising other personal laws was raised. Views 
expressed by the Parliamentarians against the Hindu Code Bill are 
found in the record of Parliamenary debates. They were of the 
view that Common Civil Code should be introduced instead of 
secularising the laws of Hindus alone. At the time of introducing 
the Hindu Code Bill the then Prime Minister, Pandit Jawahar Lai 
Nehru, took for granted the willingness of the community to 
change its personal law and as to change the personal law of the 
Muslim as soon as they too are not willing to accept the change 
by a process of education. On this Mr. More a member of 
Parliament reacted by saying that it was not lack of wisdom but 
reaction which causes the assured unwillingness of the Muslims to 
accept the change. Pt. Nehru said. 
"The honourable member is perfectly entitled to his 
views on his subject. It he or any body else willing a 
Civil Code Bill, it will have my extrime sympathy. But 
I confess I do not think that at the present moment 
the time is ripe in India for me to try to push it 
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through. I want to prepare ground first and this kind 
of thing it one method of preparing the ground.'"*^ 
Although various amendments have been made in the 
marriage and divorce laws of Hindu till now the Indian government 
and stewards of the social reform have not been able to prepared 
the ground as yet to change the personal law of the Muslim. 
History rather appears to support the view point of Mr. More than 
of Pt. Neliru whose preparing the ground by passing the Hindu 
Code Bill is by no means less than an act of legislative 
discrimination against the Hindus because the other half the 
promised unfulfilled.'*^ 
Dr. Upendra Baxi'*" too is sore at such a prospect that had 
come to pass. He squarely lays the blame on the shoulders of the 
government for not giving leadership to the cause of secularising 
Muslim Personal Law in the manner of Hindu Personal Law. And 
for always sitting idle waiting for the spontaneous response of 
community. He also attribute the motive of electoral advantage of 
getting the backing of minority support by a policy of studied 
inaction in the matter of government. 
The response of the government was that the members 
supporting Hindu Code Bill and asking instead for a Uniform Civil 
Code, were not making the demand on principle Ambedkar 
claimed that the opponents of the Hindu Code were damanding a 
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Uniform Civil Code as a tactics. These people probably thought 
that it would take a long time to enact a Uniform Civil Code, but 
he could produce such a bill within two days. However, he gave 
no further reasons for not introducing a Uniform Civil Code. 
Instead he countered the objection that a Hindu Code Bill should 
be made applicable to every one by saying that other communities 
had not been consulted on the matter and that a secular state did 
not mean that it could flout the sentiments of the people.'*^ 
The government is the Provisional Parliament and 
subsequently in the first Lok Sabha, continued its stand that the 
Hindu Code was but the first step towards a Unifonn Civil Code. 
Nevertheless doubt were expressed whether, after the enactment 
of Hindu Code Bill, the legislature would bother to enact a 
Uniform Civil Code"^; he had articulated the same idea in 1949.^' 
Following the enactment of Hindu Reforms Acts there was 
no significant activity on the part of State to initiate the process 
for the enactment of a Uniform Civil Code.'*^ Until the Shah Bano 
controvery brought the issue of religious personal laws and legal 
equality for wemen into sharp focus. The government decision to 
introduce the Muslim Womens Bill in the Lok Sabha attracted the 
charge that the government was succumbing to the pressure of 
religious fundamentalists of the Muslim Community. It was 
probably to counter this suggestion that the Prime Minister 
announced that the government would introduced a Uniform Civil 
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Code bill in the forthcoming Mansoon session of the Parliament 
in 1986.'*^ 
But it did not mean that the government did not give any 
assurance to the Muslim minority regarding non implementation of 
Uniform Civil Code or not interfering in their Personal laws. In 
Oct. 1972, while addressing the Minority cell of the Gujarat 
Congress Pradesh Committee at Gandhi Nagar, the then Prime 
Minister of India, Late Mrs. Indira Gandhi, urged Indian Muslims 
themselves to start the process of considering changes in their 
personal law. In this context she further adviced them to get 
assimilated in the majority culture in the same way as the Parsis 
had assimilated themselves with the people of Gujarat^". On 
another occasion Mrs. Indira Gandhi assured a delegation of 
Muslim leaders led by Sheikh Abdullah, that met her in New Delhi, 
in August 1973, that there was no proposal before the government 
to change the Muslim Personal Law and there was no reason at all 
for Muslim to feel agitated over the issue.^' 
The Congress Central Parliamentary Board in 1973 reiterated 
that the government had no intention of making any alteration in 
the Muslim Personal law. The All India Congress Committee 
General Secretary said that the Board took the opportunity to 
declare that it would stand by the All India Congress Committee's 
1938 resolution in this connection and assured the Muslim 
minority that there was going to be no change in their personal 
law against their wishes.^^ 
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Late Mr. Faklimddin Ali Alimad, then President of India in 
1972 in an election meeting at Hyderabad, stated that so long as 
the Congress Party remained in power, the rights of Muslims 
would be protected at any cost and that there would not be any 
change in the Muslim Personal Law." 
Coming to the next regime of Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, the attitude 
of the government not only remained non interference in Muslim 
Personal law but going a step further he strenghtened the 
government stand on non-inteference of Muslim Personal law by 
Passing a Bill in the Lok Sabha, that is, Muslim Women Bill. In 
order to allay the apprehensions arising from the Supreme Court 
Judgement in Shah Bano case Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi 
decided to introduce the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on 
Divorce) Bill in the Parliament with the plan that the government 
could not remain insensitive to the feelings and reactions of large 
sections of people, specially on delicate matters such as religion, 
custom, and cultural identities. The hush-rush circumstances in 
which the move was made to introduce the Bill were both 
unseemly and unwarranted. As an opposition member pointed out 
that the Bill was not mentioned in the list of business or even the 
supplementary list. The government's attempt to introduce the Bill 
without consensus, has raised a number of doubt in the minds of 
the people. Is Rajiv Gandhi honestly intrested in protecting 
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Muslim Women? or is he more interested in protecting the Muslim 
votes? Why has the government chosen to take the drastic step of 
amending the Constitution at the behest of what Rajabali calls the 
forces of reaction, without consulting the other point of view, 
even within the Congress (I)? Does it sincerely believe that it is 
practically possible for divorced Muslim women to obtain 
protection from the cruelty and barbarity of their men through the 
clauses of this Bill? Has Mr. Gandhi stopped to consider the 
consequences of his action will have on the other minorities.^'* 
Some opposition members condemned the government's 
move to appease the Muslim fundamentalist through legislation. 
Mr. Indradeep Sinha of the C.P.I, and Mr. V. Gopal Swami of the 
D.M.K. strongly criticised the ruling party's Bill in the Rajya 
Sabha and said, 'This clearly indicated that the rulling party had 
yielded to the pressure of Muslim fundamentalist.^^ 
It is true that the Mulsim Personal Law Board had organised 
massive demonstrations against the Shah Bano verdict and that 
both Hindus and Muslim communities were creating communal 
tension in the country. But should the laws of the law be held to 
ransom by a handful of communalists? 
Hari Jai Singh says that It will be a pity if the politics of the 
compromise is allowed to degenerate into the politics of surrender 
before the forces of reaction and obscurantism.^^ 
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As regards Rajiv Gandhi government's views on Uniform 
Civil Code, the Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandlii in an interview to the 
editor of Tamil fortnightly Thughlak, Madras on January 13, 1986 
said that he is in favour of a Uniform Civil Code but wants it to 
be introduced only after a concensus reached among political 
parties, religious leaders and imminent personalities. He further 
said that: 
"Uniform Civil Code in our Constitution and it may 
be a very good thing if we can have it. But I do not 
see it coming about immediately. Before we get a 
Uniform Civil Code or a decision is taken about it 
must come by a specific decision, some sort of 
unanimity that we need in such a Code." 
He further said : 
"It is not for me to codify the Muslim Law. It is for 
Muslim personalities and some senior people to come 
forward and see what can be done. Unless it is 
codified and it is put down on paper, it is going to be 
difficult for the courts to interpret i t . " " 
The government clarified its stand on Uniform Civil Code in 
the following words : 
"It has been the consistent policy of the government 
not to interfere in the personal laws of any community 
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until the initiative therefore comes from the community 
concerned. In view of this the government do not 
propose to bring in any legislation on Uniform Civil 
Code:'''' 
The Government made a submission before the Supreme 
Court in Oct. 1996 : 
"... Due to absence of uniformity of views among the 
different sections of citizens in the country as to the 
enactment of Uniform Civil Code of laws relating to 
marriage, succession etc., it is not possible for the 
union government to enforce a Uniform Civil Code 
for all communities in the country. "^^ 
Union Law Minister D. Swami clarified the government's stand 
on Uniform Civil Code in the following words : 
"The govermnent does not propose to introduce a 
Uniform Civil Code in the country.... 
"...The government would not interfere in the 
personal laws of the minority communities. A Uniform 
Civil Code can be introduced only when the initiative 
comes within the minority communities."^" 
On 29th March, 1990 the Government reassured the 
minorities that any amendment to their personal laws will be made 
only upon the initiative of the community concerned : 
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"A Common Civil Code for all Indian Citizens would 
involve amendments to the Personal Laws of various 
communities. The government policy is to undertake 
such excercise on the initiative taken by the minority 
communities themselves. In view of the 
recommendation received from certain persons and 
associations belonging to minority communities, 
efforts are being made to ascertain the consensus of 
the minorities."^^ 
Again in 1991 the government declared its policy of non-
interference in the personal laws of minority communities in 
following words : 
"Introduction of Uniform Civil Code for all citizens 
will necessarily involve changes in the Personal laws 
of the minority communities. The consistent policy of 
the government has been not to interfere on its own in 
the Personal Laws of the minority communities unless 
initiative for the change comes from such 
communities."^^ 
During the surcharged atmosphere in 1986, Prime Minister 
Rajiv Gandhi declared the policy of the government in these 
memorable words ; 
"I do not see it coming about immediately. Before we 
get a Uniform Civil Code or talk about it, it must 
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come by a specific decision, some sort of unanimity 
that we need such a code."^^ 
All these arguments of government spokesmen against 
Uniform Civil Code imply that there is a direct nexus between the 
Uniform Civil Code and Muslim Personal Law as though 
introduction of former is designed to cancel or even override the 
later. To consider the Uniform Civil Code as something aimed 
solely at Muslim Personal law is to give a wholly mistaken twist to 
the argument. '^* 
From the statements of government spokesmen, it appears 
that the government does not have a firm and clear stand. 
Theoretically a good many of government spokesmen seem in 
favour of reforming Muslim Personal Law, But in practice, seem 
reluctant to reform it because of political considerations. 
C. Role of Opposition Parties 
This section incorporates the stand taken by the oppostion 
parties on the Uniform Civil Code. The Janata Party President, 
Mr. Chandra Shekhar, on April 15, 1986 is reported to have 
observed in Pune, 'The Talaq Bill was absolutely unnecessary. I 
wonder why the government brought i t . "" 
Mr. Syed Shahabuddin, another Janata Stalwart, says : 
"First I must make it clear that the Constitution does 
not envisage a Common Civil Code but only a 
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Uniform Civil Code. A Uniform Civil Code, in turn, 
does not necessarily mean one single code for all 
sections of population but one that broadly reflects 
the varied ethos in the Country. I do not think that 
there is any constitutional compulsion to intoruduce 
an Uniform Civil Code as the Contitution does not set 
any time limit for this process". 
He further said that: 
"I do not subscribe to the view that a Uniform Civil 
Code is essential for a National integration or the 
survival of a country on the other hand, if we force a 
Uniform Civil Code on unwilling people it will 
jeopardise National Unity when a Uniform Civil Code 
is enacted and if any rule in it contravenes the 
Shariah, Muslim should be granted exemption from 
it. Every law allows for exceptions. A Muslim can 
not, in good faith, violate the Shariah. We should 
avoid a situation in which a good Muslim can not be a 
good citizen as well.'^^ 
The National executive of the Bhartiya Janta Party at its 3 day 
meeting held at Chandigarh in Jan. 1980, in a resolution 
condemned the, "virulent campaign" launched against the 
Supreme Court by the Muslim League and Jamaat-e-Islami 
following the court's Judgement in Shah Bono case. The 
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executive meeting described the judgement as "pre-eminently just 
and sensible". 
The B.J.P. demanded that the amendment prqposed be 
abandoned forthwith since it went counter to the spirit of the 
Indian Constitution, one of whose directive principles require the 
state to move towards a Uniform Civil Code^^. 
The B.J.P. Bombay Unit at its executive committee meeting 
in Dec. 1985 demanded the expulsion of Union Environment 
Minister, Z.R. Ansari for his criticism of the Supreme Court 
judgement. According to the committee he had insulted the 
Constitution and lowered the prestige of Parliament. The 
committee has decided to observe 1986 as the Common Civil 
Code Year."^ ^ 
The Communist Parties have in this case taken a clear but 
cautious stand, upholding the principle of maintenance for 
divorced women, but reaserving judgement on the speedy 
implementation of a Uniform Civil Code. Mr. M. Basava Punnaiah, 
C.P.I Polit Bureau Member condemned in Calcutta on Dec 28, 
1985 the statement made by the Prime Minister in support of 
Muslim conservatism that the western conception of the equality 
was not applicable to Muslim women in India. ^ ^ 
The Polit Bureau of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) 
considers the Supreme Court judgement... as a judgement in the 
right direction. It ... said that : 
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"Religious practises violative of human rights and 
dignity and sacerdotal suffocation of essential civil 
and material freedom, are not autonomy but 
oppression."^" 
The Central Committee endorsed the stand taken by the Polit 
Bureau on the issue of a Uniform Civil Code .... 'Our party 
welcome the broad direction in the judgement. At the same time 
certain remarks in the judgement give an impression that the Hindu 
social laws have been reformed while in reality discrimination 
against Hindu women continue in the present setup. Instead of 
imposing a Common Civil Code by the state decree, it is a 
essential that the rights of women and their equal status are taken 
up for all communities and existing laws be amended or fresh 
legislations initiated providing equality for women in marriage, 
property and other social matters. This can help in paving the way 
towards evolving a Common Civil Code.'"'' 
The national council of CPI on 22 July, 1995 expressed 
'Serious concern over the calculated attempts by the B.J.P. to 
communalise the issue of social reform. It has announced to make 
framing of Uniform Civil Code a central issue of its poll 
campaign. It is obvious that by making the framing of Uniform 
Civil Code a poll issue, the B.J.P. has added a new plank to its 
strident Hindutva campaign.' Framing of Uniform Civil Code is 
not a communal problem. It is basically a problem of social 
reform in the society. 
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The national council opined that framing of a Uniform Civil 
Code is a very complicated issue. Not only Muslims but almost 
all the religious communities in our country have their own 
personal laws. In such a situation, framing of Uniform Civil 
Code have to be preceded by reforms in various personal laws 
and customary laws. 
Uniform Civil Code can be framed only on the basis of a 
broad consensus over the issues and it has to be based on gender 
equality. Imposition of Uniform Civil Code from above will be 
I 
counter productive,'^ 
The Janata Party President Subramanyam Swami said that the 
BJP is not sincere about the implementation of Uniform Civil 
Code in his own words : 
"The BJP, if it is sincere about the Uniform Civil 
Code should begin by imposing in on its own leader 
and cadres when Ram Jethmalani was the Vice-
President of the BJP for a number of years the BJP 
never questioned him as to why he has two legally 
wedded wives living in the city of Bombay 2 kms. 
apart. One BJP Rajya Sabha member from Gujrat has 
three legally wedded wives, not to mention another 
top leader of BJP who has kept a woman in his house 
for 25 years and reared children through her. It is this 
fraud that exposes the BJP's commitment to Uniform 
Civil Code." 
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"Besides calling for Uniform Civil Code in marriages 
we need a common code in other areas which BJP 
never raises; for example, the income-tax relief 
provided to Hindu Undivided Families (HUF) is not 
available to Muslim families. This does not bother the 
BJP because the Hindus are beneficiaries. In this 
inequity in law. Muslims are the losers. The crux of 
the BJP campaign for Uniform Civil Code is thus a 
creation of hatred and alienation of Muslims from 
Indian society and by such hatred to consolidate the 
Hindu votes. The BJP is not pro-Hindu because it has 
never come up with a; single idea for reform in Hindu 
society, but it is purely an anti-Muslim party because 
its programmes revolve around undoing the position 
of Muslims in Indian society. In this respect BJP is a 
de-facto agent of Pakistan because Pakistan also 
propagates that Hindus and Muslims cannot be treated 
equally in India.""^^ 
An important leader of the BJP L.K. Advani said that : 
"If the BJP is voted to power not only Muslim law, 
even Hindu, Christian and other laws would be 
changed suitably within the constitutional 
framework."^'' 
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Another important leader of BJP, Atal Bihari Vajpayee also 
declared that 'The BJP will launch a national debate and a 
campaign on awareness on the question of a Common Civil 
Code' .... He further said that : 
"Political parties have not seriously tried to convince 
our Muslim friends that a Common Civil Code does 
not mean something that is anti Muslim ... There are 
practises under the Hindu Law also that need to be 
modified or amended."''^ 
D. Role of the Press 
Vasudha Dhagamvar is very critical about the role of press, 
when she says : 
"Admittedly even the national press has to give its 
readership good stories. Disastrous events and 
outrageous opinions make better copy, 'sell' more. 
But the press has other responsibilities too not least 
of which is to state the truth however dull it may be. 
Hamid Dalwais, Asghar Ali Engineer and the 
Satyashodhak Samaj command very httle press. Their 
meetings are hardly reported and their protests given 
little space. This was also the experience during the 
Muslim Women's Bill. Neither the reformer nor the 
pro-Uniform Civil Code Muslims are able to get 
publicity for their views...."''^ 
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But the above assessment of the press is not correct. Most 
of the national English daiHes and the leading newspapers in Hindi 
are always supportive of the idea of a Uniform Civil Code. Those 
Muslims who are pro-reformer and in favour of the 
implementation of the Uniform Civil Code are given space for 
their write-ups. They are also invited for talks on radio and 
television. In contrast the views of orthodox Muslims and 
opponents of the Uniform Civil Code are not given space for their 
write-ups and views. Of course, the media gives importance to the 
reports of the public demonstrations, dharnas, rallies and 
functions organised by Muslims as the masses attend this type of 
functions in large numbers. The media cannot suppress these 
news beyond a certain limit. Since Hamid Dalwai, Asghar Ali 
Engineer and the organisations like Satyashodhak Samaj have 
almost negligible following in the masses that's why they do not 
get that publicity which is given to Shahbuddin, Zia-ur-Rahman 
Ansari, Banatwala, Ulema and organisations Hke Muslim Majlis-e-
Mushwarat and All India Muslim Personal Law Board. ' 
It is, therefore, submitted that the English press and Hindi 
press are supportive of the implementation of the Uniform Civil 
Code. But the Urdu press is totally against such a move as the 
Urdu has now become the language of the Muslims. The 
newspapers generally try to satisfy their readers and the views 
expressed in the write-ups in Urdu dailies, fortnightlies and the 
magazines overwhelmingly contain the material which is against 
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the imposition of Uniform Civil Code. It means that the majority 
of the Muslims do not want the abrogration of their Personal 
Laws. In this way we can say that the press like politicians, 
scholars, social workers, human rights activists is also divided on 
communal lines. The role of the press should be to present the 
correct picture of the problem. But our national press has failed 
to discharge its duties honestly. 
Summary 
It is highly unfortunate that the role of press and politician in 
this regard has been quite poor and has badly failed to generate a 
congenial environment to promote the objective of Uniform Civil 
Code. The politicians have not so far shown any strong 
endeavour because of political consideration. Their motive seems 
to be that by talking of Unifonn Civil Code publicly they will 
loose their vote bank and it will be better for them to be silent on 
this important issue. Similarly, the state has also not made any 
serious effort to discharge this constitutional obligations. It is 
evident from the above study that the government has not taken 
any serious steps to explain the contents and significance of 
Article 44. It is clear from the study that no party has so far raised 
itself above the political alliances with communal parties. 
The government's stand since the independence is not to 
implement the mandate of Article 44 on minorities without their 
consent. It have seen that, since pre-partition days, the Indian 
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National Congress has maintained its commitment to the 
protection of personal laws of various communities. All Prime 
Ministers from Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru to Narsimha Rao, 
although supporting the view that Uniform Civil Code should be 
for all the communities, also have maintained that this would not 
be done without the approval of the community concerned. This 
approach is different for the majority community as they do not 
have that sense of insecurity as the minorities have in their minds. 
Whatever changes were made in classical Hindu Law in 1955-56 
they were very essential for the Hindu community. But even in 
those Acts and later on in their amendments the government has 
inserted so many laws which are against the philosophy of 
Uniform Civil Code. Even the NDA government headed by Mr. 
Atal Bihari Vajpayee has also left the issue of Uniform Civil Code 
untouched on the basis of consensus reached between the 
various constituents of National Democratic Alliance. 
Thus, the situation remains same that the Uniform Civil Code 
is not going to be applied on minorities without their consent in 
near future. 
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Conclusion and Suggestions 
No doubt the issue of the reform of personal Laws of 
different communities and the enactment of Uniform Civil Code is 
not an easy task. It is a very controversial and sensitive issue. 
The analysis is also difficult. The most disturbing, rather 
disappointing feature of the above mentioned controversy 
(Debate) is that it is mostly political and sentimental, ill infonned 
and hardly conducive to make either parties understand one 
another's mind. As a matter of fact there has been no real debate 
at all. The protagonists express their views in the English press, 
the opponents reply in the Urdu press. The protagonists refer to 
the winds of change to the spirit of modernity and to the 
constitutional provisions relating to a Uniform Civil Code; while 
their opponents quote the Qur'an and Sunnah, emphasize the 
religious and cultural rights of the minority, and the long history 
of existing laws. Specific proposals for change are rarely debated. 
Bad sociology, fictions statistics and heresay accounts of what 
has been happening in the Muslim countries are glibly swallowed 
by the limited readership of a few modernists while the masses 
and the Ulema are generally satisfied by cursory argument 
Conclusion and Suggestions 
supposed by supposely awe-inspiring authority, which in reality 
serves only their own complecency. Islamic injunctions such as 
the restricted permission to polygamous marriages or to the rules 
relating to divorce or inheritance are seldom explained to the 
citizens of modern India in terms understandable to them.' 
Champions of democracy shamelessly cite laws imposed by 
military dictators and there is no one to give them a lie as to the 
background and evolution of these exposed changes. No 
comparative study of the Islamic provisions relating to marriage, 
divorce, inheritance etc. and their 'modern' alternatives have been 
made so that an unbiased citizen could formulate his own views in 
well informed manner. 
Muslim Personal Law, is in fact, another name of the cultural 
and social freedom of the Indian Muslims. It implies essentially 
that Muslims are free to maintain their cultural entity and abide by 
Islamic Shariah in certain specified fields and that in these fields 
codes of law will adjudicate in accordance with Islamic laws. In 
actual practise however, this freedom is limited to divorce, 
inheritance, endowments and other related matters. During the 
British period these matters were, in general, decided in the light 
of Islamic law and the practice continues down to this day.^  
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The distinction between 'Personal' and 'non Personal' laws 
which was unknown to early India became noticeable during 
Muslim rule, this distinction further consolidated during the British 
Period because the British followed the pohcy of non-interference 
with the religious susceptibihes of the native Indians. They 
thought that anything could not be wiser than to ensure that the 
Hindus and the Muslims should be governed by their respective 
'personal laws' in matters relating to succession, inheritance, 
marriage etc. This policy was laid down in no uncertain terms 
under the Regulations of 1772 and 1793. The legislative ventures 
in the area of 'Personal Laws', during the period, were sporadic 
and peacemeal, and were undertaken to meet a need here and a 
demand there. Most of these were corrective and reformative 
legislations, favoured by public opinion. 
Soon after independence the question of position of personal 
laws got entangled into the whirlpool of national politics. Heated 
debates took place in the Constituent Assembly on this issue; and 
inspite of the best efforts made by the Muslim members, the 
majority of the members of the Constituent Assembly were 
unwilling to provide a constituional protection to the variety of 
personal laws for all time to come. Instead they introduced Article 
44 in the Constituton, which envisages a 'Uniform Civil Code'. 
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This article that asks the State 'to endeavour to secure for the 
citizens a Uniform Civil Code through out the territory of India', 
has often been used as a challenge or threat to the existence of 
the variety of personal laws. This article has been particularly 
used agaisnt Muslim Personal Law as if it is only this law which is 
a stumbling block in the procurement of a 'Uniform Civil Code'. 
This myth does not hold water at all.^  
On the basis of above anlaysis, it deserve due consideration 
tha,t champions of the Uniform Civil Code who believe that 
without it homogenity is not possible which is imperative for the 
unity and national integration of India. It must not be ignored that 
Uniform Civil Code is one of the directive principles of state 
policy out of a host of other directives. It possesses only a 
persuasive force rather than compulsive authority, as its no 
implementation is not enforceable by the court of Law."* 
The deep rooted multiplicity of personal law, religion, 
language, culture and custom are the real hurdles of in the way of 
the implementation of Uniform Civil Code in India. The diversities 
of family law of different communities, the tribal's own laws and 
customs, the belief of the people that the source of law and 
religion is the same and that faith, law and religion are intermixed 
and interwoven, have prompted people to oppose the Uniform 
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Civil Code from its very inception. The Uniform Civil Code under 
Article 44 is just one of the several other directive principles of 
state policy, while Articles 25, 26 and 29 which deal with religious 
and cultural freedom are the fundamental rights and both conflict 
with each other. In such conflicting situation fundamental rights 
are mandated to prevail constitutionality.^ 
History bears living testimony that when great Emperor, 
Akbar, introduced "Din-e-Ilahf and Ashoka introduced 
'Dhamma' at the cost of the prevalent laws of the people it 
counter blasted.^ Mughals and British rulers of the Indian 
subcontinent preserved the personal laws of Hindu and Muslim 
communities because of the dominant view held that Personal 
Laws were too much identified with the religion and culture of the 
people. The British regime appointed various law commissions 
from time to time on the issue of codification. Nevertheless, the 
British administration was of the view that by virtue of findings of 
the commission that personal laws could not be codified as such 
excercise would amount to interference with religious and cultural 
matters of the people.^ 
Sometimes the proponents of the Uniform Civil Code cite the 
example of Muslim countries where certain changes have taken 
place in those areas which we, in India, call Muslim Personal Law. 
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They also argue that in the early days of Islam the Caliphs and 
Imams did certain juristic activities and changed frequently the 
laws introduced by their predecessors. Pages of Islamic history 
reveal that changes were frequently introduced in the Shariah law 
by the ancient jurist themselves. Caliph 'Umar' and 'Ali' had 
overruled many principles of law settled by their predecessors. 
Imam 'Shaibani' had set aside some of the verdicts of his master 
Imam 'Abu Hanifa'; 'Ghazali' has devidated from certain 
principles of law laid down by Imam 'Shafei'; 'Shatebi' had 
dessented from some of the opinions of Imam 'Malik' and so on. 
The Prophet of Islam had not come with any 'Corpus Juris". 
Neither the Qur'an nor the Sunnah had furnished an exhaustive 
code of law. These Nasus had provided only the flmdamentals of 
the law. Formation of detailed legal rules was left to Prophet 
during his life time. After his demise, the mission was taken over 
by the Caliphs who were the administrative cum-ecclesiasticial 
heads of the Islamic state, and, at a later stage by the jurists and 
interpreters of the revealed law. Through the media of their 
judgements and fatwas they filled the scriptural skeleton of the law 
with flesh and blood.^ 
Muslim law, thus underwent a long process of evolution. The 
fabric of law was woven and rewoven with the spindle of juristic 
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interpretation or adminsitration. During this period of 
development, Islamic law remained a iaw in the making'. In this 
period if a later jurist or interpretor overruled the law settled by 
the predecessors, it constituted a step towards the development 
of law. Difference of opinions, among the doctors of law in this 
period of Islamic legal history, infact, form part of the process of 
legal evolution. All this juristic activity was based strictly on the 
interpretation of the mandatory laws revealed by the Qur'an or 
setted by the Prophet (SAW) under Divine Authority. As a result 
of such juristic activities, several schools of law based on the 
same sources but having conflicting doctrines in the matters of 
details, established their authority in several parts of the Muslim 
world. In the later phases of Islamic history, the principles of one 
or the other schools of law were accepted in toto by the various 
Islamic people.^ 
According to the Islamic legal theory 'Allah' is the only law 
giver and these exists no other basis of the legal fabric than the 
Divine Will. Shariah, the code of Islamic law is regarded as 
immutable by the Muslims. The Fundamental Principles of the 
Shariah are not open to reconsideration by man. The theory of 
immutability means what is immutable is actually the 'grundnorm' 
of the Shariah and not any of its varied interpretations.. There are 
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four schools of Sunni Law and three schools of Shia Law. These 
school has its own system of law. Many principles of law in one 
school are significantly different in the other school. In this 
situation as a general practise an individual should adhere to any 
one of the school in toto and is not allowed to make his own 
choice of legal rules from various schools. Nevertheless, all the 
schools have equilegal validity and sanctity under Islamic Law. 
Since none of them enjoy any superiority over others the judges, 
jurists and legislatures may apply the principles of a school of 
Islamic law other than that which may be locally prevalent. This 
flexible nature of Islamic law was the basis of legislative reforms, 
barring a few exceptions in certain Muslim countries which are 
often cited by the proponents of Uniform Civil Code to effect 
changes in Muslim Personal Law. From the above discussion we 
may safely derive two conclusions : 
1. Muslim countries have not amended the principles of Islamic 
law under the influence of any western law. 
2. They have not altered the basic norm of the Islamic law as 
the fundamental laws of Islam are sacrosanct. They cannot 
be altered by any man made law. They have just substituted 
one rule of Islamic law by substituting it from any other 
school of Islamic law. 
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Moreover, if any state has replaced Islamic law by a secular 
law then this is an act of transgression. The most dangerous point 
of the entire controversy is that the role of Supreme Course which 
has time and again raised the issue of Uniform Civil Code 
knowing fully well that Article 44 of the Constitution is judicially 
unenforceable. The court expessed extremely uncalled for views 
about the desirability of the enactment of Uniform Civil Code in 
three well known cases, viz. Shah Bano, Jorden Diengdeh and 
Sarla Mudgal case. In these three cases the issue was never 
Uniform Civil Code but the Supreme Court under the garb of 
judicial activism inserted unnecessary, unwarrented, obiter dictas 
which it could have easily avoided without affecting in the least 
the ratio decidendi in the above mentioned cases. In this way the 
Supreme Court unintentionally provided inflammatory material to 
those who want to forcibly enforce their personal laws on 
minorities in the name of Article 44. But the last case decided by 
the Supreme Court i.e. Ahmedabad Women 's Action Group case^^ 
has clarified the position and the ambiguities created by Sarla 
Mudgal's case. In this case three writ petitions were filed under 
Article 32 of the Constitution challenging the constitutionality of 
various provisions of different personal laws. The court, in this 
case, quoting its observations from its earlier decision, rejected 
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all the petition holding that the issues involved were the matters of 
state policies with which the covirt is generally not concerned. The 
Supreme Court further clarified that its earlier observations in 
Sarla Mudgal 's case regarding the desirability of the enactment 
of Uniform Civil Code, was made incidentally. Thus, it is a 
welcome decision of the Apex Court of India in which the court 
rightly realised that while considering the sensitive matters like 
Uniform Civil Code, it must exercise judicial restraint. This 
judgement has for the time being put the controversy into the cold 
but no one knows for better when the controversy will arise again. 
India, being a secular state must not interfere with the 
Personal Law of the people which was an essential and integral 
part of their religion, faith, culture, moral ethics and way of life. 
The abrogation or replacement of personal laws should not be 
treated as a measure of 'social welfare and reform'. It is 
noteworthy that the British government in India, did not endeavour 
to scrap or touch upon the Personal Laws. This was not a new 
policy which the Britisher's had followed. Infact the policy of 
non-interference in religious and personal matters can be traced 
from the days of Mohammad Bin Qasim's invasion of Sind. Wlien 
after defeating the local ruler the Islamic empire gave liberty to the 
local inhabitants to 'worship their Gods' and 'to live in their 
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houses in whatever manner they liked'. This policy of non-
interference in personal and rehgious matters was also followed 
during the Sultanat period with few exceptions. The Mughal rulers 
also followed the policy of non-interference with the Personal 
laws of Indians and virtually in view of the sanctity and sensitivity 
that Personal laws are the part, and parcel of religion and that 
practice of personal law estabhshes the cultural identity too, 
hence as political expediency, the Britishers did not interfere in the 
Personal laws of the Indians and left them untouched. 
The Muslim Personal Law is constitutionally protected and 
exempted from any kind of interference from outside under Article 
25 of the Constitution. The reason is that section 2 of Muslim 
Personal Law {Shariai) Application Act, 1937 states that 
questions relating to marriage dower, divorce, maintenance, 
custody, guardianship and inheritence matters are to be settled in 
accordance with Shariat, if the parties are Muslims. Part III of 
the Constitution of India is devoted to the rights which includes 
Articles 25, 26, 29 and 30 dealing with the freedom to profess and 
practise religion and establishing educational institutions to protect 
the cultural identity of the minorities in India. Moreover the 
governing, principle of the Constitution is 'Equality before law' 
and 'Equal protection of laws' as given under Article 14, therefore 
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Muslim Personal Law being fundamental right of Muslim is as 
much protected by the Constitution as other personal laws of 
other rehgious communities. 
Constitutionally speaking the Directive Principles of State 
Policy is not enforceable. Although the Supreme Court has 
enlarged and extended the scope of directive principles of state 
policy but in case of conflict between fundamental rights and 
directive principles the fundamental right will prevail. 
Now we come to the reasons given for enforcing Uniform 
Civil Code. Following reasons are cited by the proponents of the 
Uniform Civil Code. 
1. That it is a glaring example of appeasement of Muslims. The 
males among them are allowed to marry four wives, thus 
multiplying numbers and causing excessive growth rate in 
population. 
2. That separate Personal laws contribute to separation among 
Muslims. 
3. That the Uniform Civil Code will lead to national integration 
and draw the Muslims into the national mainstream. 
Uniform Civil Code will lead to communal harmony for the 
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loss and, consequently, the life style of all the communities 
will be coloured in the same hue and tang. 
5. That such a code will uplift the dignity and status of women 
in India. 
6. That this code will strengthen secularism. 
Hence the secular principles require the state to enforce 
uniform laws to all citizens disregarding religion. Although the 
arguement that Muslim Personal law is causing excessive growth 
rate in population is the weakest as it has no basis in fact, it is 
this argument which has become part of the Hindu folklore. The 
rate of incidence of polygamy among Muslims is lesser than the 
non-Muslims as has been shown by various surveys conducted by 
the governental and non-governental organisations. But it is not 
the polygamous Muslim males that matters it is their women in 
reproductive age group who give birth to children. Wider 
distribution of women under monogamy will tend to increase birth 
rate, while polygamy decreases it. Then it is not true that muslims 
do not adopt birth control measures because of their religion. If 
any sections of Muslims do not easily take to family planning, the 
reasons lie in their socio-economic backwardness, especially 
female illiteracy and not in religion. 
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The next reason mentioned above arrognantly implies that 
Muslims are not in the national mainstream and need to be bullied 
into it. What exactly does this 'being in the national mainstream' 
mean? The Muslims have, despite cultural and physical invasions 
retained their distinctive identity and still live a different life style 
which is naturally bound to be at variance with others due to their 
distinguish philosophy of life and religion. Evidently, it is this 
preservation of identity and separate carriage that amounts to 'not 
being in the national mainstream' according to the emissaries of a 
Uniform Civil Code. This immersion into the national mainstream 
is also the backbone of the term 'national integration'. But what 
about the facts that the tenns 'national integration' and 
'mainstream' are as vague as they are undefined? If the cherished 
identity of each community fades away into some imaginary 
national mainstream in the current softpush button laws will it lead 
to national integration or disintegration? People being humans and 
not machines can never be expected to part with their identity and 
laws without disturbing harmony and concord. 
A common code anywhere can only harm national integration, 
for true integration in a democracy stands for tolerance and 
coexistence of various communities. This also answers the next 
reasons set forth for enforcing a common code - the communal 
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harmony will be achieved through a Uniform Code. Wrenching the 
laws and culture that are beloved to a coimnunity and deriving it 
to adopt alien laws can hardly create goodwill or harmony 
between communities. 
The arguments about nationalism and secularism seeking to 
homogenise culture are not valid in theory or in practise. Matters 
like marriage, divorce, or adoption are culture bound; and any 
attempt to bring them under one law will cause serious damage to 
cultural norms and values of groups. 
India is a secular state, but it is also a plural society with 
diversity of culture. Democracy gives full play to pluralism, in 
cultural matters which require a regime of legal plurahsm. 
Cultural autonomy and plurahsm should, however, not mean 
right to deny women justice. Concern for gender justice is 
absolutely valid, whereas concern for uniformity is not. Muslim 
women, like Hindu women, suffer from a number of disabilities 
because of their historical backwardness and powerlessness. In 
certain spheres, Muslim women suffer more than Hindu women; 
in certain other areas it is the Hindu women who are more 
oppressed. 
There is therefore a strong case for reforming Muslim 
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Personal Law to secure Muslim women justice, as it is important 
to reform Hindu family laws to secure justice to Hindu women. 
In the case of Muslims, glaring example of injustice are 
instant unilateral divorce by husband and an unfattered male right 
to polygamy. In the case of Hindu women their disinheritence, 
under certain state laws, from agricultural land and non-availability 
of divorce on the basis of temperamental incompatibility are some 
examples of injustice. Thus women of both community suffer, 
under law, for want of provision for divorcee's share in the 
matrimonial property. 
Now what is the solution? The solution of the above 
mentioned problem does not lie in implementing the mandate of 
the Article 44 of the Constitution of India. We have already seen 
that the fate of Special Marriage Act, 1954 in which the idea of 
Uniform Civil Code was translated into action in 1954. While 
explaning the objectives of the Special Marriage Act late Prime 
Minister Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru expressed that it was a step to 
achieve the goal of Uniform Civil Code. This Act's applicabihty 
was on voluntary basis. Muslims opposed the content and 
consequences of the Act through their religious scholars and their 
political leaders but this Act had not been popular why Indian 
citizens for the purpose of the marriages are not universally 
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adopting the provisions of this Act - for registration of their 
marriages. If under peculiar and adverse circumstances any 
marriage is registered under the provisions of Special Marriage 
Act, 1954. How society reacts? Are the advocates of Uniform 
Civil Code in India able to reply in convincing manner in Indian 
context? 
The Hindu law reform which were enacted in 1955-56 are 
also an eye opener for the proponents of the Uniform Civil Code. 
If we go into the history of these Acts we would find that for 
passing these Acts many compromises were made by the 
government. Sometimes these compromises were to satisfy the 
orthodox Hindus and sometimes it was done for political 
expediency. Many provisions of old Hindu law were retained in 
the four Hindu legislations mostly injurious to women. Many 
practices of old Hindu law were retained which were derogatory 
to the women. Even the subsequent changes made in the four 
Hindu legislations have strengthened the religious based Hindu 
Personal law rather than secularising the Hindu law. 
It is a common belief - and a great myth - that only the 
Muslims of India have a Personal law and that it is that law alone 
which is stalling the procurement of 'Uniform Civil Code' through 
oiit the territory of India' as envisaged by the Cosntitution. It is 
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clear from the discussion in previous chapters of the thesis that in 
our country there are a variety of personal laws applicable to 
different communities. They are as follows : 
(i) Hindu Personal Law, largely codif but partly uncodified 
(also applicable, mutatis mutandis to Buddhists, Jains and 
Sikhas); 
(ii) Customary law of Hindus, Buddhists, Jains and Sikhs where 
ever protected by legislation are case laws; 
(iii) Tribal law of Hindus and others; 
(iv) Christian Personal Law - codified but archiac; 
(v) Parsi Personal Law - wholly unreformed and uncodified; 
(vii) Muslim Personal Law - reformed but largely uncodifed. 
Generally, the supporters of Uniform Civil Code project the 
issue in such a fashion that it appears that it will be the minorities, 
especially the Muslims, who will have to give up their Personal 
Laws. But, if the Muslims, Christians and Parsis were to give up 
their Personal law abruptly, what could be the substitute for them. 
Obviously, the Special Marriage Act, 1954, Indian Succession 
Act, 1925, and The Guardians and Wards Act, 1986. How could, 
then these minorities be expected to adopt the said laws when 
the majority communities has not done so. If the idea is to 
impose the Hindu law enactments of 1955-56 in the name of 
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Uniform Civil Code on the minorities then the minorities especially 
the Muslims are not going to accept it. Muslims being in minority 
are bound to be sensitive and they feel that Uniform Civil Code is 
one of the devises to destory their religious and cultural identity. 
This sense of insecurity has increased manifold after the 
demolition of Babri Mosque and the rise of communal forces in 
the country. 
Of course there are certain areas in Muslim Personal Law 
where the reform is urgently needed. These areas are polygamy 
and divorce. The solution of these problem lies in reforming these 
laws so that the women stop from suffering due to the 
consequences of these laws. 
Islamic Law by its very nature and structure is amendable 
and changable. However, Islam being a particular way of living 
with certain objectives and principles guiding human activities and 
ambitions. It is not to say that every kind of change would be 
acceptable in Islam. For the purpose of reconstruciton of any 
principle of Islamic Law, on has to make sure that : 
(i) The change in issue is not contrary to the basic teaching and 
objectives in Islam; 
(ii) Is the change really in the interest of the society, .leading to 
its welfare, happiness and prosperity; 
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(iii) The change will have no evil repercussions in the near or 
distant future. 
If the above three conditions are satisfied then one may 
proceed to find out the ways and means to make reforms in 
Islamic law. The method of Ijtehad is provided in Islamic Law. 
This method suggest that the door is still open for reassessment 
arid revaluation of arguements based on reasoning which is called 
Ijtehad. The main task oa Mujtahid is : 
(a) To suggest any change or amendment, if possible, in the law 
prescribed by the old doctors of Islamic j.urispmdence, in 
order to meet a new situation; and 
(d) To find a solution to new problems arising out of changed 
social and economic conditions of the world. 
Thus through the medium of Ijtehad the problem faced by 
the Muslim Women may be solved. There is no need to.impose an 
alien code on the Muslims in the name of Uniform Civil Code. 
Since Uniform Civil Code has resentment and discontent amongst 
Indian minorities especially Muslims, hence same is not wise to 
take up this thorny issue at the cost of annoyance of Indian 
minorities. 
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Previous discussions in the earlier chapters of this thesis lead 
us to suggest the following measures that, it is hoped will be 
helpful in solving the vexed problem of the implementation of a 
Uniform Civil Code throughout the territory of India. The 
suggestions are as follows : 
(a) Although the state is reluctant to impose Uniform Civil Code 
on diverse people, the minimum it should do to generate 
those conditions that will make a progressive and broad 
minded out look of the people. 
Education obviously can play a vital role in this regard. 
The solution to the problem lies in spreading education 
among the ignorant masses. It is the duty of the government 
to raise the social, educational and economic standard of the 
ignorant masses which will ultimately make them aware of 
their rights and obligations. 
(b) Since the Muslims are the most backward among the 
minorities in India, the long term solution to the problem of 
reform in Muslim Personal Law lies in spreading education 
among Muslim masses. It is the duty of the social workers, 
leaders and the government to raise the social educational 
and economic standard of 'orthodoxy'. It is the duty of the 
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Muslim intelligentia to educate the Muslim community about 
its rights and obligations. 
The only obstacles in the reform of Muslim Personal Law are 
the backwardness of the community and the lack of courage 
and fear on the part of Muslim leadership. 
(c) To guage the feelings of the community the government 
should hold the referendum in the minority communities in 
which all adult men and women can participate. Before the 
reforendum the government should propogate the importance 
of referendum through press, radio, television, internet and 
public meetings conducted by all the shades of opinion. 
(d) The govermnent must prepare a good environment for 
Uniform Civil Code by explaining the contents and 
significance of Article 44. It should take steps and find out 
means to fight obscurantists who oppose the move of 
Uniform Civil Code. A conservative section of the citizen 
must be made to understand the utility of uniformity of laws 
so that they do not stand in the way of implementation of 
'Article 44' of the Constitution. 
(e) The state should bring social reform slowly and in stages, 
and the stages may be territorial or they may be coimnunity-wise. 
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(f) In deciding the kind of code that should be enacted the two 
possible courses of action are - an optional Uniform Civil 
Code enacted to coexist with the various religious personal 
laws, as Special Marriage Act, 1954, exists with other 
religious marriage law or the other option to be replaced the 
existing religious-personal-laws with the Unifonn Civil Code. 
The Constitution does not indicate weather the Uniform Civil 
Code should be optional or compulsory. At face value, the 
first option seems eminently desirable, that is that the state 
provides a law that incorporates sex-equality but if any 
individual does not wish to give up their religious personal 
law they woved contyiue to be governed by the religious 
personal law. 
(g) An attempt should be made to enact a model Uniform Civil 
Code embodying what is best in all personal laws. It must be 
a synthesis of the good in our diverse personal laws. It 
should represent one, drawn up by consultation between the 
- different communities in India on the principle of give and 
take. 
(h) The vast majority of Muslims in India are afflicted with a 
sense of insecurity and anxities and this in turn has bred 
deep religiousity in them. A good course of action for 
[ 396 ] 
Conclusion and Suggestions 
educated liberal Muslims to adopt would be to actively 
involve in the basic problems of Muslim society. 
(i) There are certain areas in Islamic law which do not reflect the 
correct Islamic position for example 'Triple-Divorce' and 
'Khul 'a'. The Muslims generally think that the only mode of 
the dissolution of the marriage by the husband is 'Triple-
Talaq' similarly the concept of 'Khul'a' is misunderstood in 
India. The concept of 'Khul'a' udner Islam is almost 
analogous to the power of divorce in the hands of husband. 
If these two branches are explained to the Muslims by the 
'Ulema' and the press, television, radio by the government 
then tlie problem of 'Triple Divorce' may be curtailed to a 
large extent. 
(j) In case of 'Khul'a' it is wrongly understood that without the 
consent of husband a Muslim wife can not obtained 
'Khul'a'. This erraneous concept is the result' of Privy 
council ruling in 19th century. This can be rectified either by 
the Parhament or by a decision of the Supreme Court - thus 
giving very important power in the hands of Muslim women. 
(k) The minorities especially Muslims must be assured that the 
government is their well wisher and does not want to impose 
an alien law upon them by force. The government must also 
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remove the feelings of insecurity and dissatisfaction among 
the Muslims. 
(1) The refonn of Muslim Personal Law should be encouraged 
by the government through the leading and respected Ulema 
of Muslim community. The solution of the problem of the 
Muslim Personal Law should be searched within the Islamic 
law. No effort should be made to cross the limits set by the 
Islamic law i.e. Shariat. 
(m) To dispel the fear from the minds of the minority especially 
the Muslim the state can repeal 'Article 44' of the 
Constitution or at least to treat it as unworthy of being 
activised. Removal of this threat or perception of threat to 
Muslim identity will, it can be hoped, cause the enlgithened 
sections of Muslims to undertake the required refonns. 
(n) The government should never try to impose a uniform code 
of family laws on its citizens specially the minorities for the 
sake of 'national unity' or national integration. Such a move 
by the govermnent will further alienate the Muslims because 
they would consider it to be extending the Hindu majority 
rule over them. This would cause discontent and rebellion in 
the Muslim community and would be injurious to the 
'national unity' and 'naitonal integration'. 
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(o) Before enacting a Uniform Civil Code throughout the territory 
of India the government must also keep in mind the religious 
freedom guaranteed under 'Article 25' and 'Article 26' of 
the Constitution. 
The government must also take into account the legality and 
enforceability of 'Article 44' and the relationship between 
Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles of state policy. 
The state must realise that in case of conflict between 
Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles of the 
Constitution of India must the former shall prevail over the 
later. 
If the above measures are adopted sincerely and honestly the 
problem of implementation of 'Article 44' can be solved in India. 
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Appendix -1 
Government of India Act 1915 
Section 112. Law to be administered in cases of 
inheritance and succession 
The High Courts at Calcutta, Madras and Bombay, in the 
exercise of their original jurisdiction in suits against inhabitants of 
Calcutta, Madras or Bombay, as the case may be, shall, in matters 
of inheritance and succession to lands, rents and goods, and in 
matters of contract and dealing between party and party, and in 
matters of contract and dealing between party and party, when 
both parties are subject to the same personal law or custom 
having the force of law, decide according to that personal law or 
custom, and when the parties are subject to different personal 
laws or customs having the force of law, decide according to the 
law or custom to which the defedant is subject. 
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Appendix - II 
Government of India Act 1935 
292. Existing law of India to continue in force 
Notwithstanding the repeal by this Act of the Government of 
India Act, but subject to the other provisions of this Act, all the 
laws in force in British India immediatly before the 
Commencement of Part III of this Act shall continue in force in 
British India until altered or repealed or amended by a competent 
Legislature or other competent authority. 
298. Persons not to be subjected to disability by reason of 
race, religion etc. 
1.. No subject of His Majesty domiciled in India shall on 
grounds only of religion, place of birth, descent, colour or 
any of them be ineligible for office under the Crown of 
India, or be prohibited on any such grounds from acquiring, 
holding or disposing of peroprty or carrying on any 
occupation, trade, business or profession in British India. 
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Appendix - III 
Text of Constituent Assembly Debates 
Article 35. 
Mr. Mohammad Ismail Sahib : (Madras Muslim) : Sir, I move 
that the following/>rav/50 be added to article 35 : 
"Provided that any group, section or community of people shall 
not be obliged to give up its own personal law in case if it has 
such a law." 
The right of a group or a community of people to follow and 
adhere to its own personal law is among the fundamental rights 
and this provision should really be made amongst the statutory 
and justiciable fimdamental rights. It is for this reason that I along 
with other friends have given amendments to certain other articles 
going previous to this which I will move at the proper time. 
Now the right to follow personal law is a part of the way of 
life of those people who are following such laws; it is part of their 
rehgion and part of their culture. If anything is done affecting the 
personal law, it will be tantamount to interference with the way of 
life of those people who have been observing these laws for 
generation and ages. This secular State which we are trying to 
create should not do anything to interfere with the way of life and 
religion of the people. The Matter of retaining personal law is 
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nothing new; we have precedents in European countries. 
Yugoslavia, for isntance, that is, the kingdom of the Serbs, Croats 
and Slovenes, is obliged under treaty obligations to guarantee the 
rights of minorities. The clause regarding rights of Mussalmans 
reads as follows : 
"The Serbs, Croats and Solvene State agrees to grant to the 
Mussalmans in the matter of family law and personal status 
provisions suitable for regulating these matters in accordance with 
the Mussalman usage. 
We find similar clauses in several other European 
Constitutions also but these refer to minorities while my 
amendments refer not to the minorities alone but to all people 
including the majority community, because it says, 
"Any group, section or community of people shall not be 
obliged" etc. Therefore it seeks to secure the rights of all people 
in regard to their existing personal law. 
Again this amendment does not seek to introduce any 
innovation or bring in a new set of Laws for the people, but only 
wants the maintenance of the personal law already existing among 
certain sections of people. Now why do people want a uniform 
civil code as in Article 35? Their idea evidently is to secure 
harmony through uniformity. But I maintain that for that purpose 
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it is not necessary to regiment the civil law of the people including 
the personal law. Such regimetnation will bring discontent and 
harmony will be affected. But if people are allowed to follow their 
own personal law there will be no discontent or dissatisfaction. 
Every section of the people, being free to follow its own personal 
law will not really come in conflict with others. 
Shri Suresh Chandra Majumdar; (West Bengal General) : Sir, 
on a point of order, what is being said now is a direct negation of 
Article 35 and cannot be taken as an amendment. The Honourable 
Member can only speak in opposition. 
Mr. Vice-President : I hold that the Honourable Member is in 
order. 
Mr. Mohammad Ismail Sahib : Therefore, Sir, what I submit is 
that for creating and augmenting harmoney in the land it is not 
necessary to compel people to give up their personal law. I 
request the Honourable Mover to accept this amendment. 
Mr. Naziruddin Ahmed : Sir, I beg to move : 
"That to article 35, the following proviso be added, namely:-
"Provided that the personal law of any community which has 
been guaranteed by the statute shall not be changed except with 
the previous approval of the community ascertained in such 
manner as the Union Legislature may determine by law." 
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In moving this, I do not wish to confine any remarks, to the 
inconvenience felt by the Muslim Community alone. I would put it 
on a much broader ground. In fact, each community, each 
religious community has certain civil laws inseparably • connected 
with religious beliefs and practices. I believe that in framing a 
uniform draft code, these religious laws or semi-religious laws 
should be kept out of its way. There are several reasons which 
underlie this amendment. One of them is that perhaps it clashes 
with article 19 of the Draft Constitution. In article 19, it is 
provided that 'subject to public order, morality and health, and to 
the other provisions of this Part, all persons are equally entitled to 
freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practice 
and propagate religion'. In fact this is so fundamental that the 
Drafting Committee has very rightly introduced this in this place. 
Then in clause (2) of the same article it has been further provided 
by way of limitation of the right that "Nothing in this article shall 
affect the operation of any existing law or preclude the State from 
making any law regulating or restricting any economic, financial, 
political or other secular activity which may be associated with 
religious practice." I can quite see that there may be many 
pernicious practices which may accompany religious practices and 
they may be controlled. But there are certain religious practices, 
certain religious laws which do not come within the exception in 
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clause (2) viz. financial, political or other secular activity which 
may be associated with religious practices. Having guaranteed, 
and very rightly guaranteed the freedom of religious practice and 
the freedom to propagate religion. I think the present article tries 
to undo what has been given in article 19. I submit. Sir that we 
must try to prevent this anomaly. In article 19 we enacted a 
positive provision which is justiciable and which any subject of a 
State irrespective of his caste and community can take to a Court 
of Law and seek enforcement. On the other hand, by the article 
under reference, we are giving the State some amount of latitude 
which may enable it to ignore the right conceded. And this right is 
not justiciable. It recommends to the State certain things and 
therefore it gives a right to the State. But then the subject has not 
been given any right udner this provision. I submit that the present 
article is likely to encourage the State to break the guarantees 
given in article 19. 
I submit. Sir, There are certain aspects of the Civil Procedure 
Code which have already interfered with our personal laws and 
very rightly so. But during the 175 years of British rule, they did 
not interfere with certain fundamental personal laws. They have 
enacted the Registration Act, the Limitation Act, the Civil 
Procedure Code, the Penal Code, the Evidence Act, the Transfer 
of Property act, the Sarda Act and various other Acts. They have 
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been imposed gradually as occasions arose and they were 
intended to make the laws imiform although they clash with the 
personal laws of a particular community. But take the case of 
marriage practices and the laws of inlieritance. They have never 
interfered with them. It will be difficult at this stage of our society 
to ask the people to give up their ideas of marriage, which are 
associated with religious institutions in many communities. The 
laws of inheritance are also supposed to be the result of religious 
injunctions. I submit that the interference with these matters 
should be gradual and must progress with the advance of time. I 
have no doubt that a stage would come when the civil law would 
be uniform. But then that time has not yet come. We believe that 
the power that has been given to the State to make the Civil Code 
uniform is in advance of the time. As it is, any state would be 
justified under Article 35 to interfere with the settled laws of the 
different communities at once. For instance, there are marriages 
practices in various communities. If we want to introduce a law 
that every marriage shall be recognised and if not it will not be 
vaUed, we can do so under Article 35. But would you invalidate a 
marriage which is valid under the existing law and under the 
present rehgious beliefs and practices on the ground that it has 
not been registered under any new law and thus bastardize the 
child born? 
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As I have already submitted the goal should be towards a 
uniform civil code but it should be gradual an with the consent of 
the people concerned. I have therefore in my amendment suggeted 
that reHgious laws relating to particular communities should not be 
affected except with their consent to be ascertained in such a 
manner as Parliament may decide by law. Parliament may well 
decide to ascertain the consent of the community through their 
representatives, and this could be secured by the representatives 
by their election speeches and pledges. In fact, this may be made 
an article of faith in an election, and a vote on that could be 
regarded as consent. These are matters of detail. I have attempted 
by my amendment to leave it to the Central Legislature to decide 
how to ascertain this consent. I submit. Sir, that this is not a 
matter of mere idealism. It is a quesiton of stem reality which is 
not a matter of mere idealism. It is a question of stem reality which 
we msut not refuse to face and I believe it will lead to a 
considerable amount of misunderstanding and resentment amongst 
the various sections of the country. Wliat the British in 175 years 
failed to do or was afraid to do, what the rauslims in the course 
of 500 years refrained from doing, we sould not give power to the 
state to do all at once. I submit Sir, that we should proceed not in 
haste but with caution, with experience, with statesmanship and 
with sympathy... 
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Mahboob Ali Baig Sahib Bahadur : Sir, I move that following 
proviso be added to article 35. 
"Provided that nothing in this article shall affect the personal 
law of the citizen." 
My view of article 35 is that the words "Civil Code" do not 
over the strictly personal law of a citizen. The Civil Code covers 
laws of this kind : laws of property, transfer of property, law of 
contract, law of evidence etc. The law as observed by a particular 
religious community is not covered by article 35. That is my view. 
Anyhow, in order to clarify the position that article 35 does not 
affect the personal law of the citizen, I have given notice of this 
amendment. Now, Sir, if for any reason the framers fo this article 
have got in their minds that the personal law of the citizen is also 
covered by the expression "Civil Code", I wish to submit that 
they are overlooking the very important fact of the personal law 
being so much dear and near to certain rehgious communities. As 
far as the Mussalmans are concerned, their laws of succession, 
inheritance, marriage and divorce are completely dependent upon 
their religion. 
Shri M. Ananthasayanam Ayyangar : It is a matter of contract. 
Mahboob Ali Baig Sahib Bahadur : I know that Mr. 
Ananthasayanam Ayyanagar has always very queer ideas about the 
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laws of other communities. It is interpreted as a contract, while 
the marriage amongst the Hindus is a Samskara and that among 
Europeans it is a matter of status. I know that very well, but this 
contract is enjoined on the mussalmans by the Quran and if it is 
not followed, a marriage is not a legal marriage at all. For 1350 
years this law has been practiced by Muslims and recognized by 
all authorities in all states. If to-day, Mr. Ananthasayanam 
Ayyangar is going to say that some other method of providing the 
marriage is going to be introduced, we refuse to abide by it 
because it is not according to our religion. It is not according to 
our code that is laid down for us for all times in this matter. 
Therefore, Sir, it is not a matter to be treated so lightly. I know 
that in the case of some other communities also their personal law 
depends entirely on their religious tenets. If some communities 
have got their own way of dealing with their religious tenets and 
practices, that cannot be imposed on a community which insists 
that their tents should be observed. 
Shri L. Krishnaswami Bharthi : it sought to be done only by 
consent of all concerned. 
Mr. Vice-President : Mr. Bharthi, the majority community has 
always been so very indulgent that I would ask you as a personal 
favour to give the fullest possible freedom to our Muslim brethren 
to express their views. I would ask you to exercise patience for a 
litle while, I know they feel very strongly on this matter. 
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Shri L. Krishnaswamy Bharthi : My point was. Sir, that it was 
not an attempt at imposition. If anything is done, it will be done 
only with the consent of all concerned, and the Honourable 
Member need not only labour that point. 
Mr. Vice-President: It is understood and I thank you for it. 
Mahboob Ali Baig Sahib Bahadar : Now, Sir, people seem to 
have very strange ideas about secular State. People seem to think 
that under a secular State, there must be a common law observed 
by citizens in all matters, including matters of their daily life, their 
language, their culture, their personal laws. That is not the correct 
way to look at this secular State. In a secular State, citizens 
belonging to different communities must have the freedom to 
practice their own religion, observe their own life and their 
personal laws should be applied to them. Therefore, I hope the 
framers of this article have not in their minds the personal law of 
the people to cover the words "civil code". With this 
observation, I move that it may be made clear by this proviso, 
lest an interpretation may be given to it that these words "civil 
code" include personal law of any community. 
B. Pocker Sahib Bahadur : (Madras Muslim) : Mr. Vice 
President, Sir, I support the motion which has already been 
moved by Mr. Mohamad Ismail Sahib to the effect that the 
following provisio be added to article 35. 
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Provided that any group, section or community of people 
shall not be obliged to give up its own personal law in case it has 
such a law." 
It is a very moderate and reasonable amendment to this 
article 35. Now I would request the House to consider this 
amendment not from the point of view of the Mussalaman 
community alone, but from the point of view of the various 
conmiunities that exist in this country, following various codes of 
law with reference to inheritance, marriage, succession, divorce, 
endowments and so many other matters. The House will note that 
one of the reasons why the Britisher, having conquered this 
country, has been able to carry on the adminsitration of this 
country for the last 150 years and ove rwas that he gave a 
guarantee of following their own personal laws to each of the 
various communities in the country. That is one of the secrets of 
success and the basis of success and the basis of the 
adminsitration of justice on which even the foreign rule was 
based. I ask Sir, whether by the freedom we have obtained for 
this country, are we going to given up that freedom of conscience 
and that freedom or religious practices and that freedom of 
following one's own personal law and try to aspire to impose 
upon the whole country one code of civil law, whatever it may 
mean, which I say as it is, may include even all branches of civil 
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law, namely, the law of marriage, law of inheritance, law of 
divorce and so many other kindred matters? 
In the first place, I would like to know the real intention with 
which this clause has been introduced. If the words "Civil Code" 
are intended only to apply to matters of procedure like the Civil 
Procedure Code and usch other laws which are uniform so far as 
Indian is concerned at present well, nobody has any objection to 
that, but the various Civil Courts Acts in the various provicnes in 
this country have secured for each community the right to follow 
their personal laws as regards marriage, inheritance, divorce etc. 
But if it is intended that the aspiration of the State should be to 
override all these provisions and to have uniformity of law to be 
imposed upon the while people on those matters which are dealt 
with by the Civil Courts Acts in the various provinces, well I 
would only say. Sir, that it is a tyrannous provision which ought 
not to be tolerated : and let it not be taken that I am only voicing 
the feeling of the Mussalmans. In saying this, I am voicing forth 
the feeling of ever so many sections in this country who feel that 
it would be really tyrannous to interfere with the religious 
practices, and with the religious laws, by which they are governed 
now. 
Now, Sir just like many of you, I have received ever so many 
pamphlets which voice forth the feelings of the people in these 
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matters. I am referring to many pamphlets which I have received 
from organizations other than Mussalmans, from organizations of 
Hindus, who characterize such interferences most tyrannous. 
They even question. Sir, the right and the authority of this body 
to interfere with their rights from the constitutional point of view. 
They ask : Who are the members of this Consutituent Assembly 
who are contemplating to interfere with the religious rights and 
practices? Were they returned ther eont he issue as to whether 
they have got this right or not? Have they been returned by the 
various legislatures the elections to which were fought out on 
these issues? 
If such a body as this interferes with the religious rights and 
practices it will be tyrannous. These orgnizations have used a 
much stronger language than I am using. Sir, therefore, I would 
request the Assembly not to consider what I have said entirely as 
coming from the point of view of the Muslim community. I know 
there are great differences in the law of inheritance and various 
other matters between the various sections of the Hindu 
community. Is this Assembly going to set aside all these 
differences and make them uniform? By uniform, I ask, what do 
you mean and which particular law, of which community are you 
going to take as the standard? What have you got in your mind in 
enacting a clause like this? There are the Mitakshara and Dayabaga 
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systems; there are so many other systems followed by various 
other communities. What is that you are making the basis? Is it 
open to us to do anything of this sort? By this one clause you are 
revolutionizing the whole country and the whole setup. There is 
no need for it. 
Sir, as already pointed out by one of my precedessors in 
speaking on this motion, this is entirely antagonsitic to the 
provision made as regards Fundamental Right in Article 19. If it 
is agnostic what is the purpose served by a clause like this? Is it 
open to this Assembly to pass by one stroke of the pen an article 
by which the whole country is revolutionized? Is it indeed? I do 
not know what the framers of this article mean by this. On a 
matter of such importance, I am very sorry to find that the 
framers and draftsmen of this article have not bestowed 
sufficiently serious attention to that. Whether it is copied from 
anywhere or not, I do not know. Anyhow, if it is copied from 
anywhere, I must condemn that provision even in the 
Constitution. It is very easy to copy sections from other 
constitutions of countries where the circumstances are entirely 
different. There are ever so many multitudes of communities 
following various customs for centuries of thousands of years, y 
one stroke of the pen you want to annul all that and make them 
uniform. What is the purpose served? What is the purpose served 
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by this uniformity except to murder the conscience of the people 
and make them feel that they are being trampled upon as regards 
their religious rights and practices? Such a tyrannous measure 
ought not to find a place in our Constitution. I submit Sir, there 
are ever so many sections of the Hindu community who are 
rebellign against this and who voice forth their feelings in much 
stronger language than I am using. If the framers of this article 
say that even the majority community is uniform in support of 
this, I would challenge them to say so. It is not so. Even assuming 
that the majority community is of this view. I say, it has to be 
condemned and it ought not be allowed, because, in a democracy, 
as I take it, it is the duty of the majority to secure the sacred 
rights of every minority. It is a misnomer to call it a democracy if 
the majority rides roghshod over the rights of the minorities. It is 
not democracy at all; it is tyranny. Therefore, I would submit to 
you and all the Members of this House to take very serious note 
of this article; it is not alike that to be passed like this. 
In this connection. Sir, I would submit that I have given 
notice of an amendment to the fundamental right article also. This 
is only a Directive( Principle. 
Mr. Vice-President : That may be taken up at the proper time. 
B. Pocker Sahib Bahadur : What I would submit is only this. 
The result of any voting on this should not be allowed to affect 
the fate of that amendment. 
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Mr. Hussain Imam : (Bihar : Muslim) : Mr. Vice-President, Sir, 
India is too big a country with a large population so diversified 
that it is almost impossible to stamp them with one kind of 
anything. In the north, we have got extreme cold; in the south we 
have extreme heat. In Assam we have got more raisn than 
anytwhere else in the world : about 400 inches; jsut near up in the 
Rajputana desert, we have no rains. In a country so diverse, is it 
possible to have uniformity of civil law? We have ourselves 
further on provided for concurrent jurisdiction to the provinces 
as well as to the Centre in matters of succession, marriage, 
divorce and other things. How is it possible to have uniformity 
when there are eleven or twelve legislative bodies ready to legislate 
on a subject according to the requirements of their own people 
and their own circumstnaces. Look at the projection we have 
giyen to the backward classes. Their property is safeguarded in a 
manner in which property is not safeguarded in Scheduled areas. I 
know of Jharkhand and Santhal Parganas. We have given special 
protection to the aboriginal population. There are certain 
circumstances which demand diversity in the civil laws. I, 
therefore, feel, Sir, that in addition to the argumetns which have 
been put forward by my friends who spoke before me, in which 
they feel apprehensive that their personal law will not be safe if 
this Directive is passed. I suggest that there are other difficulties 
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also which are purely constitutional, depending not so much on 
the existence of different communities as int he existence of 
different levels in the intelligence and equipmetn of the people of 
India. You have to deal not with an uniformly developed country. 
Parts of the country are very very backward. Look at the Assam 
tribes, what is their condition? Can you have the same kind of law 
for them as you have for the advanced people of Bombay? You 
must have a great deal of difference. Sir, I feel that it is all right 
and a very desirable thing to have a uniform law, but at a very 
distant date. For that, we should first avait the coming of that 
even when the whole of India has got educated, when mass 
illiteracy has been removed, when people have advanced, when 
their economic conditions are better, when each man is able to 
stand on his own legs and fight his own battles. Then, you can 
have uniform laws. Can you have, today, uniform laws as far as a 
child and a young man are concerned? 
Even today under the Criminal law you give juvenile 
offenders a lighter punishment than you do to an adult offenders. 
The apprehension felt by the members of the minority community 
is very real. Secular state does not mean that is anti-relihious 
State. It means that it is not irreligious but non-religious and as 
such there is a world of difference between irreligious and non-
religious. I therefore suggest that it would be a good policy for 
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the members of the Drafting Committee to come forward with 
such safguards in this provision as well as meet the apprehension 
genuinely felt which people are feeling and I have every hope that 
the ingenuity of Dr. Ambedkar will be find a solution for this. 
Shri K.M. Munshi : (Bombay General) : Mr. Vice-President. I 
beg to submit a few considerations. This particular cluase which 
is now before the House is not brought for discussion for the first 
time. It has been discussed in several committees and at several 
places before it came to the House. The ground that is now put 
forward against it is firstly that it infringes the Fundamental Right 
mentioned in article 19, and secondly, it is tyrannous to the 
minority. 
As regards article 19 the House accept it and made it quite 
clear that "Nothing in this article shall affect the operation of the 
existing law or preclude the State from making any law (3) 
regulating restricting. I am omitting the unnecessary words, "or 
other secular activity which may be associated with religious 
practices; (b) for social welfare and reforms." Therefore the 
House has already accepted the principle that if a religious 
practice followed so far covers a secular activity or falls within 
the field of social reform or social welfare, it would to Parliament 
to make laws about it without infringing the Fundamental Right of 
minority. 
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It must be remembered that if this clause is not put in does 
not mean that the Parhament in future would have no right to enact 
a Civil Code. The only restriction to such a right would be article 
19 and I have already pointed out that article 19, accepted by the 
House unanimously permits legislation covering secular activities. 
The whole object of this article is that as and when the parliament 
thinks proper or rather when the majority in the Parliament thinks 
proper an attempt may be made to unify the personal law of the 
country. 
A further argument has been advanced that the enactment of 
a Civil Code would be tyrannical to the minorities. Is it tyrannical? 
Nowhere in advanced Muslim countries the personal law of each 
minority has been recognized as so sacrosanct as to prevent the 
enactment of a Civil Code. Take for instance Turkey or Egypt. 
No minority in these countries is permitted to have such right. But 
I go further. When the Shariat Act was passed or when certain 
laws were passed in the Central Legislature in the old regime,, the 
Khojas and the Cutchi Menons were highly dissatisfied. 
They then followed certain Hindu customs; for generations 
since they became converts they had done so. They did not want 
to conform to the Shariat; and yet by a legislation of the Central 
legislature certain Muslim members who left that Shariat law 
would be enforced upon the whole community carried their point. 
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The Khojas and the Cutchi Menons most unwillingly had to 
submit to it. Where were the rights of minority then? When you 
want to consolidate a community, you have to take into 
consideration the benifit which may accure to the whole 
community and not to the customs of a part of it. It is not 
therefore correct to say that such an act is tyranny of the majority. 
If you will look at the countries in Europe which have a Civil 
Code, everyone who goes there from any part of the world and 
every minority, has to submit to the Civil Code. It is not left to be 
tyrannical to the minority. 
The point however is this, whether we are going to 
consolidate and unify our personal law in such a way that the way 
of life of the whole community may in course of time be unified 
and secular. We want to divorce religion from personal law, from 
what may be called social relations or from rights of parties as 
regards inheritance or succession. What have these thing got to 
do which religion I really fail to understand. Take for instance the 
Hindu Law Draft which is before the Legislative Assembly. If one 
look at Manu and Yagnavalkya and all the rest of them, I think 
most of the provisions of the new Bill will run counter to their 
injuctions. But after all we new are an advancing society. We are 
in a stage where we must unify and consohdate the nation by every 
means without interfering with religious practice. If however the 
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religious practice in the past have been so constructed as to cover 
the whole field of life, we have reached a point when we must put 
our foot down and say that these matters are not religion, they are 
purely matters for secular legislation. This is what is emphasized 
by this article. 
Now look at the disadvantages that you will perpetuate if 
there is no Civil Code. Take for instance the Hindus. We have the 
law of Mayukha applying in some parts of India, We have the law 
of Mayuklia applying in others, and we have the law of Dayabagha 
in Bengal. In this way, even the Hindus themselves have separate 
law and most of our Provinces and States have started making 
separate Hindu law for themselves. Are we going to permit this 
piecemeal legislation on the ground that it affects the personal law 
of the country? It is, therefore, not merely a question for 
minorities but it also affests the majority. 
I know there are many among Hindus who do not like a Civil 
Code, because they take the same view as the honourable Muslim 
Members who spoke last. They feel that the personal law of 
inheritance, succession etc. is really a part of their religion. If that 
were so, you can never give, for instance, equality to women. But 
you have already passed a Fundamental Right to that effect and 
you have an article here which lays down that there should be no 
discrimination against sex. Look at Hindu Law: you get any 
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amount of discrimination against women; and if that is part of 
Hindu religion or Hindu religious practice, you can not pass a 
single law which would elevate the position of Hindu women to 
that of men. Therefore, there is no reason why there should not 
be a civil code tliroughout the territory of India. 
There is one important consideration which we have to bear 
in mind and I want my Muslim friends to realise this, that the 
sooner we forget the isolationist outlook on life, it will be better 
for the country, religion must be restricted to spheres which 
legitimately appertain to religion and the rest of life must be 
regulated, unified and modified in such a manner that we may 
evolve, as early as possible, a strong and consolidated nation. 
Our first problem and the most important problem is to produce 
national unity in this country. We think we have got national unity. 
But there are many factors and important factors which still offer 
serious dangers to our national consolidation, and it is very 
necessary that the whole of our life, so far as it is restricted to 
secular spheres, must be unified in such a way that as early as 
possible, we may be able to say, "Well, we are not merely a nation 
because we say so, but also in effect, by the way we live by our 
personal law. We are a strong and consolidated nation." .From 
that point of view alone, I submit, the opposition is not, if I may 
say so, very well advised. I hope our friends will not feel that this 
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is an attempt to exercise tyranny over a minority, it is much more 
tyrannous to the majority. This attitude of mind perpetuated under 
the Bitish rule, that personal law is part of the religion, has been 
fostered by the British and by Biritish courts. We must, therefore, 
outgrow it. If I may just remind the honourable Member who 
spoke last of a particular incident from Fereshta which comes to 
my mind, Allauddin Khilji made several changes which offended 
against the Shariat, though he was the first ruler to establish 
Muslim Sultanate here. The Kazi of Delhi objected to some of his 
reforms, and his reply was : "I am an ignorant man and I am ruling 
this country in its best interest. I am sure, looking at my ignorance 
and my good intentions the Almighty will forgive me. When he 
finds that I have not acted according to the Shariat". If Allaudding 
could not, much less a modern government accept the proposition 
that religious rights cover personal law or several other matters 
which we have been unfortunately trained to consider as part of 
our religion. That is my submission. 
Shri Alladi Krishnaswamy Ayyar : (Madras : General): Mr. 
Vice-President, after the very full exposition of my friend the 
Honourable Mr. Munshi, it is not necessary to cover the whole 
ground. But it is as well to understand whether there can be any 
objection to the article as it runs. 
"The State shall endeavour to secure for the citizens a 
uniform civil Code throughout the territory of India." 
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A Civil Code as has been pointed out, runs into every 
department of civil relations, to the law of contracts, to the law of 
property, to the law of succession, to the law of marriage and 
similar matters. How can there be any objection to the general 
statement here that the States shall endeavour to secure a uniform 
civil code through out the territory of India? 
The second objection was that rehgion was in danger, that the 
coimnunities cannot live in amity if there is to be a uniform civil 
code. The Article actually aims at amity. It does not destroy 
amity. The idea is that differential systems of inheritance and other 
matters are some of the factors which contribute to the 
differences among the different peoples of India. What it aims at 
is to try to prepare at a common measure of agitation in regard to 
these matters. It is nt as if one legal system is not influencing or 
being influenced by another legal system. In very many matters 
today the sponsors of the Hindu Code have taken a lead and not 
from Hindu Law alone, but from other systems also. Similarly, the 
Succession Act has drawn upon into the Roman and the Enghsh 
systems. Therefore, no system can be self-contained, if it is to 
have in it the elements of growth. Our ancients did not think of a 
unified nation to be welded together into a democratic whole. 
There is no use clinging always to the past. We are departing from 
the past into an important particular, namely, we want the whole 
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of India to be welded and united together as a single nation. Are 
we helping those factors which help the welding together into a 
single nation or is this country to be kept up always as a series of 
competing communities? That is he question at issue. 
Now, my friend Mr. Pocker levelled an attack against the 
Drafting Committee on the ground that they did not know their 
business. I should like to know whether he has carefully read what 
happened even in the British regime. You must know that the 
Muslim law converts the field of contracts, the field of criminal 
law, the field of divorce law, the field of marriage and every part 
of law as contained in the Muslim law. When the British occupied 
this country, they daid, we are going to introduce one criminal law 
in this country which will be applicable to all citizens, be they 
Englishmen, be they Muslims. Did the Muslim take exception, and 
did they revolt against the British for introducing a single system 
of criminal law? Similarly we ham( of contracts governing 
transactions between Muslims and Hindus, between Muslims and 
Hindus, they are governed not by the law of the Koran but by the 
Anglo-Indian jurisprudence, yet no exception was taken to that. 
Again, there are various principles in the law of transfer which 
have been borrowed from the English jurisprudence. 
Therefore, when there is an impact between two civilizations 
or between two cultures, each culture must be influenced and 
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influence the other culture. If there is a determined opposition, or 
if there strong opposition by any section of the community, it 
would be unwise on the part of the legislators of this country to 
attempt to ignore it. Today, even without Article 35, there is 
nothing to prevent the future Parliament of India from passing 
such laws. Therefore, the idea is to have a uniform civil code. 
Now, again, there are Muslims and there are Hindus, there are 
Catholics, there are Christians there are Jews, in different 
European countries. I should like to know from Mr. Pocker 
whether different personal laws are perpetuated in France, in 
Germany, in Italy and in all the continental countries Europe, or 
whether the laws of cuccession are not coordinated and unified in 
the various States. He must have made a detailed study of Muslim 
jurisprudence and found out whether in all those countries there is 
a single system of law. 
Leave alone people who are there. To-day, even in regard to 
people in other parts of the country, if they have property in the 
continent of Europe, where the German Civil Code or the French 
Civil Code obtains the people are governed by the law of the 
place in very many respects. Therefore, it is incorrect to say that 
we are invading the domain of religion. Under the Muslim law, 
unlike under Hindu law marriage is purely a civil contract. The 
idea of a sacrament does not enter into the concept of marriage in 
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Muslim jurisprudence though the incidence of the contract may be 
governed by what is laid down in the Koran and by the later 
jurists. Therefore, there is no question of reHgion being in danger. 
Certainly no Parliament, no Legislature will be so unwise as to 
attempt it apart from the power of the Legislature to interfere with 
religious tenetes of pioples. After all the only community that is 
willing to adapt itself to changing times seems to be the majority 
community in the country. They are willing to take a leaf from the 
Muslims for the purpose of reforming even the Hindu Law. 
Therefore, there is no force in the objection that is put forward to 
Article 35. The future Legislatures may attempt a uniform Civil 
Code or they may not. The uniform Civil Code will run into every 
aspect of Civil Law. In regard to contracts, procedure and 
property unifomity is sought to be secured by their finding place 
in the Concurrent List. In respect of these matters the greatest 
contribution of British jurisprudence has been to bring about a 
uniformity in these matters. We only go a step further than the 
British who ruled in this country. Why should you distrust much 
more a national indigenous Government than a foreign 
Government which has been ruling? Why should our Muslim 
friends have greater confidence, greater faith in the Britis rule 
that in a democratic rule which will certainly have regards to the 
rehgious tenets and behefs of all people? 
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Therefore, for these reasons, I submit that the House may 
unanimously pass this article which has been placed before the 
members after due consideration. 
The Honourable Dr. B.R. Ambedkar : Sir, I am afraid I cannot 
accept the amendments which have been moved to this article. In 
dealing with this matter, I do not propose to touch on the merits 
of the quiestion as to whether the country should have a Civil 
Code or it should not. That is a matter which I think has been 
deialt with sufficiently for the occasion by my friend, Mr. Munshi 
as well as by Shri AUadi Krishnaswamy Ayyar. When the 
amendments to certain fundamental right are moved, it would be 
posible for me to make a full statement on this subject, and I 
therefore do not propose to deal with it here. 
My friend Mr. Hussain Imam, in rising to support to 
amendments asked whether it was possible and desiratable to have 
a uniform code of laws for a country as vast as this is. Now I 
must confess that I was very much surprised at that statement, for 
the simple reason that we have in this country a uniform code of 
laws covering almost every aspect of human relationship. We have 
a uniform and complete Criminal Code operating throughoutr the 
country, which is contained in the Penal Code and the Criminal 
Procedure Code. We have the Laws of Transfer of Property, 
which deals with property relations and which is operative 
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throughout the country. Then there are the Negotiable Instruments 
Acts and I can cite innumerable enactments which would prove 
that this country has practically a Civil Code, uniform in its 
contents and applicable to the whole country. The only province 
the Civil Code has not been able to invade so far is Marriage and 
Succession, It is this little corner which we have not been able to 
invade so far and it is the intention of those who desire to have 
article 35 as part of the Constitution to bring about the change. 
Therefore, the argiunent whether we should attempt such a thing 
seems to me somewhat misplaced for the simple reason that we 
have, as a matter of fact covered the whole lot of the field which 
is covered by a uniform civil Code in this country. It is therefore 
too late now to ask the question whether we could do it. As I say, 
we have already done it. 
Coming to the amendments, there are only two observations 
which I would like to make. My first observation would be to state 
that members who put forth these amendments say that the 
Muslim personal law, so far as this country was concerned, was 
immutable and uniform tlirough the whole of India. Novv I wish to 
challenge that statement. I think most of my friend who have 
spoken on this amendment have quit forgotten that up to 1935, 
the North-West Frontier Province was not subject to Shariat Law. 
It followed the Hindu law in the matter of succession and in other 
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matters, so much so that it was in 1939 that the Central Legislature 
had to come in to the field and to abrogate the application of the 
Hindu law to the Muslims of the North-West Frontier Province 
and to apply the Shariat law to them, that is not all. 
My honourable friends have fogotten, that, apart from the 
North-West Frontier Province, up till 1937 in the rest of India, in 
various parts, such as the United Provinces, the Central. Provinces 
and Bombay, the Muslims to a large extent were governed by the 
Hindu law in the matter of succession. In order to bring them on 
the plane of uniformity with regard to the other Muslims who 
observed the Shariat Law, the Legislature had to intervene in 1937 
and to pass an enactment applying the Shariat law to the rest of 
In.dia. 
I am also informed by my friend Shri Karunakara Menon that 
in North Malabar the Marumakkathayam Law applied' to all not 
only to Hindu but also to Muslims. It is to be remembered that he 
Marumakkathayam Law is a Matriarchal form of Law and not a 
Patriarchal form of law. 
The Mussulmans, therefore, in North Malabar were up to 
now following the Marumakkathayam Law. It is therefore no use 
making a categorical statement that the Muslim Law has been an 
immutable law which they have been following from ancient times. 
That law as such was not applicable in certain parts and it has 
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been made applicable ten years ago. Therefore, if it was found 
necessary, that for the purpose of evolving a single civil code 
applicable to all citizens irrespective of their religion, certain 
portions of the Hindu law, not because they were contained in 
Hindu law but because they were found to be the most suitable, 
were incorporated into the new civil code projected by Article 35. 
I am quite certain that it would not be open to any Muslim to say 
that the framers of the civil code had done great violence to the 
sentiments to the sentiments to the Muslim community. 
My second observation is to give them assurance. I quite 
realise their feelings in the matter, but I think they have read rather 
too much into article 35, which merely proposes that the State 
shall endeavour to secure a civil code for the citizens of this 
country. It does not say that after the Code is framed the State 
shall enforce it upon all citizens merely because they are citizens. 
It is perfactly possible that the Code shall apply only to those 
who made a declaration that are prepared to be it so that at the 
initial stage the application of the Code may be purely voluntary. 
Parliament may feel the ground by some such method. This is not 
a novel method. It was adopted in the Shariat Act of 19i37 when it 
was applied to territories other than the North-West Frontier 
Province. The law said that here is a Shariat law which should be 
applied to Mussulmans provided a Mussulman who wanted that 
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he should be bound by the Shariat Act should go to an officer of 
the state, make a declaration that he is willing to be bound by it, 
and after he has made that declaration the law will bind him and 
his successors. It would be perfectly possible for parliament to 
introduce a provision of that sort, so that the fear my friends have 
expressed here will be altogether nullified. I therefore submit that 
there is no subsatance in these amendments and I oppose them. 
Mr. Vice-President : The question is : 
"That the following pravz.s'o be added to article 35 : 
"Provided that any group, section or community or people 
shall not be obliged to give up its own personal law in case it was 
such a law. 
The motion was negatived. 
Mr. Vice-President : The question is : 
"That to article .U 35, the following provLvo be added, namely. 
"Provided that the personal law of any community which is 
guaranteed by the statute shall not be shanged except with the 
previous appoval of the commimity ascertained in such manner as 
the Union Legislature may detennine by law." 
The motion was negatived. 
Mr. Vice-President: The question is : 
"That Part IV of the Draft Constitution be deleted" 
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The motion was negatived 
Mr. Vice-President : The Question is : 
The motion was adopted 
Article 35 was added to the Constitution 
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Appendix - IV 
Constitution of India 
13. Laws inconsistent with or in derogation of the 
fundamental rights. 
(1) All laws in force in the territory of India immediately before 
the commencement of this Constitution, in so far as they are 
inconsistent with the provisions of this Part, shall, to the 
extent of such inconsistency, be boid. 
(2) The State shall not make any law which takes away or 
abridges the rights conferred by this part and any law made 
in contravention of this clause shall, to the extent of the 
contravention, be void. 
(3) In this article, unless the context otherwise requires,-
(a) "Law" includes any Ordinace, order, bye-law, rule, 
regulation, notification, custom or usage having in the 
territory of India the force of law; 
(b) "laws in force" includes laws passed or made bya 
Legislature or other competent authority in the territory 
of India before the commencenment of this Constitution 
and not previously repealed, notwithstanding that any 
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such law or any part thereof may not be then in 
operation either at all or in particular areas. 
(4) Nothing in this article shall apply to any amendment of this 
Constitution made under Article 368. 
14, Equality before law. The State shall not deny to any person 
equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within 
the territory of India. 
15. Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, 
race, caste, sex or place of birth. 
(1) The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on 
grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or 
any of them. 
(2) No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, 
place of birth or any of them, be subject to any disability, 
libility, restriction or condition with regard to -
(a) access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and places of 
public entertainment; or 
(b) the use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads and places 
of public resort maintained wholly or partly out of State 
funds or dedicated to the use of the general pubhc. 
(3) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any 
special provision for women and children. 
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(4) Nothing in this article or in clause (2) of Article 29 shall 
prevent the State from making any special provision for the 
advancement of any socially and educationally backward 
classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and the 
Scheduled Tribes. 
19. Protection of certain rights regarding freedom of 
speech, etc-
(1) All citizens shall have the right -
(a) to freedom of speech and expression; 
(b) to assemble peaceably and without anns; 
(c) to from associations or unions; 
(d) to move freely throughout the territory of India; 
(e) to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India; 
and 
(f) 
(g) to practice any profession, or to carry on any 
occupation, trade or business. 
(2) Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (1), shall affect the 
operation of any existing law, or prevent the State from 
, making any law, in so far as such law imposes reasonable 
restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said 
sub-clause in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of 
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India, the security of the State, friendly relations with freign 
States, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to 
contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence. 
(3) Nothing in sub-clause (b) of the said clause shall affect the 
operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or 
prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the 
interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India or public 
order, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right 
conferred by the said sub-clause. 
(4) Nothing in sub-clause (c) of the said clause shall affect the 
operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or 
prevent the State from making any law imposing in the 
interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India or public 
order or morality, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of 
the right conferred by the said sub-clause. 
(5) Nothing in sub-clauses (d) and (e) of the clause shall affect 
the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or 
prevent the State from making any law imposing, reasonable 
restrictions on the exercise of any of the rights conferred by 
the said sub-clauses either in the interests of the general 
public for the protection of the interests of any Scheduled 
Tribe. 
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(6) Nothing in sub-clause (g) of the said clause shall affect the 
operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or 
prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the 
interests of the general public, reasonable restrictions on the 
exercise of tlie right conferred by the said subclause, and, in 
particular, nothing in the said sub-clause shall affect the 
operation of any existing law in so far as it relates to, or 
prevent the State from making any law relating to,-
(i) the professional or technical quahficaions necessary for 
practising any profession or carrying on any occupation, 
trade or business, or 
(ii) the carrying on by the State, or by a corporation owned 
or controlled by the State, of any trade, business, 
industry or service, whether to the exclusion, complete 
or partial, of citizens or otherwise. 
21. Protection of life and personal liberty. 
No person shall be deprived of his life personal liberty except 
according to procedure estabhshed by law. 
25. Freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and 
propagation of religion.-
(1) Subject to public order, morality and health and to the other 
provisions of this Part, all persons are equally entitled to 
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freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, 
practise and propagate religion. 
(2) Nothing in this article shall affect the operation of any 
existing law or prevent the State from making any law -
(a) regulating or restricting any economic, financial, political 
or other secular activity which may be associated with 
religious practice; 
(b) providing for social welfare and reform or the throwing 
open of Hindu religious institutions of a character to all 
classes and sections fo Hindus. 
Explanation I. - The wearing and carrying of Kirpans shall be 
deemed to be included in the profession of the Sikh religion. 
Explanation II. - In sub-clause (b) of clause (2), the referece to 
Hindus shall be construed as including a reference to persons 
professing the Sikh, Jain or Buddhist religion, and the reference 
to Hindu religious institutions shall be construed accordingly. 
31. Compulsory acquisition of property. 
(1) No person shall be deprived of his property same by 
authority save by authority of law. [Omitted by the 
Constitution (44tli) Amendment Act 1978] 
37. Application of the principles contained in this Part. 
The provisions contained in this Part shall not be enforceable 
by any court, but the principles therein laid down are nevertheless 
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fundamental in the governance of the country and it shall be the 
duty of the State to apply these principles in making laws. 
44. Uniform civil code for the citizens. 
The State shall endeavour to secure for the citizens a uniform 
civil code tliroughout the territory of India. 
225. Jurisdiction fo existing High Courts. 
Subject to the provisions of this Constitution and to the 
provisions of any law of the appropriate Legislature made by 
virtue to powers conferred on that legislature made by virtue to 
powers conferred on that legislature by this Constitution, the 
jurisdiction of, and the law administrated in, any existing High 
Court, and the respective powers of the Judges thereof in relation 
to the administration of Justice in the Court, including any power 
to make rules of Court and to regulate the sittings of the Court 
and of members thereof sitting alone or in Division Courts, shall 
be the same as immediately before the commencement of this 
Constitution : 
Provided that any restriction to which the exercise of original 
jurisdiction by any of the High Courts with respect to any matter 
concerning the revenue or concerning any act ordered or done in 
the collection thereof was subject immediately before the 
commencement of this Constitution shall no longer apply to the 
ex.ercise fo such jurisdiction. 
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245. Extent of laws made by Parliament and by the 
Legislatures of States. 
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, Parliament may 
make laws for the whole or any part of the territory of India, 
and the Legislature of a State may make laws for the whole or 
any part of the State. 
(2) No law made by Parliament shall be deemed to be invalid on 
' the ground that it would have extra-terrtorial operation. 
3 72.Continuance in force of existing laws and their 
adaptation. 
(1) Notwithstanding the repeal by this Constitution of the enactm 
ents referred to in Article 395 but subject to the other 
provisions of this Constitution, all the law in force in the 
territory of India immediately before the commencement of 
this Constitution shall continue in force therein until altered 
or repealed or amended by a competent Legislature or order 
competent authority. 
(2) For the purpose of bringing the provisions of any law in 
• force in the territory of India into accord with te provisions 
of this Constitution, the President may by order make such 
adaptations and modifications of such law, whether by way 
of repeal or amendment, as may be necessary or expedient, 
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and provide that the law shall, as from such date as may be 
specified in the order, have effect subject to the adaptations 
and modifications so made, and any such adaptation or 
modification shall not be questioned in any Court of law. 
(3) Nothing in clause (2) shall be deemed -
(a) to empower the President to make any adaptation or 
modification of any law after the expiration of three 
years from the commencement of this Constitution; or 
(b) to prevent any competent Legislature of other competent 
authority from repealing or amending any law adapted or 
modified by the President under the said clause. 
Explanaition I.- The expression "law in force" in this article shall 
include a law passed or made by a Legislature or other competent 
authority in the territory of India before the commencement of 
this Contitution and not previously repealed, notwithstanding that 
it or parts of it may not be then in operation either at all or in 
particular areas. 
Explanation II.-Any law passed or made by a Legislature or 
other competent authority in the territory of India which 
immediately before the commencement of this Constitution had 
extra-territorial effect as well as effect in the territory of India 
shall, subject to any such adaptations and modifications as 
aforesaid, continue to have such extra-territorial effect. 
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Explanation III.- Nothing in this article shall be construed as 
continuing any temporary law in force beyond the date fixed for 
its expiration or the date on which it would have expired if this 
constitution had not come into force. 
Explanation IV.- An Ordinace promulgated by the Governor of a 
Province under s. 88 of the Government of India Act 1935, and in 
force iimnediately before the commencement of this Constitution 
shall, unless withdrawn by the Governor of the corresponding 
State earlier, cease to operate at the expiration of six weeks from 
the first meeting after such commencement of the Legislative 
Assembly of that State functioning under clause (1) of Article 
382, and nothing in this article shall be construed as continuing 
any such Ordinance in force beyound the said period. 
LIST III 
(Concurrent List) 
5. Marriage and divorce; infants and minors; adoption; wills, 
intestacy and succession; joint family and partition; all 
respect of which parties in judicial proceedings were 
immediately before the commencement of this Constitution 
subject to their personal law. 
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Appendix - V 
Mussalman Wakf Validating Act, 1913 
[7th March, 1913] 
An Act to declare the right of Mussalmans to make 
settlements of property by way of wakf in favour of their families, 
children and descendants. 
Whereas doubts have arisen regarding the validity of wakf 
created by persons professing the Mussalman faith in favour of 
themselves, their famiHes, children and descendants and ultimately 
for the benefit of the poor or for other religious, pious or 
charitable purposes; 
and whereas is expedient to remove such doubts : 
It is hereby enacted as follows : 
1. Short title land extent : 
(1) This Act may be called the Mussalman Wakf Validating 
Act, 1913. 
(2) In extends to the whole of India except the state of 
Janunu and Kashmir. 
2. Definitions. In this Act unless there is anything repugnant in 
the subject or context : 
(1) "'Wakf" means the permanent dedication by a person 
professing the Mussalman faith of any property for any 
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purpose recognized by the Mussalman law as religious, 
pious or charitable. 
(2) "Hanafi Mussalman" means a follower of the 
Mussalman faith who conforms to the tenets and 
doctrines of the Hanafi school of Mussalman law. 
3. Power of Mussalmans to create certain Wakfs. 
It shall be lawful for any person professing the Mussalman 
faith to create a Wakfw\\\QX\ in all other respects is in accordance 
with the provision of Mussalman law, for the following, among 
other, purposes : 
(a) for the maintenance and support wholly or partially of 
his family, childdren or descendants, and 
(b) Where the person creating a wakf is Hanafi Mussalman, 
also for his own maintenance and support during his life-time 
or for the payment of his debts out of the rents and profits 
of the property dedicated : 
Provided that the ultimate benefit in such cases expressly or 
impliedly reserved for the poor or for any other purpose 
recognised by the Mussalman law as a religious, pious or 
charitable purpose of permanent character. 
4. Wakfs not to be invalid by reason of remoteness of 
benefit to poor, etc. 
No such wakf shall be deemed to be invalid merely because 
the benefit reserved therein for the poor or other religious, pious 
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ru# fk;dulwdeoh# sxusrvh# ri# d# shupdqhqw# qdwxuh# lv# srvwsrqhg# xqwlo 
diwhu# wkh# h{ wlqfwlrq# ri# wkh# idplo | /# fkloguhq# ru# glivfhqgdqwv# ri# wkh 
shuvrq#fuhdwlqj#wkh#vva^/! 
5. Saving of local and sectarian custom : 
Nothing in this Act shall affect any custom or usage whether 
local or prevalent among the Mussalmans of any particular class 
or sect. 
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Appendix - VI 
Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937 
(Act XXVI of 1937) 
[7th October, 1937] 
An Act to make provisions for the applications of the 
Muslim Personal Law {Shariat) to Muslims. 
WHEREAS it is expedient to make provisions for the 
application of the Muslim Personal Law {Shariat) to Muslims; it 
is hereby enacted as follows : 
1. Short title and extent : 
(1) This Act may be called the Muslim Personal Law 
{Shariat) (Application) Act, 1937. 
(2) It extends to the whole of India except the State of 
Jammu and Kashmir. 
2. Application of Personal Law to Muslims : 
Notwithstanding any customs or usage to the contrary, in all 
questions (save questions relating to agricultural land) regarding 
intestate succession special property of females, including 
personal property inherited or obtained under contract or gift or 
any other provision of Personal Law, marriage, dissolution of 
marriage including talak ila, Zihar, Han, khula and mubaraat, 
maintenance, dower, guardianship, gifts, trusts and trust 
properties and wakfs (other than charities and charitable 
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institutions and charitable and religious endowments) the rule of 
decision in case where the parties are Muslims shall be the Muslim 
Personal Law (Shariat). 
3. Power to make a declaration : 
(1) Any person who satisfies the prescribed authority -
(a) that he is a Muslim, and 
(b) that he is comeptent to contract within the meaning of 
section 11 of the Indian Contract Act 1872, and 
(c) that he is resident of the territories to which this act 
extends may, by declaration in the prescribed from and 
filed before the prescribed authority, declare that be 
desires to obtain the benefit of the provisions of this 
section, and thereafter the provisions of the section 2 
shall apply to the declarant and all his minor children and 
wills and legacies were also specified. 
(2) Where the prescriebd authority refuse to accept a declaration 
under sub-section (1), the person desiring to make the same 
may appeal to such officer as the State Government may, by 
general or special order, appoint in this behalf, and such 
officer may, if he is satisfied that the appellant is entitled to 
make the declaration, order the prescribed authority to 
accept the same. 
4. Rule making power : 
(1) The State Government may make rules to carry into effect 
the purposes of this Act. 
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(2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the 
foregoing powers such rules may provide for all or any of 
the following matters, namely :-
(a) for prescribing the authority before whom and the form 
in which declarations under this Act shall be made; 
(b) for prescribing the fees to be paid for the filing of 
declarations and for the attendance at private residences 
of any persons in the discharge of his duties under this 
Act; and for prescribing the times at which such fees 
shall be payable and the manner in which they shall be 
levied. 
(3) Rules made under the provisions of this section shall be 
published in the Official Gazette and shall thereupon have 
effects as if enacted in this Act. 
5. Dissolution of marriage by Court in certain 
circumstances : 
• (Repealed by the Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act 1939 
(VIII of 1939) s. 6 (17-3-1939). 
6. Repeals : 
The undermentioned provisions of the Acts and regulation 
mentioned below shall be repealed in so far as they are 
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, namely :-
(1) Section 26 of the Bombay Regulation IV of 1827; 
(2) Section 16 of the Madras Civil Courts Act, 1873; 
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(3) Repealed; 
(4) Section 3 of the Oudh Laws Act, 1876; 
(5) Section 5 of the Punjab Laws Act, 1872; 
(6) Section 5 of the Central Provinces Laws Act, 1875; 
(7) Section 4 of the Ajmer Laws Regulation, 1877. 
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Appendix - VII 
The Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939* 
(Act VIII of 1939) 
3 (Passed by the Indian ge islation) 
Received the assent of the Governor-General 
on the 17th March, 1939 
An Act to consolidate and clarify the provisions of Muslim 
law relating to suit for dissolution of marriage by women married 
under Muslim Law and to remove doubts as to the effect of the 
renunciation of Islam by a married Muslim woman on her marriage tie. 
Whereas it is expedient to consolidate and clarify the 
provisions of Muslim law relating to suits for dissolution of 
marriage by women married under Muslim law and to remove 
doubts as to the effect of the renunciation of Islam by a married 
Muslim woman on her marriage tie; it is hereby enacted as 
folio ws:-
1., Short title and extent : 
(1) This Act may be called The Dissolution of Muslim Marriage 
Act, 1939. 
(2) It extends to the whole of India except the State of Jammu 
and Kashmir. 
2. Grounds for decree for dissolution of marria e : 
A woman married under Muslim law shall be entitle to obtain 
a decree for the dissolution of her marriage on any one or more 
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of the following grounds, namely :-
(i) that the whereabouts of the husband have not been known for 
a period of four years; 
(ii) that the husband has neglected or has failed to provide for 
her maintenance for a period of two years; 
(iii) that the husband has been sentenced to imprisomnent for a 
period of seven years or upwards; 
(iv) that the husband has failed to perform, without reasonable 
cause his marital obligations for a period of three years; 
(v) that the husband was impotent at the time of the marriage and 
continues to be so; 
(vi) that the husband has been insane for a period of two years or 
is suffering from leprosy or virulent venereal disease; 
(vii) that she, having been given in marriage by her father or other 
guardian before she attained the age of fifteen years, 
repudiated the marriage before attaining the age of eighteen 
• years; 
Provided that the marriage has not been consummated; 
(viii)that the husband treats her with cruelty, that is to say :-
(a) habitually assaults her or makes her life miserable by 
cruelty of conduct even if such conduct does not 
amount to physical treatment, or 
(b) associated with woman of evil repute or leads an 
infamous life, or 
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(c) attempts to force her to lead an immoral life, or 
(d) disposes of her property or prevents her exercising her 
legal rights over it, or 
(e) obstructs her in the observance of her religious 
profession or practice, or 
(f) if he has more wives than one, does not treat her 
equitably in accordance with the injunctions of the 
Koran; 
(ix) on any other ground which is recognised as a vahd for the 
dissolution of marriages under Muslim law; 
Provided that -
(a) no decree shall be passed on ground (iii) until the 
sentence has become final; 
(b) a decree passed on ground (i) shall not take effect for a 
period of six months from the date of such decree, and 
the husband appears either in person or through and 
authorised agent within that period and satisfies the 
Court that he is prepared to perform his conjugal 
duties, the Court shall set aside the said decree; and 
(c) before passing a decree on ground (v) the Court shall, 
on application by the husband, make an order requiring 
the husband to satisfy the Court within a period of one 
year from the date of such order that he has ceased to 
be impotent, and if the husband so satisfies the Court 
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within such period, no decree shall be passed on the 
said ground. 
3. Notice to be served on heirs of the husband when the 
husband's whereabouts are not known : 
In a suit to which clause (i) of section 2 applies -
(a) the names and addresses of the persons who would have 
been the heirs of the husband under Muslim law if he had 
died on the date of filing of the plaint shall be stated in the 
plaint. 
(b) notice of the suit shall be served on such persons, and 
(c) such persons shall have the right to be heard in the suit; 
Provided that paternal uncle, and brother of the husband, if 
any, shall be cited as part even if he or they are not heirs. 
Effect of conversion to other faith : 
The renunciation of Islam by a married Muslim woman or her 
conversion to a faith other than Islam shall not by itself operate to 
dissolve her marriage : 
Provided that after such renunciation, or conversion, the 
woman shall be entitled to otbain a decree for the dissolution of 
her marriage on any of the grounds mentioned in section 2; 
Provided further that the provisions of this section shall not 
apply to a woman converted to Islam from some other faith who 
re-embraces her former faith. 
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4. Rights of dower not to be affected : 
Nothing contained in this Act shall affect any right which a 
married woman may have under Muslim law to her dower or any 
part thereof on the dissolution of her marriage. 
5. Repeal of Section 5 of Act XXVI of 1937 : 
Section 5 of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application 
Act, 1937, is hereby repealed. (Repealed by Act XXV of 1942). 
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Appendix - VIII 
Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on 
Divorce) Act 1986 
(No. 25 of 1986*) 
(First published in the Gazette of India (Extraordinary). Part 
II, Section I dated the 19th May, 1986). 
An act to protect the rights of Muslim Women who have been 
divorced by, or have obtained divorce from, their husbands and 
to provide for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. 
Be it enacted by Parliament in the Thirty-seventh Year of the 
republic of India as follows : 
1.. Short title and extent : 
(1) This Act may be called the Muslim Women (Protection 
of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986. 
(2) It extends to the whole of India except the State of 
Jammu and Kashmir. 
2. DeHnitions : 
In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires : 
(a) "divorced woman" means a Muslim woman who has married 
according to Muslim law, and has been divorced by, or has 
obtained divorce from, her husband in accordance with 
Muslim law : 
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(b) 'Uddat period" means, in the case of a divorce woman :-
. (i) three menstrual courses after the date of divorce, if she 
is subject to menstruation; 
(ii) three hmar montsh after the divorce, if she is not subject 
to menstruation; and 
. (iii) if she is enceinte at the time of her divorce, the period 
between the divorce and the delivery of her child or the 
termination of her pregnancy, whichever is earlier. 
(c) "Magistrate" means a Magistrate of the First Class 
exercising jurisdiction under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 
1973(2) of 1974) in the area where the divorced woman 
resides; 
(d) "prescribed" means prescribed by rules made under this 
. Act. 
3. Mahr or other properties of Muslim women to be given 
to her at the time of divorce : 
Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the 
time being in force, a divorced woman shall be entitled to -
(a) a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance to be 
made and paid to her within the iddat period by her 
fonner husband; 
(b) where she herself maintains the children born to her 
before or after her divorce a reasonable and fair 
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provision and maintenance to be made and paid by her 
former husband for a period of two years from the 
respective date of birth of such children; 
(c) an amount equal to the sum of mahr or dower agreed to 
be paid to her at the time of her marriage or at any time 
thereafter according to Muslim law; and 
(d) all the properties given to her before or at the time of 
marriage or after her marriage by her relatives of the 
husband or his friends. 
(2) Where a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance or the 
amount of mahr or dower has not been made or paid or the 
• properties referred to in clause (d) of sub-section (1) have 
not been delivered to a divorced woman on her divorce, she 
or any one duly authorised by her may, on her behalf, make 
an application to a Magistrate for an order for payment of 
such provision and maintenance, mahr or dower or the 
dehvery of properties, as the case may be. 
(3) Where an application has been made under sub-section (2) 
by a divorced woman, the Magistrate may, if he is satisfied 
that -
(a) her husband having sufficient means, has failed or 
neglected to make or pay her within the iddat period a 
reasonable and fair provision and maintenance for her 
and the children, or 
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(b) the amount equal tot he sum of mahr or dower has not 
been paid or that the properties referred to in clause (d) 
of sub-section (1) have not been delivered to her. 
make an order, within one month of the date of filing of the 
application, directing her former husband to pay such 
reasonable and fair provision and maintenance to the 
divorced woman as he may determine as fit and proper 
having regard to the needs of divorced woman, the standard 
of life enjoyed by her during her marriage and the means of 
her former husband or, as the case may be, for the payment 
of such mahr or dower or of the delivery of such properties 
referred to in clause (d) of sub-section (1) to the divorced 
woman : 
Provided that if the Magistrate finds it impracticable to 
dispose of the application within the said period, he may, for 
reasons to be recorded by him, dispose of the application 
after the said period. 
(4) If any person against whom an order has been made under 
sub-section (3) faisl without sufficient cause to comply with 
the order, the Magistrate may issue a warrant for leaving the 
amount of maitnenance or mahr or dower due in the manner 
provided for levying fines under the Code of Criminal 
Procedure, 1973 (2) of 1974), and may sentence such 
person, for the whole or part of any amount remaining unpaid 
after the execution of the warrant, to imprisonment for a term 
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which may extend to one year or until payment if sooner 
made, subject to such persons being heard in defence and 
the said sentence being imposed according to the provisions 
of the said Code. 
(4) Order for payment Maintenance : 
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the fomm( going 
provisions of this Act or in any other law for the time being 
in force, where a Magistrate is satisfied that a divorced 
woman has not remarried and is notable to maintain herself 
after the iddat period, the may make an order directing such 
of her relatives as would be entitled to inherit her property 
on her death according to Muslim law to pay such reasonable 
and fair maintenance to her as he may determine fit and 
proper, having regard to the needs of the divorced woman, 
the standard of life enjoyed by her during her marriage and 
the means of such relatives and such maintenance shall be 
payable by such relatives in the proportions in which they 
would inherit her property and at such periods as he may 
specify in his order : 
Provided that where divorced woman has children, the 
Magistrate shall order only such children to pay maintenance 
to her, and in the event of any such children being unable to 
pay such maintenance, the Magistrate shall order the parents 
of such divorced woman to pay maintenance to her : 
Provided ftirther that if any of the parents is unable to 
pay his or her share of the maintenance ordered by the 
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Magistrate on the ground of his or her not having the means 
to pay the same, order that the share of such relatives in the 
maintenance ordered by him, be paid by such of the other 
relatives as may appear to the Magistrate to have the means 
of paying the(. same in such proportions as the Magistrate may 
think fit to order. 
(2) Where a divorced woman is unable to maintain herself and 
she has no relatives as mentioned in sub-section (1) or such 
relatives or any one of the them have not enough means to 
pay the maintenance ordered by the Magistrate or the other 
relatives have not the means to pay the shares of those 
relatives whose shares have been ordered by the Magistrate 
to be paid by such other relatives under the second provision 
of sub-section (1), the Magistrate, may, by order, direct the 
State Wakf Board established under Section 9 of the Wakf 
Act, 1954 (29 of 1954), or under any other law for the time 
being in force in a State functioning in the area in which the 
woman resides, to pay such maintenance as determined by 
him under sub-section (1), or as the case may be, to pay the 
share of such of the relatives who are unable to pay, at such 
periods as he may specify in his order. 
5. Option to be governed by the provision of sections 125 
to 128 of Act 2 of 1974 : 
If on the date of the first hearing of the application under 
sub-section (2) of Section 3, a divorced woman and her former 
[463 ] 
Appendices 
husband declare, by affidavit or any other declaration in writing in 
such form as may be prescribed, either jointly or separately, that 
they would prefer to be governed by the provisions of Section 
125 or the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 (2 of 1974), and file 
such affidavit or declaration in the court hearing the application, 
the Magistrate shall dispose of such application accordingly. 
Explanation : For purposes of this section, "date of the 
first hearing of the application" means the date fixed in the 
summon for the attendance of the respondent to the appHcation. 
6. Power to make rules : 
(1) The Central Government may by notification in the Official 
Gazette, make rules for carrying out the purposes of this Act. 
(2) In particular and without prejudice to the foregoing power, 
such rules may provide for -
(a) the form of the affidvit or other declaration in writing to 
be filed under Section 5, 
(b) the procedure to be followed by the Magistrate in 
disposing of application under the Act, including the 
serving of notices to the parties to such applications, 
dates of hearing of such applications and other matters, 
(c) any other matter which is required to be or may be 
prescribed. 
3. Every rule made under this Act shall be laid as soon as may 
be after it is made, before each House of Parliament, while it 
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is in session, for a total period of thirty days which may be 
comprised in one session or in two or more successive 
sessions, land if before the expiry of the session immediately 
' following the session or the successive sessions aforesaid, 
both Houses agree in making any modification in the rule or 
both Houses agree that the rule should not be made, the mle 
shall thereafter have effect only in such modified form or be 
• of no effect, as the case may be, so, however, that any such 
modification or annulment shall be without prejudice to the 
validity of anything previously done under that rule. 
7. Transitional provisions : 
Every application by a divorced woman under Section 125 or 
under Section 127 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, -1973(2) of 
1974), pending before a Magistrate on the commencement of this 
Act, shall, notwithstanding anything contained in this Code and 
subject to the provisions of Section 5 this Act, be disposed of by 
such Magistrate in accordance with the provisions of this Act. 
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Appendix - IX 
The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on 
Divorce) Rules, 1986 
Ministry of Law andustice (Legislative Department) 
Notification No. G.S.R. 776(E), dated the I9th May, 1986, 
published in the Gazette of India, Extraordinary, part II, Section 
3(i) dated 19.5.86, pages 3-4). 
In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 6 of the 
Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 (25 
of 1986), the Central Government hereby makes the following 
rules for carrying out the purposes of the Act, namely. 
1. Short title and commencement : 
(1) These rules may be called the MusHm Women (Protection of 
Rights on Divorce) Rules, 1986. 
(2) They shall come into force at once. 
2. Definitions : 
In these rules, unless the context otherwise requires, 
(a) "Act" means the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights 
on Divorce) Act 1986 (25 of 1986). 
• (b) "Code" means the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 (2 
of 1974), and 
(c) "Form" means form annexed to these rules. ' 
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3. Service of summons : 
(1) Every summons issued by a Magistrate on an application 
made under the Act, shall be in writing, i m( n duplicate, signed 
by the Magistrate or by such other officer as he may, from 
time to time, direct, and shall bear the seal of the Court. 
(2) Every such summons shall be accompanied by a true copy 
of the application. 
(3) Every summons issued under sub-rule(l) shall specify the 
date of the first hearing of the application which shall not be 
later than seven days from the date on which the summons is 
issued. 
(4) Every summons shall, be served by a police officer or by an 
officer of the Court issuing it. 
(5) The summons shall, if practicable, be served personally on 
the respondent, by delivering or tendering to him one of the 
duplicates of the summons. 
(6) Every respondent on whom the summons is so served shall, 
if so required by the serving officer, sign a receipt on the 
back of other duplicate. 
(7) Where the respondent cannot, by the exercise of due 
deligence, be found, the summons may be served by leaving 
one of the duplicates for him with some adult male member 
of his family residing with him, and the person with whom 
the summosn is so left shall; if so required by serving officer, 
sign a receipt therefor on the back of the other duplicate. 
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(8) If the service cannot, by the exercise of due dehgence, be 
effected as provided in sub-rule(6), or sub-rule (7), the 
serving officer shall affix one of the duplicates of the 
summons to some conspicuous part of the house or 
homestead in which the respondent ordinarily resides, and 
thereupon the Court, after making such inquiries as it thinks 
fit, may either declare that the summons has been duly served 
or order fresh summons in such a manner as it considers 
proper. 
(9) When a Court desires that a summons issued by it shall be 
served at any place outside its local jurisdiction, it shall 
ordinarily send such summons in duplicate to a magistrate 
within whose local jurisdiction, the respondent resides, or is, 
to be there served. 
(10) When a summons issued by a Court is served outside its 
local jurisdiction and in any case when an officer who served 
the summons is not present at the hearing of the case, the 
affidavit purporting to be made before a Magistrate that such 
summons has been served and a duplicate of summons 
purporting to be endorsed in the manner provided by sub-
rule (6) or sub-rule (7) by the person to whom it was 
delivered or with whom it was left shall be admissible in 
evidence and the statements made therein shall be deemed to 
be correct unless and until contrary is proved. 
(11) The affidavit mentioned in sub-rule (10), may be attached to 
the duphcates of the summons and returned to the Court. 
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10. Evidence. All evidences in the proceedings under the Act 
shall be taken in the presence of the respondent against whom an 
order for the payment of provision and maintenance, Mahr or 
dower or the delivery of property is proposed to be made or, 
when his personal attendance is dispensed with, in the presence 
of his pleader, and shall be recorded in the manner specified for 
summary trials under the Code. 
Provided that if the Magistrate is satisfied that the respondent 
is wilfully avoiding service or wilfully neglecting to attend the 
Court, the Magistrate may proceed to hear and detennine the case 
ex-parte and any order so made may be set aside for good cause 
shown on application made within seven days from the date 
thereof subject to such terms so as to payment of cost to the 
opposite party as the Magistrate may think just and proper. 
5. Power to postpone or adjourn proceedings. In every 
application under the Act, the proceedings shall be held as 
expeditiously as possible and in particular, when the 
examination of witnesses has once begun, the same shall be 
continued from day to day until the witnesses in attendance 
have been examined unless the Court finds adjournment of 
the same beyond the following day to be necessary for 
reasons to be recorded. 
6. Costs : 
The Court in dealing with the application under the Act shall 
have power to make such order as to cost as may be just. 
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7. Affidavit under Section 5. An affidavit filed under Section 5 
of the Act shall be in Form ' A . 
filed 8. Declaration under Section 5. A declaration in 
under Section 5 shall be in Form 'B ' . 
Form 'A' 
Form of Affidavit 
(See Rule 7) 
I/We son/wife of 
aged years, resident of 
and son/wife 
of aged years, 
resident of hereby state on oath 
as follows : 
1. That I/We have informed myself/ourselves of the 
provisions of Section 5 of the Muslim Women (Protection of 
Rights on Divorce), Act 1986 and of the provisions of Section 
125 to 128 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 
2. That I/We desire to be 
governed by the provisions of Section 125 to 128 of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure, 1973 in preference to the provisions of the 
IVfuslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act 1986. 
3. That the contents are true. 
Deponent/Deponents 
Signed and verified at this the day 
of 19 
Deponent/Deponents 
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Form 'B' 
Form of Affidavit 
(See Rule 8) 
I/We son/wife of 
aged years, resident of 
and son/wife 
of, aged years, 
resident of hereby declare as 
follows : 
1. That I/We have informed myself/ourselves of the 
provisions of Section 5 of Muslim Women Protection of Rights 
on Divorce), Act 1986 and of the provisions of Section 125 to 
128 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 
2. That I/We desire to be 
governed by the provisions of Section 125 to 128 of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure, 1973 in preference to the provisions of the 
Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act 1986. 
3. That the contents of the above declaration are true. 
Deponent/Deponents 
Signed and verified at this the day 
of 19 
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Appendix - X 
Caste Disabilities Removal Act 1850 
(Act XXI of 1850) 
An Act for extending the principle of s. 9, Regulation VII, 
1832, of the Bengal Code throughout India. 
PREAMBLE 
Whereas it is enacted by s. 9, Regulation VII, 1832 of the 
Bengal code, that "whenever in any civil suit the parties to such 
suit may be of different persuations, when one party shall be of 
the Hindu and the other of the Muhammadan persuation, or where 
one or more of the parties to the suit shall not be either of the 
Muhammadan or Hindu persuations the laws of those religions 
shall not be permitted to operate to deprive such party or parties 
of any property to which, but for the operation of such laws, they 
would have been entitled"; and whereas it will be beneficial to 
extend the principle of that enactment throughout India; It is 
enacted as follows :-
1. Law or usage which inflicts forfeiture of, or affects, 
rights on change of religion or loss of caste to cease to 
be enforced -
So such of any law or usage now in force within India as 
inflicts on any person forfeiture of rights or property, or may be 
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held in any way to impair or affect any right of inheritance, by 
reason of his or her renouncing, or having been excluded from the 
communion of, any religion, or being deprived of caste, shall 
cease to be enforced as law in any Court. 
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Appendix - XI 
ChiJd Marriage Restraint Act, 1929 
(as amended in 1978) 
(Act No. XIX of 1929) 
(October 1, 1929) 
An Act to Restrain the Solemnization of Child Marriages; it 
is hereby enacted as follows :-
1. Short title, extent and commencement : 
(1) This Act may be called the Child Marriage Restraint Act, 
1929. 
(2) It extends to the whole of India except thfe State of 
Jammu and Kashmir and it applies to all citizens of India 
without and beyond India. 
(3) It shall come into force on the 1st day of April, 1930. 
2. Definitions. In this Act unless there is anything repugnant in 
the object or context. 
(a) "child means a person who, if a male, has not completed 
twenty-one years of age, and if a female, has not 
completed eighteen years of age; 
(b) "child" marriage means a marriage to whcih either of 
the contracting parties is a child; 
(c) "contracting party" to a marriage means either of the 
parties whose marriage is or is about to be theieby 
solemnized; and 
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(d) "minor" means a person of either sex who is under 
eighteen years of age. 
3., Punishment for male adult below twenty-one years of age 
marrying a child i 
Whoever being a male above eighteen years of age -and below 
twenty-one, contracts a child marriage shall be punishable with 
simple impTisonment which may extend to fifteen days or with fine 
which may extend to one thousand rupees or with both. 
4. Punishment for male adult above twenty-one years of age 
marrying a child : 
, Whoever, being a male above twenty-one years of age, 
contracts a child marriage shall be punishable with simple 
imprisonment which may extend to three months, and shall also 
be Hable to fine. 
5. Punishment for solemnizing a child marriage : 
Whoever performs, conducts or directs any child marriage 
shall be punishable with simple imprisonment which may extend 
to three months, and shall also be liable to fine, unless he proves 
that he had reason to believe that the marriage was not a child 
marriage. 
6. Punishment for parent or guardian concerned in child 
marriage : 
(1) Where a minor contracts a child marriage, any person having 
charge of the minor, whether as parent or guardian or in any 
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Other capacity, lawful or unlawful, who does any act to 
promote the marriage or permits it to be solemnized, or 
negligently fails to prevent it from being solemnized, shall be 
punishable with simple imprisonment which may extend to 
three months, and shall also be liable to fine : 
Provided that no woman shall be punishable with 
imprisonment. 
(2) For the purposes of this section, it shall be presumed, unless 
and until contrary is proved, that where a minor has 
contracted a child marriage, the person having charge of such 
minor has negligently failed to prevent the marriage fom 
being solemnized. 
7. Offence to be cognizable for certain purpose : 
The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, shall apply to 
offences under this Act as if they were cognizable offences 
(a) for the purpose of investigation of such offences; and 
(b) for the purpose of matters other than (i) matters referred 
to in section 42 of that Code, and (ii) the arrest of 
person without an order of Magistrate. 
8. Jurisdiction under this Act : 
Notwithstanding anything contained in section 190 of the 
Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, no Court other than of 
Metropolitan Magistrate or Judicial Magistrate of the'first class 
shall take cognizance of, or try, any offence under this Act. 
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9. Mode of taking cognizance offences : 
No Court shall take cognizance of any offence under this Act 
after expirty of one year from the date on which the offence is 
alleged to have been committed. 
10. Preliminary inquiries into offences : 
Any Court, on receipt of complaint of an offence of which it 
is authorised to take cognizance, shall, unless it dismisses the 
complaint under section 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 
1973, either itself make an enquiry under section 202 of that or 
direct a Magistrate subordinate to it to make such enquiry. 
11. (Omitted by Act XLI) of 1949). 
12. Power to issue injunction prohibiting marriage in 
contravention of this Act : 
(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this 
Act, the court may, if satisfied from information laid before it 
through a complaint or otherwise that a child marriage in 
contravention of this Act has been arranged or is about to be 
solemnized, issue an injunction against any of the persons 
• mentioned in sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of this Act prohibiting 
such marriage. 
(2) No injunction under sub-section (1) shall be issued agaisnt 
any person unless the court has previously given notice to 
such person, and has afforded him an opportunity to show 
cause against the issue of the injunction. 
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(3) The court may either on its own motion or on the application 
of any person aggrieved, rescind or alter any order made 
under sub-section (1). 
(4) Where such an application is received, the court shall afford 
the applicant an early opportunity of appearing before it either 
in person or by pleader, and if the court rejects the 
application wholly or in part, it shall record in writing its 
reasons so for doing. 
5. Whoever knowing that an injunction has been issued against 
him under sub-section (1) of this section, disobeys such 
injunction shall be punished with imprisonment of either 
description for a term which may extend to three months, or 
with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees or both : 
Provided that no woman shall be punishable with 
imprisonment. 
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